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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the concept and  practice of philosophy within the 
Spanish academia during the first half of the XX century, in relation to 
d ifferent political and  institutional regimes. In particular, the research 
focuses on the academic career of the most prominent  intellectual of 
that time, José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), who dominated  the Spanish 
philosophical scene for almost fifty years. Through the analysis and  
study of his intellectual biography and  of his theory of education, this 
research sheds light on the instrumental political and  social function 
that the academic teaching of humanities d id  play in the case of the 
Spanish contemporary history. The thesis investigates the mutual 
relations between the philosophy of Ortega and  the one purported  by 
the Spanish academia, thought as a social and  political institution, 
considering the period  comprised  since his first appointment as a 
professor at the University of Madrid , in 1910, until his death in 1955. 
In particu lar, contrary to the majority of the stud ies on the author, the 
thesis pays particu lar attention to the second  part of his life marked , 
since 1936, by a long exile, a brief return in Spain after the end  of World  
War II, and  the creation, in 1948, of the Institu te of Humanities, an 
experimental educative project he developed  during Franco’s regime.  
 
The kernel of this investigation is constituted  by an often d ismissed  
feature of Ortega’s philosophy: i.e. the centrality of the theory and  
practice of education during the whole course of his life. Significantly, 
he always developed  his theorisations within a particular context: the 
Spanish academia and , in particular, the University of Madrid . This 
institution constantly underwent relevant changes during the first half 
of the XX century due to parad igmatic mutations in the political 
regimes lead ing the country. In particular, the period  analysed  in this 
thesis includes the study of four d ifferent historical parad igms: the 
period  which followed  the end  of the Restoration, the one ru led  by the 
II Republic, the beginning of Franco’s regime and , finally, its changes in 
relation to the post-war international context. This variability affected  
the way in which Ortega conceived  the function of philosophers an d  
intellectuals in society. His philosophy, which can be defined  as a 
constant intellectual protrepsis, changed  in relation to the political and  
academic circumstances under which he lived . In fact, he conceived  the 
 
XXII 
role of the intellectual as strictly intertwined  with a social and  political 
mission, that went beyond  the limited  boarders of the academia, even if 
it always arose from this institution.  
 
Based  on a study of Ortega’s teachings in  their historical context, 
conducted  through a careful reconstruction of the academic debates 
that characterised  the Spanish University – rendered  possible by the 
analysis of a wide range of primary sources, both from personal and  
public archives, as well as of newspapers, cultural reviews, books and  
school texts – this research contributes to shed  light on the functioning 
of the academic debate and  its role within society, in particu lar in 
relation to the creation and  d iffusion of humanistic d isciplines. The 
research offers an analysis of a very compelling case study that permits 
to comprehend  how academic debates evolve under d ifferent political 
regimes, and  the extent to which philosophy is always forged  and , at 
the same time, contribute to modify the institu tion within which it  
develops. In conclusion, the work offers an innovative read ing of the 
philosophy and  intellectual activity of Ortega y Gasset, contributing to 
clarify one of the most controversial period s of his life which, until 
now, had  not been analysed  in-depth. 
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IN TRODUCTION  
 
1. Topic and research questions 
José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) is considered  as one of the most 
prominent intellectuals in the Spanish speaking context. For almost a 
century he oriented  the Spanish academic debate determining its 
scientific and  political agenda, its philosophical and  literary tastes , both 
during and  after his life. In sp ite of being unanimously shared  this 
affirmation has not been translated  so far in a comprehensive stu dy of 
his works that – starting from an analysis of his philosophy and  in 
particu lar of h is theory of education – would  define the form that his 
academic teaching acquired  in relation both to his theoretical insights 
and  to the political and  social circumstances under which he lived . Put 
it d ifferently, despite the increasing number of works that during the 
last two decades have demonstrated  the pivotal role played  by his 
theory of education in relation to his overall philosophical account, the 
question of the mutual relationships between his theorisations and  the 
surrounding university context has been naïvely stud ied  so far.  
Indeed , on every single aspect of human knowledge – Ortega wrote 
– so much has been written that the entire life of a man would  not be 
sufficient to read  all about it, let alone the possibility of acquiring a 
decent grasp and  forming an autonomous idea on it. Ironically enough, 
this is not the case as far as his pedagogical thought, and  above all his 
concrete professorship, are concerned . There are in particu lar two 
reasons that contribute to render this topic an intriguing case study 
which has to be scrupu lously analysed  not only since it is insufficiently 
considered  by Ortega’s scholars, but also insofar as it can produce a 
better knowledge of the processes of cultural production on a general 
point of view. Both of them reveal, through Ortega’s case, the existence 
of a fascinating dynamics that affects all intellectual experiences but 
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whose importance, at least within the branch of philosophical stud ies, 
is usually underestimated .  
The first is related  to the mutual influence between the philosophy 
purported  by an author and  the factual circumstances, the social and  
political milieu within which he develops his theoretical activity. This 
first consideration not only means that philosophical ideas cannot be 
thought as abstract entities which spring up as staggering intu itions 
independently from the concrete circumstances under which they 
develop. Indeed , it also implies a further consequence, i.e. the 
impossibility of conceiving the academic activity as a neutral and  
objective practice which is carried  out in a sort of “Hyperuranion”, 
with neither an interest in influencing the concrete policies and  politics 
of a society nor a tendency to be oriented  by a more or less exp licit 
hegemonic culture which often imposed  itself on the very academic 
d iscourse. At the same time, this implies that the philosophical activity 
can never be conceived  as an activity carried  on by a single ind ividual, 
but rather always by a group which can be identified  and  stud ied  
through the analysis of its lingu istic utterances: i.e. through the creation 
and  establishment over time of d ifferent communities of d iscourse. 
The second  aspect that Ortega’s case contribute to elucidate d irectly 
springs from this consideration, and  can be encapsu lated  in a short 
sentence: all academics possess a social status and  exercise a political 
power. It is not a matter of being a lead ing or a third -rate intellectual, 
this is indeed  a cond ition which can belong both to p rofessional as well 
as to amateur thinkers. The question is subtler and  is related  to the fact 
that the academic practice always has a twofold  nature: on the one 
hand  it is a vocational and  open-minded  activity, on the other it 
consists in a social obligation and  in the consequent transmission of an 
imposed  set of knowledge from a generation to another.  
In the case of the teaching of humanities, which d irectly deals with 
social and  political problems, this is blatantly evident. The history of 
Spanish Academia during the XX century represents a fascinating 
instance of this tendency of politicising education and , in particular, the 
University. For this reason, and  given the fact that José Ortega y Gasset  
is a philosopher whose life underwent rad ical changes both in relation 
to the social status he possessed  and  the political power he exercised ,  
his case constitu tes a perfect archetype for studying this complex 
dynamics. 
 
3 
With the term “politicisation” this thesis  does not refer merely to 
the everyday political struggle concerning single and  limited  decisions , 
inside and  ou tside the acad emia. On the contrary, the term  refers to the 
political and  ideological debates that constitute the background  
orienting and  guid ing the concrete policies that take place inside and  
outside the University. In the Spanish case the University represented  
the pillar of a society that remained  substantially conditioned  by a 
vertical mode of knowled ge construction and  transmission. Thus, by 
understating the role p layed  by University within this production of 
hegemonic power it w ill be possible to comprehend  a large and  
important part of the Spanish cu ltural and  political history which so far 
still remains largely unexplored . 
The basic conviction enlivening this thesis is that only by 
considering Ortega’s professorship as both a vocation and  a deliberate 
choice it would  be possible to comprehend  to what extent his 
intellectual activity represented  a constitutive trait both of his personal 
existence and  of that of his nation. He had  been a teacher and  a lead ing 
intellectual for more than forty years, since he established  himself as a 
professor of Metaphysics at the Universidad Central of Madrid  in 1910 
until his death in 1955. During this very long period  his philosophy 
changed  in relation to the constitutive d iscontinuity characterising the 
Spanish political circumstances and  – both as a consequence and  as an 
effect – the university scenario. In other word s, during this period  the 
shifting sands of culture d etermined  very rad ical changes both at the 
institutional, political and  social level. All these mutations influenced  
and  were concurrently influenced  by Ortega, determining slight and  
big shifts both in the matter and  form of his teaching and  intellectual 
practices. The very term “intellectual” acquired  d ifferent meaning s 
over time. In this changing context, explaining the persistence of 
Ortega’s legacy in the Spanish academia evidently constitu tes an 
intriguing research question, an open problem which has not been 
sufficiently considered  by his scholars.  
 
2. Scope and aims  
The thesis offers an innovative contribution to the study of the 
works and  teachings of Ortega y Gasset in respect to two basic aspects: 
a chronological and  a methodological one. In relation to the first, in 
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contrast to the majority of the stud ies conducted  on the author, the 
thesis does focus in particu lar on the last years of Ortega’s life: from the  
the beginning of the civil war – followed  by his return to Spain after the 
exile in Europe and  South America – until his death. The common 
dismissal of this period  of Ortega’s life is due both to the immed iate 
rejection of his political neutrality by his d iscip les and  by  some 
opposed  biased  trends within the Spanish historiography concerning 
the period  of Franco’s regime. At the same time, it will be impossible to 
comprehend  the evolu tion of his thought w ithout taking into 
consideration its origins. For this reason, the thesis d oes also 
substantially deal with the initial period  of his intellectual activity.  
This innovative chronological perspective aims to attract the 
attention of a far more general public than the one represented  by the 
scholars of Ortega for at least two important reasons. Firstly, because 
the stud y of the ways in which  Ortega’s educative theory and  practice 
was elaborated  and  developed  during Franco’s regime can contribute 
to enrich the overall comprehension of the troublesome relations 
among political institutions and  intellectuals during a very 
controversial period  for the history of Spain. A period  responsible for  
the evolution – or rather the regression – of the philosophical practice 
in the country for a very long period  of time. Secondly, because 
Ortega’s pedagogical concerns and  the ways in which they were 
developed , specifically d uring the d ictatorship, gave birth to a 
comprehensive theory of education which interestingly overlapped , 
and  at the same time countered , most of the concurrent debates about 
the role played  by Humanities in enhancing the effective involvement 
of citizens in social democratic practices.  
Thus, the research aims at analyzing and  studying in its historical 
context the ped agogical and  political projects developed  by the Spanish 
philosopher in Madrid  d uring the whole course of his life and , in 
particu lar, during the most troublesome period  of his intellectual 
experience. To this second  aspect they will be devoted  three of the four 
main sections which compose the entire thesis, spanning from the 
beginning of his exile until the realisation of the project he developed  in 
Madrid  between 1948 and  1950, i.e. the Institute of Humanities. By 
considering the theories and  practices of education pu t forward  by the  
philosopher during this period  the research intends to comprehend  if 
and  to what extent his theorizations have contributed  to bu ild  and  
orientate the concrete Spanish political debate for almost fifty years. 
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Therefore, by taking into account both the cultural projects realized  by 
Ortega and  the several books he published  on the role of intellectuals in 
society, it cou ld  be possible to question  the way in which political 
theories and  intellectual experiences develop and  change in relation to 
social and  political transformations. 
These general scope and  aim s of the present research are also 
complemented  by a more specific outlook in relation, in particular, to 
the second  period  of Ortega’s life. In fact, thanks to a study in context 
of Ortega’s teaching activity and  via an analysis of his political 
theorisations during this epoch, the research intends to shed  light on 
four significant aspects usually d ismissed  by his scholars. The first is a 
clarification of the extent to which Ortega’s last ed ucational projects 
could  or cou ld  not be considered  as in constant confrontation with the 
academic and  therefore political questions which marked  the first 
phase of Franco’s d ictatorship , from 1939 to 1951 (about, for instance, 
legitimacy, sociability, European integration, etc.).  
Connected  to this first aspect is the second  innovative aim of the 
research in relation to the last period  of Ortega’s activity. In fact, 
through the analysis of the books he published  during these years and  
in which he reflected  on the role of education and  the function of 
intellectual in politics, it will be possible to put into question the 
historical myth accord ing to which the period  among 1936 and  1948 
would  have constituted  a period  of silence and  political isolation for the 
Spanish philosopher. In fact, after having reached  a relevant influent 
position within the Spanish political scenario during the Second  
Republic (1931-1936), not only as a philosopher but also as a deputy in 
the parliament, Ortega y Gasset aband oned  his country ,. The first years 
of Franco’s d ictatorship were marked  in particular by a vivid  interest 
within the new political and  intellectual elites for replacing the old  
liberal culture with new values and  ideologies. This process called  for a 
d irect involvement in political issues of all the higher educational 
institutions and , consequently, of the university . In such a context, the 
academia became the key element for constructing a new ideology 
among restricted  intellectual minorities – contributing to shap e the 
political d iscourse of the regime – and  for propagating these emerging 
values among the rest of the population. Due both to the significant 
prestige reached  by Ortega during his long career and  to the systematic 
theory of education and  cultural transmission he had  developed  during 
his intellectual activity, he constituted  a reference point within this new 
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political scenario. The research would  thus contribute to comprehend  
to what extent his influence was ostracized , instrumentally u tilised  or 
authentically appreciated  by the regime and , concurrently, by some 
niche minorities within it by those political groups which are usually 
deemed to have represented  the little shelters where the liberal Spanish 
culture latently survived .  
In relation to this it is possible to identify a third  aspect of 
innovativeness as far as the investigation on the last Ortega is 
concerned . In fact, this research aims at shedding light on the 
intriguing question of the critical presence and  influence of Ortega y 
Gasset during the first years of the Francoist regime via a twofold  
investigation: a) the study of the cultural d iscourse built by minority 
sectors of the Falangist movement which identified  in the philosopher a 
reference point for their purposes and  aims; and  b) the analysis of the 
activities brought about by Ortega in Spain and  abroad  d uring this 
period . On this aspect, a special attention will be devoted  to the very 
scarcely stud ied  case of the Institute of Humanities, a cultural project he 
built up in Madrid  with the help of some of his d isciples between 1948 
and  1950. This investigation will also permit to take into account the 
following ramifications of his ambitious educational project outside the 
Spanish borders. In this way it will be possible to und erstand  if and  to 
what extent the Institute constituted  an attempt of introducing an 
experiment of liberty and  freedom of expression within an 
intellectually closed  and  censorious d ictatorship.  
Lastly, this research does also have a fourth and  more ambitious 
purpose which permits to pose a substantive research question  which 
goes beyond  the limits of the Spanish case. Indeed , through the case of 
the pedagogical commitment of Ortega y Gasset, a philosopher who 
was unceasingly and  actively engaged  in intellectual and  political 
projects throughout substantially d ifferent political regimes, this 
research aims at understand ing and  questioning the role of higher 
education and  cultural institutions in the construction , maintenance or 
critique of political leadership  and  social consensus. In fact, these 
cultural institutions possess a strong ped agogical character and  
substantially contribute to the ed ification of those political theories 
which give form to the political sphere and  shape the general public 
debate. Consequently, this research intend s to pu t into question the 
relations among the development of political theory and  philosophical 
d iscourses with the historical and  political contexts in which and  for 
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which they were conceived  and  propagated . This aspect of the thesis is 
d irectly linked  with the extremely vivid  debate that in the last decade 
has characterised  the Spanish self-perception of the social role of 
historians and  intellectuals. In fact, as the debate between Santos Juliá 
and  Sebaastian Faber has revealed  [Santos Juliá , 2009; Faber, 2007, 2012, 
2014] the responsibility and  irresponsibility of the intellectual in 
relation to the social and  political circumstances under which he lived  
constitutes an unsolved  question in relation to the construction of the 
Spanish historical memory and  in relation to the role we are commonly 
used  to attribute to the intellectuals and  the academicians as active 
players within the political context [Cox, 2015]. 
 
3. Methodology 
This research pertains to the d omain of intellectual history. It 
constitutes a study in context of the intellectual debates which 
developed  among cultural élites in relation to th e thought of Ortega y 
Gasset. Rather than an intellectual biography the research constitutes 
an attempt to develop a meta-analysis of Ortega’s thought and  
pedagogical activity. It aims at doings so by studying a single aspect of 
his vast philosophical theory and  practice that exhibits the most 
evident connection within the political sphere: the socialization and  
politicization of people through education . An aim which culminated  
in the significant case of the Institute of Humanities. 
Therefore, from a method ological point of view, the research joins 
two qualitative method ologies: a) an archival research and  study of 
historical sources, in order to reconstruct the political context 
surrounding this question b) a philosophical critique of Ortega y 
Gasset’s theory of education both in relation to this historical context 
and  concerning its relevance as a general political theory.  
In fact, by analysing the intellectual activity of Ortega y Gasset  not 
only from a theoretical point of view but also from the point of view of 
intellectual history and  sociology of philosophy
1
 it would  be possible to 
                                                          
1
 This term has been coined  by Collins [1998] in his compelling book on the 
sociological evolution of philosophy. In particular, he used  this expression for 
ind icating the construction , within the philosophical practice, of social groups 
struggling for the cultural hegemony. He coined  the term to ind icate the way in 
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comprehend  to what extent his theoretical perspective cannot be 
separated  from the concrete context in w hich it developed .  
Interestingly enough, some of the gu id ing principles of the method  
adopted  in this research are obtained  by following some suggestions 
regard ing the technique of the historic practice provided  by the very 
Ortega and  which have proven to be extremely akin to what has been 
later labelled  with the term “intellectual history”
2
. One of the 
fundamental convictions that informs this d iscipline is that all 
philosophical and  political ideas d o possess a concrete life in relation to 
the social world  in which they developed , an intellectual life in mutual 
relation with the social, intellectual and  political circumstance [Rorty, 
Schneewind , Skinner, 1984]. Put it d ifferent, the intellectual history  
could  be defined  as the historical study of the past thoughts [Skinner 
2001]. This means that to comprehend  the philosophy of a given author 
it has always to be taken into account the context in which he 
developed  it, insofar as all philosophical ideas are the expression of a 
system of thought and  living which informs a given historical epoch. 
Whereas we are accustomed to attribute the ontological status of “a 
d ifferent historical epoch” to very far periods of time  in relation to our 
                                                                                                                               
which the intellectual d iscourse, and  in particular the philosophical one, 
develops accord ing to determined  social patterns. The inescapable 
“situatedness” of all philosophical practices that Collins has contributed  to 
d isclose, and  its relation to the evolution  of philosophy through generational 
processes of transmission , constitute the main problem faced  by this thesis in 
reference to the Spanish acad emia during the XX century . At the same time, 
starting from this general framework, this thesis d issociates from Collins’ book 
insofar as it aims to put the situ atedness of Ortega’s philosophy  in relation to 
the evolution of his thought and  in that of the intellectual context in which it 
was received .  
2
 The field  of intellectual history, which developed at least since 1960s and , 
later, w ith the so-called  linguistic turn, includes a very vast number of scholars 
who have developed  their theories in d ifferent d irections and  in relation to 
d ifferent branch of humanities: in relation to the history of ideas, cultural 
history, history of concept, discourse theory, social history, political theory, 
sociology…. In spite of the great variety of approaches, often antithetical 
among one another, it still seems possible to find  a lowest common 
denominator of all these different theories, in particu lar in the study in their 
peculiar contexts of intellectual theories and  ideas. Ideas w hich are thought as 
fundamental elements contributing to give an explanatory sense the social and 
political practices of a given epoch and  society, being at the same tim e 
influenced  by them [Whatmore, 2015; Collini, 2016]. 
 
9 
present, it is possible to argue that all historical interpretations need  t o 
start by considering the object of their investigations as a constitutive 
alter in relation to the present. This is what this thesis intends to do in 
the case of Ortega y Gasset, studying how his theory of education and  
his theory of the intellectual influence in society d epended  on the 
concrete circumstances in which he lived  and  also on a given historical 
and  social epoch – that is the Spanish and  European society of the first 
half of the XX century – which has to be thought as rad ically d ifferent 
to our own, even if it can be said  to constitu te a part of our own 
historical background .  
The methodological suggestions which can be deduced  from the 
theory of history developed  by Ortega y Gasset precisely relat e to the 
constitutive d ifference which characterises the human life in d ifferent 
epoch. In particular, some interesting insights on how to write history 
can be found  in the Prólogo a Historia de la Filosofía de Émile Bréhier, 
written by Ortega in 1942. In this text he affirms the necessity of always 
considering the ideas purported  by a philosopher together with the 
concrete material situations in which he lived , given the fact that the 
proper meaning of any philosophical idea is intrinsically linked  to the 
moment in which and  for which it has been thought
3
.  
This implies that all philosophical ideas – and  this is evidently the 
case of the educative theory proposed  by Ortega y Gasset – always 
spring up from a concrete situation, a set of material and  historical 
circumstances and , at the same time, play a performative role in that 
very context. Very often the context which constitutes the basis of the 
meditations of a philosopher is only implicitly present in his works, 
being for him an obvious and  therefore imperceptible precondition . For 
this reason, the obligation of the historian is that of bringing it to light 
                                                          
3
 As Ortega put it: «La vida es siempre concreta y lo es la circunstancia. De aquí 
que solo si hemos reconstruido previamente la concreta situación y logramos 
averiguar el papel que en función de ella r epresenta, entenderemos de verdad  
la idea» [OC, VI: 148]. All Ortega’s texts, unless stated  otherwise, will be quoted 
in their original language without provid ing a translation. The reference will 
always be, if not stated  d ifferently, to the last complete ed ition of his works 
(Obras Completas) published  by Taurus and  the Fundación Ortega y Gasset 
between 2004 and  2010. The Roman numerals will ind icate the volume, the 
Arabic ones the number of the pages within that volume. It has to be noted  that 
the first six volumes gather the works that Ortega published  during his life, 
whereas the last four volumes – VII to X – those which have been published 
posthumously.  
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again. To do this in the case of Ortega it is necessary to always take into 
account at the same time his philosophy and  the institutional and  social 
context in which, or in relation to which, he developed  his theories, that 
is to say, the academic world , considered  both at a local and  a global 
level.  
The purpose of this method  is that of reconstructing the unceasing 
d ialogue between the philosophical theory and  practice of Ortega and  
the Spanish society, in d ifferent periods of his life. In fact, the 
philosophical activity, as Ortega put it, cannot be separated  from its 
social and  political d imension , both insofar as it is practiced  within an 
institutional framework and  because all in tellectual activity always 
aims to play a vital role in the build ing of the public opinion
4
. As a 
consequence, in the course of this research a particular emphasis will be 
put on the institutional and  political turnin g points of the Spanish 
society that determined  a d ifferent relation of the philosopher with his 
circumstances. In this way it will be possible to reconstruct the 
“und ulating history of the prestige and  d isrepute of the philosopher” 
[OC, VI: 153] in the parad igmatic case of Ortega y Gasset , which can be 
said  to epitomise the Spanish intellectual life of the XX century and , to 
a certain extent, the one of the European society.  
This methodological approach , which takes into consideration at the 
same time the theoretical contributions of the philosopher, the time in 
which he lived  and  the concrete educative practices he developed  over 
time – defining them as linguistic acts in a broad  sense – appears to be 
extremely useful in particu lar in the case of Ortega y Gasset to counter 
a common tendency within the literature concerning the last period  of 
his life: that is the d ivision between partisans and  detractors of his 
behaviour in relation to the Franco’s regime. A clear instance of this 
opposed  tendency is offered  by the debate among the scholar s of the 
philosopher which followed  the publication of Gregorio Morán’s book 
El maestro en el erial [1998]. In this text the author identified  in the 
period  of Ortega’s exile a lack of intellectual responsibility during the 
civil war and , moreover, in relation to the oppressive Spanish political 
regime with which, Morán implicitly argues, Ortega would  have to a 
certain extent d irectly collaborated . A complete d ifferent interpretation 
on this period  of Ortega’s life was offered  for instance by the book of 
                                                          
4
 «La filosofía es también función de la vida colectiva, es un hecho social, una 
institución. Y tod o esto pertenece también a la realidad  “filosofía”» [OC, VI: 
151]. 
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José Luis Abellán. Ortega y los orígenes de la democracia. In his book 
Abellán affirms that during all his exile and , in particu lar, thanks to his 
decision to return to Mad rid  to contribute to the amelioration of the 
intellectual scenario, Ortega would  have help setting the ground  for the 
future democratic development of Spain, «creyendo que su prestigio 
intelectual puede ayud ar a esa caída del franquismo con su sola 
presencia, aunque esta de momento sea d iscreta» [Abellán, 2000: 147].  
Both of these perspectives commit the same mistake, i.e. they take 
for granted  the fact that in the new political scenario the only possible 
way to exercise an intellectual role would  have been that of being in 
favour or in contrast not of an idea, but rather of a political party. On 
the contrary, by considering the role that Ortega attributed  to the 
philosophical activity as a meta-political med itation, it would  be 
possible to trace a completely d ifferent history of his intellectual 
presence during the last period  of h is life.  
In fact, since its instauration , the Franco’s regime completely 
changed  the way in which the intellectual, the academia and  all the 
cultural world  were conceived . In particular in relation to the role 
assigned  to the humanities in the definition of its ideology. These, in 
fact, were conceived  as having a fundamental legitimating function for 
the purposes of the political regime. The University was conceived  as a 
part of the political sphere. However, this relation  among the control of 
the cu ltural power and  the exercise of the political one cannot be 
limited  exclusively to periods of d ictatorial or oppressive culture. As a 
matter of fact, the academia, as all the other cultural institutions, 
always represents a crucial social factor in determining the creation and  
transmission of a particu lar political view. This, in general terms, could  
be defined  as the hegemonic tendency of cultu ral institu tions in 
relation to d ifferent political contexts. The existence of a constant 
struggle for the conquest of the hegemony appears as a basic structure 
of the academic d iscourse in particular in  all those cases in which 
opposite visions collide in relation to a same relevant question. 
Accord ingly, to comprehend  the relevance of Ortega y Gasset both 
before, during and  after the instauration of Franco’s d ictatorship it 
would  be necessary to focus on the positions he assumed in relation to 
the most debated  questions within the intellectual world  during 
d ifferent periods of his life and , concurrently, to the consequent 
reactions of the academic world  to the contributions of the philosop her. 
By stud ying this pecu liar dynamic which characterises the intellectual 
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production it would  be possible to offer a new and  compelling 
perspective on a still opened  and  debated  question. 
For reaching this goal, and  specifically in relation to its historical 
character, the research is carried  about mainly through the textual 
analysis of primary sources and  archival d ocuments, taking into 
account the d ifferent actors involved  in the academic debates. 
Moreover, concerning the intellectual d iscourses developed  within the 
regime, this historical reconstruction has been conducted  in particular 
through a) the study of the debates both on the formal and  material 
reform of University; b) the analysis of the legislation on University 
and  cultural institutes to which these debates finally gave birth; c) the 
study of primary sources (books and  d iscourses) of very important and  
significant political figures of that period  concerning the role and  scope 
of higher education. Moreover, the research has also compared  the 
theory of education developed  by Ortega with the one concretely 
purported  and  realized  through  the legislative process carried  about by 
the regime – considering it in relation with the ideological debates over 
the role of culture and  university which extensively marked  the 
intellectual and  political debate among élites during the first phase the 
Francoist regime. In add ition, as far as Ortega y Gasset is concerned , 
the aims and  concrete realizations of his theory of ed ucation has been 
analyzed  and  d iscussed  through the help of the archival materials 
gathered  in his personal Archive and  which collect a large number both 
of administrative documents and  of personal letters which significantly 
contribute to identify and  trace the links that rend ered  possible the 
realization of his numerous educational projects during the decade of 
the forties. 
 
4. Sources 
The interrelations among the theorisations of Ortega y Gasset and  
the concrete social circumstances under which he lived  are stud ied  
through d ifferent sources in relation to the d ifferent epochs. One of the 
most important sources which has been employed  for this purpose are 
the books, writings and  conferences that Ortega gave on the theme of 
the social function of the intellectuals and  the role of university and  
education within society – both before Franco’s regime and  during its 
construction and  maintenance. These have been pu t  in relation to some 
of the most representative and  ou tstand ing voices’ of d ifferent groups 
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of interest and  lobbying within d ifferent social and  political regimes 
concerning these same top ics. For d oing this, apart from the historical 
stats and  archival sources, a useful tool for the definition of the 
academic climate in d ifferent historical and  political regimes is offered  
by the d ifferent Spanish scientific reviews published  in the domain of 
humanities. In relation to the first part of Ortega’s presence within the 
Spanish scenario, for instance, the Revista de Educación, Revista de 
Occidente, the Boletím de la ILE and  other reviews have been extensively 
used  for comprehend ing the social context and  the reception of his 
theory. A very useful source for reconstructing the period  of the so-
called  Edad de Plata of the Spanish academia is offered  by the online 
Archivo de la Edad de Plata (www.edaddeplata.org) and  the Archivo de la 
JAE (arhivojae.ed addeplata.org). In add ition, in relation to the 
institutional context, they have also been taken into account the laws 
published  in the BOE, the Diario de Sesiones del Congreso and  the activity 
of the Cortes, to which Ortega participated  for a short period  of time at 
the beginning of the thirties. 
Then, in relation to the second  part of Ortega’s life , a particular 
attention has been devoted  to the structure and  the id eology purported  
by the reformed University during the thirties and  the forties. The 
University, as already pointed  out, cannot be conceived  merely as a 
neutral entity but also as a political and  social institution. In order to do 
so, along with the legislative d ocuments about the reform of the 
University, they have been analyzed  also the courses, the subjects, the 
topics and  the way in which they were d iscussed  in particu lar within 
the Universidad Central de Madrid, the one in which Ortega taught and  in 
which he founded  the so-called  Escuela de Madrid. In add ition, to 
reconstruct the institutional rad ical changes that occurred  within 
society and  the university system, a great importance has been given to 
the inaugural d iscourses of the academic years pronounced  in d ifferent 
universities of the country in  the first decade of the regime, in 
particu lar from 1939 to 1943. Moreover, a significant variety of journals 
belonging to the d ifferent souls of the regime and  d irectly concerned  
with the problem of developing and  spread ing a cultural ideological 
hegemony during the period  1940-1951 have been analyzed  for 
reconstructing the d ifferent social groups which struggled  for the 
cultural hegemony. In particu lar, the reviews considered  are Arbor, 
Revista de Filosofia, Escorial, Insula, Revista Nacional de Educación, Revista 
de Estudios Políticos and  Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos. 
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The main archives consulted  for the purposes of the research are: 
Archivo Fundación José Ortega y Gasset, Madrid ; Archivo General de la 
Administración, Alcalá de Henares; Archivo Histórico de las Cortes, 
Madrid ; Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Complutense, Madrid ; 
Hemeroteca Histórica, Madrid ; Archivo Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Madrid ; and  
the documents collected  at the Fondo Antiguo of the Biblioteca Nacional, 
Madrid , related  to primary sources p ublished  during the period , in 
particu lar for the period  comprised  between 1938 and  1956. 
 
5. Status quaestionis 
The research brings together some very important and  ample 
scientific literatures by considering at the same time a) the stud ies on 
the reforms of university and  higher education which took p lace 
during the first half of the XX century in Spain , b) the literature on the 
intellectual community of d iscourse which rendered  them possible , in 
particu lar during the first found ational phase of Franco’s regime and  c) 
the vast literature concerning the philosophical, educational and  
political activities realised  by José Ortega y Gasset. 
Regard ing the first aspect of this research, there has been in the last 
decade a growing interest in the reform s of higher education  both 
before and  during the d ictatorship  of Francisco Franco. In particular, it 
is very important to p oint out the very useful research activity brought 
about within the Programme “History of Universities” of the Figuerola 
Institute of Social Science History – a part of the Carlos III University of 
Madrid  – devoted  to improve the overall knowledge on the Spanish 
high-learning and  academic institutions. Within this program several 
books on the topic have been published  in the last fifteen years, both 
collecting archival d ocuments and  proposing general interpretation s on 
the institutional changes within the d omain of higher education. 
Among them ind ispensable for the purposes of this research  are: 
Carolina Rodríguez López [2002]; Faustino Oncina Coves [2008]; 
Germán Perales Birlanga [2009]; Pablo Campos Calvo-Sotelo [2011];, 
Manuel Cachón Cadenas [2012]; González Calleja and  Álvaro 
Ribagorda [2013]; Otero Carvajal [2014]. Other interesting stud ies have 
been conducted  in other Spanish institutions [Lopez Bausela 2011; 
Esteban Recio 2014]. These stud ies all agree on the assumption that 
Franco’s regime marked  a rad ical parad igmatic change within Spanish 
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society and  educative system. Moreover, they all agree on the fact that 
this change was conducted  both within and  through the help of the 
academic institutions.  
As a consequence, in the last years it has been str essed  by several 
scholars the importance of the ideological strategy purported  by the 
regime through the help of academic institutions. The lead ing role 
which in this context the humanities and  the social sciences were 
deemed to play has been often underlined . Very usefu l texts have been 
written, for instance, by Mainer Baqué [2009], in relation to the figure of 
the pedagogue; Basco Gil and  Fernand o Mancebo [2010], in relation to 
the teaching of history; Peiró Martín [2013] on the role of the historian; 
Moreno Pestaña [2013] in relation to the study and  practice of 
philosophy during the first phase of the d ictatorship . The book of 
Moreno Pestaña is particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
research because, for the very first time within the Orteguian s tud ies, it 
presents a study in context of his philosophy in relation to the political 
changes of that historical period  (until the ‘60s). In particular, he 
devotes his study to the development of one important aspect of Ortega 
y Gasset philosophy, i.e. his theory of generation. This recent attempt 
constitutes an interesting path which this research tries to follow , even 
if partially d istancing from it.  
A very useful tool for reconstructing the questions at stake and  
defining the boarders of the political and  cultu ral élites which 
struggled  among one another for the control of the academic power is 
constituted  by the journals and  reviews devoted  to humanities and  
social sciences published  during th at period . Indeed , these journals 
have been proved  to have played  a crucial role in the spread ing of new  
political and  cultural ideologies during the first phase of the regime. 
About this topic, some books have been recently published , in 
particu lar in relation to the history and  development of those journals 
and  groups of interest which d irectly pertain to this research. Among 
them: Mora Garcia [2006]; Prades Plaza [2007]; Díaz Hernández [2008]; 
Fernand  [2008]; Sesma Landris [2009, 2014]; Fernández Martinez [2010]; 
Eduardo Iáñez [2011]. 
As far as the literature on José Ortega y Gasset is concerned , his 
intellectual biography has alread y been written at least, in particular, 
by two eminent scholars: Zamora Bonilla [2002] and  Jord i Gracia [2014]; 
and  the thought and  life of the Spanish p hilosopher have already been 
analytically stud ied  from d ifferent perspectives. For the purposes of the 
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research, which connect his philosophy with his political and  
pedagogical activities and  theorisations, significant are the works of 
Aguilar [1998]; Cacho Viu  [2000]; Graham [2001]; Lavedan [2005]; de 
Haro Honrubia [2008]; Llano Alonso [2010]; Cerezo Galán [2011]; 
Atencia [2015] and , in relation to the first part of Ortega’s life, Cabrero 
Blasco [2016]. 
For the purposes of this research the most important aspects to be 
considered  are those related  to the pedagogical scope of his writings 
and  activities. As pointed  out by Angél Casado [2001], the problem of 
education has attracted  to a very little degree the scholars’ attention. 
Considering in particular the last years of Ortega’s intellectual 
engagement it has to be noticed  that the first comprehensive insight 
into the activity of the Institute is constituted  by the biographical 
memory of the philosopher Julian Marías [1983], co-founder of the 
institute, who ded icated  a chapter of his famous Ortega. Las trayectorias 
to this intellectual experience. This text represents an important source 
in order to understand  the guidelines of the project from a d irect and  
engaged  witness of the facts. However, the reconstruction d one in this 
book is very partisan and  constitu tes more a hagiography than a 
rigorous analysis of the relevance of this experiment. Moreover, the 
extent of the whole project was not linked  to the vaster pedagogical 
theorisation of Ortega y Gasset.  
On the contrary, concerning the scientific literature, the relevance 
which the theory of education played  in the entire philosophy and  
political activity of Ortega y Gasset d uring whole his life has been 
pointed  ou t for the first time by Tabernero del Río [1993]; and , 
successively, some articles and  books followed  this study by analyzing 
some peculiar aspects of Ortega’s theory of ed ucation, largely focusing 
on the first part of his life. Among them, in particular, Vicente and  
González [2002]; Rovira Reich [2002]; Almeida Amoedo [2002]; Cambi 
et al. [2007]; Castello Melia [2009]; Monfort Prades [2011]; Garcia Nuño 
[2014]. Due to this partial and  limited  view, the vast ma jority of the 
stud ies on the theory of ed ucation of Ortega y Gasset has left apart the 
last period  of his life, stressing qu ite exclusively the relevance of his 
teaching for the following generation of Spanish intellectuals  and  in 
particu lar in relation to the University of Madrid , but without entering 
into the details of Ortega’s personal experience. Among them: Castillo 
Castillo [2001]; Reñón [2003]; Pad illa [2007]; San Martín and  Moratalla 
[2010].  
 
17 
Only quite recently, following the controversy after the  publication 
of the book of Moran [1998], some scholars have focused  specifically on 
the last period  of Ortega y Gasset’s life, but very often with an 
apologetic aim and  without taking into consideration his theory of 
education. Among them: Neira [2000]; Bolad o [2005, 2009, 2011]; 
Monfort Prades [2011]. An exception to this apologetic tendency is 
represented  by Giustiniani [2008] who in her doctoral research and  in 
succeed ing works [Giustiniani, 2009, 2014] stud ied  the philosophy of 
Ortega in relation to the historical context during the first phase of 
Franco’s regime. However, she considered  exclusively the period  from 
1936 to 1946, leaving apart all the projects carried  ou t by Ortega after 
his return in Spain and , consequently, not taking into account the 
Institute of Humanities. Recently, Campomar [2016] has contributed  to 
shed  new light on the period  of Ortega’s Argentinean exile, thanks to a 
rigorous study in context of the intellectual relationships he maintained  
in the course of his stay in that country. However, the specific point of 
view adop ted  by the author does not permit to answer to the questions 
posed  by the current research.  
Given this status quaestionis, this research aims to constitute an 
original contribu tion within the scope both of the literature on Ortega 
and  of that concerning the cultural and  academic structure and  
functioning of the Spanish educative system .  
 
 
6. Structure 
The thesis is d ivided  in four main sections, each of which is 
composed  of two or three chapters, following the chronological 
criterion. The other criterion used  for structuring the whole thesis is 
determined  by the method ology adopted  which imposes to constantly 
consider within each section both the political and  the philosophical 
sides. In other words, of always bringing together the thought of 
Ortega y Gasset with its historical context and  concrete realizations. For 
this reason, each section takes into consideration Ortega y Gasset’s 
political and  ped agogical thought and  activities in  mutual relation with 
the changing Spanish political circumstances. The four sections are: 
 
1) Birth and apogee of a spiritual guide.  
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This first section offers an introduction on the intellectual activity 
and  ped agogical theory of José Ortega y Gasset by mainly analyzing his 
writings in the period  of his intellectual formation and  apogee, from 
1908 to 1935. In particular, this section stud ies the political relevance 
and  the social implication of his pedagogical and  political theory. The 
purpose of this section is that of trying to define to what extent Ortega’s 
reflection on the role of higher education in build ing a conscious 
citizenship constituted  a constant preoccupation of his teaching and  
publicist activities, and  to understand  how it was related  to the 
concrete social and  cultural circumstances in which he lived . The aim of 
this part is that of comprehending what were the basic political strands 
which marked  the evolution of Ortega’s thinking in the first years of his 
life, and  to link them with the concrete ed ucative and  political 
initiatives he realised  in the course of this period . Moreover, it also 
aims to comprehend  to what extent the presence of Ortega within the 
Spanish academia, and  in particu lar the University of Madrid , can be 
labelled  as a significant one and  for what reasons, and  what w ere the 
main characteristics of his teaching. In add ition, this first part of the 
thesis does take into account also the institu tional and  political changes 
which occurred  during this period , characterised  by the instauration of 
d ifferent political and  cultural regimes. In this context, they will be 
analysed  the relations that the Madrilenian philosopher maintained  
with these d ifferent regimes, and  the way in which the variations in the 
circumstances produced  relevant changes in the ways in which he 
perceived  his philosophical role within society. This investigation will 
permit to consider the relation between political and  academic life both 
regard ing the institution to which Ortega belonged  and  in relation to 
the way in which he conceived  his intellectual role in a society that, also 
through the help of the educative system, was experiencing a process of 
slow modernisation characterised  by period ic accelerations and  
decelerations.  
This section will be developed  by taking into consideration three 
important hermeneutical tools which will be also used  in the following 
sections of the thesis: 1) the importance of the d iachronic development 
of Ortega’s theory of education in relation to the historical facts and  its 
relevance within Spanish society; 2) the relation of his meditations with 
his political activities; 3) the possibility of proposing and  systematizing 
a theory of intellectual influence and  cultural transmission within 
society starting from the pedagogy developed  by Ortega during this 
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period . This last aspect is of great relevance as far as the philosophical 
character of this thesis is concerned . Indeed , the determination of a 
theory of cultural transmission , starting by taking into account Ortega’s 
viewpoint, would  permit to question its own valid ity through the 
historical research, and  therefore it would  render possible a meta -
analysis of his educational practices.  
 
2) The separation from the University. 
 The second  part of the thesis is devoted  to the stud y of the period  
comprised  between the beginning of the Spanish civil war, in 1936, and  
the full establishment of a new political and  cultural system which can 
be thought to have reached  its provisional conclusion with the material 
reconstruction of the University of Madrid  in 1943. In comparison to 
the majority of the investigations on Ortega y Gasset, this thesis largely 
focuses on the last period  of his life and  intellectual experience, being 
this the most controversial and  complicated  one. That is to say, a very 
compelling case study to comprehend  what to be an intellectual in 
times of crisis really means. For understand ing the nature of this critical 
period  – that is a period  of cultural transition, as Ortega defined  it in 
the abovementioned  prologue to the book of Bréhier – this section 
reconstructs the political and  cultural scenario during the first years of 
the evolu tion of the regime. This was marked  in particular by a new 
definition of the idea of culture and  by the need  of constructing new 
political values. The University, and  in particular the Central 
University of Madrid , was the main battlefield  in which this change 
took place, both materially and  sp iritually speaking. Thus, on the one 
hand , this section of the thesis will analyze the birth and  construction 
of the rhetorical d iscourse on the mission and  aim of University which 
spread  within the élites of the New State and , on the other, the way in 
which Ortega observed  these changes from his exile. His attitude 
during this period  has frequently been defined  by the very philosopher 
as a period  of absolute silence and , by his detractors, as a period  of 
active collaboration with the regime. The stud y of his writings, public 
speeches and  conferences he gave during this period  in relation to the 
changes that were occurring in Spain – in particular in relation to the 
way in which the political power acquired  the absolute control of the 
educative system and  of all intellectual activities – will permit to 
comprehend  to what extent these common interpretations can be 
considered  as legitimate or not. For this purpose they will be taken into 
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consideration the legislative changes underwent by the educative 
system in general and  the University in particular. Moreover, a special 
emphasis will be put on forms of d issension within an apparently 
homogeneous culture, with the aim of comprehending if and  to what 
extent Ortega d id  take advantage from these initial contrapositions 
between d ifferent components of the regime’s establishment.  
Contrary to the limited  literature on this topic, the purpose of this 
section does not principally lie in a presentation of his political cond uct. 
It neither consists in expressing a jud gment over his political ambiguity 
both during and  after the civil war. On the contrary, its aim is that of 
critically inquiring into the way in which Ortega conceived  his 
intellectual role within a cultural and  political regime which was 
extremely d ifferent from the one in which he was ed ucated  and  which 
he consistently contributed  to forge. 
 
3) Hegemonic Vs Marginal. Ortega’s exile in dialogue  
The third  section of the thesis deepens into the period  of the exile of 
the philosopher – which lasted  until the summer 1945 – and  also takes 
into account the effective reform in the University teachings of 
humanistic d isciplines in Spain during the first half of the forties. In 
particu lar, the section does take into consideration the construction of a 
new parad igm of national history, and  therefore of national memory. It 
does so both from a theoretical point of view, through a presentation of 
the philosophy of history developed  during the first year of political 
control of the Spanish University, and  by taking into account the 
interpretations of a specific historical theme: i.e. the imperial past of 
Spain, in its relations to the Roman Empire. Moreover, it also 
investigates the way in which the role of the intellectual d id  
substantially changed  in the very perception of the people responsible 
for academic posts. For doing this it w ill be conduct an analysis of a 
parad igmatic case within the rhetoric of the regime, that is the way in 
which the persona of Juan Luis Vives had  been actualised  by the 
academic world  with the purpose of defining the basic traits of the new 
organic intellectual. All these rhetorical and  linguistic utterances which 
took place within the Spanish academia will be compared  to the works 
of Ortega y Gasset during the same period , in order to comprehend  if 
and  to what extent a d ialogue between the two positions was possible, 
or at least, had  been attempted  by the philosopher; and  if and  to what 
extent this attempt d id  obtain relevant results in the cultural debate 
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within the Spanish boarders. This analysis will be conducted  by the 
help of primary sources such as relevant articles published  in the 
following journals and  reviews: Arbor, Revista Nacional de Educación, 
Revista de Filosofía (UCM), Revista de la Universidad de Madrid, and  
Revista de Estudios Políticos. Moreover, it will be conducted  by 
considering the creation of new journals (such as Escorial, Leonardo, 
Insula) and , concerning Ortega’s viewpoint, considering some 
important document collected  within his personal Archive, such as 
notes and  letters. In the case of the second  part of Ortega’s Lusitanian 
exile, this section of the thesis d oes also take into account the mutations 
in the national and  international scenario, to understand  if and  to what 
extent they contribute to the return of the philosopher in Spain in 1945. 
In fact, since 1944, Franco’s d ictatorship seemed to live a profound  
crisis which could  have ended  up with its replacement in favour of the 
Bourbon monarchy but that, u ltimately, gave birth to the new 
“democratic appearance” represented  by the publication of the Fuero de 
los Españoles and  the Ley de sucesion. In this context, it will be crucial to 
understand  how the positioning of d ifferent components of the 
d ictatorship cou ld  have p lay a role of mediators for favouring the 
return of the philosopher and  if and  to what extent this corresponded  
to a political purpose within the regime or, on the contrary, constituted  
an attempt to subvert it.  
 
4) The struggle for the cultural supremacy. Ortega back in Spain 
The fourth part of the thesis deals with the last period  of Ortega’s 
life, since his coming back in Spain after almost ten years of exile. This 
sections aims to define the conditions of possibility that rendered  
possible his return in a context apparently homogeneously in contrast 
with him. For this reason, a particular attention will be paid  to the 
position of the cultural propagand a of the regime in relation to Ortega 
and  to the eventual points of fracture within the cultu ral establishment 
of the regime which could  have favoured , or seen with sympathy, the 
return of the philosopher. For this purpose they will be analysed  the 
new positioning towards the philosopher starting from 1945, in 
particu lar through the creations of new reviews and  the beginning of 
Ortega’s intervention in Spain. So, in this section it will be analyzed  the 
philosophy of education and  the teaching activity of Ortega y Gasset in 
Spain, in particular through the case of the Institute of Humanities, so 
as to study the fourth  and  final mutation of this theorization in relation 
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to historical and  political changes: from the context of the Generation of 
’14, to the II Republic to the instauration of the regime of Francisco 
Franco, by end ing with the post-war international context. A vast part 
of this last section is intended  to study  the creation of the Institute of 
Humanities in Madrid , the last educative initiative he tried  to realise in 
his country between 1948 and  1950. This part of the thesis intends to 
focus in particular on a) the reasons which sustained  the creation of the 
Institute, b) the significance of the concept of “humanities” developed  
by the philosopher, c) the relations which rendered  possible the 
realization of the Institute and  d) the motivations which brought to its 
end . The personal Archive of the philosopher has been really useful for 
this purposes, being preserved  there a) the letters of Ortega with the 
other members of the project; b) the ad ministrative documents of the 
Institute; c) the articles published  on the Institute during this period  in 
several journals and  newspapers; d ) the letters received  by Ortega by 
friends and  public figures which observed  from d ifferent point of 
views the development of the activities of the Institute. Moreover, the 
thesis will also take into account the eventual connection of Ortega’s 
educative theory and  practice from the international point of view, 
studying if and  to what extent his theorisations were connected  to a the 
share international movement that, also through a conspicuous political 
and  economic intervention, was trying to promote an educative reform 
intended  as a political instrument for build ing a global citizenship and  
a climate of peace. As a consequence, this section will present a study 
of the relevant function of the intellectual and  the philosopher within 
this new political scenario and  within a new political ideology which 
still grounds our concept of education in democratic society. Lastly, 
this section d oes also aims to understand  what  is the legacy Ortega left 
to the Spanish philosophical debate after his death.  
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PART I 
 
BIRTH AND APOGEE OF A 
SPIRITUAL GUIDE 
The first part of this work aims at clarifying to what extent the 
professorship of Ortega y Gasset, since its very beginning, had  always 
been extremely tied  to a p rofound  political engagement. In particular, 
by focusing on the period  comprised  between the beginning of the XX 
century and  the onset of the Spanish civil war, they will be exposed  the 
motivations, the circumstances, the methods and  the aims which 
marked  his intellectual upheaval. This period , which finally culminated  
in the hegemonic role played  by Ortega as the main cu ltural reference  of 
the Spanish II Republic. However, in spite of these significant 
variations, this first period  represents a qu ite homogeneous epoch in 
which the philosopher had  the opportunity to express his opinion  freely 
and  frequently, enjoying time by time the positive effects of an 
increasing prestige and  a growing reputation.  
The present section of the thesis is d ivided  in two chapters accord ing 
to a chronological criterion: they analyse respectively the first and  the 
second  decade of his intellectual activity. The two chapters present a 
similar structure which focuses on six main questions, each of those is 
articu lated  in one or more paragraphs. In particu lar they aim at 
investigating how  1) during the first part of Ortega’s life and  intellectual 
activity, he considered  that his duty as a young intellectual should  have 
been that of promoting an educational reform aimed  at ameliorating the 
material and  spiritual cond itions of his compatriots. The terms in which 
he conceived  this educational reform changed  over time also, but the 
kernel of the question never d isappeared  during all this period . 
Furthermore, 2) this constant preoccupation prod uced  an unceasing 
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meditation of the philosopher concerning the way in which he realised  
his philosophical activity. Put it d ifferently, he constantly pu t into 
question his social status and  at the same time the social status and  
political aim of the institution to which he belonged . This will be 
demonstrated  by taking into account specifically the numerous 
occasions in which he spoke to a public aud ience, that is to say not to 
his students and  colleagues within the University but to a larger public. 
However, the aim of the present thesis is that of always considering the 
ideas of Ortega in relation to the factual circumstance which rendered  
them possible. For this reason, both of the chapters 3) investigate the 
relationship  between Ortega’s aspiration of reforming his nation via an 
educational activity and  the social and  cultural background  from which 
his main ideas arose during this period . These background  conditions 
represent the implicit structure of Ortega’s life of which he was not 
responsible for bu t that substantially influenced  his thought 
contributing to determine its scope, goal and  evolution . The fourth 
question considered  in this section constitutes the pivotal problem of 
the entire thesis, that is 4) the way in which these background  
conditions, together with Ortega’s personal contribution  to the 
educative problem in Spain and  the concurrent political circumstances 
in which it was posed  – sometimes favourable sometimes adverse – 
reverberated  within the university system. This question evidently 
produces a subsequent problem concerning 5) the extent to which this 
debate within the University both depended  on political facts and  
ideologies and  contributed  to determine new cultural policies during 
d ifferent political regimes. In a sort of vicious circle which always starts 
at the same point in which it ends this first section also aims to 6) clarify 
the way in which the theory of education purported  by Ortega 
unceasingly changed  both in its contents and  methods implying a 
constant redefinition of his political function and  social status.  
This section, given the vastness of the topic, will highlight 
exclusively some momentous events with in the biography and  
production of the Madrilenian philosopher. The aim of this section is 
that of offering an introd uctory overview which would  subsequently 
permit to comprehend  both the biographical and  conceptual premises 
underlying his following intellectual activities, which otherwise would  
not be totally intelligible.  
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Chapter 1.  
The birth  of a p rofessor  su i generis  
The life of Ortega y Gasset is constitutively linked  to that of the Spanish 
academia. This relation started  since he was very young, during his 
stud ies at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Madrid , and  
later during his frequent travels in Germany, to deepen his 
philosophical knowledge. The cultural and  social climate that he met 
both in his country and  abroad  contributed  to shape his tastes and  
interests, to orient his philosophical investigations as well as his 
educative practices. Indeed , his choice to become a public intellectual 
and  an academician seems to have brought to Ortega’s mind  both as a 
logical consequence of the background  precondition characterising his 
circumstances and  by a personal vocation he au tonomously forged . 
Shedding light on this first period  of Ortega’s life is therefore 
ind ispensable to comprehend  the fundamental guidelines which 
characterised  the following evolu tion of his thinking and  professorship. 
In particular, th is chapter focuses on Ortega’s Bildung and  his follow ing 
teaching activity, dealing with the period  comprised  between 1906 and  
1920. 
To comprehend  to what extent the personal and  social circumstances 
influenced  his career, the chapter starts by (§1) analysing the familiar 
and  academic inputs he received , both in Spain and  in Germany, which 
oriented  his decisions and  interests. These (§2) will be later take d irectly 
into consideration by tracing the basic traits of his first public 
appearances which seem to be marked  in particular by the aim of 
ameliorating the conditions of Spain through a pedagogical reform 
inserted  in the vaster European social movement. This particular 
framework will permit to study (§3) the fragile but substantive relation 
between the socialism and  the liberalism of the philosopher. In fact, 
whereas the first of the components of this relation will d isappear from 
the political lexicon of Ortega, the second  would  constitute a constant 
reference of his intellectual and  political activity. The term, however, 
would  have acquired  d ifferent meanings during d ifferent epochs of his 
thought. This analysis will thus permit to comprehend  what were the 
main characteristics of Ortega’s liberalism during his youth. The 
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importance of linking the evolu tion of Ortega’s philosophy to the 
concrete circumstances under which he lived  will be proved  in 
particu lar (§4) by comparing his pedagogical interest w ith the 
d isastrous material conditions of the Spanish educative system. Thus, 
the preoccupation of Ortega will be proved  to be intrinsically linked  to 
the political and  social settings. This w ill determine the necessity to 
answer to a question that the scholars have somehow ind irectly posed  
when considering the works and  life of the Spanish philosopher, i.e. (§5) 
if he can be considered  either an academician or a politician, or to what 
extent these aspects of his persona represented  two sides of the same 
coin. This problem will be d iscussed  in particular by analysing (§6) the 
first theoretical book he published , the famous Meditations on Quixote, 
and  by linking it with the political and  educative preoccupations he 
manifested  during the same years. After this, the chapter will d irectly 
take into considerations (§7) the situation of the University of Madrid  in 
the first two decades of the XX century, to understand  if and  to what 
extent the development of Ortega’s philosophy was linked  to the 
concrete academic circumstances of his Alma Mater. This analysis does 
constitute a fund amental aspect of the thesis, insofar as it permits to 
comprehend  the evolution of the thought of Ortega in relation to the 
institutional framework within which he developed  it. In fact, as a 
consequence of this analysis, the last paragraph of this chapter w ill be 
devoted  (§8) to the definition of the basic strands of his teaching activity 
and  ed ucative theory that followed  the publication of his famous book, 
determining the beginning of his intellectual apogee.  
 
1.1 The academic fascinat ion  
Education constituted  a constant passion of José Ortega y Gasset 
from his very youth, at least since he was a student at the Faculty of 
Philosophy at the University of Madrid  [Tabernero d el Río, 1993]. His 
very biography is indeed  that of a predestined  cultural leader. Thanks 
to the personal relationships of his family, his life in Madrid  had  soon 
be characterised  by a regular attendance to the most educated  social 
milieu of the Spanish cap ital [Zamora Bonilla, 2002]. The consistent 
social capital he inherited  from his family gave him the opportunity to 
gain very early some notoriety within the Madrilenian bourgeoisie, in 
particu lar thanks to his journalistic activity for the family’s newspaper 
El Imparcial [Blanco Alonso, 2005]. Indeed , Ortega born in a well-read  
family, with a long and  outstand ing liberal trad ition. A lot of his 
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relatives hold  important role as active members of the national politics. 
His maternal grandfather for instance, Eduardo Gasset y Artime, had  
been a deputy and  a minister, and  also his father, José Ortega y Murilla, 
had  been an indolent deputy of the Cortes for twenty years, from 1898 to 
1918 [Valero Lumbreras, 2013: 11-16]. One of his uncle, Rafael Gasset, 
obtained  very prestigious political roles, cu lminating in his activity as 
Minister of agriculture and  industry in 1900. So, he was part of a long 
trad ition of moderate and  liberal politicians revitalised  by his brother, 
Eduardo, who would  be a liberal deputy from 1910 to 1923.  
The political career should  therefore appear to Ortega as the natural 
path to follow in a country characterised  by a reduced  social mobility 
and  a quite restricted  oligarchy which governed  the country [Moral 
Roncal, 2003; Fradera and  Millan, 2000: 75]. However, without 
d iscard ing the possibility of intervening in politics, Ortega y Gasset 
chose another path, preferring to follow his personal vocation toward s 
the study of philosophy rather than devoting himself to the political 
struggle and  living the life the fate appeared  to have prepared  to him. 
So, he took the first occasion which was offered  to him, that is a 
scholarship funded  by the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios and  went 
to Germany to ameliorate his philosophical knowledge
1
. He was 
attracted  by the desire of enhancing his understand ing of the German 
philosophy and  of deepening his interests towards the rigorous study of 
the d iscip line. In Marburg he d iscovered  an acad emic reality that 
surprised  and  shocked  him in comparison to the one he was 
accustomed to in Spain. So, from then on, Germany represented  to him 
a model to imitate, a cultural ideal that he and  his Country should  have 
to pursue. Significantly, in  1906, at the age of 23, Ortega expressed  the 
certainty of having a proper mission to accomplish, a personal life 
project. This consisted  in  offering his personal contribution to the 
enhancement of the social conditions of the Spanish society in a 
d ifferent manner in comparison to the one which his family had  
trad itionally pursued : not by talking in political meetings and  
assemblies, but through his educative activity within the University 
[Garcia Nuño, 2014]. 
This attitude is clearly expressed  in an interesting series of articles he 
anonymously wrote for El Imparcial, signed  with the initials X.Z. The 
series is significantly entitled  La Universidad española y la Universidad 
Alemana. The comparative study of the Spanish and  German University 
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 On the importance of the numerous Ortega’s stays in Germany during his 
youth, all fundamental for the development of a strong interest towards the 
political pedagogy, see in particular J. Zamora Bonilla [2005: pp. 83-90]. 
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conducted  by Ortega in these articles took into consideration both the 
material and  the intellectual characteristics of the two system s, that is to 
say the economic and  the scientific aspects. In these writings a young 
and  impertinent student criticises the Spanish educative system, in 
particu lar the University, depicted  as an obsolete structure ready to 
collapse. In order to ameliorate the situation , accord ing to him, it would  
have been necessary an overall reform that, starting from the 
University, would  later prop agate to politics and  society as a whole. 
This is due to the fact, accord ing to Ortega, the University and , 
generally speaking, the school, should  not be seclud ed  to society, but 
should  rather be a living part of it. Indeed , he conceived  the formal 
education as the most powerful and  effective cultural channel thanks to 
which it would  have been possible to create the necessary cond ition to 
enhance the development of the public op inion. In particu lar, because 
the school represented  to him the necessary institution that could  have 
guarantee the acquisition of democratic habits, such as the desire and  
ability to debate and  participate in a deliberative process. This, 
accord ing to him, should  have been one of the main goals of the 
schooling system. Therefore education at its highest levels – i.e. during 
University – was conceived  as a momentous part of this democratic 
empowerment rendered  possible by the development of a critical 
thinking, since University represented  both the place in which the 
future political leaders were formed and  the institution responsible for 
the wide d issemination of culture. For this reason he thought that: «Para 
volver a España nada menos que en una Grecia, no es ciertamente la 
Universid ad  el único instrumento, pero sí el más importante» [OC, I:69].  
The University, accord ing to Ortega, had  primarily a political 
function and  the professor should  not devote himself exclusively to 
scientific research, but should  firstly teach to his stud ents to investigate 
in an autonomous way, so that to develop  a critical thinking [OC, I:74, 
81]. He was really fascinated  by the thought expressed  by the Berlin 
professor Pau lsen who practiced  this form of engaged  professorship. 
Ortega wanted  to play a vital role in his country and  the journalistic 
activity seemed to him far more fascinating than the parliamentary 
politics. But even more attractive was to him the possibility of becoming 
an academician, conceiving the University not only as the temple of 
knowledge but also and  foremost as the bridgehead  for spread ing a 
liberal frame of mind  within a cultural elite. Indeed , he conceived  
education as the means through which it would  have been possible to 
foster the personal and  collective freedom, laying the foundation of 
social progress. 
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This process, to him, was rendered  necessary in order to ameliorate 
the conditions of a country that was dramatically underdeveloped  in 
comparison to most of the other European States. Ortega considered  
that the most ap t instrument to adopt was that of education, in 
particu lar of a political pedagogy strongly influenced  by the neokantian 
movement and  in particular by the Sozialpädagogie theorised  Paul 
Natorp, one of his professors in Marburg [Orringer, 1979: 75-106]. Not 
only the form, bu t also the contents of the German education he 
received  during his stays in Marburg and  Berlin captured  the attention 
of this young philosophy student. In a brief article he published  in El 
Imparcial in 1908 he wrote that he would  have devoted  himself in the 
following years to renew the general p erception and  the common 
meaning attributed  to the word  “culture”, following the example of the 
most advanced  nations, such as Germany. As he put it: «este es el tema 
entorno al cual qu isiera urd ir algunas variaciones útiles […] para 
fomentar lo que es en mí una idea fija, una manía opresora: la reforma 
del concep to que se tiene volgarmente de la cultura» [OC, I:135]. Thus 
Ortega’s academic fascination d id  not represent a personal ambition, 
but rather the profound  desire of modernise the Spanish politics 
through an ind irect bu t, accord ing to him, more powerful and  effective 
way, that is the reform of the educative system: 
 
La política significa una acciόn sobre la voluntad  indeterminada del 
pueblo, no sobre sus múscolos, una educaciόn, no una imposiciόn. No 
es dar leyes, es dar ideales y por ideales no se entiende nada vago y 
doncellil, sino cualquier posible mejora espiritual o material de la 
sociedad , desde la libertad  de cultos hasta la revisiόn del arancel, 
donde acaso esta parezca más ideal que aqu ella como más remota y 
d ifícil. 
 
1.2 Europe as a my th 
 By this time Ortega is still on the way to become a lead ing 
intellectual figure. At this point in his life, after obtaining his d octorate 
in 1904, he had  started  to teach at the Instituto Magisterio de Madrid 
[since 1908] and  had  written a large amount of articles in two liberal 
newspapers, one of those he contributed  to fund . He is twenty seven 
when, in 1910, he is invited  to a conference in Bilbao speaking of La 
pedagogía social como programa politico. This occasion represented  the 
opportunity to systematise the major theses purported  in his precedent 
articles. At the same time, it offered  him the opportunity to call for a 
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collaboration among intellectuals and  a growing midd le class to realise 
this political program. The slogan that summarises this conference is 
that of the Europeanization of Spain [Graham, 2001: 395]. To Ortega, the 
political problem affecting the country was first and  foremost a problem 
related  to its lack of culture. Accord ingly, the only way to solve it would  
have been that of importing and  transmitting the scientific and  social 
progress already made abroad .  
Even if apparently Ortega simply repeated  the arguments he alread y 
presented  in other situations, this conference represented  a first 
significant watershed  in his intellectual career. His pessimistic analysis 
of the Spanish cu ltural situation and  the call for a political regeneration 
which could  have been rendered  possible only by imitating Europe 
caused  some violent intellectual reactions – among the most notorious 
the one of Miguel de Unamuno [Ochoa de Michelena, 2007] – which 
also gave to Ortega some fame and  fortune. The significance of this 
conference is due at least to two reasons. The first is that in this occasion 
Ortega offered  a more precise account of the meaning of the two basic 
terms of his intellectual basic preoccupations so far: education and  
social ped agogy. The second  is given by the fact that thanks to this 
conference he attracted  a growing number of followers, especially 
among the younger generations which started  to identify in Ortega a 
spokesperson who could  represent their own interests towards the 
public op inion and  within the University. 
As far as the first aspect is concerned , Ortega conceived  education as 
the concrete process through which what should  be can become real. 
Indeed , the formal education always hides a normative aim which 
should  be set accord ing to the interests and  needs of the society. The 
goal of education is that of materialising the ideal project of a better 
society that the social ped agogy – conceived  as a scientific d iscip line 
rather than as a concrete practice – had  previously set. Education is 
therefore conceived  by Ortega as the necessary instrument for 
implementing the standards set by the social pedagogy. This goal 
cannot be realised  exclusively within the University system, but should  
integrate a more capillary organisation of formal schooling. As he wrote 
in his personal d iary in 1909: ««Las Universid ades d eben ser sólo para 
ciencia y para crear sabios. Lo cual quiere decir que es preciso crear otro 
tipo de instituciones d ocentes para hacer hombres [de 8 a 20 años]» [OC, 
VII:170]. In this period  he thought that it was the du ty of the State to 
create the necessary cultural infrastructures which could  have rendered  
possible the development of the country [Sánchez Ron, 1999]. 
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The political program presented  by Ortega was basically rooted  in a 
communitarian conception of the civil society, whose members as single 
ind ividuals should  have to collaborate so to construct a better society. 
At the same time, he d id  not think that this cou ld  have been the product 
of a spontaneous order, bu t rather the result of an ed ucational process. 
The fascination for the German cu lture, together w ith the read ing of 
Costa’s book Reconstitución y europeización de España, produced  in Ortega 
a sort of idealisation of Europe which operated  as a sort of mantra in his 
first intellectual interventions. As he said  in this conference: 
«Regeneración es el deseo; europeización es el medio de satisfacerlo. 
Verdaderamente se vio desde el princip io que España era el problema y 
Europa la solución» [OC, II:102]. This conference produced  a wave of 
emotional involvement among a rising generation of young intellectuals 
which, after the colonial d isaster of 1898, was trying to ind ividuate a 
new unifying myth for rehabilitating their nation [Lorente, 1994]. The 
end  of the colonial power marked  also the end  of the period  of the so-
called  Restauración, an epoch spanning from 1874 to 1898. During this 
period  a very limited  oligarchy, basically ruled  by Antonio Cánovas del 
Castillo and  Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, dominated  over the political 
decision of the Country. These two m en represented  the two main 
parties [the liberal and  the conservative] that – with a continuous 
turnover made somehow explicit through the Pacto del Pardo endorsed  
by the king Alfonso XII [Tortella, 1993] – unceasingly led  the Country.  
In this scenario, the political elections were not open and , on the 
contrary, were largely manipulated  both by the census suffrage and  by 
the influence of the very powerful local elites which determined  the 
vote in the rural electoral colleges, a phenomenon known as caciquismo 
[Cabrera and  Del Rey, 2011]. This system rendered  possible a relative 
stability during all this period  even if the political life of Spain was 
frequently opened  to the whim s of the army and  its violent 
pronunciamientos that, during this period , were the expression of a wish 
to modernise the country through the rad ical change of its institutions 
[Varela Ortega, 2013]. Moreover, a very large part of the population, 
deprived  of its political power, was basically ind ifferent or hostile to the 
political system. The everyday politics was redu ced  mainly to a struggle 
among elites and  the highest classes, represented  by the political 
institutions of the Church, the King, the Army and  the two main 
political parties [Carr, 1982]. This period  was also characterised  by the 
presence of strongly extractive political and  economic institutions which 
contributed  to determine a very low level of economic growth. 
Accord ing to the young generation impersonated  by Ortega, the politics 
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of the Restauración had  u ltimately failed , and  a new form of politics wa s 
needed . As far as education is concerned , the first important decree on 
education of the second  half of the century, which organised  the 
education system into three d ifferent levels accord ing to the ley Moyano 
(1857), was not implemented  and  education, especially for the 
elementary level, remained  substantially decentralised  and  opened  to 
the d ifferent decisions of single regions and  families [Nuñez, 2005]. This 
was the reason why Ortega called  for a new institutional effort w ithin 
the educative system and  for a process of growing decentralization. 
After this conference, during the very 1910, Ortega launched  a new 
ed itorial adventure: a review significantly called  Europa. This was a 
quite unsuccessful meteor within the Spanish cultu ral scenario, but 
constitutes a clear proof of the basic d irection which his political 
program took during this period  and  which would  have been mirrored  
in his most famous book: Meditations on Quixote [Villacañas, 2004: 117].  
 
1.3 A  liberal with a socialist  ou t look 
Starting from these premises and  due to his constant confrontation 
with the German system, politics and  education started  to represent to 
Ortega two synonymic expressions [Haro Honrubia, 2015]. Indeed , he 
was persuaded  that the only plausible political system was the one 
represented  by a liberal-democracy enhanced  by an educative process. 
Therefore, as Elorza [2002], rightly wrote, his pedagogical commitment 
implied  a constant effort towards the effective democratisation of his 
country
2
. For this reason he enrolled  in the Spanish Fabian Society, 
created  in 1907 following the British model [Abellán, 2005: 60]. He thus 
endorsed  a liberal ped agogical ideal which focused  on the development 
of the ind ividuals – and  in particu lar of those who were better equipped  
with intellectual and  material resources – in order to gradually gain a 
general improvement of the social conditions through this elitist 
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 A. Elorza, La razón y la sombra. Una lectura política de Ortega y Gasset , Barcellona, 
Anagrama, 2002
 
[1984], p . 43: to Ortega: «[R]esulta imprescind ible, para alcanzar 
la práctica trasformadora, pasar antes por la movilización de ese cuerpo 
mostrenco que comprende la mayoría de la población. De ahí que 
necesariamente democracia signifique pedagogía. [...] Es el problema en que se 
debate Ortega en sus d iez primeros años, de optar por una labor pedagógica, 
siempre fundamental para él pero sin incidencia concreta sobre un país en crisis 
de régimen». 
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influence
3
. For this reason, in spite of having alread y taken the decision 
of devoting himself to the study and  teaching of philosophy, he also 
continued  to frequently write for the family newspaper s so to d irectly 
communicate to a larger aud ience. In add ition, together with his brother 
Eduardo, he decided  to create a new liberal review: El faro.  
Interestingly enough, all the articles published  in this review during 
the first months since its creation focused  on the importance of build ing 
a new cultural politics with in what he considered  as an underdeveloped  
country. As Ortega wrote in a letter to one of the Spanish lead ing figure 
of that time, Miguel de Unamuno, the aim of this publication was that 
of offering «un ensayo de pedagogía política – y política en mi 
vocabulario ya sabe que es liberalismo y revolución, cultura contra 
materia» [Robles, 1987: 73]. Whereas it is surely possible to affirm  that 
before being a professor Ortega was a witty journalist, at the same time 
it is true that his constant worry also during this first period  of his 
formation was represented  by the problem of education. The political 
education of the population not only represented  a political problem, 
but also a matter of intellectual meditation since: «es toda idea política 
una idea científica» [OC, I:140]. So, also when speaking to a general 
aud ience with strong political aims Ortega d id  not renounce to what 
apparently seemed a certain ped antry typical of the intellectual. This, 
accord ing to him, represented  the only correct methodology to ad opt  in 
order to foster a liberal mentality: use a mass media, such as a 
newspaper, as an instrument for making people think.  
So, what does “liberalism” mean in Ortega’s vocabulary? He offers a 
clear definition of this term in an article written in 1910 entitled  La 
reforma liberal. Liberalism, to him, defines the aspiration of the 
ind ividuals and  the civil society to acquire new d omains of political 
influence contrasting the oppressive power exercised  by an old  and  
threadbare political system such as the one represented  at that tim e by 
the Spanish conservative party. Liberalism means to substitute the rigid  
system of bureaucratic laws with a more flexible attitude, both in 
economics and  politics. This, with the aim of freeing the positive 
energies of civil society in order to ameliorate the lives of both 
ind ividuals and  the community. Accord ing to Ortega, liberalism is: 
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 As Pedro Cerezo Galan wrote, in this period the posture of the philosopher 
was headed  towards «una conjunciόn entre liberalismo y socialismo, que 
pudiera corregir a uno y a otro, en una nueva forma de integraciόn». See Ortega 
y la regeneraciόn del liberalismo: Tres navegaciones y un naufragio, in Meditaciones 
sobre Ortega y Gasset, F.H. Llanos Alonso y A. Castro Sáenz (eds.), Madrid , 
Tébar, 2005, p . 629. 
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«aquel pensamiento político que antepone la realización del ideal moral 
a cuanto exija la utilid ad  de una porción humana, sea esta una casta, 
una clase o una nación» [OC, I:143]. He d id  not share a classic concept of 
liberalism such as the one purported , for instance, by Mill accord ing to 
which the true liberty would  be that: «of pursuing our own good  in our 
own way, so long as we d o not attempt to deprive others of th eirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it» And, as a consequence: «Each is the 
proper guard ian of his own health, whether bod ily or mental or 
spiritual» [Mill, 2000: 62]. Accord ing to Ortega, the single ind ividual 
cannot be conceived  as the measure of good  and  rightness, since he 
conceived  liberalism always as an instrument for the social 
development of a community. He does not believe in the spontaneous 
order – which during that period  the conservative leader Antonio 
Maura was perverting in a nationalistic sense. He conceived  liberalism 
as a moral ideal, a normative princip le to follow and  for this reason he 
thought that: «No es posible hoy otro liberalismo que el liberalismo 
socialista» [OC, I:145]
4
. For this reason he also expressed  his favour 
towards the Spanish socialist party and  its most outstand ing 
representative: Pablo Iglesias [Fox, 1988: 343-346]. 
Within this framework, ed ucation was conceived  by Ortega not as a 
propagandistic instrument, but rather as a means through which it 
would  have been possible to construct a better society, more equal and  
open. This could  have been obtained  through a spiritual, moral and  
economic improvement of the social conditions, passing through the 
development of single ind ividuals. All these enhancements could  have 
been realised  only by fostering the freedom of every single person, 
therefore promoting firstly the development of the ir intellectual abilities 
since: «lo que ha hecho al hombre hombre es la ciencia» [1920, OC, I: 
168]. The liberalism proposed  by Ortega constituted  a moral principle 
and , for this reason, he thought that a State that d id  not explicitly 
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 On this crucial aspect of Ortega’s thought see in particular the very useful 
essay by Luciano Pellicani, 1983107. As he put it: «Appare quind i evidente che il 
liberalismo orteghiano – checchè sia stato scritto al riguardo – è cosa ben d istinta 
dal liberalismo “sitile XIX secolo”. La sua continua polemica contro lo statalismo 
non è assimilabile a quella dei Mises e degli Hayek, quanto meno nel senso che 
non sfocia nella d ifesa a oltranza del mercato au toregolato. Tutto, il contrario. 
Nello stesso momento in cui Ortega sottolinea i pericoli inerenti alla illimitata 
d ilatazione della giurisd izione potestativa dello Stato, egli stottolinea il dovere 
morale dei poteri pubblici d i intervenire nel meccanismo economico al fine d i 
azzerare i privilegi di classe e d i procurare a tutti i cittad ini i mezzi materiali e 
culturali ind ispensabili per  la fruizione delle libertà».  
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recognise, as its most basic duty, the promotion of the public wisd om  
would  have been an immoral State [OC, I: 169]. In conclusion, during 
his youth Ortega conceived  liberalism as inseparable from an idea of 
justice, and  education was considered  as the basic anthropological 
instrument [Botanch Callén, 2015] that could  have rendered  possible the 
construction of a better society. But, why at the beginning of the XX 
century d id  Spain need  to be rescued  by a philosopher and  a group of 
intellectuals with progressive tendencies? To comprehend  this  point it is 
necessary to briefly recall the socio-political and  cultural conditions 
characterising the country during that period . 
 
1.4 The m aterial condit ions 
The socio-political and  cultural milieu in which Ortega was 
absorbed  was marked  by a vivid  debate within the regenerationist group  
concerning the construction of a new educative policy , which cou ld  
have put into practice the principles of the Krausist philosophy
5
. These 
had  been implemented  by Giner de los Ríos and  the Institución Libre de 
Enseñanza [Orden Jiménez, 1998; 2011]. This institution, as stated  by 
Cacho Viu [2000: 156-157], constituted  at the same time: 1) a 
pedagogical laboratory, 2) a potential political bureau made by students 
and  scholars who were able to influence the government intervening on 
social issues, 3) a place in which both young students and  old  
intellectuals could  debate and  get in touch in an informal way and , 4) as 
the basic core of the Spanish liberalism. Ortega was fascinated  by this 
institution, which represented  the most advanced  research institute 
which was extremely active during those years.  
The basic problem that the ILE was facing during this period  was 
that of the development of a liberal education, the same problem that 
Ortega prioritised  at the beginning of his academic career  [Capellán and  
Orden Jiménez, 2007]. This was d ue to the d isheartening m aterial 
conditions of the country which can be recalled  through the help of 
some historical d ata. As far as the educative situation was concerned , in 
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 Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1831) was a German Romantic 
philosopher. During the XIX century Giner de los Ríos imported  in Spain his 
philosophy which influenced  the Spanish liberalism and  determined the 
creation of the ILE in 1876 [Stoetzer, 1998]. This philosophy, a blend  of Hegel 
and  mystical meditation which combined  philosophy and  religion [Rodríguez 
Carro, 2014; García Mateo, 1992], was mainly based  on the ideas of social and  
ind ividual progress   
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1875, when the ILE was created , the illiteracy rate was equal to 75% of 
the adu lt population. At the time in which Ortega started  his academic 
career it was still higher than 60% [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 141]. If we 
take into consideration the people aged  between 10 and  60, in 1920, the 
rate was still equal to the 42,5%, extremely higher in comparison to the 
rest of Europe [Tabernero d el Rio, 1993: 19]. In general terms, during the 
period  from 1875 to 1915 the vast majority of the population was unable 
to read  and  write, and  so unable to engage effectively in a political 
debate [Nuñez, 2005: 164]. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1: Level of education d uring the Restauración
6
  
 
 
Fig. 2: Evolution of the illiteracy mean.  
 
                                                          
6
 The graphs presented here are elaborated  from the data collected  in Nuñez, 
2005: 207-244. 
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Not only the population was living in a deplorable condition, bu t 
also considering the formal educative system the situation was really 
d isappointing. During primary school, the ratio students/ teacher was 
equal to 75:1, and  people who could  go to university in the period  1917-
1935, that is the period  in which Ortega exercised  a sort of cultural 
hegemony within the humanistic facu lties, was merely comprised  
between one and  two parts of thousand  [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 354]. 
Finally, taking into consid eration  what nowad ays is considered  as the 
period  of compulsory education, only 2% of the population d id  formally 
go to school [Nuñez, 2005: 233].   
The second ary and  university education was an extremely elitist 
reality, apparently scarcely integrated  with the p opular culture of its 
time. From a legislative point of view , during the first two decades of 
the XX century the d ifferent governments in power had  not been able to 
promote a substantial reform of the educative system. The lack of a 
unified  project was partially compensated  by some very specific actions 
taken in particular by some reformist institutions, above all the Junta 
para la Ampliación de Estudios and  the ILE. The JAE was created  in 1907 
and  some years later, in 1909, a decree established  that compulsory 
education should  encompass all the people aged  from 6 to 12. In 1910 it 
was created  the Residencia de Estudiantes and  in 1915 the Residencia de 
Señoritas, followed  in 1916 by the Instituto Escuela
7
. All these institutions 
contributed  to set into the political agenda the educative reform s that, 
during those very years, Ortega was strenuously d efending [Puelles 
Benitez, 1989]. The rate of literacy starting to significantly increased  
after the end  of the I World  War in conjunct with all these institution al 
changes and  the relative economic growth enjoyed  by the Country untill 
the mid -thirty, when it was abruptly interrupted  by the civil war (see 
Fig. 2).  
Given these material conditions it is evident that Ortega, in 
proposing a profound  educative and  political reform, was looking at the 
poorness of the factual situation, of which he was informed by the 
statistical reports of his friend  and  d isciple Lorenzo Luzuriaga [Scotton, 
2016]. When, during the LEP Conference in 1914, he called  for the 
collaboration of an entire generation of young students, it cannot be 
d ismissed  the fact that more than half of the Spanish population of that 
time was younger than him [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 141]. Spain was 
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 The Instituto Escuela was the first educative institu tion in Spain that prepared  
the student to enter the University. Later on, as we will see in the final part of 
this thesis, it was the means through which Ortega restarted  to occupy an 
influential cultural position after his exile. 
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indeed  experiencing a generational crash, a crash that more th an 
ideological was grounded  on a very concrete and  material struggle. 
Thus when talking of a new and  an old  politics, found  an extremely 
receptive aud ience ready to listen to him. The civil society of which he 
was talking was composed  by all those dynamics and  energetic young 
persons who attended  his speeches, whereas the State was represented  
by an old -fashion and  aged  intellectual gerontocracy. To look ou tside 
the Spanish boarder, as Ortega d id , was therefore a factual and  vital 
necessity.   
 
 
1.5 A  philosopher or a polit ician?  
In 1910 Ortega obtained  the chair of Metaphysic at the University of 
Madrid . He thus realised  his desire to become an official intellectual, to 
obtain a relevant social status within the Spanish society of the XX 
century. He d id  not renounce to look for the collaboration of the society 
at large, writing in numerous newspapers, launching new reviews and  
speaking in political meetings. He was indeed  a public figure. H is 
political program presented  in 1910 founded  in the follow ing years a 
growing interest also within national politics. Thus, on March 23 1914, 
he was invited  as the representative of the Liga de Educación Política 
Española to pronounce a public speech at the Teatro de la Comedia of 
Madrid . This political association, launched  in 1913, proclaimed  itself 
neutral in relation to the party system even if it was really akin to the 
Partido Reformista [Elorza, 2002: 72-74]. Ortega, on that occasion, clearly 
mixed  his philosophical and  political role, in a conference significantly 
entitled  Vieja y Nueva Política. The pedagogical and  political concerns he 
alread y manifested  in his previous writings
8
 now acquired  a new 
concreteness. Indeed , on this occasion  he formally was the spokesman 
of a political association .  
In this conference he claimed  for a d irect intervention of the 
University and  the schooling system in politics, since he thought that 
the political reform of the country should  have been put into practice by 
starting from an educative process. As he had  previously declared  in a 
conference at the Escuela de Magisterio in 1913, he felt that the “time of 
the master” had  come. In other words, it had  come the right moment for 
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 «El texto de tal d isertación contiene casi todo lo que su autor había ya d icho 
sobre España, en d iferentes ocasiones y en d iversos artículos. No hay pues, 
rectificación, sino exposición sistematizada de conjunto». Cfr. S. M. Tabernero 
del Rio [1993: 57]. 
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implementing a popular education in order to obtain a political 
regeneration. In the Madrilenian meeting of March 1914 he d irectly 
assigned  for the first time this regenerative role specifically to the 
institution to which he belonged , that is the university. The new politics 
mentioned  by Ortega was actually a curious synthesis of pragmatism 
and  idealism, in the sense that he conceived  politics as an intellectual 
activity. Every political decision should  have been taken considering the 
needs of the population at large, thinking deeply to the consequence of 
every choice taking into consideration the existence of a common good . 
Against the caciquismo– that could  be defined  as a political practice of 
lobbying lacking a political cu lture [González Hernández, 1999; 
Villacañas, 2014] – Ortega assigned  to the University, conceived  as a 
laboratory of intellectual thinking, a lead ing role in determining the 
ends that political leaders should  have to realise and  put into practice.  
Not only the politicians, but also the philosopher s and  intellectuals 
of the generation of ‘98, accord ing to Ortega: «ap laudían la mediocridad  
porque no tuvieron la experiencia de lo profund o» [OC, I: 772], largely 
causing d isruptive consequences for the general political and  historical 
condition of the country [Storm, 1999]. Ortega moved  a very rad ical 
critique to the old  politics, the España caduca [OC, I: 762], as he called  it, 
which was conceived  as responsible for the national underdevelopment. 
However, he d id  not call for a complete destruction of the past 
intellectual and  political experiences, bu t rather for their 
modernisation
9
. There were, for instance, some intellectuals figure of the 
previous generation that he considered  as fruitful examples to follow 
even for that new generation that, after his speech, would  have started  
to leader the country, the famous Generación del ’14, a movement that, 
significantly, sprang from the University [Costa Delgado, 2015]. In other 
words, it is not possible du ring this period  to separate the professorship  
of Ortega y Gasset from his political interventions: cu lture and  politics 
were conceived  as synonyms both in theory and  in practice.  
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 He indeed  speaks of a «nueva declaración y voluntad  de pensamientos que, 
más o menos claros, se encuentran ya viviendo en las concienc ias de nuestros 
ciudadanos». J. Ortega y Gasset, Vieja y Nueva Política, in Obras Completas, tomo I, 
p . 710. 
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1.6 Philosophy  as polit ical educat ion : the M editat ions on  
Quixote 
Interestingly enough, the accusations he purported  during the 
political meeting in 1914 d id  not d iffer from the ones he presented  in 
what is unanimously considered  as his first philosophical book: the 
Meditations on Quixote, published  in 1914. In this book he d irectly 
quoted  vast parts of his recent speech, accusing the entire intellectual 
class, that constitu ted  the pillar of the University, to have produced  
intellectuals «educados por una ed ad  rencorosa, que había laminad o el 
universo y hecho de él una su perficie, una pura aparencia» [OC, I: 802]. 
In the Meditations politics and  philosophy are even more strictly 
intertw ined . His interpretation of Cervantes’ book aims at offering a 
new perspective on a very popular text, deeply rooted  in the collective 
identity of Spain. By insisting on his critique against Unamuno [Cerezo 
Galán, 2007], who ind ivid uated  in Don Quixote the essence of a tragic 
character lacerated  by the conflict between faith and  reason [Savignano, 
2013], Ortega identifies in him a d ynamic hero, who not only acted  in a 
new and  positive way, bu t who was also able to transmit and  teach this 
proactive attitude to a larger population [Haro Honrubia, 2006]. Don 
Quijote was used  as a representative of the new national hero. D uring 
his youth Ortega conceived  his role as a philosopher and  the intellectual 
as strictly related  to a political function, and  he was persuaded  of 
having ped agogical mission to accomplish .  
Accord ingly, also the Meditations can be und erstood  as a 
philosophical attempt to build  a new Spain in strong opposition to the 
old -style politics Ortega wanted  to replace. When he speaks about the 
Quixote, he is indeed  talking about the political situation he was living . 
He thought that the only way in which the philosophical practice could  
have been useful would  have been  as a meditation on the present 
enriched  by a theoretical and  historical perspective. Thus it is possible 
to notice an evident proximity of his academic interests to the concrete 
political goals of his generation. So, when he mentions the adventurous 
character of Don Quixote he defines it as a real and  true tendency to 
ameliorate the material conditions. Therefore, not simply as the «vapor 
de un cerebro» [OC, I: 811], that is the mist of a confused  brain such as 
that of a mad . On the contrary, Don Quixote epitomised  a positive 
attitude, maybe u topian but not completely unrealistic, to change the 
circumstances that impeded  the free evolution of one’s own personality 
and , consequently, of society. 
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Ortega tried  to do it by acting as an innovative intellectual from his 
academic chair. Interpreting the desire of a whole generation, he tried  to 
import in Spain the most recent philosophical debates that were 
animating the European intellectual scenario. He was one of those 
young students who, at the beginning of the XX century, had  had  the 
possibility to spend  a formative period  abroad  thanks to the fellowship 
given by the ILE and  the JAE. Indeed , the social ped agogy that Ortega 
imported  and  ad apted  to the Spanish context was strongly influenced  
by the thought of Pau l Natorp, and  the very ideas he purported  found  
within the Spanish academia a very fertile background  for germinating. 
This is proved , for instance, by the fact that the very book of Natorp had  
been translated  into Spanish by a young professor: Manuel García 
Morente, who in the ILE’s Bulletin, when presenting the book, wrote 
that the University of Madrid  should  have dealt with the creation of 
culture in order to profoundly reform and  ameliorate the cond itions of 
the country [Morente, 1914]. Significantly, Ortega calls his meditations 
on Quijote “experiments for rescuing his circumstances”. An expression 
that meant an attempt to elevate the academic and  political debates and  
design a fruitful political project
10
.  
However, by the end  of 1914 the European War was approaching 
and  that political atmosphere which could  have rendered  possible a 
revival of the liberals values was deteriorating. The  LEP, created  just 
few month before, interrupted  its activities. This situation encouraged  
Ortega to think about new political projects with the aim of continuing 
to exercise his influence within the political and  cultu ral scenario. This 
is why he founded , in January 1915, a new cultural review called  
España. This publication  was rendered  possible thanks to the economic 
help of N icolás María de Urgoiti, a Basque entrepreneur who, from then 
on, represented  a constant reference point for financing all Ortega’s 
projects. The goal of España was the same of the LEP and  the PRE and  
among the participants to this project it is possible to find  several people 
who already signed  the Manifesto of the league. Among them Ramiro de 
Maeztu, Pérez de Ayala, Azaña, the very secretary of the PRE, Luis de 
Zulueta and  one of the most acclaimed  intellectuals of that period : 
Eugenio d’Ors [Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 152-153]. In spite of the great 
expectations of Ortega the project was soon aband oned  and  the last 
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 «[Ortega] delinea un’idea d i filosofia come scienza universale coniugata con il 
riconoscimento della sua costitutiva valenza pratica in questa capacità d i 
comprensione- salvación del presente ed  elaborazione d i un progetto politico-
culturale che d isegni, altresì, il compito proprio dell’intellettuale nei confronti 
della realtà» [Cantillo, 2012: 33-34]. 
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articles he published  for this review d ate back to the beginning of 1916. 
The d ismissal of this cultu ral initiative was probably due, as Antonio 
Elorza has demonstrated  [2002: 84-88], to the very limited  aud ience it 
had  been able to reach and  the subsequent economic d ifficulties that 
rendered  impossible its survival.  
  During the period  comprised  between 1910 and  1916 professor 
Ortega y Gasset was not only engaged  in a constant political activity, 
but was also closely tied  to outstand ing politicians. Most of these 
politicians shared  with him a common preoccupation, that is to say that 
they felt the need  to modernise the country accord ing to a liberal 
framework, w ith the aim of increasing social justice and  promoting 
egalitarianism as two basic conditions for rendering possible an open 
and  competitive society. The idea ground ing this movement was that of 
posing the bases for developing a new intellectual elite
11
. The role of this 
elite would  not have been that of perpetuating an oligarchic form of 
exercising power, but rather to implement a real democratisation of 
Spain. N ot in the sense of a general levelling of culture [Haro Honrubia, 
2008: 66], but as an ascending process of the population towards the 
highest level of knowledge. This could  have been rendered  possible by 
the institutionalisation of a popular education and  the d issemination of 
knowledge within the university and  via the existent mass media, i.e. 
newspapers and  cultural reviews. Surely, Ortega obtained  very scarce 
results in terms of mass engagement
12
, but he d id  play an agglu tinative 
role within the progressive political cu lture of his country, d ialoguing 
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 Cerezo Galán [2011: 16-31], significantly defines this period  of Ortega’s 
production as an attempt to establish an enlighten cultural attitude among those 
who had  to act in politics: «La generación de 1914 interviene en la vida pública, 
creando opinión, en cuanto intelectual, redup licativamente, es decir, en función 
de un saber profesional y una d isciplina metódica, que le confiere autoridad  y 
prestigio.[…] La proyección de esta actitud  metódico/ reflexiva en política tenía 
que ser decisiva y definitoria». Ibidem, p . 23. 
12
 Vicente Cacho Viu, for example, is extremely critical in relation to the concrete 
effects of the political pedagogy theorised by Ortega: «el cambio desencadenado 
entre las minorías cultas no tuvo su debido correlato en una accíon educadora 
masiva, hecha imposible por la impermeabilidad  del mundo oficial y aun de 
amplios sectores sed icentemente trad icionales; monopolizador aquel, el Estado, 
de una enseñanza universitaria y, con el tiempo, de cuotas crecientemente 
importantes de la elemental obligatoria, y fuertemente implantados éstos, con 
pedagogías ya andadas a retirar, en los estud ios secundarios». [Cacho Viu,  
2000: 58]. 
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with some political figures such as Francisco Giner de los Ríos
13
 and  
Pablo Iglesias [Cabrero Blasco, 2012].  
To the activity of the LEP, participated  several of the most 
outstand ing figures of that time such as Ramiro de Maeztu, Antonio 
Machado, Manuel Azaña, Pablo Azcárate, Américo Castro, Manuel 
García Morente, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Salvador Mad ariama and  Ramón 
Pérez de Ayala. Ortega represented  the reference point of an entire 
generation which was trying to rad ically change and  revolutionise the 
previous political regime, a modern Don Quixote
14
.  
 
1.7 The Universit y  of M adrid at  t he beginn ing of the X X  
cen tury . 
After the d issolution of the LEP and  the failure of España Ortega 
decided  to devote himself exclusively to the personal meditation and  
the academic life, conceived  for the first time in his personal existence as 
a profession secluded  from a d irect intervention in politics. This new 
aptitude of the philosopher is reflected  in a new sort of publication, 
quite intimate, which he began in 1916: El Espectador. From then on 
Ortega renounced  to the active political intervention , but without 
abd icating to the critical role that he assigned  to the intellectual in 
relation to the political life. He aband oned  the political arena to join a 
new form of critical spectatorship, aiming to «raise a stronghold  against 
politics», offering a pure theoretical account on political issues
15
. 
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 Giner de los Ríos saw «en Ortega al lider de la generación de jovenes 
intelectuales que toman con vigor las riendas de la cultura española y que , por 
encima de la generación que les precede, conectan con la moral de la ciencia que 
Giner defendía desde los comienzos de la Restauración». Aymerich Soler, 2002: 
173. 
14
 See on this point the very precise work by Menéndez Alzamora, La generación 
del 14 y José Ortega y Gasset, in M. Menéndez Alzamora and  Robles Egea (eds.), 
Pensamiento político en la España contemporánea, Trotta, Madrid , 2013. On this 
generation see as well the interesting article by Costa Delgado, Capital cultural, 
carrera profesional y trayectoria política en la crisis de la Restauración , in «Sociología 
Histórica», 2, 2013, pp. 153-180. 
15
 As Westler and  Craiutu [2015: 594] correctly pu t it: «In Ortega’s view, the task 
of El Espectador was to curve out a space for independent reflection in an age of 
impassioned  politics and  to provide respite to those weary of ideologically 
driven d iscourses and who sought to preserve their intellectual independence. 
As such, El Espectador was supposed  to represent a rejection of “bad” politics, 
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In the meanwhile he was teaching at the University of Madrid , an 
institution characterised  by a very elitist and  old -fashioned  structure, 
but with reformist tendencies. Indeed , the JAE was acquiring a 
predominant role also within this University, and  at that time 
represented  the most prestigious cultural institu tion of the country. The 
JAE represented  the engine of the Spanish socio-political modernisation 
and  for this reason, in sp ite of declaring its political neutrality, it had  to 
face the resistances of conservatives and  catholic sectors both within 
and  outside the University. Nevertheless, after having overcome a first 
political impasse that could  have determined  the death of the JAE at its 
very beginning
16
, it later gained  a growing influence within the 
University as a cu ltural reference point  [Otero Carvajal and  López 
Sánchez, 2012: 129].  
Ortega’s relation with the ILE and , subsequently, w ith the JAE , was 
extremely close. He shared  the same interests in renewing the cultural 
and  political scenario through a ped agogical activity and  he was 
particu larly fascinated  by its founder: Francisco Giner de los Ríos 
[Sánchez de Andres, 2010: 49-93]. Ortega was not the only one to share 
this vision. Indeed , the fellowship  program carried  on by the JAE had  
produced  in very few years a fervent climate of international 
dynamism. During the first years of its life, the program gave to more 
than 300 university students and  young researcher s the possibility to 
spend  a period  abroad , an impressive number considering the scarcity 
of the student population. Moreover , the majority of these students 
during their stud ies in a foreign university had  the opportunity to 
acquire an in-depth knowledge on educative and  ped agogical issues, on 
the d idactic method ology and  the university reforms that had  been 
recently carried  out in other country. In fact, 140 of the total fellowships 
given between 1907 and  1914 had  been allocated  to research conducted  
on ped agogical themes [Marín Eced  1987: 261-278]. An extraord inary 
effort which resulted  in a large number of publications explicitly 
                                                                                                                                
i.e. ideological politics, and  it constituted  a model for a more effective 
intellectual engagement with the political world».  
16
 The most violent attack against the JAE came from the very minister 
Rodríguez San Pedro who on December 27, 1907, declared  at the Congress of 
deputy his deepest worry for the consequences that  this institution could  have 
produced  in terms of undesired  modernisation: «Si por un cosmopolitismo 
exagerado no puden debilitarse y quebrantarse los fundamentos morales en que 
toda la Nación debe descansar». Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, legislature 1907, 
vol. 436, n. 127, p . 4003. 
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devoted  to these problems. Among the most prolific researchers and  
writers who had  been formed via a JAE’s fellowship it is possible to find  
authors such as: Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Rod olfo Llopis Ferrándiz, 
Fernando García Medina, Antonio Gil Muñiz, Concepción Sáinz -Amor 
García, Félix Martí Alpera, Antonio Juan Onieva Santamaría, Pedro 
Rosselló Blanch e Fernando Sáinz Ruiz.  
Thus the ample general consensus of Ortega’s proposal was mainly 
especially due to the fact that the aud ience to whom he was speaking 
had  received  his very intellectual inputs and  shared  a common vision. 
The tight bond  between the JAE and  the University was legally 
recognised  by a Royal Decree (11-4-1913) which established  that its 
secretary would  have to be a university professor. Significantly, one of 
the most vigorous supporters of the JAE in the parliament was Eduardo 
Ortega y Gasset, the brother of the philosopher. In the course of a 
d iscussion on the possibility to limit the scope of the JAE he maintained  
the necessity of preserving the autonomy of the institution, affirming 
that the vision it endorsed  was not a form of rad icalism, bu t just a 
moderate reformism which could  have enriched  the liberal trad ition of 
the country without any subversive tendency
17
.    
This d iscussion in the parliament revealed  the existence of a more or 
less hidden struggle that was taking place inside the University during 
that period . The growing power exercised  by the ILE and  the Krausist 
influences d id  encounter the opposition of the catholic members of the 
faculty of Philosophy of the University of Madrid , exacerbating an 
opposition rooted  in a recent past. In particu lar, whereas the 
department of Metaphysics was trad itionally more inclined  towards a 
laic and  progressive philosophical and  political outlook , since the 
teaching of the former Republic president Nicolás Salmerón Alonso 
[Alcaraz, 1991]; on the contrary the department of the History of 
Philosophy constituted , since the professorship of Marcelino Menéndez 
y Pelayo, an outpost of the trad itionalism and  anti-Krausism. In spite of 
being originally created  by the founder of the Krausist movement in 
Spain, i.e. Sanz del Río [Orden Jiménez, 2000] this department 
constituted , since the time of Menéndez Pelayo, the epicentre of the 
resistance against the modernisation of the University. Menéndez 
Pelayo’s id iosyncrasy towards Krausism traced  back to his youth as a 
student of professor Salmerón, who he considered  as a despotic and  
incompetent teacher. For instance, he wrote to his friend  a letter , dated  
1874, in which he condemned  the temper of the professor with this final 
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 See the interesting text collected  in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, legislature 
1914, vol. 501, n. 110: 3366, 3397-3398. 
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remark: «Esto te dará muestra de lo que son los Krausistas, de cuyas 
manos qu iera Dios que te veas siempre libre»
18
.  
When Ortega d id  obtain the chair of Metaphysics he had  to defend  
also the interests of the institution that he ind irectly represented , that is 
the ILE and  the Republican trad ition. In the meanwhile, after the death 
of Menéndez Pelayo, the chair of History of Philosophy had  been 
assigned  to Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín who, since 1910, started  to ed it 
the complete works of his master. The struggle among the two souls of 
the Faculty of Philosophy constituted  a recurrent character of the 
Spanish University until the civil war which ended  up  in the hegemony 
of the most trad itionalist side. A continuous contraposition between 
laicism (Ortega), and  Catholicism (Menéndez Pelayo-Bonilla-Zubiri) 
[Cañas López, 2005]. A latent struggle that d id  not vanish neither 
during the ‘30s, when a philosopher somehow akin to the philosophy of 
Ortega, that is Xavier Zubiri, was put in -charge of the Department of 
History of Philosophy. 
José Ortega y Gasset was then acquiring a growing influent ial role 
within the intellectual sphere and  also within the public opinion. After 
his Madrilenian conference and  the publication of the Meditations he 
became, as Jord i Gracia [2014: 84] has written, something similar to a 
media star of the time. He represented  an emblematic figure of what 
later would  have been named the Edad de Plata of Spanish cu lture, an 
intellectual constellation in which Ortega represented  a planet able to 
attract several satellites, as illustrated  by a marvellous painting of 
Giménez Caballero in 1928 (see Annex 1).  
This image also constitu tes a wonderful testimony of the counterpart 
of this modernising group that, during the Edad de Plata and  also in the 
following years, characterised  the conservative tendency of the Spanish 
cultural system: a contraposition among d iametrical opposite 
intellectual and  political groups that existed  not only inside the Faculty 
of Philosophy but also in other facu lties and , more generally speaking, 
in the whole cu ltural debate. This contraposition  would  later cause 
d isruptive consequences in the political history of the country. On t he 
one hand  the galaxy of Ortega, who had  a very relevant role during the 
‘20s. This group  gravitated  towards the liberal newspaper El Sol, 
lunched  by Ortega and  Urgoiti in 1917 [Desvois, 2010]. On the other 
side, the group which composed  the ed itorial staff of ABC, a 
conservative newspaper which during the next decades would  replace 
the hegemonic role played  by Ortega and  his followers. Ortega’s 
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 Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Epistolario, Fundación Universitaria Española, 
Madrid  1982-1991, I: 104. 
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collaboration with  El Sol was extremely fertile. He chose this particular 
means to go beyond  the limited  academic circle. During fifteen years 
(1917-31) he published  in El Sol 426 articles. For this reason, when 
abandoning this ed itorial project, in 1931, he affirmed  that in those 
articles one could  have found  his whole philosophy in pills
19
 [OC, IV: 
625]. 
So, by the end  of the second  decade of the XX century , the wish of 
reforming and  modernising the country founded , in the University of 
Madrid , the support of a young generation of students and  researchers 
really willing to change it. This desire was concretised  also from a 
legislative point of view through the project of University autonomy 
proposed  by the minister of education César Silió in 1919. The aims that 
moved  the minister was very similar to the one purported  by Ortega, as 
revealed  by a precedent essay written by Silió in 1914. Indeed , he 
thought that the University represented  an old -fashioned  institution 
that should  have been reformed in order to ameliorate the conditions of 
the society as a whole:  
   
Pensamos –separándonos de la opinión de muchos a quienes asusta la idea 
de conceder un régimen de libertad  a las actuales universidades, entecas y 
viciadas en su función – que en el rad icalismo de la reforma podrá hallarse 
el remedio.[…]Hay que proceder de manera que resulten invertidos los 
estímulos: que haya de preferirse a la Universidad  preparatoria de 
exámenes rutinarios y fáciles, la Universidad  elaboradora de ciencia y 
formadora de hombres [Silió, 1914: 103]. 
 
Silió’s project aimed  to reform an institu tion considered  as unable to 
propagate to the rest of a population a cu lture that could  have been 
perceived  as useful. Before starting to implement the University system, 
not only in the biggest cities of the country but also in smaller towns, it 
would  have been necessary to reform and  modernise this institution by 
promoting a reform from within [Puyol Montero, 2011: 24-29]. This 
thought was totally shared  by the very Ortega, has proven by an article 
he wrote in 1915 for España, in which he contrasted  the idea of opening 
a new university in Murcia
20
.  
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 For a detailed  study of the journalistic activity of Ortega y Gasset during this 
period  see the very interesting article of Blanco Alonso, 2010, in particular pp. 
85-100. 
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 «Llevar a Murcia una Universidad  era como enviarles un cuerpo muerto, de 
que en su lugar debía creares una institución más moderna y eficaz» [OC, I:855]. 
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The catastrophic conditions of the university had  been denounced  
also by some professors of the University of Madrid , significantly by 
one of Ortega’s friend  and  a member of the LEP: Manuel García 
Morente. A year before the presentation of Silió’s p roject he wrote a 
long essay for the Bulletin of the ILE in which he highlighted  the 
existence of a constitu tive problem inside that institution: «El problema 
interno de la Universid ad  no puede resolverse sino por la Universid ad  
misma» [García Morente, 1996 [1918]: I, 2: 86]. When the minister 
announced  the reform project he praised  the decision. He was 
persuaded , as his friend  Ortega was, that all the political and  social 
problems of the country sprang from the deficits of the University 
system. Commenting the project of the minister he wrote: «La 
decadencia de la Universidad  española es atribuible a muchas causas 
ciertamente; pero una de ellas, y de no escasa importancia, es el 
alejamiento de la socied ad , en que la Universidad  ha ido malviviend o» 
[García Morente 1996 [1919]: I, 2: 146].  
By separating this institution from the State’s bureaucracy, accord ing 
to Morente, it would  have been possible to near the civil society. The 
independence of the University from politics, its au tonomy and  the 
possibility of developing an open and  free scientific research cou ld  have 
produce a growing interest among the intellectuals in the quality of the 
infrastructures in which they teach and  of the methodology of their 
teachings. Improving the interests for the real effects that they research 
could  bring about in society. Morente d id  not ponder exclusively a 
formal reform, bu t tried  to define also the basic gu idelines of a new 
methodology and  contents of teaching. He underlined  the need  of a 
critical education aimed  at forming democratic habits and  also at  
enhancing the research at its most advanced  level
21
. In fact, he thought 
that an education purely attentive to the real cond itions of the job 
market would  have been a perversion of the authentic goal of the 
university system
22
. He also set some concrete goals to be realised  in 
terms of modernisation of the university structure: the enhancing of the 
library facilities, of seminars and  laboratories, the active collaboration 
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 «La función universitaria, en consecuencia, no será solamente la docente de 
enseñar sino, sobre todo, la productiva, la investigadora, la inventora» [García 
Morente, 1996 [1919], I, 2: 150]. 
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valor de la ciencia. El cuarto es una perversión del ideal universitario, cuasa por 
el abuso del poder central del Estado» [Ibidem: 149]. 
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between research groups of experienced  scholars and  young students 
with the aim of limiting the formal lectures. Generally speaking, a 
growing participation of the students to the life of the University and  a 
selection of the teachers accord ing to a competitive criter ion. The 
Spanish university were about to follow the examples of other European 
countries engaged  in an overall reform of this institution, in particular 
following the French model [Baratas Díaz, 1995], enhancing the higher 
education autonomy and  the creation of independent research centres. 
To summarise, it seems correct to affirm that the JAE had  brought 
about, in a very short period  of time, enormous resu lts. It realised  an 
extensive lobbying activity within the University and , in particular, via 
the Centro de Estudios Históricos, which generated  a positive climate that 
permitted  to put into practice a rad ical change. Among the members of 
the Centro, a research institute of advanced  stud ies, there were 
outstand ing intellectual figures such as Menéndez Pidal, Americo 
Castro, Manuel  Bartolomé Cossio, Julian Besteiro, Manuel Garcia 
Morente and  José Ortega y Gasset.  
However, in March 1922, the scenario significantly changed: the 
minister’s activity  was stopped  by a new wave of resistance which 
sprang from the same University of Madrid , from its conservative and  
catholic wing. The excuse was offered  by the controversy on the 
celebration of the Day of the Stu dent. This d ay was trad itionally 
celebrated  by the catholic student association on March 7
th
, anniversary 
of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The minister decided  to renew this trad ition, 
without considering the fact that the Dean of the University of Madrid , 
Carracido, had  alread y set a d ifferent date: February 4
th
. This d ichotomy 
produced  a crash of catholic against nonreligious associations. The first 
were supported  by the political forces: not only the minister but also the 
King decided  to take part in the celebration taking p lace in March. This 
event opened  the way to an overt conflict between trad itionalists an d  
reformists, both inside and  ou tside the University. A conflict that 
reached  politics, determining the end  of Silió’s project and  his 
replacement d uring the following summer with a trad itionalist minister: 
Montejo y  Rica. 
 
1.8  The gu idelines of Ortega’s professorship 
The philosophy of Ortega during this period  developed  accord ing to 
some main basic guidelines: the interest for  Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism 
and  Husserl’s phenomenology and  the study of the value theory 
developed  by Max Scheler [Savignano, 1996: 5-20]. Starting from all 
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these influences he developed  his theory of perspectivism, a 
philosophical account that assigned  to single ind ividuals a creative and  
productive function in relation to the reality surrounding them 
[Graham, 1994; Defez i Martín, 2003]. All these d ifferent influences 
constituted  the object of his teachings and  constituted  also part of a 
theory of education he sporad ically sketched  during his lectures and  
writings. As already pointed  out, the theme of ed ucation played  a 
fundamental role in his most famous essays and  conference, such as the 
Meditations on Quixote and  Vieja y Nueva Política, but also in other 
writings such as El Quijote en la Escuela (1920). In all these texts Ortega 
repudiated  an utilitarian form of education which was largely accepted  
at that time and  represented , in Spain, by Antonio Zozaya
23
.  
His criticisms toward s an utilitarian concept of ed ucation were 
d irected  against the tendency of prioritising the preservation of the 
status quo over the possibility of tracing new scenarios. He presented  
his arguments in particular in an article entitled  Los “Nuevos” Estados 
Unidos in which, by following the theses of the German pedagogue 
Georg Kerschensteiner, he describe his education as opposed  to the 
process of adap tation in utilitarian terms, talking about a pedagogía 
deportiva in contrast to a pedagogía utilitaria. Influenced  by the new 
biological d iscoveries, and  in particular by the theories of Hans Driesch 
(1867-1941) and  Jakob Von Uexküll (1864-1944)
24
, Ortega considered  the 
evolution of human life not as a mere form of adaptation to reality, but 
rather as a creation and  mould ing of a new state of affairs  [Rogers, 
1994]. Therefore, he considered  pedagogy as a d iscipline aimed  at 
stimulating human creativity without thinking exclusively to its 
pragmatic utility. That is to say, not considering as the ultimate goal of 
education that of promoting only the ability of solving pragmatic 
problems for achieving predetermined  targets. For this reason he gave 
particu larly importance to a humanistic culture which cou ld  enhance 
the creative potentiality of each person, as demonstrated  in particular 
by the poetic thinking and  the use of metaphors as a personal language 
having a universal valid ity
25
.  
                                                          
23
 In 1920 Zozaya published  an article, entitled  Aprendamos a vivir, whose thesis 
were in rad ical opposition to the ones purported by Ortega. See La Libertad, 12-
III-1920.   
24
 Regard ing this biologist Ortega declared  in 1922: «[D]ebo aclarar que sobre mí 
ha ejercido, desde 1913, gran influencia estas meditaciones biolόgicas. Esta 
influencia no ha sido meramente científica, sino cord ial» [OC, VI: 308]. 
25
 Salas Ortueta, 2009: 141: “El lenguaje, la perspectiva ind ividual y el contexto 
social dentro del cual un ind ividuo se produce preexisten a la invención de una 
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He conceived  education as the main  way through which all persons 
could  have reached  a complete fulfilment of their own humanity 
through a liberal process of emancipation and  self-improvement
26
. 
Accord ingly, he thought that, as a professor, he had  the duty to foster 
the ethics of research among his students and  to contribute to the 
enhancement of culture, which in this period , for him, represented  a 
sort of ethical and  socio-pedagogical norm [Parente, 2013: 13]. Not just 
an abstract idea, but a principle of moral conduct
27
 [Pellicani, 1971]. 
For these reasons, all the social institutions that were responsible for 
the education of the young generation s – such as the Church, the State, 
the School and  the private institu tes of education – should  have 
contributed  to ameliorate the lives of each and  every citizen so as to 
offer to everyone the same opportunity to live a satisfactory life
28
. Thus, 
in this period , Ortega’s philosophical account was strictly bound  to his 
pedagogical concern. For instance, the very d istinction between a rigid  
and  bureaucratic State and  a fervent civil society is also reflected  in his 
theory of education, with the d istinction between an external and  
imposed  culture as opposed  to a personal and  interiorised  education. 
This second  type of education d iffers from the first insofar as it always 
put into question the external reality, fostering a proactive attitude 
towards the research and  the significance of culture for one’s own life 
[Ferrari Nieto, 2009]. This is due to the fact that, accord ing to Ortega, 
knowing is d ifferent from comprehending [Scotton, 2014], and  this is 
true in particular as far as the political sphere is concerned  [OC, I:770].  
Starting from these premises Ortega assigned  to education a very 
precise political goal. Indeed , given that culture is not merely conceived  
                                                                                                                                
metáfora y a la vez este decir es efectivo e incluso puede adquirir vigencia de 
acuerdo con unas condiciones o reglas». On the importance of metaphor as an 
expression of the personality and  as a form of vital reason valid  at the 
interpersonal level see in particular Gutiérrez Pozo, 2000a and  2000b. A more 
recent perspective is offered  also by Scotton, 2014. 
26
 To Ortega the sportive attitude of human intelligence would ultimately render 
possible the enanchement of «Los ímpetus originarios de la psique, como son el 
coraje y la curiosidad , el amor y el od io, la agilidad  intelectual, el afán de gozar 
y triunfar, la confianza en sí y en el mundo, la imaginación, la memoria» [OC, II: 
405] 
27
 «La cultura – la vertiente ideal de las cosas – pretende establecerse como un 
mundo aparte y suficiente, ad onde podamos trasladar nuestras entrañas. Esto es 
una ilusión y sólo irada como ilusión, sólo puesta como un espejismo sobre la 
tierra, está la cultura puesta en su lugar» [OC, I: 812]. 
28
 «Los organismos por la cultura creados – ciencia o moral, Estado o Iglesia – no 
tienen otro fin que el aumento y potenciación de la vida» [OC, II:225]. 
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as an external set of knowledge but also as an internal and  personalised  
comprehension of the world  which contributes to forge the moral and  
intellectual habit of each ind ivid ual, this means that each person 
possesses a proactive attitude to change the external reality accord ing to 
his perception of the normative character of social ru les. When Ortega 
affirms that «la voluntad  es un objeto paradoxal que empieza en la 
realid ad  y acaba en lo ideal» [OC, I: 818], this means that every cultural 
production and  political reality cannot be conceived  without taking into 
account the ind ividual who brought it about, and  that every significant 
social change cannot but be the result of an educational process and  the 
realisation of a vital need . The function of education is therefore that of 
exhibiting the relation between the ind ividual and  the community in a 
way that can render the second  of these terms intelligible to the first
29
. 
And  this is rendered  possible in particular by the process of rendering 
comprehensible the culture of a nation, that is the raison d’être of the 
community. For this reason, he wrote:  
 
La cultura nos proporciona objetos ya purificados, que alguna vez fueron 
vida espontánea e inmediata, y hoy, gracias a la labor reflexiva, parecen 
libres del espacio y del tiempo [...] Lo que hoy recibimos ya ornado con 
sublimes aureolas, tuvo a su tiempo que estrecharse y encogerse para pasar 
por el corazón de un hombre [OC, I: 755]. 
 
Ortega exhibits an Aristotelian account of human being, considered  
as a social animal [Haro Honrubia, 2015: 498]. But to be a social being 
every and  each ind ivid ual must comprehend  the reality which 
surrounds him and  have to retrace the reasons which have prod uced  
that society rather than another. In other words, for being a member of a 
community each person must comprehend  and  share with the other 
members of the same group a common background , and  this 
contributes to define a collective identity which constitutes the basis of 
the social consensus:  
 
Apenas herida la retina por la saeta forastera, acude allí nuestra íntima, 
personal energía, y detiene la irrupción. La impresión es filiada, sometida a 
civilidad , pensada – y de este modo entra a cooperar en el ed ificio de 
nuestra personalidad . [OC, I: 781] 
                                                          
29
 It is true as Haro Honrubia wrote, that during his youth and  before 1914: 
«Para Ortega el valor del ind ividuo se manifiesta y justifica en lo social o 
colectivo» [2015: 495], bu t at the same time the society has to justify his existence 
by calling for the participation and  collaboration of the ind ividuals who 
compose the community.  
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This is evidently opposed  to a defence of the status quo. In fact, the 
rejection of the acquired  culture is always possible and  sometimes 
desirable. Thanks to the better comprehension offered  by the educative 
process this rejection would  not ultimately end  up in an anarchical rash, 
but rather in a reasonable political proposal rising from the will of the 
single ind ividualities. From a political point of view, Ortega’s pedagogy 
cannot be classified  neither as conservative nor as revolutionary. On the 
contrary, it constitutes a p roject of participative politics, characterised  
by a previous revitalisation and  rationalisation of the public debate 
through an educative process since, as he pu t it: «una cu ltura 
impresionista está condenada a no ser una cu ltura progresiva» [OC, I: 
785].  
A democratic system that d id  not prioritise a critical education 
among its citizens would  consequently be, accord ing to Ortega, a de 
facto non-democratic government. Civilisation is therefore conceived  by 
the Spanish philosopher as a process of development of ind ividual 
freedom in order to contribute to the social progress [Serafín-Tabernero, 
2009]. Indeed , it is in the single person that Ortega identifies the 
cornerstone of the relation between the ind ividual and  the community , 
and  this is reflected  in his ped agogy that assigns a pivotal role to the 
valorisation of one’s own vitality . Within this general philosophical and  
pedagogical outlook and  the context described  in the precedent 
paragraphs, Ortega y Gasset exercised  his professorship at the 
University of Madrid  arousing the interest of the students and  
stimulating a regeneration of the University from within. The significant 
effects of his teaching on the political and  cultural Spanish scenario will 
be analysed  in detail in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2. 
Fortunes and  failu res. The gold en age 
of an impertinent intellectual  
The period  comprised  between 1920 and  1935 represents the apogee of 
Ortega’s intellectual and  political experience , in all its facets and  
d ifferent roles. During this period  he was firstly a respected  political 
advisor and , successively, the founder and  leader of a liberal party . The 
centre of his interests and  preoccupations was still represented  by the 
educative problem that during these years started  to be qu ite 
exclusively declined  in the terms of the need  of a comprehensive 
university reform. In a period  in which both at a national and  at an 
international level the political scenario was experiencing a continuous 
institutional turmoil, the pedagogical proposal of the Spanish 
philosopher acquired  a more and  more relevant political scope and  
goal. This was partially due to the constitutive strand s of his educative 
theorisation, always conceived  as a form of enhancing the political 
awareness and  consequent participation of citizens to public life. 
However, the social political contingencies d id  d etermine a new  
formulation of the main problems that had  always represented  the 
kernel of Ortega’s political and  ped agogical vision. In this context , he 
had  to d irectly face a new and  compelling problem: the education not 
only of the uneducated  person, but also and  foremost of the impolite 
one, of the person who rejects all form of education but who violently 
demands his right to intervene in the public sphere.  
This chapter investigates (§1) Ortega’s definition of the proper role 
of the intellectual and  liberal philosopher as part of a restricted  elite 
that, far for being separated  to the rest of the society, had  to accomplish 
to its political responsibility for the enhancing and  amelioration of 
democracy. It is exactly to promote this cultural and  social development 
that the philosopher created  what would  have been one of his most 
effective and  important projects: the Revista de Occidente (§2). Through 
this ed itorial project he was able to reach a far more ampler public than 
the one that populated  the University, obtaining a social power and  a 
public recognition that rendered  him a reference point not only within 
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the academia but also and  foremost within the whole Spanish liberal 
bourgeoisie. At the same time, he continued  exercising a lead ing role 
also within the Faculty of philosophy at the University of Madrid  (§3), 
where he started  to focus more frequently on ped agogical issues, w ith 
the aim of proposing a reform of the intellectual both inside the 
university and  in the social sphere. The changing political conditions 
and , in particular, (§4) the onset of the d ictatorship of Primo de Rivera 
determined  the first of a series of critical moments within the life of 
Ortega y Gasset both as a liberal thinker and  as a public figure. 
However, whereas many Spanish and  international intellectuals were 
increasingly moving towards fascists or at least au thoritative political 
perspective Ortega, on the contrary, always maintained  during the 
period  of the d ictatorship  a liberal outlook, persuaded  that the only 
plausible solution to every political question should  have been offered  
by a critical analysis of reality, and  never by a violent intervention. In 
the meanwhile, (§5) the University of Madrid  was acquiring a more and  
more massive d imension that mirrored  both the growing extension of 
the middle class of the country and  its grow ing politicisation that was 
causing d isrup tive consequences in the institutional stability of the 
nation. Ortega d id  consider as ind ispensable such a reflection on these 
new phenomena. H is ideas would  have been translated  into an overall 
philosophical account immediately after the end  of Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship, mainly through the publication of two main books: (§6), 
The revolt of the masses and  The mission of the University. These texts 
focused  on the same problem – the dangerous relationship between 
democracy and  the mass society – by two complementing perspective: 
from the point of view of the political ruler and  from the point of view 
of the intellectual leader. The two perspective ultimately  merged  in the 
very experience of Ortega who in 1931 founded  with some other liberal 
intellectuals the Agrupación a Servicio de la República (§7). This new form 
of philosophical intervention in the political sphere represented  the 
peak of Ortega’s long med itation on the role of the intellectual in society 
and  an experience that marked  also the successive political and  cultural 
life of the nation in the following years. Significantly enough, one of the 
institution which benefitted  the most from this intellectual intervention 
in the realm of politics would  have been (§8) the University, and  in 
particu lar the one of Madrid  and  its humanistic faculties that lived  an 
extremely exciting chapter of its life that  would  have been dramatically 
put into question during the following years. 
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2.1.  Ortega behind the scenes of polit ics  
Ortega’s d isaffection towards an active political participation and  
the following focus on the academic activity d id  not produce a lack of 
interest in political issues in the period  comprised  between 1915 and  
1922. On the contrary, he played  a peculiar role of political advisor 
concerning all the major topics at stake within the public debate. This is 
evidently reflected  in the articles he published  for three main 
newspapers and  reviews: El Imparcial, El Sol and  España.  
In the liberal newspaper El Imparcial he published  in 1917 a series of 
articles significantly entitled  Hacia una mejor política, [Towards a better 
politics]. Through this slogan he called  for a substantial change in the 
way in which the political themes were d iscussed  within the public 
debate, both in the Parliament and  in the ampler domain of the civil 
society. Indeed , he was persuaded  that only by sharing a better 
understand ing of the political issues at stake and  favouring a well-
informed public op inion, it would  have been possible to construct a 
better society. For overcoming the politics of the Restauración he 
considered  as ind ispensable firstly to educate citizens in order to build  a 
public opinion: «Los ministros españoles tienen de la vid a social una 
idea propia, a la vez, de un Faraón y de un cacique de aldea. Creen que 
la vid a social se hace en sus despachos. No se enteran de que la vid a 
social es convivencia» [OC, III:25].  
For this reason, Ortega assigns to the intellectuals a pivotal role in 
the process of build ing the public opinion. He thought that only by 
nearing citizens to the parliamentary d iscussions and  stimulating a 
conscious debate within the civil society on these themes, the goal of 
constructing a solid  public opinion  cou ld  have been realised . Moreover, 
he was persuaded  that this process should  have been put into practice 
by a new generation of young intellectuals – professors, teachers and  so 
on – who, guided  by the common purpose of modernising the country, 
had  to reform an old  and  obsolete political system. The most significant 
instances of this tendency in the works of Ortega are respectively an 
article and  a long essay he published  in España and  El Sol: Imperativo de 
intelectualidad (1922) and  España Invertebrada (1922). This second  text in 
particu lar enjoyed  an incred ible fortune not only in Spain but also 
abroad , significantly contributing to determine the most various and  
often antithetical interpretations of the political and  social thought of 
Ortega during his whole life
30
. 
                                                          
30
 Ortega, in the prologue to the second  ed ition of this essay expressed  his 
worries for this multiplicity of interpretation s that often subverted  the sense of 
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During the ‘20s the philosopher unceasingly called  for a twofold  
reform of the Spanish cu ltu re, that is to say both a change in the general 
philosophical outlook provided  by the University and  a reform of the 
relationship  among intellectuals, politicians and  civil society 
[Savignano, 1983: 25]. In particular, he conceived  that professors, w riters 
and  scientists should  all contribute to the reform of the political 
d iscourse by forming an enlighten elite able to set the bases of the social 
consensus towards a new form of conceiving politics: «construir una 
minoría selecta capaz de influir hond amente en los destinos étnicos y 
dar un comienzo de nueva organización a este pueblo nuestro que se 
deshace y atomiza d ía por d ía» [OC, III: 383]. The pessimism which 
followed  the failure of the LEP in 1914 just vanished  in 1922 with the 
publication of the Imperativo de Intelectualidad, a text in which Ortega 
declares that the Spanish intellectuals had  finally the opportunity to 
accomplish to their political mission, that was «la hora de la gran tarea» 
[Ibidem]. After the end  of the I World  War he conceived  the possibility of 
putting into practice a form of engaged  professorship , abandoning the 
party system, cou ld  have renewed the reformist tend ency ind icated  by 
the generation of the ’14. By appealing to a specific class, that was that 
of the intellectuals and  university teachers, he envisaged  the chance of 
constructing an aristocratic elite willing to ameliorate the general 
condition of the whole civil society [OC: III: 385]. 
In order to do this he thought it was ind ispensable that intellectuals 
traced  the basic guidelines of a political project aimed  to instil in the 
public opinion the wish of taking part into a common national destiny 
for realising a new and  better society. This is the main top ic of his 
España Invertebrada that begins by taking into consideration the issue of 
the separatist movements of the Northern regions. These movements 
had  recently produced  violent manifestation against the State 
government, as in the fam ous case of the strike in Barcelona in 1919 
whose main causes can be traced  back to a lack of confidence in an old -
fashioned  political system [Bengoechea, 1998; Prad as Baena, 2003]. 
Thus, in order to unify the country, it was necessary to move towards 
the realisation of a unanimously shared  political vision. Indeed , he 
conceived  a nation, like Renan, as an everyd ay plebiscite, that is to say 
as a continuous and  enthusiastic collaboration of citizens to a common 
and  unified  political project. For realising this quite utopian goal it was 
                                                                                                                                
his political view. OC, III: 423: «Si yo hubiese podido prever para él tan 
envid iable fortuna, ni lo habría publicado. […] Al encontrarse ahora este ensayo 
con los lectores que no estaban previstos, temo que padezca su contenido 
algunas malas interpretaciones». 
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necessary to count on a solid  intelligentsia, able to transmit this project to 
the public opinion
31
. 
The basic aim of this intellectual influence was that of mitigating the 
d ramatic and  violent effects of a d irect intervention of the masses in the 
political life, as recently proved  by the Catalan tu rmoil and  by the 
bolshevist revolution. All these very d ifferent outbreaks of political 
violence, to Ortega, shared  a basic trait, i.e. a brutal aggressiveness that 
was due to a lack of thinking and  planning. A lack both of a real 
comprehension of the social norms and  of a set of political reforms. For 
these reasons he called  for the need  of improving a reflexive attitude 
concerning political issues both among politicians and  the civil society. 
He thought that the masses, that were increasingly conquering larger 
political influence within the European society, lacked  the essential 
ability to take part into a serious political debate d ue to educational 
shortages. In fact, he believed  that only education should  have provided  
the basic abilities for understating and  taking part in a really 
participative democratic process. It was necessary to enhance a process 
of alphabetisation and  mass education, not of ind octrination but of 
critical thinking. In fact, he thought that all revolutionary movements were 
first and foremost blatant manifestations of cultural problems rather than 
political ones. The lack of trust in the leading classes of the country had to be 
counter by an educative process. In fact: 
 
Este fenómeno mortal de insubord inación espiritual de las masas contra 
toda minoría eminente se manifiesta con tanta mayor exquisitez cuanto más 
nos alejamos de la zona política. Así el público de los espectáculos y 
conciertos se cree superior a todo dramaturgo, compositor o crítico, y se 
complace en cocear a unos y otros. Por muy escasa d iscreción y sabiduría 
que goce el crítico, siempre ocurrirá que posee más ambas calidades que la 
mayoría del público. Sería lo natural que ese público sintiese la evidente  
superioridad  del crítico y, reservandose toda la independencia definitiva 
que parece justa, hubiese en él la tendencia de dejarse influir por las 
estimaciones del entendido. Pero nuestro público parte d e un estado de 
espíritu  inverso a éste: la sospecha d e que alguien pretenda entender de algo 
un poco más que él, le pone fuera de sí. [OC, III: 481-482]. 
  
The minority recalled  by Ortega in España Invertebrada (1922) is not 
formed by a nobility or by an aristocracy of money. On the contrary, he 
purports the necessity of constructing a minoría selecta in virtue of the 
                                                          
31
 On the relation between this intellectual elite and  the general population see in 
particular Haro Honrubia, 2008. 
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ind ividual’s merits. A ruling class able to be an example of virtue, 
competence, knowledge and  that d oes not impose its power but rather 
is able to conquest and  attract the masses. The concepts presented  by 
Ortega in this text have frequently been interpreted  as the expression of 
a political thought on the border between an authoritative democracy 
and  a form of conservatism [Achiri, 2012]. However, the aristocracy of 
spirit described  in his writings reveals a completely d ifferent aim
32
. 
Indeed , he repeated ly speaks about the construction of a “new -man” 
during this period , using a well-imposed  rhetorical expression of those 
times
33
. However, when talking about this new man he never refers to a 
new political leader, but rather to the need  of forming a new type o f 
citizen. Therefore, his form of aristocratism cannot be separated  from 
the concurrent attempt to p romote a cultural reform of the coun try so to 
avoid  the degeneration of democracy into a pernicious anarchism.  
The mass is thought by Ortega as a potentially positive political 
resource but only insofar as it rationally participates in the public 
debate. For this purpose, education is needed  in order to train citizens to 
become free and  active members of a social community . For this reason, 
as he put it: «es la política quien debe ad aptarse a la pedagogía, la cual 
conquistará sus fines p roprio y sublimes» [OC, III: 517]. The 
construction of a ruling class constituted  only the first but ind ispensable 
phase of Ortega’s political proposal, since its very construction was 
thought as the basic instrument through which it would  have been 
possible to forge a new form of enlighten ed  citizenship. In fact: 
 
En la clase intelectual reside vagamente - ¡muy vagamente, es cierto! – la 
única posibilidad  de constituir una minoría selecta capaz de influir 
hondamente en los destinos étnicos y dar un comienzo de nueva 
organización a este pueblo nuestro que se deshace y atomiza d ía por d ía 
[OC, III: 383]. 
 
This is the reason that brought Ortega to present himself, during this 
period , as a political advisor both in the newspaper El Sol, in a series of 
                                                          
32
 The aristocratism of Ortega is undeniable. As he will write in the La rebelión de 
las masas: «Yo no he d icho nunca que la socied ad  deba ser aristocrática, sino 
mucho más que eso. He d icho y sigo creyendo cada d ía con más enérgica 
convicción, que la sociedad  humana es aristocrática siempre, quiera o no, por su 
esencia misma». On this controversial aspect of Ortega’s thought see in 
particular Majfud  2006. 
33
 Indeed , the rhetoric of “newness” which spread  in Europe during that period 
substantially affected  the thought of Ortega during the ‘20s, as proven by 
Lasaga, 2013. 
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articles entitled  Ideas Políticas (1922) and , in particular, offering his 
advice to the very King, as proved  by a famous meeting organised  by 
the marchioness Villavieja, attended  by several intellectuals
34
. In Ideas 
Políticas he defines the role of the intellectual not only as a mere 
spectator of the political debate, but rather as a person able to 
determining its flux, offering a critical view that should  be constantly 
take into consideration. Indeed , in one of these articles he significantly 
wrote that: «El intelectual un poco consciente de sus destinos, en lugar 
de ped ir al político un acta, debe ped irle que le lea con mediana 
atención» [OC, III: 391].  
 
2.2 Rev ista de Occiden t e. The birth of Ortega’s m y th   
The growing impact of the liberal movement on the formal 
educative system also produced  a relevant influence on the political 
spheres, which, at that time, was still ruled  by a restricted  elite. Indeed , 
the liberal coalition [Conjunción Liberal] won the general election of April 
29
th
 1923. Such coalition constituted  a very fragmented  group  u nable to 
leader the country towards the path of modernisation proposed  during 
the electoral campaign. The real political participation of the public 
opinion was still very limited  [A. Yanini, 1993; Dardé Morales, 2015]. In 
this context, Ortega started  to take into consideration the possibility of 
founding a new cultural review in order to exercise his intellectual role 
both within the academia, the liberal ruling class and  an emerging 
public opinion. Thus the purposes expressed  in España invertebrada were 
translated  in a new cu ltural project: the Revista de Occidente. The first 
volume was published  during the summer 1923, just two months after 
having shared  the idea with Fernand o Vela, its ed itorial secretary
35
. The 
desire which brought Ortega to realise this project was that of 
presenting an up -to-date vision of the European philosophical and  
literary debate in order to offer to the general aud ience a critical 
instrument to understand  the present age. As he put it in 1923:  
 
Muchas gentes comienzan a sentir la penosa impresión de ver su existencia 
invadida por el caos. Y, sin embargo, un poco de claridad , otro poco de 
orden y suficiente jerarquía en la información les revelaría pronto el plano 
de la nueva arquitectura en que la vida occiden tal se está reconstruyendo. 
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 A chronicle of the meeting can be found  in El Sol, 3-VI-1922.  
35
 For a brief bu t very precise story of this review from its very foundation until 
the present see in particular Márquez Padorno, 2005: 101-110. 
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La Revista de Occidente quisiera ponerse al servicio de ese estado de espirítu  
característico de nuestra época [OC, III: 529]. 
 
This fortunate ed itorial project constituted  a reference point in the 
Spanish cultural scenario until the beginning of the civil war, in 1936. It 
brought in the country the most relevant European debates of the time 
both in the field  of humanities and  natural sciences, looking in 
particu lar to the German intellectual scenario [Lemke Duque, 2014], 
without d ismissing the contribution of France, England  and  Italy. 
Indeed , the majority of the Spanish population still continued  to be 
largely illiterate and  d id  not have access to these texts. However, while 
Ortega was fighting for his modernising ideas through an educational 
reform, a new well-read  and  wealthier bourgeoisie was starting to take 
form. This constituted  the  aud ience of the Revista that circulated  in 
approximately 3000 copies, included  those that were intended  to the 
Latin American public [Sánchez Camara, 2001]. The price of each copy 
was equal to 3.5 pesetas, in an epoch in which the annual salary of the 
primary teachers, for instance, was comprised  between 2500 and  3000 
pesetas [López Martín, 1986]. The success of the review is proven by the 
fact that it rap id ly passed  from publishing three times a year to be a 
monthly publication. Its fame also crossed  the Spanish boarders and  
had  an important echo also in France and , in particular, in England  
through the interest of the journal The Dial [Garbisu, 2015]. 
Philosophy, literature, science, aesthetics, biology… all these top ics 
were treated  in the review which represented , as Márquez  Podorno 
correctly put it, the ideal complement for compensating the excessive 
specialisation which characterised  the university education [2015: 105]. 
This ed itorial project reveals what was Ortega’s concept of his own 
mission as a university teacher and  as a intellectual engaged  in politics, 
and  of the political nature of his pedagogy during this period . Indeed , 
from the ‘20s, Ortega thought that a comprehensive education was 
ind ispensable to promote the formation of a cultured  ruling class and  
bourgeoisie aimed  to comprehend  and  consequently rule the social 
processes. In fact, this review was addressed  both to the students and  
the professionals, the liberal bourgeois who, after having received  an 
higher and  university education , desired  to stay informed of the main 
scientific progress
36
. In this way the Revista constituted the realisation of 
Ortega’s pedagogical aims during almost fifteen years, spreading his ideal of a 
modernisation of the country through an educational reform . Through it 
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 For a profile of the readers of the review see in particular López Campillo, 
1972. 
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Ortega succeeded  in one of his most ambitious goal: awaken a large and  
popular interest towards philosophical questions, with the aim of 
shaping a well-informed  citizenship. For this reason, together w ith the 
Revista he also promoted  a book collection publishing the European 
classics texts of philosophy, sociology and  psychology. This was 
rendered  possible by the collaboration with the ed itor Espasa Calpe and  
in particu lar by the creation of the Biblioteca de Siglo XX , during the 
period  1921-1923 [López Cobo, 2013]. 
If we analyse the contents of the Revista it will soon emerge that 
pedagogy constitu tes one of its main and  most recurrent topics. In 
particu lar, the view adopted  by the review was that of a comparative 
study of the educational reforms which had  been put into practice in 
other countries. Moreover, accord ing to the philosophical principles of 
Ortega, the review tried  also to assume a perspectivistic approach: that 
is inqu iring a same top ic from d ifferent perspectives in order to 
illuminate the constitutive plurality of realities and  opinions. An 
instance of this tendency is offered  by the article by Luis de Zulueta, 
entitled  ¿Cómo formar la personalidad humana? [Zulueta, 1923]. Here he 
presents the debate on the role of education in the shap ing of citizens 
that took place in French between the minister of Poincaré government, 
León Bérard  – supporter of a classic education – and  Albert Thierry, a 
socialist trade unionist and  advocate of a professional education. The 
conflict of opinion is described  as a vibrant chronicle, aimed  not at 
answering to the questions formulated  by the author in a dogmatic way, 
but rather at offering the possibility of acquiring a better understand ing 
of the top ic at stake to develop a critical thinking on it.   
These projects developed  by Ortega were not  cathedrals in the 
desert. On the contrary, they perfectly fit in the cultu ral background  of 
the period . Indeed , the thesis purported  by Ortega were evidently due 
to the ILE’s influence and , at the same time, constituted  an original 
contribution to its main ideas, having an ample echo on the multip le 
institutions related  to it. Moreover, during those years, the Madrilenian 
philosopher enjoyed  an incred ible success. He represented  a trendy icon 
for a new generation of students proceed ing from an emergent upper-
middle class: the so-called  señorito satisfecho [Moreno Pestaña, 2011: 126]. 
This was reflected  in particular in one of the most prolific cu ltural 
institution of the time: the Residencia de Estudiantes founded  by JAE in 
1910
37
. Indeed , one of the students of the Residencia, Rafael Méndez, in 
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 For comprehending the importance of this institution, and  the related 
Residencia de Señorita, w ithin the Spanish cultural scenario of the so-called  Edad 
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remembering that period  of his formation and  the atmosphere within 
the institution, spoke about: «muchachos vestidos con sobria elegancia, 
amables, racionalistas, qu e leían a Ortega y Gasset» [Méndez, 1987: 20]. 
Some of these fascinated  followers of the philosopher also actively 
participated  into the Revista de Occidente that, in its first 15 years, 
counted  on the collaboration of more than 300 authors, half of whom 
were Spanish
38
. 
However, it would  be erroneous to consider the Revista de Occidente 
as the only liberal review which during that time operated  towards a 
renewal of the Spanish educative system. Indeed , it cannot be d ismissed  
the very important role played  during this period  by the Revista de 
Pedagogía, created  in 1922 by one of Ortega’s disciples and  friends: 
Lorenzo Luzuriaga Medina. This publication significantly contributed  
to ameliorate the debate on the reform of the education [Nicolich, 1983 
and  1992]. It d id  it in particular by facing the question of the importance 
of humanities in all the level of the formal schooling, from the primary 
school to the university [Casado Marcos de León, 2011]. The purpose of 
this review was: «reflejar el movimiento pedagógico contemporáneo y, 
en la medid a de sus fuerzas, contribu ir a su desarrollo»
39
. Also this 
review contributed  to the fame and  popularity of Ortega’s philosophy, 
and  in particular of his pedagogy. Indeed , the very Luis de Zulueta, 
wrote in 1922 an article – that inaugurates this new review – entirely 
dedicated  to Ortega’s theory of education, in which he underlined  that 
thanks to the lessons of the Madrilenian philosopher, the most up -to-
date pedagogical notions had  been recently imported  in Spain [Zulueta, 
1922: 5]. Within the same review also Ortega’s friend  and  colleague 
Manuela García Morente affirmed  that the works of the philosopher, in 
particu lar the essays included  in El Espectador, contained  a very 
interesting ped agogical thought, a quite comprehensive theory of 
                                                                                                                                
de Plata see in particular Ribagorda, 2009 – in particular pp. 173-257; and  
Ribagorda 2011.  
38
 Among the most active collaborators, a part from the very Ortega, is 
important to underline the presence of some of the most influent ial intellectuals 
who continued to have a determinant role in the Spanish cultural policy of the 
country. They constituted  also in the following decades the core of  Ortega’s 
intellectual circle, and  developed  their intellectual career also independently 
from their master in the following years. They are in particular Fernando Vela, 
who published  55 articles, Antonio Marichalar (54), Gómez de la Serna (33), 
García Morente (20), García Gómez (17), José Antonio Maravall (16), Gregorio 
Marañon, Xavier Zubiri, Ledesma Ramos, Julián Marías, Pérez de Ayala, José 
Sacristan.  
39
 Revista de Pedagogia, 1, Enero 1922. 
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education. He appreciated  in particu lar the fact that his contribu tion to 
pedagogy was strictly related  to a vaster philosophical debate, aimed  at 
promoting the development of the humanity of every and  each single 
ind ividual [García Morente, 1922a; 1922b]. The basic ground  of Ortega’s 
pedagogy was constituted , to Morente, by his theory of vital reason. A 
theory that advocated  for the full development of one’s own personality 
through a practical inquiry into the intimate motivations of his actions 
and  decisions.  
To summarise, during the ‘20s Ortega developed  an overall theory 
of education which overcame his previous theorisations that had  qu ite 
exclusively concerned  the need  of bringing about an effective political 
education and  socialisation of the masses. Indeed , he started  focusing 
also on the anthropological premises of his ed ucative thinking. 
Moreover, all his theses found a very favourable ground in which they 
flourished during this period, also thanks to a capillary propagation of his ideas 
through all the possible media of the time: newspapers, cultural reviews, 
journals, schools, university and, moreover, politics. He represented  without 
any doubt a popular intellectual icon d uring that decade. His influence 
spread  through all the d iscipline and  his figure acquired  a symbolic 
status which rendered  him a catalyst for a cu ltural renovation that 
involved  the whole Spanish cultural and  political elite.   
   
2.3 Ortega’s un iversity  t eaching (1921-1922) 
Both of the articles respectively written by Zulueta and  García 
Morente in 1922 for the recently founded  Revista de Pedagogía underlined  
the innovativeness of Ortega’s university lessons and  their importance 
in relation to the development of a comprehensive theory of education. 
For this reason – after having analysed  Ortega’s pedagogy as exposed  in 
the articles he wrote for a larger aud ience and  their warm reception 
within the academic scenario – let’s now consider to what extent his 
university lessons d irectly dealt with pedagogical issues and  how he 
perceived  his role as a philosopher within the academia. For these 
purposes it is important to consider the course he realised  during the 
academic year 1921-1922, whose main themes later appeared  in a book 
published  in 1923 and  entitled  El tema del nuestro tiempo
40
.    
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 For realising these analyses they have been taken into consideration both the 
notes used  by Ortega for developing his classes and  the book which sprang 
from them. The notes have been recently published  in his complete works 
Lecciones del Curso Universitario 1921-1922, in OC, VII, pp. 767-797 
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In the first chapter of this book Ortega offers a clear instance of the 
way in which he interpreted  h is role as a university teacher. His aim 
was that of contributing to the formation of a  new generation of 
students and  intellectuals willing to contribu te not only to the 
development of the academic scientific production but also, and  
foremost, to create and  influence the public opinion. He wanted  to build  
within the faculty of philosophy a «minoría d e corazones de 
vanguard ia» characterised  by a «filosofía beligerante, que aspira a 
destruir el pasad o mediante su rad ical superación» [OC, III: 562]. The 
real philosopher and  intellectual was conceived  as a person of great 
talent and  scrupulous m ethodology who would  have converted  him in 
a «ind ividualid ad  egregia que consiste, precisamente, en una actuación 
omnímoda sobre la masa» [OC, III: 563]. Indeed , Ortega thought that 
the political history of a country proceeded  with a d iscontinuous 
rhythm given by the alternation between phases of creation, 
establishment and  crisis of intellectual generations. Each of these 
generations was conceived  as responsible for the creation of an overall 
system of ideas, social, political and  educative institutions that 
responded  to the needs of the population within a limited  period  of 
time by creating an hegemonic cu ltural perspective. Within this general 
theoretical framework Ortega reproached  the absence of such 
generation at the time of speaking and  for this reason he conceived  his 
university lessons as having a precise aim. His teaching: «aspira […] tal 
vez sin lograrlo, a cumplir con tod a pulcritud  el imperativo histórico de 
nuestra generación» [OC, III: 567], which consisted  in a parad igmatic 
change of the Spanish intellectual and  institutional scenario.  
He considered  his professorship as a political tribune, and  he 
defined  a very ambitious p lane, that of: «buscar una r igorosa y amplia 
orientación en los rumbos de la historia» [Ibidem]. This would  have been 
realised  through a philosophical investigation of the new tendencies of 
the mass society, a meditation on the structure of the public life with the 
aim of constructing an elitist ruling class able of comprehend ing, 
explicating and  regulating it: 
 
La política es gravitación de unas masas sobre otras. Ahora bien; para que 
una modificación de los senos históricos llegue a la masa, tiene que haber 
influido en la minoría selecta. Pero los miembros de ésta son de dos clases: 
el hombre de acción y el hombre de contemplación. No es dudoso que las 
nuevas tendencias, todavía germinante y débiles, serán percibidas primero 
por los temperamentos contemplativos que por los activos. La urgencia del 
momento impide al hombre de acción sentir las vagas brisas iniciales que, 
por el pronto, no pueden henchir su práctico velamen. […] La materia 
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delicad ísima de la ciencia es sensible a las menores trepidaciones de la 
vitalidad , y puede servir para registrar ahora con tenues signos lo que 
andando los años se verá proyectado gigantescamente sobre el escenario de 
la vida pública [OC, III: 570-571]. 
 
Starting from these premises he argues in favour of a “reform of the 
intellect”. Thus, the epistemological inquiry he develops in the first part 
of this course is very strictly bound  to his political call for a reform of 
culture and  therefore of the teaching method ology. His critiques 
towards a dogmatic and  abstract teaching and  his defence of a more 
personalised  instruction were d irected  towards a precise target: the 
build ing of a new form of intellectuality able to speak to an ample 
aud ience and  to have a relevant political influence through his soft 
intellectual power. This constant Ortega’s worry is reflected  in his very 
theory of knowledge in which, talking about the formation of cu ltural 
parad igms, he argues that:  
 
No basta, por ejemplo, que una idea científica o política parezca por razones 
geométicas verdadera para que debamos sustentarla. Es preciso que, 
además, suscite en nosostros una fe plenaria y sin reserva alguna. Cuando 
esto no ocurre, nuestro deber es d istanciarnos de aquélla y modificarla 
cuanto sea necesario para que ajuste rigorosamente con nuestra orgánica 
exigencia [OC, III: 585-586]. 
 
As a result, his philosophical account implies at least two important 
consequences concerning the role he assigned  to the intellectuals in 
society. Firstly, since every scientific idea is fundamentally linked  to the 
most urgent questions concerning the concrete biological, political and  
intellectual life of ind ividuals, this implies that the philosophical activity  
should  always consist in an analysis of the present that pays attention to 
these concrete aspects. Secondly, given the significance of an ample and  
d iffuse acceptance of the cultural parad igm brought about by this  
activity, Ortega supports the idea of the intellectual engaged  in politics 
and  able to communicate his ideas to the mass. This is not considered  by 
the philosopher as an homogenous group, but rather as a d iscrete sum 
of potentially reasonable ind ividuals. The intellectual has the duty to 
talk to this conjunct of ind ividuals trying to rationally persuade them of 
the correctness and  utility of the system of ideas purported  by him and  
his generation.  
For this reason his ped agogy is grounded  on the p rinciple of the 
personalisation of teaching, given the importan ce he assigned  to the 
ind ividual comprehension as the main pillar of the educative process: 
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«la verdad  integral sólo se obtiene articuland o lo que el prójimo ve con 
lo que yo veo; y así sucesivamente» [OC, III: 616]. This thesis constituted  
the core of his pedagogy as expressed  in his university lessons during 
that period . In this way he connected  the general cultu re purported  by a 
generation to the ind ivid ual d imension of a liberal education: «El 
“sentido teorético” de un juicio es, pues, algo objetivo a que se llega por 
medio del acto de juzgar, que es una activid ad  del sujeto» [OC, VII: 
792]. This constitutes the kernel of the cultural liberalism purported  by 
Ortega’s theory of education which end s up by promoting the political 
participation of every and  each ind ividual
41
.  
So, his university teaching shared  the same basic traits of his popular  
writings. He d id  not think to the academia as the place for build ing a 
neutral and  objective science, at least as far as humanities were 
concerned . On the contrary, he conceived  it as a social institution which 
should  have been responsible of a political and  historical change within 
the Spanish culture and  society. This rad ical change had  to be realised  
through a rational reform rendered  possible by the educative process, 
not through a revolution. This is what he underlined  also in a short text 
he added  to El tema de nuestro tiempo, El ocaso de las revoluciones (1923). 
Ortega condemned  both the irrational and  violent forms of political 
revolution  and  those characterised  by an excessively utopian and  
rationalistic vision. Indeed , given his cultural liberalism , he conceived  
every effective political movement as a concrete manifestation of an 
idea, of an original and  creative thinking. As he put it:  
 
Todo el mundo estará de acuerdo en reconocer que las revoluciones no son 
en esencia otra cosa que rad icalismo político. Pero tal vez no todo  el mundo 
advierte el verdadero sentido de esta fórmula. […] No se es radical en política 
porqué se sea rad ical en política, sino porque antes se es rad ical en el 
pensamiento [OC, III: 626]. 
 
The basic d ifference from an utopian revolution and  an effective 
reform plane would  lie on the d ifferent degree of concreteness in 
relation to the vital needs of the citizens involved  in it. He thought that 
the decade of the ‘20s would  have been unable to produce an authentic 
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 As written by Valero Lumberas, 2013: 52-53: «Esta dualid ad  y el énfasis de 
herencia claramente institucionista, en la d imensión pedagógica de la política de 
construcción de un hombre interior, de una personalidad moralmente sólida 
que se proyectase al exterior en una tarea común, sería un rayo permanente del 
liberalismo cultural orteguiano, sin cuya consideración se corre el riesco de mal 
interpretar la d imensión política de la obra del filósofo». 
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revolution since he was sure that the failure of the utopian revolution of 
the past century would  have produced  a transitional epoch 
characterised  by a revitalisation of trad itionalism and  conservatism. 
During such a period  the political consensus would  have been based  on 
an unquestioned  faith in  the social norms rather than on  a rational 
comprehension of these same social norms
42
. This was, accord ing to 
Ortega, what was happening in Spain during that period  in which the 
old -regime still remained  in power: 
 
El caso de España es bien claro: se han dado y se dan extremadamente en 
nuestro país todos los otros factores que se suelen considerar decisivos para 
que la revolución explote. Sin embargo, no ha habido propiamente espíritu  
revolucionario. Nuestra inteligencia étnica ha sido siempre una función 
atrofiada que no ha tenido un normal desarrollo [OC, III: 636]. 
 
However he conceived  these periods as transitional and  as 
essentially anti-intellectualist epochs. Indeed , the intellectual should 
always aim at enhancing in the population a rational and not superstitious  
comprehension of reality. This was d ue to the fact that: «El filósofo, el 
intelectual, anda siempre entre los bastid ores revolucionarios. Sea d icho 
en su honor. Es él el profesional de la razón pura y cumple con su deber 
hallándose en la brecha antitrad icionalista» [OC, III: 637]. Thus, Ortega 
also in his university lessons supp orted  the idea of the intellectual as 
engaged  in the political debate, not as a mere politician, but rather as an 
anti-conformist and  critical spectator. His duty was mainly avoiding that 
the masses were manipulated by charismatic leaders. For this reason, when 
shortly after, in 1923, Spain experienced  the authoritative and  d ictatorial 
leadership of Primo de Rivera, Ortega d id  manifest a sense of 
frustration and  pessimism towards the possibility of pu tting into 
practice his intellectual reform.  
The d ictatorship of Primo de Rivera represented  just the first of a 
series of cases in which, d uring his long intellectual life, Ortega had  to 
face a relevant change in the political regime. A change largely opposed  
to his own political and  p hilosophical perspective and , at the same time, 
in contrast to the political ideas prevalently endorsed  by the University . 
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 Ortega developed  such political view influenced  by the case of the Roman 
Empire as presented  by the German historian Theodor Mommsen who, 
accord ing to him, demonstrated  that: «Las épocas post-revolucionarias, tras una 
hora muy fugaz de aparente esplendor, son tiempo de decadencia» [OC, III: 
639]. Mommsen constituted  a constant reference of Ortega’s political thought, in 
particular as far as his reflection on the idea of “nation” is concerned. See in 
particular Aguilar Gavilán, 1998 and  Bagur Taltavull 2013.  
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The analysis of his posture during this and  other occasions will surely 
permit to comprehend  to what extent his theorisations were reflected  in 
his political behaviour and , concurrently, how the changing political 
circumstances determined  a rad ical reformulation of some of his main 
ideas.      
 
2.4 Ortega durin g the dictatorship (1923-1929) 
The Alzamiento of Primo de Rivera on 13
th
 September 1923 had  a 
significant impact on the Spanish cultural atmosphere. A wave of 
catholic trad itionalism invaded  the University . The new minister of 
education, Eduardo Callejo, fought against the influence of the JAE 
within the educative system, trying to introd uce a d ifferent pedagogical 
ideal: that of the Colegios mayores [Ribagord a, 2013: 116-121]. However, 
in spite of this rad ical change in the pedagogical trend , Ortega 
maintained  his influential role both within and  outside the university. 
This w as mainly d ue to the fact that the elitist ideas he purported  in 
some of his more famous writings [e. g. España Invertebrada and , 
partially, El tema del nuestro tiempo] d id  find  a very good  reception 
within right w ings and  conservative circles [Cerezo González Cuevas, 
2009: 82-84]
43
. Moreover, Ortega d id  not take position against the 
General and , in relation to the new political regime, often showed a 
quite ambiguous public posture.  
A clear example of the conservative interpretation of Ortega’s 
thought is offered  by the fortune of one of his article he wrote in 1920 in 
which he sustained  the thesis accord ing to which, in order to end  with 
the communist wave of strikes in 1920, it would  have been necessary 
the d irect intervention of an authoritative power  [OC, III: 313-314]. This 
precedent episode was later uncritically interpreted  as an endorsement 
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 This conservative interpretation of Ortega’s thought is still endorsed  by some 
of the main scholars of his thought. The very González Cueva, for instance, 
affirmed that since 1914 Ortega moved  towards a conservative perspective 
which culminated  in his endorsement of Primo de Rivera’s d ictatorship. See in 
particular Cerezo González Cuevas, 2006: 272-273: «El pronunciamiento militar 
del 13 de septiembre de 1923 acaudillado por el general Miguel Primo de Rivera 
fue favorablemente recibido por el filósofo, que tres años antes, como ya 
sabemos, había ped ido una d ictadura militar». 
Sometimes, the instrumental interpretation of Ortega’s thought which circulated  
in the conservative groups of the time had  been ingenuously confused  with the 
very idea purported  by the philosopher. This is the case of the short essay 
written by Truellen Floría, 2008.   
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to the regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera. This was also due to the 
instrumental use of Ortega made by the very d ictator during his first 
manifestation as the new leader of the country in Barcelona in 1923, 
where he d irectly quoted  the philosopher’s words [Fonck, 1996: 126-
127].  
Moreover, another relevant factor which contributed  to Ortega’s 
fortune during the first part of the d ictatorship was the  misuse made of 
his political theses by some university students. These young students 
were active in political organisations, in particular the Asociación Católica 
Nacional de Propagandistas, founded  in 1908 [Montero, 1993]. This is the 
case, for instance, of José María Pemán and  José Pemartín Sanjuan, two 
students of the University of Cadiz who would  later be two reference 
points of the following regime of Francisco Franco. The ideology of 
Primo de Rivera’s movement was extremely fragile and  bad ly defined . 
It represented  an eclectic political thought in which coexisted  extremely 
d ifferent authors such as Balmes, Ganivet, Vázquez de Mella, Ortega, 
Scheler, Bergson or Schmitt [Castro Sánchez, 2013]. Many of the 
concepts elaborated  by Ortega were used  for the purpose of 
legitimating the new regime and  a violent political behaviour. In 
particu lar the thesis of the selected  minority developed  by the 
philosopher in his España invertebrada p layed  a significant role in  
labelling him as a conservative and  reactionary thinker. 
However, if we take into consideration the opinion s Ortega 
personally expressed  few days after the Alzamiento of Primo de Rivera, 
we d iscover a completely d ifferent reality. The philosopher wrote an  
article to be published  by El Sol in October 1923, Política de estos días. The 
article d id  not appear in the press due to a rad ical change in the 
ed itorial politics of the liberal newspaper that was trying to counter the 
conservative attacks of the ABC by nearing to the d ictatorship. Indeed , 
El Sol were facing relevant economic problems and  these critics, 
together with the austerity of the Papelera Española, were causing the 
newspaper’s bankrupt. Ortega’s article remained  unpublished  bo th 
because of the military and  ed itorial censorship of the very newspaper 
in which he had  to publish [Fonck, 2010: 12-16]. In this writing
44
 Ortega 
defends his right to intervene as a free and  independent intellectual 
within the public debate by criticising the military d ictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera. He separated  himself from the tendency of this new political 
front of using his very words as a sort of slogan, depriving them of their 
authentic meaning and  of any philosophical substance. In particular, he 
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 The text of Ortega’s article has been published  in the recent ed ition of his 
complete works. See OC, VII: 803-806. 
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argues that his thesis, that was being abusively used , had  been 
previously thought in a completely d ifferent context and  for pursu ing 
opposite ends. In fact:  
 
Con otros hombres de ciencia y de letras que pertenecen a mi generación, he 
combatido ásperamente a los viejos políticos y a la vieja política durante más 
de quince años. Me importa recordar que la expresión “vieja política” se ha 
levantado hasta la popularidad  que hoy goza de una mísera conferencia mía 
dada en 1914. Conste, pues, que me he bad ito contra el eclipsado régimen 
más que casi todos los españoles que ahora resumen su patriotismo  [OC, 
VII: 805]. 
 
By underlining his patriotism Ortega is not supporting the new 
nationalist regime. On the contrary, he says this exclusively to counter 
the incorrect exploitation of his thesis by this new ideology:  
 
Por mi parte, no estoy d ispuesto a acep tar esa línea mágica que 
arbitrariamente se qu iere trazar con ánimo de imponer a todo prójimo una 
localización forzosa. La perversidad  del antiguo régimen no abona en modo 
alguno cualquier otro con que se le quiera sustituir. […] Y las ideas, tópicos, 
sentimientos que dominan la vida española en estas semanas no me parecen 
los más adecuados para que se forje una nueva nación saludable  [Ibidem].  
 
Thus, Ortega neither endorsed  nor d irectly opposed  the new 
political regime that, he though, could  potentially help the country to 
ameliorate in comparison to the recent past, but only if the new 
establishment had  previously realised  a «profund a rectificación de ideas 
y de actos» [OC, VII: 806]. A rectification that, to Ortega, could  be 
carried  about only through the advising role of the intellectuals. 
Therefore, the Madrilenian philosopher d id  not renounce to the 
possibility of playing an influential role also within this new politica l 
movement in which many of his students had  taken part. During the 
first years of Rivera’s d ictatorship (1923-1926), Ortega published  several 
articles both in El Sol and  in the very review of the movement: La 
Nación. Through these articles he continued  to influence the public 
debate. Moreover, he reflected  more critically on the importance of the 
intellectuals and  education in determining the consensus towards on e 
political regime rather than another .    
Indeed , in Sobre la vieja política (November 1923), Ortega reproached  
the populist aptitude of the regime. In fact: «lo más pernicioso que 
puede hacerse es halagar sus [of the mass] torcidos instintos, dándole a 
entender que es ella virtuosa y que sus males proced en de ind ividuos 
determinados, y, al fin y al cabo, sobresalientes» [OC, III: 553]. Ortega 
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insisted  in affirming the need  of changing and  reforming the Spanish 
politics, bu t he thought that in order to d o this it would have been 
necessary to forge a new bourgeoisie, an upper-middle class able to rationally 
participate in politics. Even in this new scenario he d id  not renounce to 
present his main theses in favour of a cultural reform of the nation that 
had  to precede the consequent political one: «La curación de España es 
faena mucho más grave, mucho más hond a de lo que suele pensarse. 
Tiene que atacar estratos del cuerpo nacional mucho más profundos que 
la “política”, la cual no representa sino la periferia y cutis de  la 
socied ad» [OC, III: 554]. The ind irect advices he gives to Rivera’s 
establishment can therefore be summarised  in two main points: a ) 
favouring the presence of intellectuals w ithin the political cabinet; b ) 
having the courage of taking unpopular decisions for benefiting the 
country in the middle-long term. Thus, the partial support of Ortega to 
regime constituted at the same time a veiled critique.  
One instance frequently quoted  as a proof of Ortega’s endorsement 
to the regime of Primo de Rivera is the series of articles entitled  Ideas 
Políticas (1924). In particular, the philosopher is often reproached  for 
being a supporter of a conservative and  authoritative form of 
government d uring the ‘20s when he wrote that: «El paso por la 
d ictadura creo yo que será una ad mirable experiencia pedagógica para 
las socied ades actuales» [OC, III: 681]. However, Ortega is extremely 
ironical in mentioning such ped agogical utility which  rather than a 
support of the d ictatorship  turns out to be a ferocious critique of it: «al 
cabo de ella, aprenderán las masas – que no se convencen con razones, 
sino por los efectos sufrid os en su  prop ia carne – que ciertas libertades 
no son, a la altura de estos tiempos, cuestiones políticas sobre que 
quepa, en principio, d iscusión» [Ibidem]. Thus, also during the 
d ictatorship of Primo de Rivera Ortega d id  not renounce to promote a 
liberal political reform w ithin a democratic framework. At the same 
time, this very democracy was considered  by Ortega as ind ispensable to 
transform and  ameliorate the society by enhancing the rationality of its 
members, of a mass he wanted  to convert in an  enlighten minority 
[Peris Suay, 2014]. The au thoritarianism which was spread ing in the 
whole Europe should  have represented , to Ortega, only a transient 
moment of its political history whose positive function would  have been 
that of rehabilitating the liberal Parliamentary system  as an instrument 
for promoting a public and  rational debate
45
. All the articles of the series 
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Ideas Políticas analyse the importance of reforming the parliamentary 
institution, bu t only after having put into practice a concrete educational 
reform: «¡Educación, cu ltura! Ahí está todo. Ésa es la reforma 
sustancial» [OC, III: 693].  
Thus, the struggle against illiteracy and  ignorance envisaged , 
accord ing to Ortega, the construction of a new form of humanistic 
education. During these years the philosopher engaged  in what was a 
very relevant debate within the Spanish intellectuals at that time, i.e. the 
nature of the normative id eal of a new humanism. This debate started  
from the publication of a book by Ramiro de Maeztu, a friend  of Ortega 
during his youth
46
, who, in La crisis del humanismo (1919) argued  in 
favour of the restoration of a trad itionalist thinking, erad icated  in the 
past and  with a catholic outlook. In this text, against Ortega’s proposal 
for a liberal intellectual reform , Maeztu  supported  the establishment of 
a «clasicismo cristiano» [Maeztu, 2001: 89] in order to ameliorate the 
conditions of the country
47
. In fact, he thought that only the medieval 
and  Christian trad ition could  have resolved  the Spanish cultural crisis. 
Ortega d id  take place in this debate, supporting Maeztu’s thesis of the 
necessity of a reform of humanism and  humanistic cu lture as a way to 
reform the society, but conceiving it in an opposite d irection . Indeed , he 
thought that Maeztu’s thesis:  
 
con ser de gran interés, no ha conseguido convencer a muchos que, como 
yo, sólo desearíamos llegar a convencernos de que el latín y el griego 
enseñan, mejor que otro aprendizaje, a movilizar el pensamiento. En 
cambio, debe insistir con denuedo en la formación de esa Liga contra la 
Incoltura. El d ía en que esa Liga existiese y gozase de plenitud , España 
estaría salvada. Porque la reforma sustantiva de nuestra nación tiene que ser 
de nuestra sociedad  y no de nuestra política [OC, III: 694]. 
 
To the same problem the two intellectuals offered  totally d ifferent 
solu tions, in spite of the syncretism that the political rhetoric of a young 
                                                                                                                                
Parlamento debe funcionar con poca frecuencia y gran solemnidad , debe decid ir 
sobre pocas y elevadas cuestiones, debe mantenerse a una patética d istancia de 
lo menudo y cotid iano». 
46
 Ortega in 1914 dedicated  his famous Meditaciones del Quijote to his friend 
Ramiro de Maeztu.  
47
 As José Luis Villacañas wrote in relation to this book: «Con este libro ya se 
cierra el camino de modernización social-liberal que, en paralelo con Ortega, 
Maeztu había emprendido en 1901. A partir de este libro las soluciones de 
Maeztu hallaron sus veneros en las últimas teorías antimodernas a su 
d isposición» [Villacañas, 2000: 166]. 
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group of right-wing students were realising during that period . The 
same mislead ing interpretation affected  also the id ea of “nation” as 
conceived  by Ortega. In particu lar, his thesis about the necessity of 
overcoming the party system in favour of the construction of a unique 
political project able to look at the interest of the nation as a whole and  
not at the interest of some lobbies was now intended  as an endorsement 
to the nationalistic party of Primo de Rivera. In  fact, by imitating the 
example of Mussolini, who created  the fascist only party in 1922, the 
following year the Spanish general had  founded  an analogous party. 
In conclusion, the analysis of Ortega’s writings and  lesson s during 
the d ictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera – in which some scholars 
have sometimes identified  an open endorsement to the regime – has 
reveals that his political thinking and  intellectual posture maintained  a 
strong continuity with his precedent med itations, supporting very 
similar theses to the ones that brought him to the creation of the LEP in 
1914. His support to the General is limited  to an initial period  and  his 
optimism towards the possibility of a change in the country purported  
by a new political movement was very scant. He always was extremely 
cautious and  sceptical due to the illiberal character of the regime. In 
particu lar during its subsequent stabilisation that started  from 
December 1925. Ortega d id  not support neither right nor left  fronts 
during this period  and , as Beatrice Fonck has rightly put it: «La 
benevolencia de Ortega respecto al nuevo régimen es aparente y en 
cierta forma demoledora» [Fonck, 2010: 17]. Against the political 
rad icalisation of two opposite fronts which began during the ‘20s, 
Ortega argued  in favour of an independent intellectual posture since: 
«“Derechas” e “izqu ierdas”, las dos Iglesias, me excomulgan, cad a cual 
desde su mano» [OC, III: 802]
48
. He thought that the popular irrational 
and  uncritical support to one of these fronts constituted  a serious 
danger for the development of a liberal democracy. The regime 
manifested , accord ing to Ortega, a complete lack of cu ltural and  
historical substance, and  for this reason he progressively rejected  it: «La 
d ictadura desnuda y a la intemperie, sin atmósfera de pensamiento, 
toma fácilmente el aspecto de un simpe suceso que no llega a ser un 
momento histórico. […S]ólo las ideas pueden darle estabilid ad» [OC, 
IV: 32]. Consequently, he advocates for himself a critical and  intellectual 
role aimed  at explaining the reasons of the upheaval of such rad ical 
movements in order to counter them.    
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 Ortega strongly criticised  also the left during this period. For a presentation of 
his main arguments see in particular García Queipo de Llano, 1998: 246-249. 
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2.5 The Universit y  of M adrid during the dictatorship  
Due to the rad icalisation of the political debate, since the end  of 1925 
Ortega started  to separate more firmly the political and  the academic 
spheres. This attitude was a consequence of the growing intrusion of the 
press censorship and , secondly, of the factual rejection of the 
philosopher’s advise by the establishment. His last attempt to conquest 
a significant role in shap ing the ideology of the regime is probably 
constituted  by some articles he published  on the conservative leader 
Antonio Maura. Through these texts he partially praised  some of the 
policies carried  about by the recently d ied  conservative leader
49
. His 
strategy is plain and  he would  repeat it also in the future, during the 
d ictatorship of Francisco Franco. Pu t it shortly, he decided to indirectly talk 
about current political situations by referring to past political actors or public 
figures who were appreciated and esteemed by the regime in charge. This 
strategy was aimed at achieving two main results: a) escaping from a rigid 
censorship and b) taking part into an existing debate, gaining public attention 
without speaking of apparently too sensitive topics. Indeed , in spite of being 
considered  by the movement’s press as a «pontífice láico»
50
, during this 
time he enjoyed  extremely limited  spaces of intellectual freedom. 
From 1926 he consequently decided  to devoted  himself to more 
neutral top ics, such as aesthetic, literature, etc. These changing political 
circumstances moved  him to elaborate a philosophical justification of 
the separation between the political and  the intellectual spheres. This 
theorisation is rigorously expressed  in particular in a long essay entitled  
Mirabeau o el Político (1927). His critique of the intellectual poorness of 
the regime brought him to rad ically d istinguish between tw o 
ontologically d ifferent forms of living: «los ocupad os y los preocupados; 
políticos e intelectuales» [OC, IV: 210]. The intellectual, Ortega argues, is 
often expelled  from the political scenario, but this does not mean that a 
critical aptitude should  not be ad opted  by the very politicians. In fact: 
«en el progreso de los tiempos la sociedad  se complica y los políticos 
necesitan ser cad a vez más intelectuales» [OC, IV: 222]. He criticised  the 
popular misconception of the successful politician conceived  exclusively 
as a charismatic and  authoritative man of deeds. Such authoritarianism, 
without the ability to convince the masses by rationally defending his 
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 As Zamora Bonilla wrote, in these texts Ortega aim was that of: «obligar al 
ciudadano a participar en la vida pública entregando al mayor número de 
ciudadanos la toma de decisiones sobre los problemas que les afectaban» 
[Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 252]. 
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 La Nación, 22-VII-1926. 
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legitimacy, would  constitu te a very fragile form of government
51
. The 
rational support of the public op inion, realised  also through the help of 
the intellectuals, was accord ing to Ortega an ind ispensable condition for 
the establishment and  maintenance over time of a political regime.  
This statement could  sound  like a prophecy considering the 
evolution of Primo de Rivera’s d ictatorship and  the effects that the lack 
of intellectual participation to his project produced . Indeed , since 1926, 
the Spanish academia, and  in particular the University of Madrid , 
started  to manifest its d issent towards the political leader. Just some 
months before, the very brother of Ortega, Eduardo, wrote from his 
French exile a very influencing book in which he d irectly countered  the 
d ictator
52
. The regime responded  through a repressive and  violent 
public attack against those persons identified  by the conservative press 
as “false intellectuals”, opposed  to the “true intellectuals” which 
supported  the politics of Primo de Rivera
53
. Among the au thentic 
intellectuals there were authors such as Eugenio d’Ors, Ramiro de 
Maeztu, Ramón y Cajal, etc.  
These were very prestigious figures of the Spanish cu ltural scenario, 
but their influence d id  not spread  effectively throughout  the entire 
University system. Indeed , the importance of conquering this institution 
and  imposing a conservative pedagogical model – that of the catholic 
trad itionalism – was absolutely clear to the regime. However, in 
particu lar in the case of Madrid , this aim  had  to face the resistances of 
an institution which had  been recently shaped  accord ing to liberal and  
reformist principles. In fact, the University of Mad rid  represented  a 
bastion of liberalism and  democratic thinking during this period , and  
also a place of exacerbated  political rad icalisation and  violence between 
generations, both vertically and  horizontally speaking
54
. The catholic 
                                                          
51
 «El que haya perseguido con alguna curiosidad  los últimos siglos de Roma, 
habrá notado este trágico hecho: el gran político no parece. En vez de reconocer 
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exclusivismo, acentuando al extremo la dote de fuerza y se busvan puros 
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 Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, La verdad sobre la dictadura, Paris, Juan Dura, 1925. 
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 See ABC, 24-IV-1926. 
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 Ribagorda, 2013: 27: «La oposición a la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera 
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front crashed  with a liberal and  modernising thinking that had  been 
forged  at least during the p reviously twenty years by the ILE and  other 
relevant educative institu tions (JAE, RE, RS). This is rendered  evident 
by considering the overall composition of the university teacher s in 
Madrid . In 1925, 75% of them, for instance, had  a d irect link to JAE 
[Otero Carvajal, 2013: 44-50].  
The d ictator tried  to take part in the reform of the university system. 
He also tried  to present himself as an intellectual and , after having 
donated  a large amount of money to the University of Salamanca, in 
July 1926 he had  also been proclaimed  Doctor ad honorem. During the 
d ictatorship the university started  to be more open to the masses , 
attracting a growing number of students. The university population 
almost duplicated  in the period  comprised  between 1923 and  1929, 
passing from 29.000 to 45.000 studen ts
55
. When Ortega started  his 
teaching activity in 1908, the overall university population amounted  to 
15.000 students
56
. This quantitative change – which d id  not depend  on 
the national institutional and  political change – determined  the need  of 
constructing new infrastructures for accommod ating the students. In 
Madrid  the project of a new campus started  to be implemented  during 
that period  by the king Alfonso XIII in 1927 [Niño, 2013]. Moreover, the 
minister of education Eduardo Callejo promoted , in 1926, a growing 
autonomy of the university, that ended  up favouring the construction of 
religious research centres and  colleges.    
The idea of the conservative and  Catholic d ictatorship , as presented  
for instance by Pemartín in 1928 in his book entitled  Los valores históricos 
de la dictadura española, had  to appear an aberration to the liberal 
intellectual class. Indeed , the laicism, liberalism and  Europeanism 
which Ortega and  his colleagues had  spread  within the university 
represented  the antibod ies against the cap illary d iffusion of 
authoritarianism in Spain during the ‘20s. The political ideology of the 
right and  conservative movement was grounded  on three main p illars: 
a) a political and  economic corporatism; b) the construction of a 
restricted  elite with the aim of manipulating the masses; c) the defence 
of the legitimacy of an extremely powerful execu tive power [Castro 
Sánchez, 2014: 60]. All these points were rad ically opposed  by the 
                                                                                                                                
estud iantil que había comenzado a mediados de los anos veinte y que se 
clausuró dramaticamente en el bano de sangre de la guerra civil».  
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 Datos y cifras de la enseñanza en España, in «Rivista Sind ical de Estad istica», 114, 
1966, pp. 36-38. 
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 Acuña de, J., Vargas de, P. [1927], pp. 136-142. 
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political and  cu ltural reform suggested  by Ortega and  generally 
purported  within the University.  
For this reason, the Mad rilenian philosopher can be collocated  
among the group  of the “false intellectuals”, using the d istinction 
adopted  by the new political establishment. This is p roven by a letter 
sent to Ortega by the d irector of the Ateneo de Madrid in 1927
57
, Gregorio 
Marañon, who praised  Ortega’s book on Mirabeau  (1927) of which, he 
says: «He hablad o con mucha gente. Ha hecho un gran efecto»
58
. So, 
since at least 1926 within the intellectual class and  in particular w ithin 
the University of Madrid , emerged  a fervent opposition towards the 
regime of Primo de Rivera. An opposition that  partially contributed  to 
the progressive lack of popular appeal of his political proposal
59
.  
The majority of the intellectual community d id  not support anything 
of the educative policy of the regime. The following events that took 
place in 1928-1929 revealed  that the support of this community would  
have been ind ispensable in order to guarantee the survival of the 
regime. Indeed , it was within the University , opposing to the Callejo’s 
law, that in the summer 1928 the students started  to manifest against the 
regime. The protest exacerbated  between the end  of February and  the 
beginning of March 1929 with the strike in the Faculty of Law. The 
conflicts were so harsh to impose to close the university of Madrid  for 
almost two years, from 16
th
 March 1929 until the end  of October 1930. 
The violence spread  in the very centre of the Spanish capital, causing 
surprise, fear and  grudge in the population.  
During all this period  Ortega continued  to be a reference point 
within the University, both among his colleagues and  the students. 
And , among these, both for those who belonged  to the Catholic front 
and  to those who belonged  to the opposition. This is proven by a letter 
sent to Ortega by a group  of students affiliated  to the Confederación de 
Estudiantes Católicos de España who at the end  of 1929, during the 
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 The Ateneo had  indeed already manifested  its hostility towards the regime in 
the spring 1926, affirming that: «el pensamiento no puede vivir sin la libertad». 
See Note of the Junta del Ateneo de Madrid, in Queipo de Llano, 1998: 275. 
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 Letter by Gregorio Marañon to Ortega y Gasset, in Archivo Fundación José 
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from his chair of Greek at the University of Salamanca. However this 
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dramatic events which were taking place in the university, asked  him to 
ind icate: «su  manera de pensar sobre la intervención de los estud iantes 
en la vid a y gobierno de la Universidad »
60
. Ortega was constantly 
evoked  by both of the fronts. However, in all his public interventions of 
this period  he continued  to observe a more or less rigid  political 
neutrality, w ithout abandoning his major preoccupation: the cultural 
reorganization of the country through an educative reform that had  to 
start from the University.  
 
2.6 The reform  of the Un iversit y  
Following the cierre of the University in 1929 Ortega resigned  from 
his role as a professor, showing his non-acceptance of the regime
61
. Even 
if independently from the formal schooling system he continued  to 
teach, passing from the university class to the theatres and  cinemas of 
Madrid . The lessons he gave in the cinema Rex and  the theatre Infanta 
Isabel in 1929 – Qué es filosofía – represented  the chance he always 
sought to get in touch with an ampler public
62
. Ortega’s fame reached  
his climax d uring this period  and  in particu lar after the publication in 
1930 of the complete book of his famous Rebelión de las Masas, his most 
popular and  internationally renowned  book. 
When, the 9
th
 October 1930, the University re-opened  Ortega’s 
popularity was at its best. Some students belonging to the FUE invited  
him to give a conference on the most urgent topic at stake: the future of 
the University after the end  of the d ictatorship. The dramatic events of 
the precedent years evidently called  for a meditation on the socia l role 
of this institution, its scope and  aims. Ortega accepted  the invitation. 
Not only he gave this conference, but he also published  his reflections 
on El Sol and , soon after, a collection of these articles in the form of a 
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book entitled  Misión de la Universidad. This threefold  circulation of his 
theses makes patent the will of the philosopher to propose his reflection 
to the public opinion through all the possible channels offered  to him 
[Blanco Alonso, 2005: 101-145]. He conceived  his role as similar to that 
of a philosopher of the Enlightenment: contribu ting to forging a critical 
public op inion. Indeed , such a critical public opinion, accord ing to 
Ortega, was completely absent in the Europe of the 1930s. To be 
established  it needed  to be spread  thanks to a process of civilisation 
among the population. This would  constitute a long time process which 
would  have involved  both a cultural and  a political education of the 
masses in order to reassure the valid ity of social institutions by 
exhibiting the historical reasons that brought to their meaningful 
creation and  maintenance over time [Sánchez Cámara, 2003]
63
.     
 The Mission of the University constitutes without any d oubt not only 
a philosophical and  ped agogical, bu t also a political text. This is 
evidently proven by  the introd uctive d iscourse he addressed  to his 
students
64
. He presents himself as a sp iritual guide and  as a heir of the 
trad ition of the pedagogical renewal started  by ILE and  the other 
related  institutions
65
. 
This remark d id  not constituted  a nostalgic souvenir of the past, of 
the beginning of his teaching career. On the contrary, he argued  that the 
theories of the ILE would  finally have had  the possibility to be pu t into 
practice in the new University that was going to be created . In fact, the 
ideas spread  by that institution in the past, given the slow rhythm of 
history, were finally founding a favourable ground  to flourish in th e 
current situation. Ortega affirms that the presen t cond itions had  finally 
favoured  the creation of an  unanimous group  of p eople, of intellectuals, 
who were expressing a common goal since they were sharing a common 
background . They all wanted  to reform this institution, accord ing to the 
basic princip les expressed  by the ILE:  
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 A similar concept of the public opinion has been presented  for instance by 
Searle, 2010: 103: As Searle puts it: «the institutions and  the institutional facts 
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Sin duda la hora es feliz; llegan ustedes en la madrugada de una fecha 
ilustre: un pueblo durmiente durante siglos comienza a estremecerse con 
esos menudos temblores torpes que anuncian en un cuerpo el despertar y 
que va a ponerse en pie [OC, IV: 1036]. 
 
The group ind icated  by Ortega is more likely to be that composed  of 
some Madrilenian professors, writers and  intellectuals who, on 23
th 
 
March 1930 went to Barcelona for an homage to the Catalan 
intellectuals. That trip  forecasted  the following creation of a delegation 
of the Spanish intelligentsia wanted  to reform the country. Among them, 
apart from the very Ortega y Gasset, the Madrilenian group was 
composed  of Gregorio Marañon, Pérez de Ayala, Jiménez de Asúa, 
Pedro Salinas, Menéndez Pidal, Luis de Zulueta, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, 
Sánchez Albornoz, Araquistán, García Lorca and  others [Márquez 
Padorno, 2003: 47-54]. That recent experience constituted  a vivid  
memory in the mind  of Ortega when speaking to his students of an 
existing path towards a rad ical reform of the University for which he 
called  for a collaboration of students and  teachers.  
He criticised the students’ drift towards violence and the extreme 
politicisation of the University of Madrid, and interpreted them as symptoms of 
the spreading of populism within the academia. In this context populism 
appeared  to him as a synonym of briskness and  slovenliness, of a lack of 
patience and  reflexion. In particu lar, he uses the expression chabacanería 
which, accord ing to him, would  constitute the rad ical evil of the Spanish 
society, representing the concrete manifestation of the public ignorance 
he had  always tried  to counter. This cond ition, says Ortega, had  
rendered  impossible a real investigation and  intellectual act ivity within 
the University. For this reason, he affirms that: «Desde hace años he 
tenido que buscar un sitio fuera del ed ificio universitario porque los 
gritos habituales de los señores estud iantes, estacionados en los pasillos, 
hacen imposible entenderse dentro de las aulas» [OC, IV: 1039]. 
The reform of the University is therefore considered  as a priority in 
order to interrupt the continuous degeneration of this institution. For 
this purpose he considers as ind ispensable to reverse the process of 
depersonalisation that was taking place both within and  ou tside the 
academia, with the aim of reforming the political situation of the whole 
country: «Para actuar sobre una masa hay que dejar de serlo, hay que 
ser fuerza viva, hay que ser grupo en forma» [OC, IV: 1040]. As in the 
case of the Rebelión de las Masas, also the educative reform proposed  by 
Ortega deals with the social category of the mass-man, the hombre masa. 
With this term he ind icates a mediocre person whose cognitive abilities, 
character and  desires are the expression of an uneducated  person who, 
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in his everyday life, simply conforms to the rest of the population 
without thinking autonomously [OC, V: 252]. To counter this situation, 
whose pernicious effects, accord ing to the philosopher, recently came 
into being in the widespread  use of violence as a political instrument 
both in Spain and  in the rest of Europe, he considered  as ind ispensable 
to foster a mass education. The University, conceived  by Ortega as the 
right p lace to foster a careful investigation, should  therefore be open to 
a larger aud ience
66
. But before doing this, it was necessary to change its 
functioning, which has proved  to cause more harms than benefits.   
Indeed , the University should  become a «principio p romotor de la 
historia europea» [OC, IV: 568] by promoting a struggle against 
populism. This would  have been rendered  possible only through the 
construction of a comprehensive understand ing of the reality and  a 
following transmission of a systematic cu lture – conceived  as a “system 
of vital ideas possessed  by each historical epoch” [OC, IV: 568]. 
Therefore, to bu ild  the bases of a social rational consensus among the 
population it was necessary, accord ing to Ortega, to transmit a cultural 
background  that had  to be generally shared  by the whole population. 
Since the mass man and the low social class had been conquering an increasing 
relevance within the political life, he suggested to open the University to a 
vaster audience.  
Given the low level of the students – i.e. of the mass man – it would  
have been necessary to introduce a basic ped agogical principle: the 
principle of economy in education. The University should  have to 
guarantee a basic understand ing of the main problems at stake, so to 
offer to everyone the minimum background  ind ispensable for  taking an 
active and  meaningful part into the cu ltural debate. For this reason, the 
teaching should  have been focused  exclusively on general notions that 
every and  each one could  understand  and  from which everyone cou ld  
have significantly benefitted  both from a material and  intellectual point 
of view. Thus, Ortega says:  
 
Hay que partir del estud iante medio y considerar como núcleo de la 
institución universitaria, como su tornos o figura primaria, exclusivamente 
aquel cuerpo de enseñanzas que se le pueden en absoluto rigor exigir, o lo 
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 As Márquez Padorno rightly wrote [2001: 196]: «La Misión de la Universidad 
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que es igual, aquellas enseñanzas que un buen estud iante medio puede de 
verdad  aprender [OC, IV: 549].  
 
This consideration implies two further consequences: a) the 
necessity of build ing a unified  study plan whose aim was that of 
offering a general understand ing of all the basic questions o f the current 
cultural debate. Indeed , he conceived  this basic curricu lum as composed  
of the following subjects: physics, biology, history, sociology and  
philosophy. Moreover, Ortega’s account implies b ) a very severe 
critique to a university oriented  exclusively to fostering the research 
without paying attention to the fund amental role p layed  by the d id actic. 
For promoting the cultural development of citizens it was far more 
important to transmit notions and  foster a critical attitude rather than 
concentrate exclusively on a self-referential research. The complexity of 
the contemporary cultural setting called  for synthetic visions and  not for 
hyper-specialised  research:    
 
Nunca tal vez el hombre medio ha estado tan por debajo de su propio 
tiempo, de lo que éste demanda. Por lo mismo, nunca han abundado tanto 
las existencias falsificadas, fraudulentas. Casi nad ie está en su quicio, 
hincado en su auténtico destino. El hombre al uso vive de subterfugios con 
que se miente a sí mismo, fingiéndose en torno un mundo muy simple y 
arbitrario, a pesar de que la conciencia vital le hace constar a gritos que su 
verdadero mundo, el que corresponde a su plena actualidad , es 
enormemente complejo, preciso y exigente [OC, IV: 559]. 
 
With this reform proposal Ortega d id  not intend  to  eliminate the 
investigation from the university. He simply thought that this should  
not have been a priority of all the students and  teachers being limited  
only to some of the best qualified  students and  researchers. For these 
reasons, Ortega also criticises the common attitude of his colleagues 
within the academia who only focus on their micro resear ch without 
taking into account the problems which the current society in which 
they live was facing. In spite of the knowledge they posses on specific 
fields, they are just as barbarian as their students and  the mass man in 
respect both to their own existences and  to the social life. Ortega’s 
proposals of a university reform took into consideration: a) a 
methodological reform (principle of economy); b) a recruiting reform 
(favouring the d id actic and  explanatory ability of the teachers); c) an 
infrastructure reform (promoting the modernisation of the institution ). 
All these reforms were aimed  at achieving a unique goal: rendering the 
University a really influential social institu tion , since: «La vid a pública 
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necesita urgentemente la intervención en ella de la  Universid ad  como 
tal» [OC, IV: 567]. Ortega’s d ream was that of a University that would  
have been able to contribute to the formation of the public op inion in a 
more effective and  capillary way than the other mass media. Politics 
and  education are conceived  as complementary by the Spanish 
philosopher. A basic conviction that would  have also oriented  his 
political intervention after the publication of this reform proposal. 
 
2.7 A  professor in  polit ics  
Politics and university are conceived by Ortega as the two sides of a same 
coin. The first constitutes the place in which the public opinion exercises 
his right and  duty to freely deliberate. But the public opinion is not 
merely created  through polls or elections. These, Ortega thinks, are only 
the final ou tputs of a long and  on -going process of d iscussion and  
mutual understand ing that takes place in the everyday life
67
. In fact, the 
public opinion that forms a mature liberal democracy cannot just be an 
expression of unthinking wills and  instinctual reactions. On the 
contrary, it has to be a rational and  critical view on social reality in 
order to ameliorate it [Peris Suay, 2009]. The public opinion that should  
characterise the life of a liberal democracy cannot permit the 
proliferation of an hyper-democracy in which all opinions, even the 
dumbest, count equally [Ariso, 2013]. For this reason, creating a public 
opinion is the main du ty of the educative system and , in particular, of 
the University. This d oes not imply any form of propagandist teaching, 
since the plurality of points of view is always consid ered  by Ortega as 
the basic condition for the flourishing of society and  ind ividuals. He just 
advocates for a critical education whose main goal would  have b een 
that of constructing a reflexive public op inion. This general theorisation 
did  produce d irect consequences on Ortega’s public life.  
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 As Habermas 2006: 413 put it: «The presumption of reasonable outcomes rests 
in turn on the assumption that institutionalized  d iscourses mobilize relevant 
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With the end  of Primo de Rivera’s d ictatorship new political forces 
appeared  on the horizon and  new political projects were planned . The 
possibility of establishing a republican government acquired  a 
progressively larger number of supporters. Among them, a group of 
intellectuals leaded  by Ortega y Gasset. On 10
th
 February 1931 the 
manifesto of this new political association was published  in El Sol. That 
was the birth of the Agrupación al Servicio de la República. Significantly, 
before its publishing, the Manifesto already circu lated  within the 
University of Madrid  [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 67-71]. The main 
Ortega’s collaborators on this new political project were Gregorio 
Marañon and  Pérez de Ayala. In this text Ortega justifies his 
participation in the active politics of his time, saying that the urgency of 
the political situation rend ered  ind ispensable «para todos salir de su  
profesión y ponerse sin reservas al servicio de la necesidad  pública» 
[OC, IV: 660]. The Manifesto obtained  the support of many liberal and  
socialist intellectuals soon after its publication. Ortega definitely broke the 
barrier between politics and intellectual activity, being persuaded that this 
would have been necessary to realise the political reform he always envisaged 
and to construct: «una República que despierte en todos los españoles, a un 
tiempo, dinamismo y disciplina llamándolos a la soberana empresa de resucitar 
la historia de España […] exigiendo mucho de cada ciudadano» [OC, IV: 661].  
The ASR d id  not obtain a unanimous acceptance among the 
intellectuals, especially among the conservative group. Eugenio d’Ors, 
for instance, immediately after  the publication of the Manifesto wrote 
for El Debate an article in which he reproached  those “espíritus 
ingenuos” who had  decided  to circulate this text among the University, 
and  denouncing its lack of concreteness
68
.  Interestingly enough, among 
those who supported  d’Ors statement there were many of those 
intellectuals who would  later play a lead ing role in the University of 
Madrid  from the decade of the ‘40s, such as Juan Zaragüeta, who also 
invited  d’Ors to write an anti-manifesto [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 80]. 
The cultural and  political p latform created  by Ortega participated  in the 
general election on 12
th
 April which marked  the beginning of the 
republican government [Pecharromán, 2002: 40-45]. In the following 
election for the Cortes Constituyentes that took place in the summer 1931, 
Ortega was one of the 13 candid ates of the ASR who obtained  the right 
to sit in the constituent parliament. He was voted  both in the province 
of León and  Jaén, where he obtained  respectively 58.000 and  80.000 
votes [Márquez Pad orno, 2003: 165]. The others member of the ASR to 
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be elected  were all intellectuals and  members of the upper civil society. 
Among them layers such as the secretary Justino de Azcárate, Juan Díaz 
del Moral, José Fernando González Uña, Manuel Rico Avello and  Publio 
Suárez Uriarte. Doctors such as Gregorio Marañon and  Vicente Iranzo 
Enguita; engineers such as Juan José Santacruz and  Bernardo Giner de 
los Ríos; and  university teachers such as Alfonso García Valdecasas, 
José Pareja Yébenes or a writer as Ramón Pérez de Ayala.  
The undisputed  leader was without any doubt José Ortega y Gasset 
who thus began his new adventure in the par liament. In his new 
condition as a politician he tried  to put his ideas in practice. So, he d id  
not renounce to the political ped agogy he always tried  to realise as a 
professor. Significantly, d uring the first d iscourse he pronounced  
during his political campaign he basically p resented  some of the theses 
he elucid ate in his Misión de la Universidad. In León, the 26
th
 June 1931, 
from the stage of a theatre he affirmed: 
 
Dicen que a las masas no se les puede hablar de asuntos precisos y d ifíciles 
porque no los entienden. […] Pero yo os d igo lo siguiente: la idea más d ificil 
del mundo cuando ha sido pensada por un hombre con plena claridad  
puede ser expuesta de manera que la entienda el entendimiento más 
humilde y el alma menos culta. Pero eso sí, la condición es que el que habla 
lo haya pensado antes de verdad  y ponga luego un poco de amor y de 
entusiasmo para transmitir la al prójimo menos iliustrado. Porque la política 
democrática es algo que se hace con el pueblo, más por lo mismo, toda 
verdadera política democrática es, a la vez, educación y enseñanza del 
pueblo [OC, VIII: 489-490]. 
 
All the brief political activities of Ortega in the parliament – he only 
participated  in the works of the ASR for approximately one year – were 
characterised  by the defence of liberal democratic principles. He d id  not 
think that democracy represented  a value per se, but only insofar as it 
could  be useful «para el objetivo central de su filosofía política: la 
educación del pueblo en los valores de la cultura» [Lumbreras, 2013: 68]. 
He participated  in the commission of the reform of the state, and  also in 
the constitutional and  the educative ones. All his parliamentary 
interventions were aimed  at elevating the public debate by offering a 
more theoretic perspective on the issues at stake. His goal was that of 
effectively give his contribution to the definition of the new politics of 
the nascent Republic. In order to gain the support of his colleagues and  
the public opinion he coined  enthusiastic expressions which would  later 
have a great fortune among the right and  conservativ e parties in the 
following years: that of the national party and  that of the New State. 
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The new Republican Constitution was approved  at the beginning of 
December 1931. Soon after its establishment, Ortega partially criticised  
it. He conceived  the possibility of creating a new republican party 
separating himself from the ASR and  proposing a “rectificación” of the 
Republic towards the construction of a National republican party for 
promoting educative, institutional and  administrative reforms (of the 
parliament, of the regional autonomy and  of the national economic 
plan). His positions were strongly criticised  by the left that accused  the 
philosopher of end orsing conservative positions within a parliament 
largely formed by left-minded  people [del Villar, 2003]. He started  to 
lose his influence within the Cortes and  he soon resigned  from his role 
within the ASR.  
Significantly, before definitely aband oning his active participation in 
the parliamentary politics, the last relevant campaign he sustained  was 
that concerning the reform of the University, in particu lar in his 
d iscourse concerning the autonomous statute of the University of 
Barcelona. This top ic unified  his two main preoccupations: the 
educative policy and  the national unity. Ortega d isapproved  the 
opportunity of conced ing to the University of Barcelona the formal 
recognition of his bilingualism in which he foresaw the risk of a 
progressive interrup tion of the activity of the State University in 
Barcelona. He lost also this last battle, and  therefore he decided  to leave 
apart his political activity and  return to be just an intellectual and  a 
philosopher, as he expressed  in 1932 in his Prólogo a una edición de sus 
obras [Salas, 2007: 156]. However, this experience was not a total failure. 
In fact, during his presence w ithin the republican government, the 
University of Madrid , supported  by the new political regime, brought 
about a series of substantial reforms that finally produced  the long 
expected  change for which the philosopher had  repeated ly called .  
 
2.8 The Universit y  of M adrid during the II Republic       
Ortega’s essay on the role and  destiny of the University, as 
previously seen, brought from a precise context and  operated  within an 
institution that was undergoing profound  and  rad ical changes. He 
represented  just the spokesperson of a larger and  prevailing group  
which shared  the same vision. From this group it started  the most 
effective opposition to the regime of Primo de Rivera, whose collapse 
opened  up new scenarios. Soon after the political election in April 1931, 
one of the first political reforms was that of the new minister of 
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education Marcelino Domingo, in May 1931
69
. His project established  
the reorganisation of the faculties of Philosoph y and  Literatures of the 
two main universities of the country: Madrid  and  Barcelona. Moreover, 
in the case of Madrid , the University was almost read y to inaugurate its 
new infrastructure in the campus of the Ciudad Universitaria.  The decree 
was, accord ing to the very minister a «ensayo de futuras reformas de la 
Universid ad» that consisted  in giving to these universities a «régimen 
de excepción»
70
 that rendered  possible to try new teaching 
methodologies and  approaches aimed  at modernising this institution. In 
particu lar, the decree recognised  more flexibility concerning the 
learning plans, giving to the students a larger freedom in decid ing their 
curricula and  in decid ing to what extent to attend  the classes. It reduced  
the numbers of exams to take. In summary, it conceded  to students an 
ample freedom. In particu lar, article 8 of the decree established  that: 
 
El Ministro reconoce a los alumnos el derecho a formar los planes de 
examen de Licenciatura o de Certificado, previa la aprobación por la 
Facultad  del que aquéllos hayan formado. Tomando como base cualquiera 
de los tipos señalados en este Decreto, el alumno podrá introducir en él los 
cambios que estima oportunos, con  tal de que el número de materias, el de 
las pruebas y la relativa d iticultad  del conjunto sean apreciados por la 
Facultad  como equivalentes a los del certificado cuya modificación se 
proponga
71
. 
 
The grounding principle of this reform can be found  not only in the 
works of Ortega but also in the propagation of his ideas that was 
rendered  possible by one of his greatest friend s and  admirer: the dean 
of the Facu lty of Philosophy Manuel García Morente. In 1932 he 
presented  the reform of the faculty underlining the importance to offer 
to a quantitatively growing studen t population a new and  more 
responsive university system [García Morente, 1996, I, 2: 342]. As Ortega 
had  d one, in order to counter the depersonalisation of the education in a 
mass society he pointed  out the necessity of prioritising the students 
over the teachers, consid ering each alumnus as a person who the 
university would  have the duty to ameliorate. For this reason , he 
underlined  the necessity of starting from improving the material 
conditions in which the ed ucation took place, favouring the creation o f 
an atmosphere of joy, comfort and  collaboration:  
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Ha de poderse crear un ambiente material de convivencia, en donde las 
vidas pacíficas de quienes cultivan los estud ios de Letras y de Ciencias, 
d iscurran fácilmente, sin tropiezos ni contrariedades, abastecidas de cuanto 
material necesitan: ed ificios cómodos y confortables, bibliotecas abundantes 
y modernas, laboratorios bien provístos y los emolumentos mínimos para 
poder dedicar íntegralmente la existencia a la vocación estud iosa.[…]Por lo 
pronto la Facultad  nuestra tendrá en el breve plazo de algunos meses un 
ed ificio nuevo, moderno, amplio, cómodo. En él se reunirán todos los libros 
que andan hoy d ispersos en las d istintas bibliotecas pertenecientes a la 
Facultad . En él habrá aulas, seminarios, despachos, sala de lectura y de 
estancia; habrá incluso gymnasio, comedor y cocina, que estud iantes – y 
profesores – podrán utilizar a mínimo coste. […] Y aún abrigo la esperanza 
de que todos los domingos y d ías festivos pueda salir de Madrid  en 
automóvil propio, sin gasto alguno, una caravana de estud iantes con algún 
profesor, a solazarse en excursión de arte y naturaleza por las comarcas 
próximas a la capital [García Morente, 1996, I, 2: 352]. 
 
Echoing the very words of Ortega y Gasset, Morente affirms that the 
first duty of the University would  have been that of communicating to a 
larger aud ience and  shaping the public opinion. To reach this goal it 
was of crucial importance to favour the d iscussion among this 
institution and  the civil society. For this reason Morente assigned  to the 
University five main du ties: a) transmitting from a generation to 
another the culture at its highest level; b) promoting the practical 
application of this knowledge and  c) favouring the performance of 
further research; d ) help ing the students to ameliorate their living 
conditions as human beings; and  e) communicate with the rest of the 
population and  contribute to the public debate
72
.  
Thus, the words of Ortega were finally being concretely  
implementing in the University, also from  a legislative point of view. 
The reform promoted  by Marcelino Domingo was undoubted ly a great 
success that had  a very good  reception both within the academia and  
the politics, two poles that also during the first biennium of the 
Republican regime were very strictly intertw ined . The experiment 
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 «Primero; ha de transmitir a las nuevas generaciones el caudal de la cultura 
lograda. Segundo: ha de ad iestrarlas en el manejo de los métodos probados, 
inciando a los estud iantes en la aplicación de las técnicas más valiosas de 
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passed  to be part of an overall Ley de Bases de la Reforma Universitaria 
promoted  by the new minister of education Fernando de los Ríos in  
March 1933
73
. Fernando de los Ríos was a social democratic politician 
who, during his youth, had  stud ied  in the ILE, founded  by his uncle 
Francisco Giner de los Ríos. In spite of the positive atmosphere that 
surrounded  the law [Jiménez-Landi, 1996: 270-275], there would  not 
have been the opportunity of d iscussing it in the parliament due to the 
concurrency of the new political election in N ovember 1933. This 
determined  the defeat of the republican and  socialist front. However, 
the educative reform during the first biennium of the Republican 
regime represented  one of the most important  aspects of the 
modernisation of the country, which permitted  to reach and  overcome 
the stand ards of many other European nations.  
In fact, the educative reform d id  not concern exclusively the formal 
university system, bu t was also implemented  towards the creation of 
new educative centres, in p articular the popular universities. These 
represented  a project that the very García Morente significantly 
promoted  during those years [Moreno Martínez and  Sebastían Vicente, 
2010]. By the beginning of December 1931 some university students also 
fostered  a project aimed  at enhancing higher education within the 
adults and  the workers. Thus, the conclusions reached  by the national 
congress of the Unión Federal de Estudiantes Hispánicos affirmed  that: «La 
misión educad ora de la Universid ad  no acaba en el estud iante: debe 
d ifundirse al pueblo y es preciso que el mismo estud iante comprenda 
esta necesidad  y extiend a la cultura que de ella recibió» [See Pérez 
Galán, 1977: 137]. This political and  social engagement of the students 
during the first biennium of the II Republic extensively increased  – as a 
consequence of the precedent rad icalisation during the regime of Primo 
de Rivera – and  the FUE acquired  a more and  more influential role in 
many of the issues related  to the educative reform. The main goal 
purported  by this group  of students was that of opening the University 
to the working class, basically in order to realise an effect ive 
transmission of the culture, as previously theorised  by Ortega. The 
creation of the summer university of Santander in 1932 – promoted  by 
the minister Fernand o de los Ríos – is another instance of this d iffuse 
tendency [Blanco Alonso and  Ramón Carriazo, 2006]. Ortega 
participated  in this project, supporting it since its very creation and , in 
the summer 1933, giving some lessons. The spirit of Ortega’s educative 
reform was then put into practice during the Republican period , 
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rendering possible his ambitious project of spread ing the influence of 
the University across the whole society.  
The main institutional supporter of this reform was the University of 
Madrid  that represented  the centre of the political and  cultural power. It 
is in this period  that a new generation of intellectuals and  scientists, 
sharing a common political and  philosophical vision started  to flourish, 
i.e. the famous Escuela de Madrid that orbited  around  the figure of 
Ortega y Gasset [Pad illa, 2007]. During these years and  until the 
beginning of the civil war the Escuela reached  its apogee
74
, before 
propagating outside the Spanish boarders d uring the following decades. 
The group of teachers and  students belonging to it would  later play a 
decisive role within the Spanish and  Latin American scenario, 
contributing to spread  the ideas of their symbolic master in d ifferent 
countries and  academic d isciplines [Orden Jiménez, 2008: 218]. Among 
them, a first generation of orteguians composed  by José Gaos, Julián 
Marías, María Zambrano, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, and  a second  and  ind irect 
generation composed  by Rodríguez Huéscar, Manuel Granell, Antonio 
Maravall and  José Luis Aranguren.  
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 However, it is important to underline that the Escuela was concretely 
conceived  as such only posthumously, that is after the end  of Ortega’s 
influential role during the 30s. Its invention rep resents a sort of historiographic 
myth created  during the Francoism in order to claim for a d ifferent cultural 
perspective by using the reference to a common master – Ortega – in order to 
counter the political and  cultural hegemony of the regime. Indeed , the school 
represented  more a memory of a recent past than a concrete reality. In fact, it is 
true that the school was: «reflejo y expresión de una realidadd  tan de bulto e 
inelud ible como es el d iscipulado orteguiano. […] El núcleo de los que pueden 
llamarse más propiamente sus d iscípulos filosóficos se sitúa en la Facultad  de 
Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad  de Madrid , desde donde irrad ia 
poderosamente». See La Escuela de Ortega, in «Revista de Estud ios Orteguianos», 
2003, 6: 201. But at the same time, starting from the civil war: «La verdadera 
d iferencia se encuen tra en dos puntos:  […] entre redes orteguianas y redes no 
orteguianas que acceden a la enseñanza previa laminación de aquella» [Moreno 
Pestaña, 2013: 78-79]. In fact, among the members of the Escuela often are 
philosophers and  intellectuals who constituted  the kernel of the new political 
and  intellectual regime, strongly opposed  to Ortega, during the first years of 
Franco’s regime, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo or Juan Zaragüeta. (See Guy, 1985: 
299). However, also within the most faithful friends of Ortega, such as Antonio 
Maravall or Julián Marías, the use of the master sometimes produced  rad ical 
misinterpretations of his thought in order to render it more compatible with the 
new political regime. For instance, Maravall rid iculously affirmed that: 
«precisamente por ser un filosofo español, Ortega ha tenido que representar 
tanto para los católicos españoles» [Maravall, 1959: 19].    
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The University of Madrid  represented  during the beginning of the 
30s a successful experiment of modernisation and  collaboration between 
teachers and  students, as demonstrated  by the Mediterranean cruise 
which took place during more than a month in the summer 1933. The 
main promoter of this travel was the very Manuel García Morente. This 
constituted  an experience of intellectual life in common  that contributed  
to create personal relations of friendships between a whole intellectual 
elite that largely approved  and  followed  the princip le of the ILE which 
rendered  possible this voyage by financing it [Gracia Alonso, 2006].    
During this period , after his d ismissal as a politician in 1932, Ortega 
started  to focus exclusively on his academic and  philosophical activities. 
He expressed  the desire to offer a systematisation of his theories and  
announced  the beginning of a “second  navigation” oriented  towards a 
more theoretical and  less political or journalistic perspective [OC, V: 99]. 
From 1932 to 1936 he shaped  some of the most relevant philosophical 
concepts of his entire life, but in spite of his desire he was unable to 
translate them into a systematic philosophical p rod uction. Moreover, 
his anthropological, philosophical and  historical reflections still 
continued  to be related  to his political and  pedagogical interest, with the 
unceasing aim of comprehending and  defining his role as an intellectual 
and  philosopher within the society, as a sp iritual guide of a whole 
generation. During a d iscourse he pronounced  at the University of 
Granad a in 1932, Reforma de la inteligencia, he called  for the 
independence of the intellectual activity from the political one. But this 
attitude d id  not constitute a synonym of ind ifference. On the contrary, 
the role he advocated  for himself was that of: «forjar las nuevas normas 
que pudieran en la hora de declinar las antiguas elevarse sobre el 
horizonte» [OC, V: 209]. In other words, he never abandoned  his desire 
of mould ing the political debate and  the public op inion, as a free and  
independent intellectual.  
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PART II 
 
THE SEPARATION FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY 
The civil war represented  a breakpoint in relation to Ortega’s life, to 
the history of the university to which he belonged  and , most of all, in 
relation to the Spanish political history. Very few stud ies so far have 
extensively taken into consideration this last period  of Ortega’s 
philosophical production and  intellectual life. Moreover, the majority 
of them has exclusively considered  the evolution of his biography 
without taking into consid eration the ways in which it related  to the 
evolution of the Spanish and  international cultural scenario. A relevant 
exception in this sense is constituted  by the book of Gregorio Morán, El 
Maestro en el Erial [1998] whose great merit was that of offering a 
general overview on the political posture of Ortega during the last 
fifteen years of his life and  in relation to Franco’s regime. This 
pioneering work, however, was characterised  by a very limited  
perspective that basically aimed  to inquire into his relationships with 
the regime from a purely political point of view. Moreover, the 
ambiguous posture of Ortega has been quickly labelled  as pro-francoist 
without taking into account the reasons and  the methods that 
characterised  Ortega’s intervention as an intellectual in the public and  
cultural debate of that period . Indeed , during his long exile that started  
in 1936  and  ended  in 1945, bringing Ortega firstly to France and  later 
to Argentina and  Portugal. During this period  the philosopher  
continued  to take part into the Spanish intellectual life, but it d id  it in a 
very d ifferent way compared  to the past. 
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Contrary to the limited  literature on this topic, the purpose of this 
section does not principally lie in a presentation of his political cond uct. 
It neither consists in expressing a judgment over Ortega’s political 
ambiguity both during and  after the civil war. On the contrary, its aim 
is that of critically inquiring into the ways in which Ortega conceived  
his intellectual role within a cultural and  political regime that was 
extremely d ifferent from the one in which he was educated  and , at the 
same, which he had  consistently contributed  to forge. This section will 
contribute to prove that, more than during his early life, in this period  
the philosophy, the ideas and  the intellectual practices of Ortega 
strongly depended  on the concrete political and  social circumstances 
under which he lived . Moreover , it will be demonstrated  that the 
Spanish case represents a particu lar and  significant instance of a 
broader question concerning the formation and  recognition of scientific 
knowledge as produced  and  transmitted  within the academia. Political 
parad igms and  hegemonies change over time and  their mutations 
impose rad ical changes in the intellectual register, in the same way in 
which d ifferent cultures impose the use of d ifferent languages.  
As for the case of languages, this imposition constitutes a force that 
bends a whole society and  every single ind ividual to adopt a certain 
style rather than another, even when one is trying to emancipate herself 
from this imposition. Indeed , it is impossible to engage in a d ialogue 
without accepting its basic rules, even if the aim of the conversation is 
that of changing these very norms. The only possible alternative to this 
condition would  be either a total isolation , represented  by a sort of 
intellectual monologue – and , ultimately, the recognition of one’s 
inanity – or a complete muteness, an aptitude that not only accept to 
recognise this uselessness, but that also chooses to prefer this condition 
rather than to accept the rules of the game. These two d ifferent 
positions, in sp ite of the self-proclaimed  silence that Ortega affirmed  to 
have observed  during his exile, d id  not correspond  to the ap titude of 
the philosopher during this period  of his life. In fact, he chose not to 
abd icate from his intellectual role. This decision im plied  the logical 
impossibility to completely leave apart the cultural debates that were 
taking p lace in Spain during that period , and  the necessity of looking 
for possible collaborations in order to p lay an active role in this 
changing scenario.  
These considerations d o not excuse Ortega from his controversial 
political responsibilities that could  be pointed  ou t during specific 
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periods of his life, such as his d isputable aptitude towards the FN 
during the civil war and  his criticisms to the republican forces. 
However, taking into account exclusively these aspects of his life and  
political thought would  merely produce a sort of anecdotic narration: 
either a desecration or an hagiography. On the contrary, the 
perspective ad opted  in this section is that of studying through the case 
of Ortega, the mutual relation that always exists respectively between 
a) a philosopher and  his time; b) the thinking he purports and  the 
common language shared  by the cultural scenario in which he acts; c) 
the power exercised  within the academia and  the political power; d ) the 
meditation on one’s own intellectual role and  the concrete historical 
and  social conditions that favour or impede it.  
Indeed , the case of Ortega is extremely interest ing insofar as he had  
to exercise his intellectual function d uring a series of d ifferent political 
regimes, always with the aim not of serving their interests but rather 
with the aim of offering a critical point of view on his circumstances. 
He d id  not pass through a process of political camouflage , as some of 
his colleagues d id , nor he escaped  from the reality. The analysis offered 
in these pages will exhibit the reasons why it is not correct to refer to 
this period  of Ortega’s thought as conservative or reactionary. And  this 
will be proven by considering in particular the meaning he attribu ted  
and  the function he assigned  to the intellectual, the philosopher and  the 
educative process in relation to society, paying particular attention to 
the definition of these terms within the academic system.  
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Chapter 3. 
The breakd ow n of the civil w ar  
The civil war represents a tragic p hase of the Spanish history and  an 
alarming instance of the political rad icalisation that characterised  the 
whole European continent during the ‘30s. During the conflict, the 
violent fights between leftist and  conservative movements , which 
marked  the period  comprised  between 1936 and  1939, prod uced  a 
d iffuse climate of violence and  barbarism. The university, that had  
always been strictly intertwined  with  politics, was now one of the 
major battlefield s of this harsh and  long conflict. In fact, since the very 
outbreak of the civil war, this institution p layed  an active part in it, 
being a symbolic as well as a concrete object of d ispute between the 
two opposite political fronts. In particular , the University of Madrid  
and  its recently bu ilt campus became a battleground  of this conflict. For 
those intellectuals who remained  in Spain – and  also for those who 
preferred  to escape abroad  – it was impossible to maintain a neu tral 
position between the Frente Popular and  the Frente Nacional. A growing 
political rad icalisation impeded  it. This was particularly evident within 
the University, one of the most active institu tion s in promoting, during 
the republican age, the enhancement of a liberal and  d emocratic way of 
thinking.  
This chapter analyses Ortega’s attitude before the civil war and  
during the period  of growing politicisation of the University (§1) and  
also the reception of the main ideas of the philosop her within the right 
movements that initially id entified  Ortega with a conservative thinker 
(§2). The physical and  spiritual destruction of the University of Madrid  
and  the Facu lty of philosophy during the conflict (§3) obliged  several 
intellectuals to emigrate. During his French exile Ortega d id  not 
renounce to be part of an intellectual debate (§4). In his philosophical 
writings during this period  he sent implicit messages to the Spanish 
cultural establishment, defending the need  of a d ialogue between the 
opposite fronts and  denouncing the extreme politicisation of the 
intellectual scenario (§5). In brief, he manifested  a conciliatory aptitude. 
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Being persuaded  of the probable victory of the FN he defended  it in a 
series of articles he arranged  with some members of the Franco’s 
entourage that were add ressed  to an international aud ience (§6). 
However, he never shared  the ideology of the regime. For this reason 
and  d ue to his philosophical and  educational framework, also in his 
most propagandistic articles he never renounced  to d irect ly criticise the 
political views, the demagogy and  populism, of the new fascist 
movements. 
 
3.1 A  crit ical spectator  
As alread y seen in the previous section, the University of Madrid  
during the II Republic constituted  a temple for the flourishing of liberal 
principles w ithin intellectuals and  the civil society. In other words, this 
educational institu tion conceived  itself as a political entity. For this 
reason, when at the end  of 1932 a new electoral campaign took place , 
one of the most outstand ing enemies of the right wing movements 
created  around  the CEDA, whose leader was Gil Robles, was 
represented  exactly by the University of Madrid . Indeed , this was 
conceived  as a symbol of the republican regime. Curiously enough, 
these criticisms rarely involved  the thought of Ortega y Gasset who 
was generally perceived  – also thanks to his critical posture towards 
the Republic since the end  of 1931 – as a possible ideologue of the 
conservative movement. In particular, his elitism and  his defence of the 
value of the minority over the masses, his idea of the nation and  his 
valorisation of the vitality of human existence constituted  some of the 
main traits that fascinated  the young intellectuals and  politicians who 
were trying to construct an eclectic right-minded  ideology
1
. An 
ideology that wanted  to counter the hegemonic thinking of the 
Republic. One of the most famous supporters of Ortega’s thought 
within these political movement was Ramiro Ledesma who, in 1931, 
founded  the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalistas [González Cueva, 
2006]. 
                                                          
1
 As Julía, 1996: 53: «No era la CEDA una formación estrictamente fascista, ya 
que rebosaba catolicismo e incluso clericalismo para serlo, pero en su 
simbología y en su lenguaje, así como en los uniformes y en los lenguajes de 
sus juventudes, hacía todo lo posible por parecerlo».  
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In fact, in spite of his atheism and  liberalism, which rendered  him 
ind igestible to the catholic and  conservative forces, Ortega was 
considered  as the author of one main text: España invertebrada (1922) in 
which he underlined  the importance of build ing a strong and  
authoritative State. H is philosophy was interpreted  as a reactionary 
proposal aimed  at build ing a new and  anti-democratic form of 
government. These read ings of his thought obliged  the philosoph er to 
intervene in the public debate in order to counter these arguments. He 
d id  it in a long article published  by El Sol in 1933 entitled  Viva la 
República. The election on 12
th
 November 1932 had  determined  the 
victory of CEDA and  the following questionin gs of the parliamentary 
democracy as an effective form of political governance. Within this 
context, Ortega wrote this article in order to affirm that his violent 
attacks to the II Republic d id  not imply any systemic critique to this 
form of government as such. On the contrary, it wanted  to constitute a 
stimulus for ameliorating the functioning of a young and  fragile 
institutional system , such as the Spanish democratic regime. For this 
reason he affirms that: «La única posibilid ad  de que España se salve 
históricamente, se rehaga y triunfe es la República» [OC, V: 283].  
Ortega’s partial endorsement to the right movements was therefore 
exclusively based  on the wish to construct a mature form of bipartite 
democracy alternating left and  right within a stable political system . In 
fact, he thought that the republican power manifested  the realisation of 
a more general and  historical tendency that could  not have been 
d ismissed . Thus, the victory of a d ictatorial, monarchical and  
reactionary right constituted  to him a falsification of this tendency, and  
ultimately an undesired  political scenario:  
 
¿Es que en serio pueden presentarse ante los españoles, como gente que 
saben lo que hay que hacer con España, los grupos supervivientes de la 
Dictadura que la han tenido siete años en sus manos sin dejar rastro de 
fecundidad  y menos después de muerto el ún ico de esos hombre que poseía 
alma cálida y buen sentido, que era el propio general Primo de Rivera? Y 
con más vehemente evidencia hay que decir lo propio de los monárquicos 
[OC, V: 285].  
 
In particular Ortega criticised  the demagogical attitud e of these new 
political movements whose tactics represent a complete d istortion of 
the basic grounds of his intellectual engagement in politics. In fact, they 
reveal a tendency «envilecedora de las masas como aquélla contra la 
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cual protestaba yo en mi d iscurso de León» [OC, V: 285]. Demagogy and 
populism, to Ortega, are the main obstacles for the development of an 
authentic democratic system, since they render thoroughly impossible the 
enhancement of political education and, therefore, the construction of a critical 
public opinion within the civil society. This absence of a clear and  precise 
thought is reflected  in the overall political program of these forces, in 
fact they: «se han d irigido al país sin clarid ad  en lo más esencial, h asta 
el punto de ocasionar el hecho sin ejemplar de haberse producid o 
incuestionablemente un triunfo y que a estas horas no se sepa a qu ién 
corresponde» [OC, V: 291]. Thus, the criticism s of Ortega towards the 
right movements are primarily concerned  with the lack of seriousness 
and  clearness in their political proposals. This was also the major cause 
of the consequent lack of pedagogical interest which is what Ortega 
considered  as the most important trait of any positive political 
movement bu t that was scarcely possess both by right and  left. 
So, back in 1932-1933, the Madrilenian philosopher already pointed  
out the need  for the new movements, that were acquiring a prominent 
role within the political scene, to construct a solid  cultural identity 
abandoning a politics made of slogans and  violence against false 
enemies, such as the communism or the masonry. In order to obtain 
this it would  have been necessary to respect the republican institutional 
framework assumed by Spain in 1931. However, the words of Ortega went 
unheard: not only the right movements constructed their own identity in 
direct opposition against the Republic and per via negationis, but they also 
opted for a complete destruction of the previous institutional system . The use 
of reason as a political means would  be d ismissed , leaving room to the 
systemic use of violence, end ing up in the burst of the civil war in 1936.  
 
 
3.2 A n  involun tary  ideologue  
However, Ortega’s precise critiques to the right movements d id  not 
impede the instrumental use made by these political forces, in 
particu lar within the rising Falangist movement. Even when he was 
criticised  by the members of FE, this critiques always reflected  a very 
particu lar dynamic of “usificación” [Medin, 2014: 253-258], that is to 
say an instrumental use of his theses. In fact, his political thought was 
either praised  as a partial justification of au thoritarianism, violence and  
elitism, or reproached  as a socialist and  liberal thinking. But in both 
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cases he represented  the main reference of a vivid  public debate
2
. The 
case of Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of Miguel Primo de Rivera and  
leader of the FE, constitu tes a clear instance of this dynamics [Simancas 
Tejedor, 2000]. In 1934 he affirmed  that in Ortega «están las raíces 
intelectuales de nuestra doctrina, en especial de este postu lad o que yo 
estimo fundamental, de la “unid ad  de destino”». He ad mitted  not to 
know personally Ortega and  that the writings he had  read  were 
exclusively the famous España invertebrada and  Rebelión de las Masas. He 
also admitted  of having constructed  his positive jud gment mainly on 
the opinion of his father. However, he cou ld  not but reproach his 
liberal attitude that he considers as his biggest mistake [Bravo 
Martínez, 1939: 52-53]. H is Homenaje y reproche a Don José Ortega y Gasset 
(1935) perfectly reveals the very eclectic and  instrumental use of Ortega 
made by the FE since his very birth
3
. In this text José Antonio 
reproaches to Ortega his lack of political courage, accusing him of 
being at the halfway between a politician and  an intellectual. He 
thought he should  have abandoned  his critical view and  actively 
participate in politics joining his movement and  putting into practice 
his project of rendering Spain a vertebrate nation. 
However, there was an abysmal d istance between the attitudes, 
scopes and  methods of Ortega in comparison to those of the movement 
promoted  by Primo de Rivera. The philosopher unceasingly continued  
to mark this d ifference and  his retirement from public life in 1932 to 
devote himself to the study and  systematisation of his thought 
evidently proves it. Within the university he continued  to defend  the 
role of the ILE and  the importance of education in order to counter the 
growing populism of the country. In this period  he started  to define the 
main traits of his theory of history (that he called  “historical reason”. 
See Lasaga Medina, 2005). His ped agogical interest continued  to be 
very strictly related  to his philosophical thought. Indeed , he conceived  
                                                          
2
 However, as Sánchez Cámara, 2005: 191, rightly wrote: «Toda pretensión de 
interpretar el pensamiento político de Ortega en un sentido «pre» o 
«parafascista» fracasa necesariamente y constituye una burda tergiversación, 
nacida acaso de una mala interpretación de su elitismo o aristocratismo, de su  
teoría de la minoría selecta». 
3
 As correctly written by Canales Patricio, 1961: 14: «José Antonio se vale de 
Ortega como Dalí puede valerse, a veces, de algún motivo o de alguna figura 
ya resuelta anteriormente, que al quedar incorporada a su composición 
adquiere un sentido d iferente u otra inteción bien manifiesta». 
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education as a process of revitalisation of the past in order to 
comprehend  the basic principles govern ing a society. Only through this 
process of internalisation of the past it would  have been possible to 
develop a sense of political participation as a meaningful and  living 
activity that every citizen should  have realised  to live authentically.  
He defended  these theses during several of his lessons and  public 
conferences, in particular when addressing to his students and  their 
very role within the university and  the society. He d id  it by tracing a 
sharp d ifference between two types of teaching: one that conceives 
students as passive receptors of useless notions and  another that aims 
at transmitting a sense of a practical and  usefu l knowledge. 
 
[E]l hacer que la pedagogía regula y que llamamos estud iar, es en sí mismo 
algo umanamente falso […]. Se introduce en la mente humana un cuerpo 
extraño, un repertorio de ideas muertas, inasimilables o, lo que es lo mismo, 
inerte. […] La solución […] no consiste en decretar que no se estud ie  sino en 
reformar profundamente ese hacer humano que es el estud iar y, 
consecuentemente, el ser del estud iante. Para esto es preciso volver del 
revés la enseñanza y decir: enseñar no es primaria y fundamentalmente 
sino enseñar la necesidad  de una ciencia, y no enseñar la ciencia cuya 
necesidad  sea imposible hacer sentir al estud iante» [OC, V: 273-275]. 
 
The educative problem constituted  a crucial preoccupation of 
Ortega also during the period  in which he unwillingly became a 
d iscussed  ideologue for the emergent right political movements. He 
chose to devote himself to the investigation and  teaching, obtaining in 
that very period  the most prestigious awards for his intellectual 
activity. In fact, in the occasion of the 25
th
 anniversary as a professor at 
the University of Madrid  in 1935, he received  a public homage from his 
colleagues and  students
4
. They celebrated  his eminent professorship in 
a series of articles written by García Morente, Fernando Vela, María 
Zambrano, Gregorio Marañon, Xavier Zubiri, Luis Santullano and  Blas 
Cabrera. In November 1934, the city of Madrid  gave him the Medalla the 
Oro de Madrid, as a public award  to the «pensad or mas grande de 
España»
5
. 
In the University he continued  to be a reference point for his 
students and  also in the broader intellectual community he enjoyed  a 
                                                          
4
 See Cuadernos de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, sezione Facultad, 2, 1935-1936. 
5
 In Abellán, 2005: 115. 
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successful public recognition as a liberal democratic philosopher . He 
obtained  also an international recognition, being invited  by the Faculty 
of Philosophy of the Sorbonne University to teach a module in 1935-
1936
6
. Moreover, his pedagogical attitude rendered  him prone to 
communicate also to a larger aud ience. Thus, the American 
newspapers Cosmopolitan, in 1935, invited  the philosopher to «avail 
yourself of this opportunity to speak d irectly to millions of our 
citizens», on the occasion of an international symposium to be held  in 
New York among other intellectual and  political figures
7
. All these 
recognitions bear witness to his philosophical writings and  also to his 
role as a public intellectual that was able to be an agglutinative political 
element both inside and  ou tside the university. 
This had  been rendered  possible by the context of the University of 
Madrid , the p illar of the cu ltural and  political Spanish power [González 
Calleja, 2013]. It is not surprising, consequently, that  also in the 
following years this University will have constituted  the centre of the 
political debate, and  every rad ical change in the social and  political 
situation of the country would  have passed  through it. The new 
political regime identified  in the ILE and  the Republican model of the 
University its greatest enemy that had  to be annihilated  in order to 
construct a new cu ltural parad igm. This caused  Ortega’s departure 
from Madrid  and  the Spanish formal schooling system. A separation 
that – as it w ill be proved  in the next chapters  – would  not imply the 
d ismissal of his intellectual role, but rather a rad ical reconsideration of 
its nature.  
 
3.3 The Universit y  of M adrid as a bat t lefield  
The Spanish civil war, that ended  in 1939 with the victory of the 
Frente Nacional, determined  a new deal for the national ed ucation and  
in particu lar for the UC. The liberal and  socialist p rincip les of the II 
Republic were replaced  by new pedagogical proposals. The majority of 
them shared  a common origin, i.e. the valorisation of the catholic 
trad ition that during the ‘20s and  ‘30s had  been partially marginalised  
                                                          
6
 Letter by J. De Cardenas to Ortega, 13-XI-1935, in AOG, C-119/ 10. 
7
 Letter by P. Harry Burton to Ortega, 11-X-1935, in AOG, C-119/ 12. Ortega 
refused  this opportunity due to the concurrence of other activities. See in 
particular the letter by Ortega to Burto, 15-X-1935, CD-B/ 97. 
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by the “regenerationist” movements. The Church had  been 
substantially reluctant to accept the changes promoted  by the 
republicans and , since the famous burst of the convents which took 
place on May 11, 1931, it became suspicious with any manifestation of 
liberal thinking [Nuñez de Prad o, 2014]. Indeed, the struggle against the 
two fronts during the civil war basically reproduced the opposition between 
two different ideologies and institutions that could be epitomised in the ILE 
and the Church. A  conflict that had marked the Spanish political scenario 
for more than ten years before the Alzamiento of General Franco on July 
18
th
, 1936
8
. 
From an ideological point of view, the trad itionalism of the Catholic 
front merged  with other cultural and  political movements of the time, 
and  in particu lar w ith the Italian fascism and , to a very relevant extent, 
with the German Nazism  [Saz Campos, 2004; Paxton, 2005; Nuñez 
Seixas, 2015]. And  this in spite of the very limited  impact of the Fe de las 
JONS in the 1936 election, with only a 0,7% of votes. In fact, the 
totalitarian experience that already marked  the Italian and  German 
cases was a stimulating example for the military d ictatorship . A new 
form of authoritarian government that would  have concretely gained  
the political power even if lacking a comprehensive and  unified  
ideological account and  a normative view
9
 [Preston, 1995]. In this 
extremely complex and varied scenario the very UC constituted the main 
battlefield among opposite fronts, both during and immediately after the civil 
war.  
In particular, starting from the summer 1936, the University became 
the main battlefield  of the conflict. As Calvo Sotelo has written [2004: 
                                                          
8
 On the role of the Church during the civil war and  the reasons that supported 
its d irect intervention in the conflict see in particular Álvarez Bolado, 1995.  
9
 Indeed , this plurality of political perspectives and  interests constitu ted , in 
spite of its counterintuitiveness, a positive trait of the military regime at least at 
an initial stage. In fact, as wrote by F. Gallego Margalef, 2014: 19: «La debilidad  
organizativa del fascismo español, que en realidad  se comparte en un grado 
mayor de lo que acostumbra pensarse con fascismos de masas en visperas de 
su rápido crecimiento al iniciarse la década de los treinta, no fue un obstáculo 
para que llegara a imponer su capacidad  de integración social, su enérgico 
activismo y su habilidad  de síntesis de distintas trad icionales ideológicas en la 
construcción de un gran proyecto contrarrevolucionario que homogeneizó con 
sus propuestas doctrinales y con su mística militarizad a». On these aspects and 
on the relevance of the fascist ideology within the Franco’s regime see in 
particular F. Gallego Margalef, 2012. 
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116]: «el campus pasó de ser un espacio iluminad o por el idealismo 
educativo, intelectual y arquitectónico a convertirse de la noche al d ía 
en un sombrío y sangriento territorio de lucha». However, as already 
seen in the previous chapters, it would  be an ingenuity to define this 
change as abrupt and  completely u nexpected . In fact, the Spanish 
University had  always constituted , during the course of the whole 
century, the p lace in which d ifferent political and  ideological fronts 
violently crashed , causing d isruptive consequences which would  later 
propagate to the rest of the society. The d ivision between conservative 
and  leftist movements had  characterised  the life of the University since 
the very beginning of the XX century, and  the University of Madrid  
had  contributed  in the recent republican past to the creation of a great 
democratic expectation. The failure of this new political outlook, 
together with the frustration of the Great Depression and  the 
enhancement of the political rad icalisation s, produced  the premises for 
the outbreak of the political revolution [Payne, 2004: 112]. What is more 
significant in the case of the civil war is that the recently built campus 
of the UC, due to its strategic position in the immediate suburbs in the 
north-west of Madrid , played  a decisive role for the control of the 
whole city [Reverte, 2004].  
The battle of the Ciudad Universitaria took place starting from 
November 1936 when the troops of the FN had  to stop their march 
towards the centre of Mad rid  in the nearby of Casa del Campo, due to 
the resistance of the opposite front, and  soon after , November, 6 1936, 
they started  their attack over the city passing through the Ciudad 
Universitaria and  Plaza de España. Thus, the University was not only 
ideologically but also from a military point of view d ivided  in two 
opposite fronts and  the Faculty of Philosophy represented  one of the 
most violent centres of this conflict since its very beginning, both from 
a symbolic and  a very material point of view  [González Cárceles, 2008]. 
The very facu lties became the trenches of the battle (see Annex 2). 
Immediately after the military coup of Franco, on August 29 1936 the 
dean of the Faculty, Manuel García Morente was substituted  by Julián 
Besterio and  the very Faculty was totally destroyed  in the following 
months [Nuñez Díaz-Balart, 2008] The photographs of the ruins bear 
witness of the extreme violence of this struggle that would  later be 
instrumentally used  by the Francoist regime to blame he republican 
front for the destruction of the faculty and  to praise the new 
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government for the great efforts done in order to restore it (Annexes 3 
and  4). 
Evidently, given the circumstances, it was impossible to maintain a 
decent academic life during the conflict. However, some of the basic 
administrative activities of the University still continued  to be offered, 
but both the classes and  the exam s were suspended . The UC largely 
moved , during the civil war, to Valencia, where it continued  to operate 
as an institution of the Republic until 1939 [Rodríguez López, 2013]. In 
the meanwhile, in particular since 1938 as a consequence of the 
progressive success of the FN, the University located  in  Madrid  started  
to assume a completely d ifferent outlook. New professors, with a 
catholic and  trad itionalist ideology started  to replace the old  ones , 
while politics was reinforcing its control over this institution. 
 
3.4 Looking for a dialogue 
Ortega arrived  in Paris in September 1936, escap ing from what he 
perceived  as an extremely dangerous condition for his personal safety 
[Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 415]. He was not alone in France. N ot only 
because several members of his family decided  to follow him abroad , 
but also insofar as a lot of the most representative republican 
intellectuals and  politicians who were close to him preferred  the French 
exile to the life in Madrid . Among them, in particular, Pio Baroja, 
García Morente, Xavier Zubiri, Felipe Blas Cabrera, Carmen de Yebes 
and  Gregorio Marañon. Paris was also a refuge for some intellectuals 
who sympathised  with the FN and  with whom Ortega got consistently 
in touch d uring his exile. Among them Antonio Marichalar, and  María 
de Maeztu, the sister of Ramiro de Maeztu. In particular , Marichalar 
would  have constituted  the trait d’union between Ortega and  the FN , 
giving him the opportunity to get in touch with the cu ltural counsellor 
of the new National Defence Council who he met in Burgos in 1936, i.e. 
the journalist and  writer Eugenio Montes. Montes invited  Ortega to 
take part in the propagand a in favour of the FN
10
. 
                                                          
10
 As Marichalar wrote to Ortega that: «en Burgos esperan que usted  haga 
alguna manifestación de simpatía al movimiento, si es que, en verdad , la siente, 
y que la haga antes de la toma de Madrid . […] Lo que se esperaba es que por 
medio de artículos y declaraciones, Europa supiera cual era el modo de pensar 
de los que no estaban con el goberno rojo y no manifestaban su opin ión, no 
  
110 
Indeed , during the first months of the civil war, Ortega assumed a 
very clear position in favour of the right military and  political 
movement. More than an endorsement to a fascist ideology the 
decision of the philosopher was mainly motivated  by  two basic 
reasons. First of all by the personal rejection of the republican 
extremisms that had  characterised  this movement during the previous 
months. This was due in particu lar to the birth , at the end  of 1935, of 
the Fronte Popular, and  the creation of a left coalition that included  also 
the communists in the government [Pecharromán, 2002: 229-231]. He 
recognised  that the causes of the civil war d id  not totally rest on the 
responsibility of the FN , whose very birth and  growth  was rather the 
result of an increasing conflict within the left and  a response to the 
phenomenon of rad icalisation of the republican government.  
Ortega considered  himself as an eminent victim of this political 
rad icalisation that had  obliged  him, against his w ill, to take a political 
position against Franco immediately after the Alzamiento, depriving the 
philosopher of the opportunity to maintain his constitutive neutrality 
which characterised  the attitude of a critical spectator
11
. The second  
motivation underneath this decision was more intimate. In fact both of 
his son, José and  Miguel, were fighting with the FN in the civil war, 
persuaded  that, among the two movements, the nationalist one could  
have represented  a better political perspective
12
. The political posture of 
                                                                                                                               
obstante, d isponiendo de los elementos. En suma, servir a una causa, si no se 
sirve a la otra». Letter by Marichalar to Ortega, 12-XI-1936, in AOG, C-67/ 11. 
11
 In a letter to Vittoria Ocampo Ortega wrote that he had  been obliged  to sign a 
manifesto against Franco by some «jóvenes escritores comunistas que volvieron 
con nuevas amenazas. Entonces d ije que sólo firmaría tres líneas en que no se 
fuese contra nad ie y que hubiese podido firmar un año antes. Así salió aquello 
– redactado por no sé quien – y que contrastaba tanto con el manifiesto ad junto 
de los “escritores antifascistas” que subrayaba su carácter forzado y de 
despego». Evidently, when Ortega wrote this letter in Argentina inviting 
Ocampo to share its contents in the intellectual society of Buenos Aires he was 
strategically adopting a posture that could  have favoured  his inclusion within 
it. Letter by Ortega to Ocampo, 24-X-1936, in AOG, CD-O/ 31. 
12
 M. Ortega, 1983:134: «Durante nuestros paseos, en casa, en todo momento, 
hablé mucho con mi padre sobre España. Estábamos convencidos que la vida 
futura de nuestro país sería más posible del lado nacional que del lado 
republicano. Mi intención era no quedarme al margen. Cu ando le d ije a mi 
padre que tenía el propósito de ir al frente le pareció natural». 
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Ortega was soon known by his most close circles of friends and  
collaborators, but only partially supported . 
This is clear, for instance, by taking into account the letter that in 
June 1937 Javier Zubiri wrote to Ortega reporting the invitation of 
Salvad or Mad ariaga – the leader of the opposition to the FN from Paris 
– in order to ask him to sign a manifest supporting a peaceful 
resolution of the Spanish conflict. He presented  this petition very 
soothingly since he knew that: «no entrara en sus planes mezclarlse en 
tales empresas»
13
. Indeed , Ortega d id  not sign this manifesto. Just some 
months after receiving this letter he was strongly persuaded  that the 
FN would  soon have won the war. For this reason  he thought that the 
next political interlocutor with  whom he would  have to deal would  
have been the General Francisco Franco, and  he started  to get prepared  
for this eventuality
14
. 
For this reason, in 1937-1938 Ortega published  some texts with a 
veiled  propagandistic aim for the British and  French press, after having 
discussed  them with a member of Franco’s establishment: Luis Calvo. 
The collaboration to the cause of the FN was realised  in particular 
through two essays – a prologue and  an epilogue – that Ortega wrote 
by taking as a starting point his most famous and  appreciated  political 
works within the conservative ideology: España Invertebrada and  the 
Rebelión de las Masas. In add ition, in 1937, Ortega wrote another political 
essay he published  in the conservative journal The nineteenth century 
and after entitled  On pacifism. In summary, during the years of the civil 
war it is possible to notice a permissive and  conciliatory attitude in 
Ortega towards the FN and  its leader Francisco Franco. He was 
strongly persuaded  that this movement would  have finally won the 
war and  for this reason he tried  to appear as a possible cultural 
                                                          
13
 Letter by Zubiri to Ortega, 15-VI-37, in AOG, C-53/ 7. 
14
 As Ortega wrote to Carmen de Yebes during the summer 1937: «Veo que en la 
España blanca hay cad a vez más orden si bien a costa de ir recayendo todo bajo 
el poder de las fuerzas más habituales. En lo internacional es de notar la lenta 
pero continua gravitación de Inglaterra hacia el Gobierno de Salamanca. Lo que 
no se ve aun es proximidad  de solución». Letter by Ortega to Yebes, 25-VII-
1937, in AOG, CD-Y/ 18. Some days later he would  add  that «parece que se va 
aclarando el horizonte de nuestro gran drama español. Si no interviene algun 
elemento hoy invisible no me estrañaría nada quel el proceso se acelerarse 
vertiginosamente». Ortega to Yebes, 3-VIII-1937, in AOG, CD-Y/ 19.  
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reference point also for the future establishment by defending the 
image of Franco and  the movement in the foreign press. Nevertheless, 
neither he repudiated  his previous republican experience , presenting 
himself as an ideologue of the FN, nor he changed  his political and  
philosophical views towards a sort of conservative, authoritative or 
fascist thinking. Indeed, Ortega continued to maintain strong relationships 
with several of the republican entourage in exile
15
 and, as it will be proved, he 
always conceived his intellectual role as a critical and impertinent activity.  
In other words, Ortega, during this period , abstained  from any sort 
of political rad icalism , even if he was contended  by both the 
movements at the same time. This does not mean that he observed  a 
totally neu tral position, being on the contrary significantly oriented  
towards the defence of the FN. He was convinced  and  hoped  that 
Franco’s troops would  have soon won the war. The personal 
motivations that brought him to take this decision were not related  to 
an ideological endorsement to the basic ideas of the rising political 
regime that, after the civil war, would  start to exhibit his au thoritative, 
populist and  illiberal character. The aim of Ortega was simply that of 
trying to open the way to a political dialogue, also during a period in which it 
appeared to be blatantly impossible. He was persuaded  that this was both 
his personal and  his public duty as an  intellectual. 
 
3.5 The language of t he dialogue: Ortega on  t ranslat ion  
The first philosophical essay written by Ortega y Gasset during his 
exile clearly reveals this d ialogic tendency implicit in his political 
writings. Indeed , in Miseria y esplendor de la traducción  (1937) he adopts 
                                                          
15
 One of the most significant example of this is the relation between Ortega and 
Lorenzo Luzuriaga, who always tried  to mediate with other Spanish 
intellectuals in order to construct an alternative both to the republican and  the 
nationalist front for the post-war period. In 1937 Lorenzo Luzuriaga suggests 
for example to Ortega the idea of creating a third party as a way to limit the 
tremendous growth of the political rad icalisation among two Spains. Cfr. Letter 
by Luzuriaga to Ortega (15/ 7/ 1937, in AOG, C65/ 27C). He also manifests an 
opposite view in comparison to that of Ortega in relation to En cuanto al 
Pacifismo. In particular he thought that the civil war was not exclusively an 
issue of domestic politics, as Ortega wrote, but rather an international affair 
that implied  a foreign military and  economic intervention. See the letter by 
Luzuriaga to Ortega, 1-10-1937, in AOG, C65/ 27H. 
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an attitude that will characterised  the majority of his texts written 
during the exile, consisting in talking about the political and  cultural 
scenario of his country in an ind irect but very effective way. The veiled  
references to the historical context have often been neglected  by the 
scholars, but in the case of this thesis they are vitally important to 
understand  the strategy adopted  by Ortega to continue being an 
influential intellectual within an hostile setting and  to express his own 
political op inions while apparently talking about completely d ifferent 
topics. As Martín has recently underlined  [2014: 148], this text reveals 
the posture of Ortega during the civil war: «questa posizione scomod a 
a entrambe le parti contrapposte nella guerra d i Spagna […] un parlare 
non d iretto e immed iato che richiede la pazienza – e la volontà – 
dell’ascolto».  
In this text Ortega offers to the reader a sort of Socratic d ialogue in 
which he compares opposite theses concerning the nature of the 
translation from a language to another. Both the structure and  the topic 
of this essay are cautiously chosen by the philosopher. They reveal the 
very intention of the philosopher to favour a d ialogue among d ifferent 
positions, d ifferent languages that only by being translated  could  have 
permitted  a fruitfu l conversation among the d ifferent cultures 
purported  by those speakers. Martín [2014] underlines in particular two 
relevant aspects of this essay in relation to Ortega’s perception of his 
intellectual role during a troubled  historical period : a ) the defence of a 
neutral and  silent aptitude as an effective way to express and  
communicate his thinking
16
; b) the d istinction between a good  and  a 
bad  utopianism. Concerning the first of these aspects, Ortega’s thesis 
accord ing to which silence constitutes a way to express one’s opinion 
would  have been, in an ind irect way, a justification of his own silent 
attitude. As far as the utopianism is concerned , the d istinction between 
these two types would  reveal, accord ing to Martín, a critique to the 
republican utopianism, whose rationalism would  have caused  the 
                                                          
16
 On this performative and  political function of silence see Ferguson 2002: 8: 
« Silence can serve as resistance to any institution that requires verbal 
participation (as do virtually all). On a macroscopic political scale, states often 
require such participation and  subsequently employ a variety of means to 
compel it. The state-sponsored  requirement to take an oath is a particularly 
overt form of obligatory speech. Loyalty oaths, public recantations of heresy, 
self incrimination, enforced  pledges of allegiance, and  require jud icial 
affirmations all oblige certain well-circumscribed  speech acts». 
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explosion of the conflict. The recent thesis of Martín deserves to be 
taken into close consideration insofar as it can offer an  instance of a 
very interesting methodology that permits to read  most of Ortega’s 
writings during the exile in this comparative and  historical way. At the 
same time, it can be consistently enriched  by taking into account not 
only Ortega’s point of view , enlarging the perspective to the cultural 
and  political debates that during the same period  were taking place 
within the Spanish academia.  
In fact, the term “u topia” represented  during that period  a keyword  
also within the cultural debate that was taking p lace within the right 
movements which were trying to define their normative outlook. The 
utopia of replacing the republic with a new political order appeared  
more and  more realistic, and  this implied  the necessity of concretise 
this utopian thinking. This is the case, for instance, of the famous book 
of José Pemartin, entitled  ¿Qué es “lo Nuevo”? (1937), that tried  to define 
the basic traits of a new and  positive utopia. Ortega not only 
reproached  the republican utopianism but also warned  the new 
movement of the risks linked  to an excessively idealist out look: «La 
característica esencial del buen utopista al oponerse rad icalmente a la 
naturaleza es contar con ella y no hacerse ilusiones. El buen utop ista se 
compromente consigo mismo a ser primero un inexorable realista» 
[OC, V: 713]. Moreover, there are at least two very important parts of 
this essay which have to be cautiously analysed  insofar as they d isclose 
the way in which Ortega conceived  his intellectual activity during the 
period  of the civil war. In particu lar, a) the brief excursus on the role of 
the philosopher and  b) the long meditation, which constitutes the 
skeleton of the whole essay, concerning the anachronism of the activity 
of translating and  educating.  
The first of these aspects is briefly and  accidentally presented  by the 
Spanish philosopher as a non important aspect of the major problem, 
but it is evident the relevance of this section if compared  with the 
growing impact of populism within the European and  Spanish political 
scenario. In particular, he assigns to the intellectual the function of 
criticising the opinion of the masses and  of those who take advantage 
of their instinctual traits to obtain consensus and  power. In fact:  
 
¿No parece más verosimil que el intelectual existe para llevar la  contraria a 
la opinión pública, a la doxa, descubriendo, sosteniendo frente al lugar 
común la opinión verdadera, la paradoxa? Pudiera acontecer que la misión 
del intelectual fuese esencialmente impopular [OC, V: 714]. 
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The importance of the paradoxa as an intellectual device can be 
better comprehended  by taking into account Ortega’s writing on the 
public opinion he wrote in 1937, to reproach the New Yorker ed itorial 
company Norton&Company for the bad  translation of his Invertebrated 
Spain, which offered  the image of the philosopher as a supporter of the 
republican front. The public opinion criticised  by Ortega was the one 
that the international press was contribu ting to create and  that would  
be responsible, accord ing to the philosopher, of the wrong opinion  
accord ing to which: «la actual lucha española proced ería de la simple 
rebelión de unos militares ayudad os por unos moros y por d os 
naciones autoritarias [Italy and  Germany]» [OC, IX: 223]. He criticises 
the lack of correct information characterising the international public 
opinion concerning the Spanish civil war, in particular the English and  
American one. Without taking part for the FN, he refuses to be defined  
as a supporter of the republican front.  
In particu lar he argues in favour of the necessity of a better 
understand ing of the reasons of the two opposite parts before 
defending one or another cause. In fact, as he affirmed  in his writing on 
translation, it is not the same thing to use a similar term in Spanish or 
German. This veiled  statement can surely be interpreted  as a way to say 
that, accord ing to him, the words Führer and  Caudillo ind icated  two 
completely d ifferent realities depending on the d ifferent national 
backgrounds to which they applied . The lack of a serious 
understand ing of these cultural d ifferences would  have determined  the 
creation of a misinformed public opinion. The only possible remed y for 
this could  have been offered  by an intellectual activity that, starting 
from the facts and  not from abstract postulates, would  try to 
comprehend  and  interpret the reality [1937, OC, V: 720]. Even when 
talking of the scientific method , and  in this case of physics, Ortega, 
during this period , is referring to political questions. He indeed  
reproaches Einstein’s aprioristic pacifist outlook, accusing him for 
being too ingenious when analysing political questions.  
The second  interesting trait of Ortega’s essays written in 1937 is that 
which concerns the anachronism of translation in relation to the 
problem of education. The philosopher introduces the topic with the 
question: «¿qué hay de vivo y qué hay de muerto en nuestra lengua?» 
[OC, V: 418]. In this way, he poses the questions of the importance of 
the language spoken in a given time in relation to t he community that 
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speaks it. Accord ingly, he assigns to language the fundamental role of 
constructing the cultural identity of a nation. His opinion is fully in 
contrast with the one purported  by the trad itionalism of Ramiro de 
Maeztu or Eugenio d ’Ors. The latter, in particu lar, wrote in 1937 in a 
book entitled  La tradición – a sort of ideological guide for the falangist 
movement – in which he affirmed  that the trad ition of a nation 
constitutes the immortal and  vital trait  of its own identity. On the 
contrary, Ortega affirmed  that the histor ical consciousness of the past is 
important only insofar as it aims at reforming and  overcoming the 
history of a nation, not at glorifying it. This would  have been the aim of 
a humanistic education: knowing the past in order to project a d ifferent 
future, not just a copy of a decadent history: «No hay más remedio que 
educar su óptica para la verdad  humana, para el au téntico 
“humanismo”, haciéndole ver bien de cerca el error que fueron los 
otros y, sobre todo, el error que fueron los mejores». Ortega’s 
conclusion is a d irect attack to the classicism of d ’Ors, insofar as he 
thinks that the classics: «nos interesan, nos importan […] como errores, 
no como maestros» [OC, V: 722]. 
To summarise, Ortega’s essay on translation reveals some basic traits of 
his posture during the civil war in relation to the political and cultural 
changes that were taking place in his country and within the international 
scenario. Firstly, this text manifests a frequent tendency of the 
philosopher to talk about the current political situation in an ind irect 
and  veiled  way, camouflaging his op inion under a philosophical 
appearance. Secondly, it exhibits a partial support towards the FN in 
particu lar by defending it from the attacks of the international scientific 
and  political community. He d id  it even if he never shared  the basic 
ideological premises of the movement. In fact, as far as the pars 
construens of the FN is concerned , he always expressed  his scepticism 
about the totalitarian character of the normative utopia proposed  by 
the intellectuals and  politicians who belonged  to it
17
. Lastly, this text 
offers an instance of the way in which Ortega conceived  his intellectual 
role during this period ; that is to say as an attempt to favour the 
d ialogue between two opposite points of view w ith the aim of 
reconciling them through a mutual understand ing of their reasons. 
                                                          
17
 In fact, in his personal notes he probably wrote in the summer 1938 in taking 
into account the political ideas of Franco he affirms that: «Declaraciones 
totalitarias, de excluisivismo católico de Franco. Imposibilidad  mía de 
aceptarlas». Notes of Ortega, in AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.10.  
  
117 
However, this strategy would finally end up in a complete failure and the 
dialogue would rather resemble to a melancholy monologue.  
 
 
3.6 A  su i generis collaborat ion  w ith the FN  
Ortega also arranged  with Luis Calvo, a member of Franco’s 
entourage, the composition of some short essays supporting the cause 
of the FN. His essay on pacifism and  his political prologues to the 
Rebellion of the masses responded  to this specific purpose. These articles 
are often considered by the scholars as the main proofs of the collaboration and 
endorsement of Ortega to the new political movement
18
. However, by 
analysing the theses presented by the philosopher in these texts it is evident 
that his main preoccupation was not that of taking part into the political 
debate, but rather of guaranteeing a place for the intellectual activity to 
prosper also within a demagogical and violent political scenario. This 
statement can be asserted, for instance, by considering his Prólogo para 
franceses (1937).  
From a political perspective, h is critiques to what he calls an “old  
liberalism” d id  not imply a thoroughly defence of a sort of fascist 
corporatism or a communitarian conception of the state. On the 
contrary, he continues to affirm the priority of ind ivid ual freedom over 
the State as the most effective way to reach the enhancement of the 
society conceived  as a whole. H is defence of the regime is extremely 
weak and  he is far from enthusiastic about the general rad icalisation of 
the political situation , both concerning the left and  the right. As he put 
it: «ser de la izquierda es, como ser de la derecha, una de las infinitas 
maneras que el hombre puede eligir para ser un imbécil» [OC, IX: 364]. 
To avoid  this exasperated  politicisation he underlines the importance of 
the intellectual duty of maintaining a rigid  neu trality in respect to the 
everyday political struggle. The intellectual should  avoid  the 
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 See for instance Gregorio Morán, 1998: 61-62: «Es curioso y significativo que 
las tres aportaciones de Ortega al conflicto abierto por la guerra civil española 
estén referidas d irectamente a La rebelión de las masas. Sin entrar en otros 
detalles confirma el carácter de obra cumbre del periodo conservador de 
nuestro pensador y cuyo referente político no ha sido suficientemente 
reseñado. Suena mal el tono beligerante y reaccionario de estos añadidos con el 
acento más equilibrado del resto del libro, escrito ocho años antes».  
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“politicismo intregral” that is typical of the politicians and  the masses. 
The civil war manifests, accord ing to him, the factual d ifficu lty of 
realising a concrete social education of the masses, as he had  always 
thought during his long academic career. He expresses his worry 
concerning the «pouvoir spirituel, insuficientemente ejercido por 
mandarines literarios y por una Universid ad  que se ha quedad o por 
completo excéntrica a la efectiva vida de las naciones» [OC, IX: 368-
369].  
This text has often been understood  as the transition of Ortega to  a 
conservative thinking insofar as here he would  have ad opted  a 
conservative outlook similar to the one purported  by the so-called  
French doctrinaires. However, also in its most theoretical aspects, this 
text reveals a very d ifferent perspective. In fact, the main reference of 
this article is the French conservative liberal thinker François Guizot 
[Craiutu, 2003: 5] and  in particular his Histoire de la civilisation en Europe 
[Graham, 2001: 470]. In this text, written in 1828, Guizot theorised  the 
construction of a new political regime that would  have to be 
established  in French after the end  of the monarchical experience, the 
succeed ing revolution and  the Napoleonic au thoritarianism. The 
analogy of Ortega with the Restauración, the republic, the civil war and  
Franco’s authoritarianism  is evident, and  he shares with the French 
thinker the idea of the necessity of establishing a mix form of 
government: a constitutional monarchy which could  have permit ted  
the prospering of a liberal society merging some au thoritarian traits 
[OC, V: 387-389]
19
. In Guizot Ortega would  find  a reference point for 
developing most of his sociology, purported  in particular in some 
important books such as Ideas y Creencias and  El hombre y la Gente. As 
the French thinker, Ortega attributed  to the definition of the term 
“civilisation” a pivotal role in determining the equ ilibrium between the 
ind ividuals and  the society. In fact, the mutual relation among the two 
terms and  the priority given to the ind ivid ual over society imply that 
the process of civilisation cannot be conceived  as an imposition but 
rather as a progressive creation flowing from the ind ividual w ills. As 
Guizot put it: «Los grandes desarrollos del hombre interior han recaíd o 
en provecho de la sociedad , y que los grandes p rogresos del estado 
social han redund ado en bien de la humanidad » [Guizot, 1847: 19]. The 
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 On the borderline conception of a new form of liberalism with som e 
authoritarian characteristics, as conceived  by Ortega starting from this 
prologue, see in particular Villacañas, 2011. 
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single ind ividual is always conceived  by Ortega as the starting point of 
every political theory and , following the theses of Guizot a nd  Royer-
Collard , he attacks all forms of au thoritarianism. In fact, such political 
outlook would  end  up by depriving the ind ividuals of their freedom to 
enjoy a fruitfu l life
20
.  
Ortega never abandoned  two fund amental traits of his thinking and  
intellectual activity also when engaging into an attempt of defending 
the Spanish Falangist movement. In particular, he never renounced neither 
to a minimum form of liberalism nor to the persuasion that the real politics 
should always aim at avoiding a demagogic and populist derive, favouring the 
dialogue and the reasoning, avoiding the use of violence and fallacious forms of 
thinking. At the same time, he countered  the nationalistic outlook, 
underlying on the contrary the importance of constructing a united  
Europe in which d ifferent nations cou ld  positively coexist: «La unid ad  
de Europa no es una fantasía, sino que es la realidad  misma, y la 
fantasía es precisamente lo otro: la creencia de que Francia, Alemania, 
Italia o España son realid ades sustantivas e independientes» [OC, IV: 
355-356]. In spite of his accuses to the British internationalism , that he 
considered  as responsible for the intervention of foreign military forces 
in the course of the Spanish civil war, Ortega never defended  the 
legitimacy of au thoritarian nationalisms. On the contrary, he thought 
that he would  have been possible to integrate the interests of d ifferent 
nations into a unified  and  peaceful political pro ject. The totalitarian 
degenerations of the European politics, in particu lar in Italy and  
Germany, appeared  to Ortega as the most dangerous trait of the new 
political situation of the ‘30s
21
. In this context, the intellectual influence 
on the construction of the public opinion was conceived  by  the 
philosopher as the only possible means that could  have permitted  to 
avoid  this totalitarian risk [OC, IV: 515]. 
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 As Guizot put it: «Las sociedades humanas nacen, viven y mueren sobre la 
tierra, donde queda consumado su destino…pero, no contienen enteramente al 
hombre» [Guizot, 1847: 23]. 
21
 For this reason he considered as ind ispensable a d iplomatic resolution of the 
political tensions among Germany and  Great Britain, for avoid ing the dangers 
of the d ifferent nationalisms. He wrote in his notes: «necesidad  que había 
alguien – libre de racismo – quedase en posibilidad  de entenderse con 
Inglaterra y abocar a posibles peligros provenientes de Italia y Alemana». Cfr. 
AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.12. 
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His article On pacifism (1937) represents the most d iscussed  of his 
texts of the period . In this occasion he points out the necessity of 
passing through a totalitarian experience in order to save the old  
liberalism and  renew it
22
. He coined  for this purpose the expression 
“new liberalism” which, as he declared  in one of his note, constituted  a 
way to support the falangist movement in a very veiled  way
23
. He d id 
not share the ideology of this political force, but he thought it cou ld  
have produced  a positive change within the political history of the 
country, representing a phase to go through before overcoming it . With 
the final aim of constructing a new form of liberalism. His d isillusion in 
the political proposal of the Franco’s regime are clearly stated  by the 
very Ortega in several of his personal notes he wrote in 1938-1939
24
. 
When, in 1939, the war finally ended  with the victory of the FN he 
wrote to his friend  Gregorio Marañon – whose son, as the sons of 
Ortega, d id  take part in the war with the nationalist front – a letter in 
which he reveals his satisfaction and  hope for a positive change within 
the country
25
. An expectation that would  soon be deceived .  
In fact, just some months after send ing this letter in which he 
manifested  his partial support to the new regime, thinking he could  
have taken part to it from  an intellectual points of view, he faced  a 
completely d ifferent reality. The dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of 
Madrid , Julián Besteiro, was processed  and  condemned  to death by the 
regime even if he maintained  an irreproachable posture – accord ing to 
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 El totalitarismo salvará al liberalismo, destiñendo sobre él, depurándolo, y 
gracias a ello veremos pronto a un nuevo liberalismo templar lo regímenes 
autoritarios [OC, V. 516]. 
23
 «Mi proposito de hacer afirmación de “nuevo liberalismo” para desde ella 
defender el movimiento. Vacío que se me ha hecho fuera». AOG, NT-
26/ 6/ 1/ f.10. 
24
 As he wrote, for instance: «Una adhesión mía no era una adhesión al 
heroismo bélico de la vanguard ia, sino a las estupideces y atrocidades de la 
rataguard ia». Or: «el Prólogo para franceses lo he escrito para en todos sentidos 
tomar altura y mostrar que m i franquismo no modificaba mi liberalismo. 
Porqué la lucha en España hace que yo no pueda ir a fondo contra el 
totalitarismo so pena de parecer dar la razón a los rojos cuyo totalitarismo 
repugno todavía más», in AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.18 e NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.7. 
25
 «Hemos pasado alguna nerviosidad  con la última coletada del atún 
comunista pero a través de las confusas noticias hemos sabido representarnos 
lo que luego ha resultado la verdad . Ahora esperamos el buen comienzo del 
auténtico fin». See letter by Ortega to Marañon, 13-III-1939, in AOG, CD-M/ 36. 
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Ortega – toward s the FN during the civil war
26
. From then on the 
Spanish philosopher would  be increasingly suspicious towards the new 
political regime of which he perceived  the illiberal character. The 
possibility of exercising a proper intellectual influence within such 
violent and  d ictatorial political framework appeared  extremely d ifficu lt  
to be realised . After the killing of Besteiro, Ortega decided  not to return 
back to Spain and  continued  his exile. After having been in Paris for 
some months he moved  to Buenos Aires. He thought that «El 
intelectual serio tiene – por lo mismo que no “hace política” – que 
procurar vivir donde que de un minimum de libertad »
27
. He sought to 
maintain a basic condition of freedom for rendering possible the 
intellectual activity which was absolu tely not guaranteed  in his own 
country.  
He perceived  as more and  more d ifficult the possibility of exercising 
his critical function within a propagandistic cultural scena rio in which 
all the mass media, and  also the formal schooling system, from its 
lowest level up  to the University, were imposing a dogmatic form of 
education. In add ition, also his reception within the right -movements 
was rad ically changing in comparison to the recent past. In fact, during 
the years that preceded  the civil war he was both reproached  and  
praised . Now, on the contrary, the condemn ation of the intellectuals of 
the II Republic started  to affects all the public figures wh o had 
collaborated  to that political experience, independ ently from their 
particu lar positions. This is proved , for instance, by the book written in 
1938 by Serrano Suñer, the leader of the Tribunal de Responsabilidades, 
responsible for judging the conduct of the intellectuals who wanted  to 
return in Spain after the civil war
28
. Ortega never joined the Francoist 
movement neither participated actively in it
29
. This, in this initial period , 
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 «¡Con qué d ignidad  y sentido del deber ha estado Besteiro hasta el último 
momento! Supongo qe lo comprenderá así Franco y que no correría ningún 
riesgo pero convenía asegurar que esto es así y hacer lo humanamente posible 
para que no perturbasen a este hombre que ha hecho tanto por los madileños 
victimarios, que está enfermo y viejo». Lettera d i Ortega a Marañon, 30-III-1939, 
in AOG, CD-M/ 38. 
27
 In AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.16. 
28
 Serrano Suñer, R. [1938] Los intelectuales y la tragedia española, Ed itorial 
Española S.A, San Sebastián. 
29
 As he wrote in his personal notes: «Yo puedo adherir a un movimiento como 
se adhiere uno a un movimiento, andando –andando con el. Pero no puedo 
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impeded  to him to be included  in the new political and  cu ltural 
establishment. Nevertheless, his very peculiar form of collaboration 
with the FN during the civil war would  later give him the opportunity, 
in particular starting from the ‘40s, to intervene again in the public 
debate, even if from a very marginal and  precarious position. 
  
                                                                                                                               
adherir a un movimiento que es una cosa vaga, movil, poniendo una firma 
escrita en un preciso papel». In AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.9. 
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Chapter 4.  
The cu ltu ral revolu tion. The 
construction  of an au thoritative 
university  
This chap ter aims at analysing the intellectual debate that took place in 
Spain during the found ational period  of Franco’s d ictatorship, in 
particu lar from 1939 to 1943, in relation to the reform of higher 
education and  the university system. During this period  the academia 
represented  both a product and  a cause of the rad ical recent political 
change. For this reason, a thorough comprehension of what was going 
on within it is compulsory also to understand  Ortega’s activity. The 
debate within the Spanish academia was characterised  by a dead locked  
attempt to construct and  consolid ate a common ideology that could  
have been shared  by all the very d ifferent components of the new 
political regime.  
After taking into consideration (§1) the material changes that 
occurred  since the civil war within the academia and  in particular the 
Universidad Central of Mad rid , where a d ramatic process of purge took 
place, they will be analysed  (§2) the basic decisions and  reforms 
purported  by the first minister of Franco’s regime Sainz Rodríguez. 
Indeed , he set the bases for (§3) the following debate over the nature 
and  goal of the new University. An harsh debate that marked  the 
cultural Spanish scenario until the end  of the II World  War.  
This debate produced  two significant novelties w ithin the academic 
world : (§4) the creation of a new form of intellectual, i.e. the organic 
intellectual; and  (§5) the emergence of a new community of d iscourse. 
This community of d iscourse and  its political role w ill be analysed  in 
particu lar by taking into consideration the rhetoric that characterised 
the academic life d uring these years. In fact, in spite of its apparent 
triviality, rhetoric constitutes a crucial political aspect that can permit to 
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clearly define the basic tenets of the new magmatic id eology. In fact, as 
Van Dijk [2008: 30], put it: «The exercise and  maintenance of social 
power presupposes an ideological framework. This framework, which 
consists of socially shared , interest-related  fundamental cognitions of a 
group and  its members, is mainly acquired , confirmed , or changed  
through communication and  d iscourse».  
The reconstruction of this debate will also permit to comprehend  
that (§6) the political homologation of this community of d iscourse to a 
fix set of principles took place through to a subtle d ifferentiation 
among d ifferent commu nities [Ferrary, 1993: 200]. The creation of at 
least two main groups of interest revealed  a rad ical d ifference in the 
way of conceiving the overall educative reform  also within the regime. 
In particular, (§7) the university reform that would  finally be ap proved  
in 1943 ratified  the supremacy of the catholic front over the falangist 
one which, however, d id  not completely lose its battle . A fact that 
opened  the way to future d issents w ithin the regime. In this context, 
the instrumental use of Ortega – (§8) who, in particular due to his 
Misión de la Universidad, continued  to constitute a reference point 
during the whole debate – would  have played  a very important role in 
coagulating d ifferent intellectual and  political perspectives also during 
the following years. 
 
4.1 N ew S tate, new educat ion  
Unas de las tareas que apremiaba a nuestra juventud  combatiente era 
la de llevar el espíritu  de nuestra Cruzada al plano de la Universidad . 
Era preciso afrontar el problema doble: de una parte la Universidad 
española no podía ser neutra en el orden de las ideas. Tenía que 
definirse ideologícamente y confesar que estaba dentro o fuera de la 
concepción cristiana del mundo y de la vida. Por otro lado, la 
Universidad  no era tampoco un ente intemporal que pudiese estar 
situado al margen del movimiento político que aspiraba a cambiar de 
raíz la vida y la estructura de la Patria. Había, pues, que definir el 
estilo de la Universidad  en función de dos postulados trascendentes: 
lo religioso y lo político
30
. 
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 Editorial in «Revista de Educación Nacional», n.30, Junio 1943, pp. 4-5. 
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With these words, written in June 1943 in a short and  anonymous 
article, the d irector of the Revista de Educación Nacional and  of Franco’s 
propaganda, Pedro Rocamora, summarised  the long and  harsh debate 
that since 1938 was taking place in the Spanish inte llectual community 
concerning the reform of the University. In the summer 1943 the 
Comisión de Educación of the Cortes would  finally approve a law  which 
regulated  the University system . A law that would  then mark the 
cultural history of the country for alm ost the whole life of the regime, 
until 1970 [Fernández Soria, 1998]. These words constitute an 
impressive testimony of a constitutive tendency of the educative and  
university system that the creation of a new totalitarian state of the 
General Franco contributed  to exacerbate. In fact, the University always 
evolves in relation to the institutional, political and  social regimes in 
which it prospers. It serves d ifferent purposes depending on the needs 
of a society in a given time. This is evident in the case of the Spanish 
educative system during the whole XX century whose academia has 
long being an expression of a political ideology [Galán, 2009 and  
Puelles Benítez, 2010].  
Rocamora’s statement also reveals that both from an internal and  an 
external point of view the academic institution reproduces social and  
political states of affair. Indeed , the university is characterised  by a 
substantial d ichotomy between, on the one hand , the creation of an 
objective and  neu tral knowledge and , on the other, the accumulation of 
personal or associative powers – social status and  prestige – which are 
exercised  both within and  outside the university [Bourd ieu, 1971; 1975]. 
This constitutive d ichotomy causes the creation of more or less open 
communities of d iscourse whose processes of formation and  
consolid ation correspond  to the precarious equilibrium of these two 
opposite forces. What Angermuller [2013] has defined  with the name of 
“d iscursive cap ital”. This tendency had  clearly characterised  the life of 
the University of Madrid  during the II Republic, where the delicate 
balance of power between academic and  political institutions had  
determined  the cultural hegemony, or at least dominance, of a libera l 
and  democratic professorship. With the upheaval of the new political 
regime the academic and  political spheres would  fatally start to place 
themselves side by side, almost coincid ing. In this way they ended  up 
by threatening their reciprocal autonomy.  
In fact, whereas the University cannot be neutral in respect to its 
ideas – as Rocamora wrote – the education it purports is explicitly 
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conceived  as an instrument of political control and  domination . In 
other words, the University would  became a sort of extractive 
institution whose main aim would  be that of guaranteeing  the bases of 
the social consensus
31
, that is to say the transmission and  acceptance of 
a certain conception of the world . In fact, State legitimacy is always a 
double correlation of imposed  and  accepted  practices of power, not 
only of the ability of a State to coercively impose its norms [Searle, 
1994; 2010]. The changes in the educational system and  its institutions 
not only represent the final product of a political and  institu tional 
decision, but constitu te also a source of further changes in the very 
institutional framework of a society, contribu ting to render it more 
inclusive or, as in the case of the Spanish academia d uring the Franco’s 
regime – as witnessed  by the words of Rocamora – more extractive. 
As a matter of fact, the ruling class of the regime and , in particular 
the new members of the academia, tried  to redefine, since the very birth 
of the New State, its id eological outlook. The Spanish academia 
constitutes an instance, w ithin the history of the fascist movements in 
which not only, as in the case of Italy, an intellectual class decided  to 
follow the political trend  in a submitted  way [Croce, 1933], bu t rather 
energetically tried  to lead  this change, defining its very guidelines. 
During this process, through an intellectual debate, they were 
determined  and  transmitted  the political lines of a new ideology. Thus 
they took p lace harsh struggles for the political and  cu ltural hegemony 
of a political sector over another. This was mainly due to the magmatic 
and  chaotic scenario that characterised  the birth and  the first apogee of 
the right Spanish movements that won the civil war. In fact, desp ite the 
retrospective interpretation of Rocamora, accord ing to whom the 
ideology of the regime had  always been formed by both a  religious and  
a political character equally d istributed  in the sensibility of all the 
members of the intellectual community, the debate which took place 
within the university, concerning the very nature of the ideology which 
the New State would  have to purport, clearly reveals that this ideology 
evolved  over time through a series of violent struggles within the 
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 Acemoglu and  Robinson famously d ivided  political institutions in two 
categories: extractive and  inclusive [Acemoglu and  Robinson, 2012, in  
particular Ch. 3]. The first ones are those which d istribute power just among 
few people, a narrow elite, w ithout the participation of a large civil society and , 
even in those cases in which they do so, they still suffer for  a lack of political 
centralization that renders inefficient any political and  economic decision. 
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academia
32
. Such violent debate was particularly significant during the 
Franco’s regime, when a new cu ltural group  emerged  imposing its 
hegemony within the new political and  academic scenario. For this 
reason, it is extremely important to reconstruct it in order to 
comprehend  the social order that resulted  from it during the following 
two decades. In fact, as Bourd ieu wrote:  
 
  In the symbolic struggle over the production of common sense, or, more 
precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming, that is to say, official – 
i.e., explicit and  public – imposition of the legitimate vision of the social 
world , agents engage the symbolic capital they have acquired  in previous 
struggles, in particular, all the power they possess over the instituted  
taxonomies, inscribed  in minds or in objectivity, such as qualifications 
[Bourd ieu, 1985: 732]. 
 
 The analysis of the community of d iscourse that gave birth to this 
debate on the future of the academic institution represents a fruitfu l 
way to comprehend  the way in which the university, its rhetoric and  
the idea it purports, were both gu ided  and  contributed  to guide the 
political changes. Interestingly enough, it is possible to note that the 
new intellectual class of the regime started  to flourish before the victory 
of the FN in the summer 1939. In fact, it existed  both before and  during 
the II Republic through some key-figures such as the rector of the UC 
during the d ictatorship  of Primo de Rivera, Pio Zabala y Lera, who 
would  lead  the most important university of the country from 1939 to 
1952. He had  always been a violent critic of the JAE, opposing to the 
liberal educative model the ideal of a catholic education [Niño, 2013: 
67-103]. Other lead ing figures were, for instance, Antonio Ballesteros 
Beretta, Eduardo Ibarra, Francisco de Paula Amat, Eloy Bullón or the 
future minister of education Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez. During the first 
half of the ‘30s, within the Spanish University they had  always 
coexisted  a trad itionalist and  catholic aim with a liberal a progressive 
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 The structure of the Francoist ideology and  its construction within the 
University has been recently stud ied  by several Spanish scholars. In particular, 
the instrumental function of the University as a political means, whose main 
aim was that of creating not only a social consensus but also a common and  
shared  political view within the lead ing class, has been stud ied  by Carreras 
Ares J. and  Ruiz Carnicer M.A., 1991; Sotés Elizalde, M. A., 2004; and  Otero 
Carvajal, L.E., 2014. All these research have proved  that this process evolved 
over time, passing through very heterogeneous phases. 
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one. They had  always fought one against the other, causing d isruptive 
consequences for the life of this institution [González Calleja, 2009].  
This contraposition was not only the expression of an ideological 
incompatibility, but also the result of the crisis and  failure of an 
organization that was starting to expand  and  was becoming a mass-
institution. A lot of new students, who belonged  to a raising 
bourgeoisie, matricu lated  with the purpose of relevantly ameliorating 
their social and  economic statuses. However, their expectation were 
frequently betrayed . The radicalisation and politicisation of the students’ 
movements, both the fascist and the communist ones, were therefore the result 
of this educative and social failure of the university.  
The University became the place in which a young generation 
started  to engage in a violent form of political participation. The civil 
war was a resu lt of this tendency and  a d ramatic period  for the life of 
the UC. Most of the republican establishment of the University , soon 
after the beginning of the war , moved  to Valencia. Thus, the 
cornerstone of the Spanish culture, i.e. the University of Madrid , 
started  to acquire a new outlook increasingly more akin to the right 
movements and  the Falangist forces. The new State University opened  
his activities in 1938 with the participation of some professors such as 
Pío Zabala, Inocencio Jiménez y Vicente, Ciriaco Pérez Bustamante, 
Emilio Jimeno Gil and  Juan José López Ibor.  
In this scenario the educative problem started  to acquire  a growing 
importance for the new political regime that saw in the academia a 
possible instrument for constructing a Spanish conservative ideology. 
In fact, with the victory, for the troops of Franco and  the chaotic 
amalgam of political forces that sustained  the Caudillo during the war, 
it started  to be considered  as ind ispensable to define their own political 
identity in a unified  way. However, they lacked  of homogeneity within 
the victorious front. This was due to the fact that the glue that had  
linked  together the various right political movements into a unique 
ensemble during the civil war was merely constitu ted  by an a priori 
opposition to the republican trad ition
33
. Whereas the II Republic was 
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 As Ferran Gallego Margalef, 2014: 20 has correctly written: «La fascistiza ción 
no es el crecimiento de un partido con ideología y proyecto politico acabados, 
constituidos en el momento de su creación.[…] Es el proceso por el que la 
contrarrevolución española, y europea, va sintetizando posiciones doctrinales y 
agrupando proyectos políticos, estableciendo un campo de influencias y 
correcciones mutuas, canalizando la fluidez de sus intercambios ideológicos, 
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characterised  by a well-defined  cultural politics, the FN lacked  such 
well established  ideological thinking. For instance, the very manifesto 
of the Falange, the Consígnas Nacional Socialistas, just defined  the 
Falange as a revolutionary movement without assigning to it any 
positive value. In other words, this revolutionary tendency was not 
translated  into a practical political program , and  it always remained  a 
«revolución pendiente» [Molinero and  Ysás, 2008: 18]. The reference to 
the Catholic trad ition, at least w ithin the Falange, played  indeed  a 
second ary and  instrumental role in comparison to the desire of 
annihilate the republican power. The very Acción Católica Española, born 
from the ACNdP, during that period  found  its most relevant 
agglutinant factor in a rancorous opposition to the republican 
experience, rather than in a autonomous cultural and  political proposal 
[Cabellero de la Torre and  Robles Rodríguez, 2015]. As María 
Zambrano clearly wrote: «Nosotros los españoles teníamos nuestra 
historia en suspenso, nuestras trad iciones eran puro problema, hasta tal 
punto que los trad icionalistas tenían que inventarlas, lo cual no 
significa que no las tuviésemos, sino que estaban allí d onde no se 
nombraban». [Zambrano 1998: 98]. 
Thus, once the enemy had  been annihilated , it became urgent to 
supply the new  political state of affairs which  lacked  a proper political 
doctrine with a new  overall ideological account. An account that could  
have guaranteed  the instauration of a new ruling class able to lead  the 
Nuevo Estado. This term only ind icated  an empty signifier, a flatus 
vocis w ith no exact meaning. The university of Madrid  was not only 
one of the main battlefield s of the civil war, but also the symbol of a 
political regeneration
34
 and , at the same time, the concrete place in 
which a profound  debate over the normative ideal of the new State d id  
take p lace, involving all the d ifferent sp irits that composed  the big 
                                                                                                                               
asentando sus compromisos estratégicos, en una permanente tensión entre la 
defensa de sus identidades parciales y la convicción de pertenencia a un mismo 
espacio cuya homogeneización es objetivo compartido». Thus it is possible to 
affirm that in the case of francoism there is not a political essence which pre-
existed  to the factual existence it acquired  and  changed  unceasingly ov er time.  
34
 As the minister of education Ibáñez Martín wrote some years later: «Lo más 
modernos edificios – alarde de fina y severa arquitectura -, sufren grandes 
mutilaciones y la vida de los soldatos de España entre las ruinas de la Ciudad  
Universitaria adquiere caracteres de drámatico heroismo, afirmando en ellos la 
inquebrantable decisión de vencer». Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 66. 
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Francoist family. The aim of this debate was that of tracing the basic 
guidelines of the Spanish fascism and , at the same time, of legitimating 
the rad ical political changes that had  occurred  de facto without being 
previously theorised  de jure
35
. 
 
4.2 S áin z  R odríguez’s coun ter-reform at ion   
Since the establishment of the first minister of education of the New 
State, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, the new political regime showed its 
determination to rad ically change the pedagogical policies that 
characterised  the previous republican government [Alted  Vigil, 1984]. 
The intellectuals of the previous generation were conceived  as the main 
cause for the degeneration of the Spanish political and  cultural life, as 
clearly stated  by Enrique Suñer [1938], a professor of the University of 
Madrid  who would  later be put in charge of the Tribunal de 
Responsabilidad política during Franco’s d ictatorship . With the new 
minister of education Sáinz Rodríguez – who stayed  in power from 
January 30, 1938 to April 27, 1939 – the new regime brought about a 
counter-revolution
36
 within the Spanish educational system. Indeed , 
one of the most d ramatic d ecision taken by the new government of the 
FN concerning educational matters was that of purging from the 
academia – often violently – the majority of the university professors 
who had  been appointed  during the republican  period . In add ition, 
Sáinz Rodríguez started  to construct a new ministerial organization 
that imposed  an oppressive control over the ed ucational system as a 
whole, focusing in particular on the creation of a national-catholic 
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 Gallego Margalef, 2014: 591: «La teorización de un Estado nacional, 
totalitario, católico y revolucionario se encontraba con el camino preparado por 
una guerra que hacía que tales reflexiones fueran más el resultado de la 
conquista del poder en el proceso bélico que de una tarea de propaganda y 
convencimiento lanzado desde las cátedras en las que se formulaban los 
nuevos principios». 
36
 This expression has been recently coined  by López Bausela [2011: 24], who 
has defined  this reform as: «una reforma educativa impuesta por la fuerza, al 
amparo de un poder incontestable de carácter d ictatorial, cuyo objetivo 
principal fue operar una transformación rad ical en la mentalidad  de la 
juventud  española por med io de una contrarrevolución pedagógica que 
errad ica para siempre la opción republicana de la vida política en nuestro 
país». 
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identity through a propagandistic education in the high-school [Claret, 
2006: 44-45]. 
The minister had  previously being a member of the ACNdP and , 
even before the civil war, he contributed  to lay the found ations of the 
new ped agogical reform in a book entitled  La tradición nacional y el 
Estado futuro. In this text he argued  that the only way to build  a new 
political power in Spain able to remain into power over time would  
have to pass through a valorisation of the catholic t rad ition of the 
country, through the creation of a common faith shared  by everyone. 
For this reason, when appointed  as minister, he was persuaded  that his 
role should  have to correspond  to an inquisitorial function aimed  at: 
«Una creación de la conciencia nacional, un tribunal popularísimo, 
instrumento con que la fe colectiva del pueblo trata de liberarse 
consciente y volontariamen te de tod o contagio que pudiese traer como 
consecuencia una d ivisión de la unid ad  de la conciencia nacional» 
[Sáinz Rodríguez, 1935: 40].  
During his first public d iscourse as a minister he pointed  out the 
main characteristics of this new form of education. An education that 
he d id  not consider as a prerogative of the State but also of the Church, 
defending a peculiar form of totalitarianism in comparison, for 
instance, to the German or Italian cases. As far as education was 
concerned , this Catholic trad ition would  have been translated  into a 
form of propagand ist cultu re that:  
 
Es un deber del Estado, no porqué piense que el Estado debe ser el 
monopolizador de la enseñanza. […] Si el Estado español tiene todo el 
sentido de las nuevas modalidades de los que llamamos estados totalitarios 
en el mundo, sabrá conjugar con una doctrina original propia, ese concepto 
de la autoridad  estatal, con las normas de la trad ición católica, 
imprescind ible componente de la civilización de nuestro pueblo [Sáinz 
Rodríguez, 1938: 40]. 
 
The nominee of Sáinz Rod ríguez had  been strongly supported  by 
the very influential card inal of Toledo Gomá y Tomás. In other words 
Sáinz was substantially the mouthpiece of the most rad ical sector of the 
Spanish Catholicism
37
. This is rendered  evident by comparing the 
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 As Montero, 1993: 93-94 affirmed: «El 30 de Enero de 1938, durante la estancia 
de Herrera en España, se había producido el nombramiento del primer 
gabinete de la España nacional. La junta Técnica y las Comisiones d ieron paso a 
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theses purported  by the minister with the ones defended , for instance, 
by the most representative members of the Jesuit  group such as 
Enrique Herrera Oria, the brother of founder of the ACNdP, Ángel 
Herrera Oria
38
. Enrique Herrera devoted  himself to the educational 
problem since the beginning of the twenties, when writing for the 
catholic journal Atenas. During the ‘30s he intensified  his 
propagandistic activity through articles and  essays in particular for the 
catholic reviews Razón y Fe and  El Debate. In all his writings it is 
possible to perceive both a very harsh opposition to the previous 
republican cultural outlook – accused  of being a revolutionary, liberal 
and  Masonic form of hegemonic thought
39
 – and  a strong desire to 
propagate a religious cu lture by taking advantage of a growing 
political influence within the new right movements.  
The aim was that of substitu ting a liberal cultural framework with a 
trad itionalist one, based  on the catholic values purported  in the Papal 
bull Divini Illius Magistri, that insisted  in the necessity of bringing about 
renewed ped agogical and  propagandistic activities by the European  
religious and  political institutions. The ultimate goal of the Bull was 
that of promoting the participation of the religious believers in politics 
and , ultimately, of assigning to the catholic Church a new monopolistic 
control over education
40
. Enrique Herrera Oria engaged  in a constant 
                                                                                                                               
los d iversos ministerios: el Régimen comenzaba a d iscurrir por caminos de 
consolidación. Lo que se pretendía recrear era algo similar al Estado español 
del Siglo de Oro: una autoridad  central fuerte, apoyada en la religión católica 
como elemento de cohesión social. Si los propagandistas habían saludado con 
entusiasmo este proyecto cuando era tan sólo una idea más o menos vaga, 
ahora que empezaba a convertirse en realidad  no le iban a regatear su apoyo ni 
sus ofrecimientos de collaboración».  
38
 On the importane of Ángel Herrera Oria and  his influence within the catholic 
and  political world  see in particular Cantavella and  Serrano, 2006. 
39
 «Con la subida de Azaña, Fernando de los Rios, Marcelino Domingo y 
Domingo Barnés, se puede decir que también la masonería se había enumbrado 
en las alturas del Poder y en el Ministerio de Instrucción Pública. También en 
España, desde el 14 de abril del ano 1931, estábamos en plena guerra escolar» 
[Herrera Oria, 1934: 319]. 
40
 Pius XI, 1929: §7: «It is therefore as important to make no mistake in 
education, as it is to make no mistake in the pursuit of the last end , with which 
the whole work of education is intimately and  necessarily connected . In fact, 
since education consists essentially in preparing man for what he must be and 
for what he must do here below, in order to attain the sublime end  for which he 
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defence of the Catholic values, advocating for the influence of the 
Church in politics and , in particu lar in education. 
The arguments in favour of the hegemonic con trol of culture by the 
State were consequently based  on catholic premises also in the general 
outlook of the minister Sáinz Rodríguez. The high school and  the 
University were perceived  as the most important institutions 
responsible for the education of the masses and  also of the ruling class.  
To mend  a cultural scenario in which the Catholic influence was 
perceived  as extremely limited , Herrara Oria proposed  the construction 
of a new educational system
41
. In order to put it into practice he was 
persuaded  of the necessity of looking for a collaboration between the 
Church and  the political representatives. As he wrote in the preface of 
one of his books: 
 
Dios quiera que este libro sirva para iluminar a los ministros de 
Instrucción Pública, a nuestros legisladores, en cuyas manos está el 
derrocar la orientación mal llamada nacional de la escuela, que, con su 
laicismo masónico, no es en los momentos actuales ni religiosa ni 
española, ya que no es tampoco prolongación de la familia española que 
venera el Crucifijo y demanda para sus hijos las grandes enseñanzas  del 
mejor código de religión y moral: el Catecismo de la doctrina cristiana 
expulsado de nuestras escuelas, contra el derecho natural y las leyes de 
los pueblos más cultos [Herrera Oria, 1934: 8-9]. 
 
Accord ing to Herrara Oria, the reform of the Spanish education 
and , as a consequence, of the whole society, should  have passed 
through an initial reform of the bachillerato, that is to say the connecting 
                                                                                                                               
was created , it is clear that there can be no true education which is not wholly 
d irected  to man's last end , and that in the p resent order of Providence». 
41
 «Esa masa universitaria carece de ideas religiosas sólidas, de las que se 
derivan el respeto a la autoridad  y el amor racional a la patria. Preguntamos: 
¿Hay en los centros superiores un número suficiente de intelectuales católicos 
que tengan ideas claras y precisas en las cuestiones fundamentales del dogma y 
moral católicos, que conozcan las bases sobre que se asienta la filosofía católica? 
[…] No hay un fuerte núcleo de intelectuales católicos en el sentido que hemos 
explicado antes porque no hay Universidades católicas, y no hay universidades 
católicas, si no de derecho, al menos de hecho, porque no hay intelectuales 
católicos en número suficiente que deberían formarse en las Universidades 
católicas». [Herrera Oria, 1934: 146]. 
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link between higher education and  university. This reform represented  
the ped agogical priority of the Opus Dei, a catholic association recently 
founded  in 1930 by Josemaría Escrivá de Balanguer. The main reason 
for this interest lay on the fact that the student population in the period  
of secondary education had  extraord inary increm ented  in few years, 
passing from 64.000 students in 1928 to 125.000 in 1934 [Nuñez, 2005: 
214]. In this context, the possibility of acculturating a new generation of 
citizens and  an entire ruling class (in 1934 only the 3% of the potential 
students’ population received  a second ary education ) by transmitting a 
system of knowledge and  beliefs rad ically in contrast to the one 
purported  during the republican period  was considered  as a great 
opportunity and  a vital priority for the Catholic forces. In particular 
from a political point of view. Significantly, the reform of the 
bachillerato would  have been – together w ith the spring of the debate 
concerning the reform of the University  – the most relevant 
contribution of the minister of education Sáinz Rodríguez to the reform 
of the pedagogical system during the first life of Franco’s regime.  
 
4.3 The N ew University : a debated fu ture 
During the spring 1939, Sáinz Rodríguez was substituted  by another 
member of the ACNdP, José Ibáñez Martín. Without any d oubt, this 
catholic association had  a very relevant role in the construction of the 
new university during the first years of Franco’s regime [Cavallaro, 
2012: 41]. Once into power, the regime wanted  to build  a completely 
new institutional fram ework. This change significantly affected  the 
educative system. Following the example of the Italian fascism , the 
Ministerio de Educación Nacional was now created . The regime was 
making a tremendous leap  into the construction of a new ideological 
outlook and , for this purpose, it called  for the collaboration of the 
University, conceived  as a means both for the propagand a and  for the 
production of culture. This is evident by taking into consideration the 
Proyecto de Ley de Reforma Universitaria, published  by the end  of April 
1939
42
 [López Bausela, 2011]. The reform constituted  an urgency for the 
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 In this text the University was defined  as: «El más alto organismo de la 
cultura educativa nacional […] llamad a a constituirse en el más au torizado 
elemento orientador de los ideales fundamentales hispanicos en lo que a la 
Enseñanza y la Cultura se refiere». See BOE n. 117, 27 Aprile 1939, p . 2266. 
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new political government, since in 1939 the twelve Spanish public 
universities opened  after almost three years of interruption. The 
Caudillo had always underlined the importance of the university in the 
construction of a national identity and a compact ruling class: now it was the 
time to pass from theory to practice, and build what, together with the army 
and the public law, was considered as the third pillar of the new Francoist 
society
43
.  
In this context, the University represented  the centre of the political 
debate. This was due to the fact that its very nature and  normative 
ideal should  have to realise the best representation of the regime’s 
ideology. At the same time, however, the unity of the political forces 
that had  sustained  Franco during the civil war was extremely fragile. 
This fragmentation and  the existence of rad ically d ifferent views 
regard ing the nature of the new political power p roduced  a fierce 
contraposition. In particular between the catholic and  the falangist 
wings. The only point shared  by the two fronts was the strong desire to 
annihilate and  overcome the recent republican past, as proved  by the 
spectacu lar Auto da Fé taking place on April 30, 1939 at the UC. On that 
occasion all the “Masonic”, “communist”, “anti-Spanish” and  “laic” 
books were burnt, as in an inquisitorial process [Martínez Rus, 2014: 15-
40]. This common aim was also manifested  by the consistent 
substitution of professors within the University. In fact, considering the 
University of Madrid , 155 out of 278 professors who composed  it in 
1944 had  been appointed  just starting from 1939 onwards [Alted  Vigil, 
1991: 117]. 
On the contrary, as far as the new educational course was 
concerned , it is possible to notice the existence of very d ifferent 
positions. In fact, the destruction  of what was conceived  as a form of 
“pseudocultura” was not rep laced  by a comprehensive ideology. Indeed , 
the exclusive reference to the religious trait cou ld  have constitu ted  a 
barrier rather than a brid ge in the process of consolid ation of the unity 
among the d ifferent political aims [Martín Puerta, 2013: 17]. In 
particu lar, within the FET y JONS, a large number of people was 
looking with growing sympathy at the successes of the other European 
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 Franco, Discurso de unificación, Salamanca 19 Abril 1937, in Palabras del Caudillo, 
Ed itora Nacional, Madrid , 1943. In this occasion Franco also traced  some basic 
guidelines for the new University which should  have been a: «Universidad 
clásica, que continuadora de su gloriosa trad ición, con su espíritu  su doctrina y 
su moral, vuelva a ser luz y faro de los pueblos hispanos». Ibidem, p . 16.  
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fascisms, not only at Italy and  Germany, bu t also at the Estado Novo of 
professor Salazar, who represented  the symbol of the cu ltural 
legitimacy of the fascist id eology. The d iscussion that took place since 
1939 was both the expression of the will of constructing a new political 
ideology and  the manifestation of a struggle for power within the 
francoist family
44
. Thus, more than the image of a political unity, the 
university during the first years of the regime constituted  a very 
fragmented  social institution that, parad oxically, was deemed  
responsible for the construction of this new political id entity.  
The two basic texts that set the ground  for further d iscussions were 
the books of José Pemartín
45
 and  José Pérez Ibor
46
. The first, in his ¿Qué 
es lo nuevo?, engaged  in an attempt to conciliate a fascist patriotism 
with a religious outlook, in particular assigning this ro le to a new 
d iscipline to be included  in the university curriculum: the History of 
Spain. In fact, this should  have been: «la segunda religión de los 
Españoles, sin miedo alguno a idolatrías, puesto que por designio 
altísimo de Dios, en nuestra España la religión de la Patria se identifica 
con la religión de la Religión» [Pemartín, 1937: 162]. Pemartín looked  at 
the rhetoric of Mussolini – who defined  the fascism as the sou l of the 
                                                          
44
 Sótes Elizalde, 2004: 32: «En esas fechas, el S.E.U. y Falange se mostraban 
claramente cercanos a los regímenes nacional-socialista alemán y fascista 
italiano. Por otro lado, observando los contenidos de la revista, puede 
constatarse la unión entre los objetivos políticos y las actividades profesionales. 
Había un interés por la mejora estructural de la Universidad , pero también un 
afán por imponer la presencia de los principios falangistas en su 
funcionamiento y en su actividad». 
45
 José Pemartín y Sanjuán was in charge of the Servicio Nacional de Enseñanza 
Superior y Media. He was a monarchic falangist who collaborated  also with the 
catholic review Acción Española. Thanks to his pred isposition to d ialogue with 
the two aims of the regime he was one of the promoters of the creation of FET y 
de la JONS. In his very influential book entitled  ¿Qué es lo nuevo? he ded icated  
an entire chapter to define the educational ou tlook of the regime, calling for a 
“intensive fascism”, i.e. a form of syncretism between religion and patriotism. 
See in particular Sánchez Castro, 2013. 
46
 José Ibor was a young doctor and  alfonsin monarchist when, in 1938, he was 
nominated  for the commission concerning the discussion of the project of 
university reform. He later took part in the CSIC and  created  the scientific 
review Norma. Revista de Exaltación universitaria. His book, Discurso a los 
Universitario [1938], represented  a very influential pamphlet that oriented  the 
debate.  
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soul of the Italians
47
 – to construct his definition of the Spanish  fascism. 
Accord ing to Pemartín, religion should  have supported  the fascist 
ideology of the new State and  this, at the same time, should  include in 
its united  doctrine the basic principles of Catholicism. However, he was 
persuaded  that no educative freedom could  have been conceded  to 
private institu tions and  the whole national educational system should  
have been governed  by a totalitarian State. So, whereas the catholic 
principles were included  in the new ideology, on the contrary the 
political influence of the Church was extremely limited
48
.  
On the other hand , López Ibor’s book constituted  a very influential 
text insofar as it was the first attempt, made by the rising francoist 
ruling class, of overcoming the mere opposition to the republican 
university and  defining the basic gu idelines of a new academic system. 
Starting from this book, a vast literature of normative academic 
d iscourse would  have flourished  within the Spanish university, as it 
will be proved  in the following pages. López Ibor rejected  both the idea 
of a mediaeval university (based  on d ogmatic and  catholic premises) 
and  the rationalistic one purported  during the Republic. He called  for a 
new model of academia, that he calls “imperial” [López Ibor, 1938: 67]. 
He proposed  an ambitious project based  on the reform of the concept of 
humanism. As he put it, the Sp anish fascism should  have had  to reach 
an extraord inary goal in the European scenario: «lanzar al mundo un 
tercer humanismo, que no sea como el del Renacimiento un estud io de 
las humanidades, ni una mezcla impura de paganismo y cristianismo, 
sino un cu ltivo de los más puros valores humanos, tanto inmanentes 
como trascendentes: un humanismo auténticamente español, 
totalitario» [López Ibor, 1938: 68]. Thus, the University was conceived  
as one of the most important political institu tions for the new political 
regime, since it should  have been responsible for the creation of a new 
ideology. 
The proposal of Ibor constituted  a turning point in the relation 
between political power and  academia. For the first time since the birth 
of the falangist movement the intellectuals were not perceived  as a 
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 Mussolini, La dottrina del fascismo, Sansoni, Firenze, 1936. 
48
 «Un Estado totalitario de fondamento Fascista, tiene que exigir 
necessariamente a sus Médicos, Físicos y Matemáticos, a más de la Cultura 
específica de su especialidad , la orientación Cultural general de la Nación -
Estado: Religiosa y Patriótica. Lo que se exige en el Extranjero hay que exigirlo 
en España». Pemartín, 1937: 184. 
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weed that had  to be extirpated , but rather as a useful resource. This 
produced  another significant consequence within the academia: the 
politicisation that had  characterised  the Spanish university at least 
since the decade do the ‘20s was now converted  in a form of d irect  
political control over this institution. This caused  a genetic mutation in 
the way in which the intellectuals and  the professors conceived  their  
roles. The intellectual activity conceived  as a critical and  reflexive 
attitude, a conception always supported  by Ortega, was now replaced  
by a d irect political intervention with a sole and  unquestionable aim: 
serving the national cause. As Ibor put it: «En la Nueva Ed ad  no se 
dará el tipo del intelectual como espectad or, de aquel que no participa 
de los hechos, tratand o de imponerles un cauce, cualquiera que sea el 
riesgo que corra» [Ibor, 1938: 141]. These were the premises that, since 
Autumn 1939, characterised  the process that brought about the creation 
of a new university and , consequently, of a new form of intellectual 
that for the first time appeared  in the history of the Spanish culture. 
 
4.4 The organ ic in tellectual: t he case of M art ín  M art ínez  
The new intellectual that suddenly appeared  in the public scenario 
during the first years of Franco’s regime was a twofold  figure. On the 
one hand  he conceives himself as a spiritual and  id eological guide, on 
the other he had  to struggle for becoming an official voice of a regime 
that needed  him only insofar as he could  be useful for its purposes. His 
independence from the political power was substantially nu ll. The 
intellectual became a bureaucrat who had  to be extremely cautious in 
order to reach his ambitious goals of acquiring a better social status and  
exercise his political influence, due to the oppressive control imposed  
by the regime. During the inauguration of the UC in 1939 the very 
minister of education Ibáñez Martín  clearly defined  the role that these 
public officials should  have to p lay within the new political regime. In 
fact:  
 
Empeño del nuevo Estado es precisamente fomentar la investigación 
española colocándola en la primera lìnea de las preocupaciones y los 
problemas nacionales. Pero es deber suyo velar por la unidad  de la ciencia, 
coord inarla con las necesidades del país, hacer que redunden las 
activid ades científicas en servicio de la nación e impedir, a la par, que 
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pueden en ningún caso ser instrumento perverso contra los sag rados 
principios de la Patria [Ibáñez Martín, 1939: 34]. 
 
The desire that moved  the minister and  the Franco’s entourage 
during this period  was that of identifying university with politics , 
following the example of what was happening in Italy after the 
publication of the Carta della Scuola in that very year. As declared  in the 
XIX point of this document: «L'Università ha per fine d i promuovere in 
un ord ine d i alta responsabilità politica e morale il progresso della 
scienza e d i fornire la cultu ra scientifica necessaria per l'esercizio degli 
uffici e delle professioni»
49
. The University was therefore conceived  as 
the most powerful instrument that cou ld  have provid ed  legitimacy to 
the New State. At the same time, it was considered  as ind ispensable for 
ind icating a normative ideal to follow for the future. Thus, the 
reopening of the university, in 1939, gave the opportunity to many of 
the members of the new establishment to propose their programmatic 
view about the role of the academia within society and  politics. The 
common aim was that of defining the nature of the new academia 
within a totalitarian regime, whose basic ideology was represented  by a 
cult of the catholic trad ition and  a more or less dogmatic form of 
fascism [Iañez, 2011: 33].  
One of the most significant instances of this debate that took place 
at that time in Madrid , in particu lar at the Centro de Estudios 
Universitarios – the university recently founded  by the ACNdP – was 
that of Isid oro Martín Martínez. Martínez, a young law assistant 
professor, not only was a member of the most influent catholic 
association of the time, but he also boasted  an admirable fascist 
ped igree. In fact, he had  stud ied  in Bologna, obtaining in the homeland  
of fascism his d octorate in law. When he pron ounced  his d iscourse in 
Madrid , at the end  of October 1939, among his aud ience there was also 
the minister of education. His text reveals the desire of a young 
researcher to be part of an intellectual community that was clearly 
recognisable. In the first p ages of his d iscourse he quotes all the most 
relevant figure of the time who were engaging in the definition of the 
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 In the case of the Italian fascism, as Pasqualini, 2013: 5 wrote: «Il punto d i 
partenza nella ristrutturazione della scuola nel suo complesso è l’intenzione d i 
trasformare un’istituzione in organo politico d i regime, come si evince da gran 
parte delle d ichiarazioni». On the relation between the Italian and  the Spanish 
reform of education see in particular Vittoria, 1991 and  Puelles Benítez, 2002.  
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essence of the new academia: Pemartín, López Ibor, Herrara Oria and  
the very minister of education , whose d iscourse, that took place in the 
UC, just a week before is extensively cited  by Martínez. The structure of 
his text clearly revels the existence of a community of d iscourse to 
which he wanted  to belong. All the reference points, the noble fathers 
or rather the pantheon of the regime was extensively named and  
praised  in the course of his d iscourse
50
. So, the academia, and  in 
particu lar the humanities, were explicitly becoming what some scholars 
thinks they always are: relations of power [Kusch, 2000], and  Martínez 
not only accept, but defended  the thesis accord ing to which in a 
totalitarian State there is no place for intellectual independence: «nada, 
pues, de libertad  de cátedra» [Martín, 1940: 46]. 
Martínez was persuaded  that the University had  to play a pivotal 
role in the resurgence of the nation. In order to do it, they should  have 
been revitalised  the imperial and  Catholic trad itions of the Spanish 
most antique universities: Alcalá, Toledo, and  in particular Salamanca
51
. 
After having praised  the past and  the present of the Spanish culture he 
also traced  the basic guidelines for the ideological fu ture of the New 
State and  its University. He supported  the idea of a university built on 
Catholic values, and  purported  a religious education. The first goal of 
the University and , in general, of the higher education, should  basically 
consist in transmitting, accord ing to Martín, moral and  social values. In 
fact: 
 
La primera misión que tiene, pues, que cumplir la Universidad  española es 
la de asentar la unidad  de la cultura, forjar un pensamiento d iáfanamente 
católico y hondamente español. […]No basta ilustrar la inteligencia; es 
necesario también fortalecer y acostumbrar la voluntad . Al joven 
universitario hay que ad iestrarlo en el ejercicio de las virtudes religiosas  y 
sociales [Martín Martínez, 1940: 43, 55]. 
  
This educative mission, conceived  as a socialisation of a young 
generation accord ing to the principles of Catholicism, was not only 
limited  to the knowledge transmitted  to the students, but also to the 
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 He quoted  the thinkers of the Ancient Rome: Seneca, Quintilian, Martial, then 
the authors of the School of Salamanca, the Catholic Monarchs, Vives, Balmes, 
Donoso Cortés, …  
51
 «La Universidad  puede y debe representar un solidísimo punto de apoyo 
para el resurgimiento de España» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 15]. 
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concrete practices which should  have been ad opted  within the 
academia
52
, since: «una misa oíd a en común, un catedrático 
comulgand o junto a sus alumnos da, sin duda […] una lección mucho 
más eficaz que cuand o logra la resolución feliz de un problema 
científico complicad o» [Martín, 1940: 64-65]. However, the attempt 
made by Martínez in his d iscourse d id  not only consist in the exaltation 
of the Catholic value but also, and  more interesting, in the conjunction 
of these values with the trad ition of the Falange. Using the words of 
Primo de Rivera or Franco to sustain the necessity, for instance, of 
constructing the Colegios Mayores. The rhetoric used by the new academic 
elites of the regime was therefore radically different from the Italian or German 
one [Francesconi, 2009] and this was mainly due to the very different role 
assign to religion in the educative process. 
 
4.5 A  new lit erary  genre defin ing a commu nity  of 
discourse 
The text of Isidoro Martínez represents a significant instance of a new 
literary genre that was flourishing during that period: the programmatic 
discourse. A  genre that was rapidly passing from politics to academia due to 
the increasing osmosis between these two spheres of the Spanish cultural and 
social life. This genre was particularly, but not exclusively, adopted  
during public ceremonies su ch as opening academic speeches, 
conferences’ plenary sessions or accep tance speeches. Each of these 
d iscourses presents a same basic structure: after an initial welcome 
speech and  a lavish captatio benevolentiae of the aud ience, the speaker 
must mention his university colleagues who are no longer in charge. 
Then, before developing the theme on which he should  possess a 
mastery competence, he has to present the reasons why he chose a 
particu lar topic, motivating it on the basis of the national interest. In the 
conclusions, he has to greet the students wishing them to flourish 
within an institu tion that had  to be conceived  as a functionary part of 
the Spanish totalitarian State. In add ition , the whole speech should  
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always be characterised  by the constant reference to the main authors 
of the Falangist pantheon that some intellectuals were contributing to 
define. Eugenio d’Ors, for instance, planned  since 1939 the creation of a 
Biblioteca del falangista consciente which should  have exactly defined  the 
hegemonic ideology of the regime by publishing the books of all the 
authors considered  as akin to the mentality of the new political regime 
[Eugenio d’Ors, 1939]. In his book he offered  a series of rh etoric topoi 
and  auctoritates which would  have to constitu te the basis for most of 
these speeches.  
Therefore, the rigid  structure of these speeches marked  the birth of 
a literary genre that defined  the new ruling class. Indeed , this was a 
very powerful and  expressive genre since its rigid ity permits to notice, 
through the very slight variations that each speaker d id , the existence 
of d ifferent families and  group s within a same community of 
d iscourse
53
. The existence of this community – which flourished  within 
the academia and  contributed  to define the new ruling class of the 
country – is testified  also by the existence of a unique topic of 
d iscussion chosen by all the d ifferent members of the community in 
1939: the renewal of the university in accord ance to totalitarian 
principles. Not only in Mad rid , but also in Murcia, Oviedo, Salamanca 
or Seville the community of d iscourse was propagating its dogmatic 
vision of culture and  university.  
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 I adopt this term by referring to the works of Scattola . He used  this 
expression to define the creation of d ifferent argumentative schemes which 
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In Murcia, for instance, Santiago Montero Díaz – who the following 
year obtained  a position at the prestigious UC teaching history of 
ancient philosophy [Parra Garrigues, 1956: 306-311] – pronounced  his 
d iscourse significantly entitled  Misión de la Universidad. His affinity 
with this rising community of d iscourse is proved  by the references and  
quotes he ad opts in his text, by the unceasing attempt to rigid ly define 
the members of the ingroup and  outgroup of the Francoist family, which 
represented  the lead ing id eology
54
. Using in a very instrumental way 
the word s of Ortega y Gasset he affirmed  that the duty of the new 
University should  have been that of constructing a selected  minority  
able to annihilate the precedent liberal trad ition and  to pose the basis 
for a new totalitarian regime. In fact his aim was that of build ing: «esa 
minoría humana, rectora y decidente, capaz de proyectar sobre el 
Estad o y el pueblo los resultados de una creatividad  constante, 
enérgica, sin posibles interrupciones ni desmayos» [Montero Díaz, 
1940: 9]. 
The same d iscussion over the nature and  normative end  of the new 
University was taking place as well in Oviedo. In this case is Teod oro 
González García, professor of public law, who had  to defend  the 
totalitarian project of educational reform and , at the same time, had  to 
give his contribution to the debate. After manifesting his satisfaction 
for the birth of a new cultu ral outlook within the university , which was 
replacing the “Marxist cu ltural revolution” , he started  to define what, 
accord ing to him, was a new «ordenación jerárquica y unitaria de las 
cosas» that, obeying to the Catholic dogmas, was taking p lace within 
the academia [González García, 1939: 5]. The authorities mentioned  by 
the professor were mostly the same quoted  by Eugenio d’Ors : among 
them Donoso Cortés, Vives, Balmes or  Vazquez de Mella. The mission 
of the university, accord ing to him, would  have consisted  in creating a 
fervent laboratory of political doctrines with the main goal of 
constructing the premises for the development of a  Spanish way to 
fascism. For this reason, he harshly condemned  all the forms of political 
eclecticism and  exalted  the trad itionalist virtues of the new State . In this 
way it could  have been possible to effectively counter the «concepción 
demo-liberal-socialista del Estad o» by favouring the creation of a 
totalitarian communitarianism [González García, 1939: 33]. In the 
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course of his d iscourse he clearly breaks the barrier between academia 
and  politics manifesting that the two spheres had  ultimately collapsed  
into one. In particu lar he affirmed  that the only way to realise this new 
cultural ideal would  have been that of creating a unified  national party, 
replacing the theory of the separation of powers with the creation of a 
strong executive power and  a legitimate State of exception based  on the 
exaltation of a bad ly defined  trad itionalism . As he pu t it: 
  
La innovación revolucionaria alcanza el reconocimiento de la consagración 
política: en la vida de un pueblo, cualquier rodeo inesperado, se ve 
impulsado por el brío de los grandes acontecimientos históricos, se perfila y 
expansiona, después, con una vocación rectilínea; y en vez de representar 
una excepción, se hace presente magnífico de un impreciso y tumultuoso 
pasado. […] En el fondo de todas las revoluciones transcendentales late un 
anhelo imperioso de necesidad  y legitimidad  ¡Vano intento el de sujetar 
entonces su fuerza con cortapisas legales, con textos constitucionales 
“escritos”! [González García, 1939: 34]. 
 
Starting from these premises, González theorised  the need  of a 
cultural counter-reform against the Marxist heresy which would  justify 
all the possible violent and  repressive measure that the new regime 
could  have ad opted  in the name of the trad ition. Not only the 
University was serving the purposes of the new State by ind icating 
original normative ideals, but also by legitimating , from a theoretical 
point of view , all its oppressive and  aggressive practices.  
One of the most significant example of this tendency his offered  by 
the inaugural speech of the professor of criminal law at the University 
of Salamanca Isaias Sánchez Tejerina. In his d iscourse he offered  a 
scientific justification [«estrictamente jurid ico-penal», Sánchez Tejerina, 
1940: 24] of the A lzamiento of the FN in 1936. In fact, he affirmed  that 
the FN just reacted  to the ferocious attacks of the republicans and , for 
this reason, the decision to rebel against the violence of the leftist forces 
represented  a case of exercise of the national right of self-defence. The 
military coup was thus conceived  as the expression of a legitimate right 
that cou ld  not be put into question. As a consequence, the  very 
legitimacy of Franco’s regime could  not be d iscussed  any further. Thus, 
de facto, the main mission of the University was that of legitimating the new 
political power, and no academic activity could have been carried out without 
taking into account the interests of the nations as established by Franco and 
his ministers.  
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 At the same time, the scientific community was serving the interest 
of the State also by creating the premises for the cultural and  economic 
development of the country. This instrumental function was praised  by 
the community of d iscourse, for instance by Manuel Lora Tamayo, 
professor of chemistry at the university of Seville, in his inaugural 
speech in 1939
55
. His lead ing role in the scientific research produced  
within the Francoist family was publicly recognised  at least from the 
publication, during the civil war, of his book Ideas sobre una ordenación 
nacional de la investigación científico-técnica. The main preoccupation of 
Lora Tamayo was that of setting the bases for the creation of the 
national research centre of the New State, following the example of the 
Italian Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, founded  in 1923, and  
enormously implemented  during the second  half of the ‘30s
56
. With this 
d iscourse he wanted  to support the creation of the CSIC by defending a 
debated  thesis in that period , i.e. the lead ing role that this institute 
should  have played  within the academ ic system.  
This new literary genre was therefore both a means for constructing 
a community identity within the recently created  academia and  a way 
through which it was somehow possible to propose original views on 
the future of this very community accepting its basic, and  very rigid , 
rules. In fact all these speeches had  a double function: on the one hand  
they realised  their propagandistic purpose by dep icting to the external 
aud ience – thanks to the construction of a well defined  pantheon – the 
image of an extremely unified  institution. On the other hand , they 
served  as a vehicle for promoting an internal, even if extr emely 
reduced , debate within this very community. The range of political and  
cultural d issent was extremely limited , but it is somehow visible 
through the slights variations that appeared  in these very d iscourses, in 
particu lar when they were addressed  not to the general public but to a 
more selected  aud ience. Indeed , together w ith all these commonalities, 
the d iscourses addressed  to a university aud ience also manifested  some 
points of d isagreement as far as the normative project of the new 
culture was concerned . They were the expression of a community in 
fieri whose structures and  aims were still debated . 
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It is possible to summarise the main points of d isagreement in three 
main open questions: a) If the religious education was a priority for the 
State, how should  it be p rovided  by non -governmental associations 
such as Catholic one? This problem was extremely relevant insofar as 
the educative role of the Church could  have been drastically 
impoverished  if adopting a more fascist and  less trad itionalist point of 
view. b) The idea that the university should  have to socialise the 
masses and  to forge the new ru ling class also opened  up another 
relevant question: what kind  of professional figures should  the 
university forge in accord ance to this new institutional framework? c) 
Lastly, the University was also conceived  as a centre for scientific 
research but, with the creation of the CSIC, what would  have been the 
destiny of the single universities if they had  to be subjugated  by a 
centralised  institution? Would  the au tonomy of the single centres be 
d rastically d iminished? 
These questions animated  a very harsh debate, and  not only a 
rhetorical one. In fact the solu tions to these questions implied  further 
consequences both from a political and  cultural point of view. Indeed  
they would  have determined  the hegemony of one group within the 
fragmented  Francoist family over the other. As a matter of fact, depending 
on the responses provided to these questions, the new State would have 
adopted a more military, corporative or religious framework. This was a 
d iscussion that found  within the academia the perfect ground  for 
prospering. In fact, the community of d iscourse that gave birth to this 
d ialogue was aware – thanks to the recent example provided  by the 
totalitarian regimes established  in other  European countries – of the 
importance of implementing, through a cu ltural and  legislative activ ity, 
the theoretic premises of an authoritative power. They knew that, 
thanks to these decisions, «se forma no solo un Nuevo Estad o, sino un 
orden nuevo; se va hacia un nuevo tipo de hombre» [Beneyto Pérez, 
1939: 15]. They understood  that the definition of the nature of the new 
political regime constitu ted  the basic premise for tracing the identity of 
the new intellectual figure. The subord inate role of the intellectual in 
respect to the political sphere was alread y accepted  by this community  
of d iscourse that tried  to compensate this loss of independence and  
power by changing its very essence, trying to be part of the new ruling 
political class. 
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4.6 The st ruggle for t he hegemony  within  the academia 
Professorship and  power, became synonymic expressions and  what 
could  have appeared  as a pure rhetoric wish started  to be concretely 
put into practice creating the ideology and  structure of Franco’s regime. 
However, the d isagreements that characterised  the d ebate within this 
academic community of d iscourse d id  not vanished  but rather 
increased  while the process of institutionalisation of the educative 
system was being implemented .  
On the one hand , the creation of the CSIC in 1939 and  the ad option 
of Lull’s Arbor Scientiae symbolised  the lead ing role play by religion in 
the establishment of the national university (see Annex 5). The Catholic 
associations, and  in particular the ACNdP, were constantly pressing 
the minister Ibáñez Martín with the aim of gaining a  lead ing role in the 
educative system. The very influential bishop Pla y Deniel explicitly 
recognised  the importance of the minister’s activities in his inaugural 
discourse for the University of Salamanca in 1940. On that occasion, he 
greeted  Ibáñez Martín for having served  the cause of the Church 
«proclamando de nuevo la raíz religiosa de las primeras fuentes de 
nuestra cu ltura» and  so contributing to «converger en la Iglesia 
española el origen de nuestro florecimiento científico y de la expansión 
del pensamiento hispánico en el mund o» [Pla y Deniel, 1940: 10]. 
However, the dominant role assigned  to the Church in the educative 
process was perceived  by many members of the establishment as a 
substantial degeneration of the princip les of the Falange, of the original 
national-synd icalism that supported  Franco from the very beginning of 
his political action.  
Indeed , the educative program set by the FET y JONS during the 
civil war envisaged  a totally d ifferent cultural reform, accord ing to  
which the State should  not have played  a subaltern role in comparison 
to the Church. In fact: «La iglesia y el Estad o concordarán sus 
facultades respectivas, sin que se admita intromisión o activid ad  
alguna que menoscabe la d ignid ad  del Estado o la integr idad  
nacional»
57
. The lead ing role that the Church advocated  for himself in 
the creation of the new ruling class was in conflict w ith the prerogative 
of the national party that, in 1939, had  created  the Instituto de Estudios 
Políticos, with the aim of forging the new political and  cultural elite of 
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the country [Sesma Landrín, 2013]. Starting from these premises, at the 
beginning of the ‘40s it took place a violent struggle over the nature of 
the new educative model in which the most orthodox members of the 
Falange started  to counter the representatives of the religious 
associations [Alares López, 2011: 619]. 
A young researcher can be identified  as the spokesperson of the 
Falangist front: Pedro Laín Entralgo, a catholic intellectual who 
participated  to the definition of the principles of the national-
syndicalism [Argaya Roca, 2003, Martín Puerta, 2013: 211]. In his book, 
Los valores morales del nacionalsindicalismo, published  in the spring 1941, 
immed iately before the first governmental crisis of the Franco’s 
dictatorship of May 1941, Laín Entralgo tried  to conciliate the two sou ls 
of the regime presenting himself as a «falangista y católico» [Láin 
Entralgo, 1941: 9]. However, he d id  not renounced  to violently crit icise 
the political decisions of the minister of education who had  relegated  
the Falange to a subaltern role, betraying the party. In a context of 
apparent unity, his words could  sound  as extremely heterodox when 
affirming, for instance, that the State and  the Church should  be two 
independent entities, as affirmed  by Dante in his De Monarchia, since 
the governor should  depend  on God but not on the Pope. Laín affirmed  
that there were some «deberes morales históricos, nacionalmente 
calificados, que se les revelen en algún modo independientes de las 
obligaciones estrictamente religiosas» [Laín Entralgo, 1941: 25]. His 
criticisms towards the au tonomy of the Church and  the existence of a 
“Christian democracy” represented  by that time one of the most vivid  
synthesis of the falangist cu ltural ideal [Piñas Mesa, 2007: 54].  
The educative role of the catholic association was rad ically put into 
question by this outstand ing member of the Falangist movement who 
affirmed  that the formation of the new generation within a totalitarian 
regime cannot but being a priority of the State, without any 
intromission of the Church. He thought that the du ty of provid ing the 
moral development of the university students should  not pertain to 
these associations, bu t rather to the university unions, the SEU. 
Significantly enough, the very national representative of the SEU, José 
Miguel Guitarte, claimed  for this lead ing role in the control of the 
education during the inaugurat ion speech at the University of 
Valladolid  on November, 4
th
 1940, when, talking in the presence of the 
Caudillo, he affirmed  that the SEU, and  not the Church, constituted  «la 
línea continuad a de la más pura política falangista». For this reason the 
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University should  have adopted  a fascist educative model: moral, 
patriotic, physical and  military education in order to create a military 
camaraderie, not an apostolic one
58
.  
On that occasion, in Valladolid , also the minister of education 
Ibáñez Martín pronounced  a d iscourse resoundingly entitled  Hacia un 
nuevo orden universitario. In his speech he adopted  a slightly d ifferent 
rhetoric from the one he used  in other occasion s. He knew he was 
speaking to a Falangist aud ience, and  for this reason he preferred  not to 
appear excessively akin to the position of the religious members of the 
establishment. Consequently, he defended  the Christian principles of 
the Spanish science [Ibáñez Martín, 1940: 6] but, at the same time, he 
clearly d istingu ished  the roles of the State and  the Church  assigning to 
the former the duty to socialise the masses and  forge the new ruling 
class. He sustained  the necessity of putting the University question at 
the top of the political agenda. The reform he presented  during that 
occasion, while the project was still d iscussed  by the parliamentary 
commission, was very similar to the one presented  by the 
representative of SEU: an elitist, patriotic, hierarchical, military and  
trad itionalist university
59
. He therefore exhibited  a great political 
opportunism, and  during a phase in which the reform was still debated  
by the members of the new cultural and  political elite, he preferred  to 
continuously ad apt his speeches to the changing audiences rather than 
assuming a fix and  unmovable posit ion.  
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The balance of power significantly change since the political crisis of the 
spring 1941 when the Falangist group started to acquire a more relevant role 
in the process of nation building due to the victories of the Axis. As a 
consequence, the Falange called  for a rapid  fascistisation of the country 
[Preston, 2006: 380-395] and  education represented  the most relevant 
matter at stake. The very Revista de Educación Nacional, which 
represented  the official voice of the minister, started  to give space to 
fascist positions such as that purported  by the rector of the University 
of Santiago Ruiz del Castillo. Accord ing to him, for instance, the 
education had  to be guaranteed  exclusively by the State, intended  as a 
totalitarian form of government
60
. The review El Escorial, recently 
founded  by Laín Entralgo and  other falangist members, affirmed  the 
supremacy of the State over the Church during the very 1941 in his 
Editorial. The religious education was conceived  as included  in the 
general education purported  by the fascist movement, taking into 
consideration the fact that: «No conviene olvid ar – muchos parecen 
ignorarlo, otros quieren que no se sepa – que la Falange fué desde su 
origen un movimiento universitario, que de la Universidad  salieron sus 
mejores hombre y que entre los estud iantes se reclutaron sus mejores 
milicias»
61
. 
The appeasement of the minister towards the Falangist group  –
during a period  in which the fascist ideology appeared  to dominate in 
the political and  cultural scenario thanks to its military success – is 
testified  by an article he wrote for the REN , expressing his ad miration 
for the cultural reform brought about in Germany
62
. Moreover, from the 
legislative point of view, between the end  of 1940 and  the beginning of 
1941 they were approved  some basic laws that d rastically reformed  the 
educative system towards a fascist d irection: the Ley de Bases of SEU
63
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and  the creation of the university army (Milicias Universitarias)
64
 ruled 
by the Delegación Nacional de Educación of the FETyJONS.  
At the same time, following the example of other European 
totalitarianism s, it was created  the Consejo Nacional de Educación [Otero 
Carvajal, 2014: 69-130]. The ideology propagated  by this centre was 
extremely akin to the one purported  by the other fascisms, as proved  
by the book of one of the counsellors of the CNE [Iniesta Corredor 
[1941]], in which he compared  all the d ifferent educative reform 
recently realised  in Italy, Portugal, Germany, Hungary and  Japan. The 
fascistisation was supported by the minister of education. However, the 
reasons underneath this change in the policies of Ibáñez Martín were 
mainly opportunistic rather than reviling of a personal conviction. This 
turning point in the educative policies ultimately produced  a relevant 
exacerbation of the opposition between catholic and  falangist forces, in 
particu lar due to the lead ing role that the ACE, the ACNdP and  the 
Opus Dei wanted  to play within the cultural scenario of the New Spain. 
In fact, the preponderance of the Falangist front in the struggle for 
the cultural hegemony during the first half of 1941 was soon 
questioned  by the Catholic associations [Sotés Elizalde, 2004: 135-152]. 
Ibáñez Martín tried  to mitigate the Catholic d iscontent by creating the 
CSIC
65
. The organisation of this research institute responded , accord ing 
to the very minister, to a basic political reason: balancing the relations 
of power between catholic and  falangist forces permitting to the former 
to operate in order to Christianise the country [Ibáñez Martín, 1941b]. 
In this extremely conflictive scenario, by the end  of 1941, it started  the 
d iscussion of the Anteproyecto for the reform of the university [Italicus, 
1941: 27-32]. 
From now on the political context significantly changed  and  a new 
balance of power started  to emerge. The military self-confidence of the 
Axis began to creak, and  Spain faced  a new problem: foreseeing the 
chance of a defeat of the Axis. Spain had  to manifest its neu trality not 
only from a military but also from an ideological point of view. 
Moreover, the government crisis had  ended  up in a reaffirmation of the 
predominant role p layed  by the catholic front. By following the rhetoric 
production on the Anteproyecto, it is possible to notice a progressive 
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shift in the lexicon adopted  by the establishment. The problem of the 
“university reform” started  to be translated  into a problem of 
“educative reform” where the word  “education” was alway s conceived  
in terms of moral and  religious education.  
The shift appears evident by analysing the articles published  in the 
REN between the end  of 1941 and  the beginning of 1942. The falangist 
positions defended  by Gerardo Gavilanes, representative of FETyJONS, 
were mitigated  by the articles of Luis Araujo-Costa on the importance 
of a catholic education within the University or by the ones of the 
member of ACNdP Pedro Rocamora on the predominance of the 
Church over the State in all the questions related  to education. As he 
put it: «Se ha reconocid o […] a la Iglesia la suprema jerarquía que le 
corresponde en orden a la educación» [Rocamora, 1942: 7]. So, by the 
end  of 1942, the academic community of d iscourse was evidently 
orienting its normative project towards the creation of a confessional 
state. This occurred  while the the Axis was gradually weakening and  
the Falange suffered  a substantial extrad ition from the government 
after the removal of the ministry of foreign affairs Serrano Suñer 
[Montero, 1993 and  Gallego Margalef, 2014]. 
 
 
4.7 N at ional-Catholicism, t he Un iversit y  reform  
The long debate concerning the future of the University, which 
began since the nominee of Ibáñez Martín in 1939, was finally coming 
to an end  almost five years later. The d ifferent positions, and  in 
particu lar the confrontation with in the falangist and  the confessional 
fronts, had  been expressed  through a series of public speeches and  
books that defined  the boarders of the community of d iscourse. The 
apparent unity of the regime appear extremely fragile to any external 
observer. At the same time, this d iscussion characterised  also the 
institutional debate where the opposite views were even more rad ically 
expressed . As soon as the Cortes were opened , after having been 
suspended  since 1936, on July, 1 1943, the National Educative 
Commission promptly began to d iscuss the University reform project
66
. 
The commission was chaired  by Leopoldo Eijo, bishop of Alcalá and  
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Luis Ortiz Muñoz, a friend  of Ángel Herrera Oria, the founder of the 
ACNdP [Gutierrez García, 2008: 23-24]. Among the members of this 
commission there were the falangists Laín Entralgo and  Antonio Tovar, 
the rector of the UC, Pio Zábala y Lera and  the philosopher Juan 
Francisco Yela Utrilla, who in 1942 had  published  the book Catolicismo 
y Falange. 
The most debated  points basically concerned  the nature of the 
moral education to be guaranteed  within the university, the possibility 
of giving to the catholic private institu tes of education the same rights 
of the national universities and , u ltimately, the introd uction of religion 
as a basic module of all the university courses, d irectly controlled  by 
the Church. The d iscussion was extremely animated  and , finally, no 
overall consensus was reached . The Commission preferred  to avoid  the 
risk of a d ramatic collapse of the academic community of d iscourse by 
leaving in his final d raft an evident ambiguity concerning the 
possibility of assigning to the religiou s institutes the same right of the 
national ones. Tovar and  Laín clearly countered  this possibility , and  a 
conciliation between the two aims of the regime was rendered  possible 
only thanks to the intervention of Torres Lopez, professor of law at the 
UC.  
His proposal reflected  the precariousness of the agreement among 
the d ifferent forces of the regime, affirming that the final decision will 
be taken in an undefined  fu ture, when the relation among the State and  
the Church would  have been more clearly determ ined
67
. The long 
debate had  not been concluded  yet, but the Church seemed to have 
acquired  a growing influence in all the matters related  to education , 
even if most of its battles were effectively countered  by the member of 
the Falange [Morente, 2015: 204-207]. The final text constituted  a very 
fragile balance among the two main aims of the regime. Indeed , it 
recognised  the ideological but not institutional supremacy of the 
Church over the State, maintaining the very ambiguity that had  
characterised  the d iscussion within the commission: 
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Esta excelsa misión de formar íntegramente a la juventud  está inspirada en 
unos principios fundamentales, sin los que sería vana la docencia, 
peligrosas la investigación y la profesionalidad  e infructuosa  la educación. 
Unas y otras funciones han de servir ante todo a un mismo principio 
unitario y vivificante: el espíritu  católico. Decir  que una Universidad  .es 
católica es afirmar que vive sometida a la vigilancia de la Iglesia, la eterna 
maestra de la verdad , y que, por tanto, está lejos, no sólo de heterod oxia 
dogmática, sino de extravíos en el orden moral. En España sin perjuicio de 
reconocer a la Iglesia sus derechos docentes en materia de enseñanza  
universitaria, y de prever un mutuo acuerdo futuro de las dos Potestades, 
en el que se concierte el modo de poner en práctica esos derechos, lo 
verdaderamente importante hasta desde un punto de vista político es 
cristianizar la enseñanza del Estado, arrancar de la  docencia y de la 
creación cien1ifica la neutralidad  ideológica y desterrar el laicismo, para 
formar una nueva juventud  poseída de aquel princip io agustiniano de que 
la mucha ciencia nos acerca al Ser Supremo
68
. 
 
The Church was conquering a growing power and its influence was 
spreading in all the aspects of the social, political and cultural life of the 
country. This ideological Catholicism did not imply the removal from the most 
important charges of the new State of some of the most influent members of the 
Falange, but the internal and external circumstances were moving the regime 
towards a gradual dismissal of its fascist ideology. The publication of the Ley 
de Reforma Universitaria on July 29, 1943 represented  the culmination of 
a long lasting debate among the two opposite fronts of the Franco’s 
regime. After almost five years they had  not reached  the promised  
synthesis they had  been expected  to realise [Ibáñez Martín, 1943: 9], 
and  only the external circumstances would  have prompt them towards 
a common d irection. Curiously enough, while the p ropaganda of the 
regime on the reform of the university was reaching its climax due to 
the inauguration of the new Central University of Madrid , the very 
academic community which should  have represented  this unity was 
evidently beginning to crumble. Also for this reason the university 
legislation started  to be extremely linked  with an oppressive control of 
all the teaching activities [Souto Galván, 2008: 91-92]. 
A testimony of this fragmentation is offered  by the very minister of 
education Ibáñez Martín. During a d iscourse he pronounced  at the 
CSIC at the end  of 1943 for the first time his critiques to the false 
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intellectuals were d irected  not exclusively against the liberal thinkers 
but also against those within the regime who stayed  in the grey area  
between a legitimate and  an illegitimate ideology. As he put it:  
 
España está preparando su influencia decisiva en el pensamiento humano. 
[…] No caben posiciones centrales, ni líneas medias, entre España y anti-
España. Ofrecemos y ped imos sinceridad . Entre la España que cree y la 
España que blasfema, no admitimos la zona intermedia, dulzona y 
traidorzuela, petulante y vacía, de unos entes aislados, que no creen y 
parece que no blasfeman, pero son escépticos rotundos y blasfemos 
perfumados [Ibáñez Martín, 1947: 132]. 
 
The new Spain was now represented  by a cultural intellectual elite 
that clearly supported  and  shared  an orthodox catholic ideology, as 
proved  by the journey of the members of the CNE to Rome on February 
21, 1943 in which they were received  by the pope Pius XII
69
. The official 
ideological shift was testified  by the very Caudillo by the end  of 1943 
when inaugurating the UC. In his d iscourse he clearly defines the new 
hierarchies of the cultural policies, in fact: 
 
el Estado se ha sentido, hoy más que nunca, colaborador de la Iglesia en al 
restauración del orden cristiano y se ha propuesto, a la vez, apoyar su 
existencia presente y futura en la unidad  espiritual de los espanoles, 
lograda en el campo de la educación [Franco, 1943: 5]. 
 
Soon after, the ACe would  start to put into practice its «conquista de 
la Universidad », i.e. to systematically act so as to gain the complete 
hegemony within the University education , with the aim of forming the 
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new ruling class of the country
70
. The penetration of the Catholic 
associations within the University would  have also been guaranteed  
through a series of laws and  decrees, collected  in the LOU, which filled  
the emptiness concerning the role of the Church in the university , 
willingly left by the Ley de Reforma Universitaria
71
. Clear instances of this 
tendency are the decree for the defence of religion as a university 
subject (1944)
72
, the recognition of the CEU as part of the UC (1945)
73
 or 
the foundation of the Universidad  Internacional Menéndez y Pelayo, 
ruled  by the CSIC (1945)
74
. Moreover, since 1944, the Criminal Code 
included  an article that condemned  all form of d issent to the Catholic 
religion [Fernández-Pacheco, 2008: 225]. 
Later, since 1944, the catholic associations started  to receive a 
d ifferent and  more permissive treatment, as proved  by the fact that the 
journal of the ACe, Ecclesia, was excluded  from the control of the 
censorship  [Sevillano, 2003: 81]. From then on, the academic and 
cultural community of d iscourse of the regime and , consequently, its 
propagation within the Spanish society, started  to be oriented  towards 
a consolid ation of a Catholic and  religious ed ucation , not only in 
relation to the contents but also to the institutional framework. It is 
possible to affirm that since 1939 this community of d iscourse had  
undergone a slight change that can be observed  in its very rhetoric. 
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This mutation, even if significant, d id  not correspond  to a sort of 
genetic mutation since the Catholic trad itionalism had  always been part 
of the regime’s DNA. However, what was before just a part of the 
Francoist ideology began, since 1943, to be the very essence of what had  
been called  an “Hispanic-theocracy”. That phenomenon can clearly 
contribute to prove that the reactionary movement that composed  th e 
big Franco’s family during those very years were  not the product of a 
fix and  determined  ideology, but rather of a mass of lobbyist and  
personal interests [Villacañas, 2004b]. 
Thus, the university, responsible for the creation and  propagation of 
this ideology, was completely aband oning its initial fascist outlook and  
favouring the d iffusion of a Catholic d ogmatism. So, the resu lting 
exclusion of a relevant portion of Franco’s establishment, of some 
relevant political figures and  intellectuals that contributed  to the 
victory of the general, determined  the emergence of a partial d issent 
within the regime. The struggle for the cultural hegemony and  the 
exercise of power latently marked  the whole decad e of the 40s and  
ultimately reached  its climax in 1956 in the occasion of a students’ 
manifestation. This d issent was not aimed  at opening the way to a form 
of liberal falangism – as it has been sometimes written by the scholars. 
The existence of a “liberal Falange” constitu tes a sort of historiographic 
topos that had  been correctly countered , for instance, by Santo Juliá. Has 
he proved , the members of movement that formed a slight opposition 
to the regime during the last years of Franco’s d ictatorship , had 
contributed  to create their own foundational myth , going back to the 
decade of the 40s. However, during those years their opposition to the 
regime was mainly motivated  on the basis of their imposed  exclusion 
from the top of the regime’s hierarchy
75
. 
This phenomenon clearly prod uced  the creation of new 
communities of d iscourse within the Spanish acad emia. In fact, the 
constant and  subtle struggle for the control of the national ideology 
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produced  the creation and  consolid ation of d ifferent families w ithin the 
regime that expressed  themselves through d ifferent journals and  
reviews. This contraposition also constituted  the ground  for the 
instrumental use of Ortega during Franco’s d ictatorship by some 
members of the establishment who had  been relegated  to a second ary 
role within the regime, in particu lar after the end  of the WWII. In fact, 
Ortega had  alread y been a contended  and  criticised  reference during 
the whole period  in which the university reform had  been d iscussed  
and  debated . His voluntary exile d id  not marked  the end  of his 
influence within the Spanish academia. On the contrary, as it will be 
proved  in the next subchapter, most of the d issimilar positions 
expressed  during the debate revolved  around  his Misión de la 
Universidad. 
 
 
4.8 The stone guest  
During the period  1938-1943, in spite of its slight d ifferences, the 
community of d iscourse which characterised  the cultu ral establishment 
of the regime shared  at least a common enemy: i.e. the laic and  liberal 
educative model of the II Republic. The ILE and  the JAE were held  as 
the ultimate responsibles for the violence of the civil war and , in 
general, for all the evils of the Spanish politics
76
. The thesis purported  
by the regime can be summarised  in the slogan: «A la revolución roja, 
el socialismo le ha dad o las masas, la Institución Libre de Enseñanza le ha 
dado los jefes» [AA.VV, 1940: 5]. In this context, the role played  by the 
liberal and  republican thinker Ortega y Gasset could  not be completely 
d ismissed , even by those areas of the CEDA and  the Falange that had  
been trying to assimilate his thinking within the new ideology. For this 
reason, in several of the d iscourses analysed  in the previous pages, the 
figure of Ortega is depicted as that of an enemy of the nation whose philosophy 
had to be strenuously countered and ultimately dismissed. The Jesuit 
Enrique Herrera Oria, for instance, in his history of Spanish education, 
identified  the whole philosophy of Ortega whit the ILE, a pedagogic 
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institution he considered  as Masonic and  communist. Not only Ortega 
was considered  an heterodox for his anti-trad itionalist philosophy of 
history – as it will be proved  in the next chap ter – bu t also and  foremost 
for his anti-catholic intellectual roots. Herrera Oria’s criticisms towards 
the Madrilenian thinker reached  the paroxysm of accusing him for 
being the moral responsible for the blowout of the civil war. This was 
due to the fact that his philosophy was considered  as a form of atheism 
and , therefore, as a moral aberration: 
 
Este fue en realidad  el gravísimo error de Or tega y Gasset, repetidamente 
inculcado a los estud iantes de la F.U.E., en su célebres conferencias, tan 
elegantes de forma como endebles en el fondo histórico y, sobre todo, en el 
conocimiento de los archivos universitarios españoles. No comprendió que 
las Residencias organizadas por la Institución Libre, a través de la Junta de 
Ampliación, eran una copia sin espíritu  de los Colegios mayores y menores. 
De ahí sus amargos frutos, como la Gran Cruzada española lo ha 
demostrado sin que por eso queramos decir que todos los que en ellas se 
educaron hayan desembocado en el mar de la revolución sovietica [Herrera 
Oria, 1941: 195-196]. 
 
Each author or theory that had  been d irectly or ind irectly linked  to 
the ILE was treated  with suspicion . This institution was considered  as 
the main responsible for the marginalisation of the catholic world  from 
the higher education and  the university system, having constitu ted  the 
most rad ical experiment of modernisation in Spain, countering the 
trad itionalist status quo [Otero Carvajal, 2010]. The position of Ortega 
was rendered  extremely complicated  and  debated  also because of the 
crucial role he had  played  as a professor and  public figure in the UC, 
during the cierre of the University in 1929. Moreover, in the following 
years, he had  been the epitome of the modernizing educational 
normative ideal. The critical thinking he tried  to promote within the 
university was completely unsuitable for the new regime and  the 
separation of the d ictatorship’s community of d iscourse from his 
position was a logical precaution. This decision was reflected  also in the 
ed itorial policies. In fact, as the professor Américo Castro, recently 
emigrated  to the US, wrote to his friend  Federico de Onís:  
 
Espasa [the ed itor that had  always published  Ortega’s book] renuncia a 
sacar a la calle ed iciones listas… de los siguientes autores: Marañon, Ortega 
[…]. En suma, han trazado una raya d ivisoria, y en la España de ellos no 
queda sino literatura gesuítica o cosa parecida. Esos hombres, algunos de 
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los cuales han d ado sus hijos a la causa de Franco [it was the case of both 
Ortega and  Marañon], son mirados como enemigos
77
. 
 
So interestingly enough, the majority of the works concerning 
the nature and  role of the university within the new State always 
referred , in a polemical way, to the books of Ortega and , in particular, 
to his Misión de la Universidad. The new cultural ideal purported  by the 
regime was often constructed  per via negationis just by looking at the 
theses expressed  by the philosopher almost ten years before , rather 
than by proposing a new and  positive normative project [Neria, 2000]. 
For clarifying the meaning of this sentence, and  to comprehend  the 
positioning of the d ifferent members of the cultural establishment of 
the regime towards Ortega, it is useful to refer to some of the 
previously mentioned  texts. 
The very important d iscourse to the university students 
pronounced  by Lopez Ibor, for instance, clearly reflected  this tendency 
to develop each text concerning the reform of the university system 
through a d irect confrontation with Ortega’s book. López Ibor 
recognised  in the introduction of his d iscourse that the Misión de la 
Universidad represented  the most grandiose attempt ever made by a 
philosopher to deal w ith the problem
78
. However it was factually 
unable to reform the institution since, accord ing to Ibor, Ortega totally 
d ismissed  the importance of reforming the concept of humanity via the 
necessary reference to the Spanish Catholic trad itionalism. In 
particu lar, López Ibor moved  four main criticisms to Ortega.  
The first concerned  his laicism and  his lack of religiosity. In fact, the 
ratio-vitalism of the Mad rilenian philosopher w as interpreted  as a 
defence of a renaissance form of humanism, basically characterised  by 
its immanentism, laicism and  negation of any form of transcendence
79
.  
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The second  pertains to the political proposal of Ortega that should  
have been promoted  by education, and  in particular the Facultad de 
Cultura proposed  by the philosopher. The organisation of the courses in 
five main d isciplines, which all the university students should  have 
followed  is, to Ibor, an utopian and  also d angerous educative model. In 
fact it was both impossible that each student acquired  a so ample 
quantity of notions concerning too many d isciplines and , moreover, 
this would  have not permitted  to obtain an adequate specialised  
scholarship. The risk that Ibor ind ividuated  in this model was that of 
forging well-read  professionals who lacked  an authentic morality, a 
sort of Lutheran ethics and  not a proper Catholic – or rather Spanish – 
one [López Ibor, 1938: 53].  
The third  criticism was also more virulent and  marked  a line within 
the Francoist community of d iscourse concerning the scope of the 
educative role of the University and  the culture that the regime had  to 
promote and  spread . In fact, he d id  not share with Ortega the idea 
accord ing to which culture would  have been thought as a variable 
system of beliefs concerning the totality of one’s living experience that 
each person has to critically interiorise and  d iscuss in order to develop 
his own personality. On the contrary, culture was conceived  by Ibor as 
an immutable reality which is imposed  from above and  accord ing to 
whose eternal principles each one has to adequate and  conform his life 
without d iscussing them. As he put it: «Cultura no es, pues, el sistema 
de ideas desde el cual se vive, sino por el cual se vive. O mejor, se vive 
y se existe» [López Ibor, 1938: 55]. The educative model which had  to 
promote this form of moralistic culture, which stuck to religious and  
patriotic princip les, should  be a sort of permanent study within the 
University of the nature of the Spanish humanism. In fact: «En la 
Nueva Universid ad  no han de figurar las facu ltades yuxtapuestas como 
en un mosaico. Deben cesar los compartimentos; no en la organ ización, 
sí en el espíritu . Cad a una no debe estud iar una realidad  d istinta, sino 
todas la misma realidad  desde un punto de vista d istinto» [López Ibor, 
1938: 54].  
The fourth and  last of Ibor’s criticism to Ortega aimed  at defending 
the idea of scientific research that the regime was trying to implement 
through the project of the CSIC. A project to which he would  later have 
participated . The Spanish philosopher, accord ing to Ibor, only focused 
on the d id actic and  pedagogical aim of the University, forgetting its 
importance as a research centre and  interested , on the contrary, in 
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importing a foreign cu lture (the German one in particular) in Spain. 
This would  represent a trait of Ortega’s thinking he inherited  from the 
ILE that promoted  the myth of Europe over the Spanish trad ition. The 
new State, on the contrary, should  have focused  on the technical and  
scientific research to reach its economic and  cultural au tarchy
80
. 
Another instance that testifies that the normative ideal of the regime 
was initially grou nded  on an overall critic of Ortega’s book is offered 
by the d iscourse of Isid oro Martín Martínez. As Ibor, he recognised  the 
importance of Ortega’s outlook that, however, was u ltimately 
incomplete being «truncad o en su vuelo» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 37]. 
In particular, he shared  Ortega’s princip le of economy in education 
(§2.6) but he reproached  his lack of a moral framework of education 
and  the absence of religion from the curriculum. The criticisms 
presented  by Martín Martínez were therefore really similar to the ones 
purported  by Ibor and  can ultimately be summarised  in his enunciation 
of the mission that the university should  have accomplish: «La primera 
misión que tiene, pues, que cumplir la Universidad  española es la de 
asentar la unidad  de la cultura, forjar un pensamiento d iáfanamente 
católico y hond amente español: la medid a de lo universal servido 
según nuestras mod alid ades particulares» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 43]. 
To summarise, the characterisation of Ortega appear ed , since the 
very beginning of the debate within the regime concerning the fu ture of 
the University, as an undesired  but unavoid able reference point. His 
liberalism and  laicism could  not fit into the new Catholic educative 
model that the new establishment wanted  to  encourage. Significantly 
enough, this preoccupation was not limited  to the religious members of 
the regime. On the contrary, the aversion towards Ortega traced  the 
line also between a majority and  a minority of the falangist members of 
the cu ltural establishment. This aversion cou ld  be epitomised , for 
instance, by Pedro Laín Entralgo who at the beginning of the ‘40s – 
when his political ambitions had  not been yet slowed  down – d irectly 
criticised  Ortega for his lack of religiosity
81
. Indeed , even if Laín 
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 López Ibor, 1938: 103: «La posición de Ortega viene a ser, como no podía 
menos, la de creer que el problema español se resuelve simplemente con 
europeizar a España. No investiguemos, contentémonos con transcribir, viene a 
ser el lema de la europeizaciòn. […] Sólo una au tarquía de la inteligencia nos 
permitirá una autarquía económica». 
81
 Laín Entralgo, Educación del Impetu, in «Revista Nacional de Educación», 4, 
1941. 
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thought that education should  be a prerogative of the State and  not of 
the Church in order to forge the new falangist ruling class, he d id  not 
d iminish the importance of educating accord ing to religious principles.  
The removal of this component from Ortega’s ethics, accord ing to 
Laín, constitu ted  the main problem of a philosopher that, for this 
reason, should  have been substantially banned  from the Spanish 
nationalist ideology. The concept of belief (creencia) that Ortega 
significantly developed  d uring those very years referring to the process 
of creating and  transmitting culture, is conceived  by Laín in a totally 
d ifferent way. Not as an inner system of thoughts that each one has to 
comprehend  for living accord ingly, but rather as an imposed  set of 
norms concerning the faithful respect of the State, law and  homeland . 
These should  be conceived  as the main axes of the nationalistic 
education since, contrary to the concept purported  by Ortega: «El 
sentid o primario de nuestra vida no es el deportivo-festival, sino el 
religioso-militar» [Laín, 1941b: 16]. Accord ing to Laín, a proper 
education can ben reached  exclusively through a process of 
indoctrination characterised  by the respect for the trad ition of an 
authoritative State. This should  have u ltimately be the end  of the 
university: forging the future generation in accordance with  this rigid  
set of princip les and  beliefs. 
On the other side, a minority of the falangist  family perceived  that 
the lesson of Ortega could  still have played  a fundamental role in 
defining the basic trait of a pedagogical model. Using some of his basic 
tenets, in add ition, could  also have been of great utility for the regime. 
An example of this concep tion is offered  for instance by Lora Tamayo 
who, in his d iscourse, constantly praised  the Madrilenian philosopher 
for his educative thinking. He also reproached  some members of the 
new academic community of d iscourse for their exaggerated  attacks 
against Ortega, and  he tried  to ennoble his figure
82
. However, the 
interpretation of the philosopher offered  by Lora Tamayo it is not 
aimed  to restore the authentic importance and  implications of his 
thinking, bu t rather of using it in an instrumental way. In  fact he 
affirms that the Misión de la Universidad would  offer a full justification 
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 Lora Tamayo, 1939: 44: «A agudizar el tema entre nosotros, ha contribuido 
Ortega y Gasset con su concepto de la misión de la Universidad . Y acaso lo que 
en torno a sus ideas se ha debatido tenga mucho de lo que él mismo llama 
“volcán de lugares comunes, que es todo hombre cuando habla de una cosa sin 
haber pensado antes en ella”». 
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for the nationalistic ed ucation purported  by the regime. Since, as he 
says quoting Ortega’s book:  
 
La Universidad  no puede vivir al margen de la vida de la nación. “Tiene 
que estar abierta a la plena actualidad , más aun, tiene que estar en medio 
de ella, sumergida en ella”. Nunca más alta la Universidad  que cuando 
vibra al unísono de las grandes inquietudes nacionales [Lora Tamayo, 
19439: 45]. 
 
Thus the model of university traced  by Ortega cou ld  have served , 
accord ing to this falangist professor, as an eminent justification  for the 
predominance of the nationalist component of the regime over the 
catholic one. This interpretation  d id  not truly take into consideration 
Ortega’s thought. As already pointed  out, in his Misión the philosopher 
underlined  the necessity of build ing a university able to influence the 
life of the society not as mere instrument of the political power, but 
rather as its spiritual guid e. He criticised  the interferences both of the 
State and  of the Church in the control of the education that, accord ing 
to him, should  have had  a vital role in the construction of a critical 
public opinion. The proper aim of the university should  have been that 
of forming citizens able to avoid  political partisanships and  reject 
uncritical arguments
83
.  
Thus during the first and  d efining years of the regime’s life, Ortega 
represented  either a enemy to be annihilated  or a source that could  
have been instrumentally used  for supporting the idea of a patriotic 
and  totalitarian educative model. Ortega had  actually been expelled  by 
the new cultural scenario being a symbol of an und esired  past
84
. The 
present was dominated , in particu lar from 1943, by a p reponderant, but 
not exclusive, Catholic ideology. Curiously enough, it would  have been 
exactly the way of approaching and  criticising the works of the 
Madrilenian philosopher what would  later have traced  the line among 
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 OC, IV: 562: «Para ello tiene la Universidad que intervenir en la actualidad como tal 
Universidad, tratando los grandes temas del d ía  desde su punto de vista propio 
– cultural, profesional o científico. De este modo no será una institución sólo 
para estud iantes, un recinto  ad usum delphinis, sino que, metida en medio de la 
vida, de sus urgencias, de sus pasiones, ha de imponerse como un “poder  
espiritual” super ior frente a la Prensa, representando la serenidad  frente al 
frenesí, la seria agudeza frente a la frivolidad  y la franca  estupidez». 
84
 However, at least from a formal point of view, Ortega legally was included  in 
the list of the professors of the UC until his death in 1955. See Gracia, 2014: 566. 
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different lobbies and  families within the regime. During the beg inning 
of the 40s, the ample and  widespread  criticisms to his lack of religiosity 
clearly revealed  that the Catholic component of the regime had  
conquered  a substantial control on educative policies. 
The enormous change within the UC is also testified  by the election 
of Juan Zaragüeta as the substitute of Ortega y Gasset in the chair of 
Metaphysics. The pedagogy purported  by this priest was rad ically 
d ifferent from the one presented  by Ortega. This affirmation can be 
proven by analysing Zaragüeta’s book Pedagogía Fundamental [1943] in 
which he offered  an overall presentation of the educative model that 
the new State should  have to promote. The university traced  by the 
priest d iffered  from the one conceived  by Ortega at least in respect to 
three main aspects: a) the prominence of religion over philosophy as 
the peak of a humanistic education; b) the method ology to be ad opted ; 
c) the role of the intellectual both within the university and  in the 
society. So, it is evident that religion was gaining within the university , 
both from a formal and  practical point of view, a lead ing role in the 
education of a new generation
85
. From a method ological point of view, 
the professor should  have completely d ismissed  the Krausist 
principles, presenting to his students a closed  an rigid  set of knowledge 
that could  not be d iscussed . No space was left to the development of a 
critical thinking and : «La instrucción habrá de superar 
considerablemente a la educación, o sea la heteroformación a la 
autoformación» [Zaragüeta, 1943: 213]. Moreover, men and  women 
should  receive a d ifferent education from the primary school to the 
university. Lastly, the role of the intellectual within the society should  
correspond  to a propagation of the Catholic principles, «una vocación 
de apostolado» [Zaragüeta, 1943: 499], both within the university and  
in relation to the public debate.  
Starting from these premises Zaragüeta’s conclusions concerning 
the future of the university were extremely clear in their  rad icalism: 
this institution should  have to guarantee the construction of a national 
culture ruled  by a theological ou tlook. The total d ismissal of Ortega is 
therefore evident by taking into consideration the very form that the 
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 Zaragüeta, 1943: 179: «La estimación de los bienes humanos culmina en la 
moral, cuyo es propio apreciar el Bien absoluto y apetecerlo también absoluta y 
obligatoriamente. Por eso, la formación pedagógica de la estimativa habrá de 
coronase con la ética o d isciplina de los bienes superiores, y hasta con la 
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University was acquiring d uring the first years of the regime. However, 
for tracing the basic tenets of the new ideology of the regime it was also 
ind ispensable to establish the contents of the rigid  set of knowledge 
that Zaragüeta thought it would  have been necessary to transmit. 
During this same period  (1939-1945) the cultural establishment of the 
regime started  to produce an overwhelming amount of d iscourses and  
debates concerning the basic aspect of this new positive culture. 
Curiously enough, despite his expulsion from the official cu lture, 
Ortega d id  try to enter into this debate while in exile, with the aim of 
continuing to influence the public and  cu ltural debate presenting his 
critical voice. As detailed  in the next chapter, in spite of the enormous 
d ifficulties he faced  during this period , Ortega did not renounce to his 
intellectual role, conceived as a form of critical reflection on the present, with 
the aim of contributing to change the current social situation. The will of 
offering his radical insights on the most relevant topics of the new cultural 
establishment contributed to significantly change most of his philosophical 
agenda. In fact, he started  to suit it to the debates that were taking place 
in Spain.  
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PART III 
 
ORTEGA’S EXILE IN DIALOGUE 
After having described  the historical context and  the intellectual debate 
that gave birth to the new university, defining its normative ends from 
a macroscopic point of view, in this chapter they will be analysed  the 
concrete changes that the humanities undertook during the first years 
of Franco’s d ictatorship. Both from a formal point of view – via the 
significant legislative changes – and  from a material one – through the 
purge of an entire academic community – the University became one of 
the pillars of the regime’s propagand a, defining its  basic theoretical 
guidelines. This can be proved  in particu lar by analysing the definition 
of a new ideal of humanistic education which the reform of the formal 
university system realised  in order to serve the purposes of the political 
power. In this context, the University, and  in particular the faculties of 
humanity, started  to be conceived  both as laboratories of political ideas 
and  as institutions devoted  to the d iffusion of th is new culture. 
The University of Madrid  became the most representative place in 
which the new ideology was being built. During these years , the new 
academia rigorously defined  a precise orthodoxy that d iscriminated  
between legitimate and  prohibited  points of view. The construction of 
the new intellectual was complemented  by the definition of a new set 
of knowledge whose contents should  have to respond  to the needs of 
the political power. Consequently, humanities underwent a complete 
redefinition of their topics and  methodologies, as it will be proved  in 
this section by analysing the changes that took place in the teaching of 
1) history, 2) philosophy and  3) political sciences. Put it d ifferently, the 
creation of the organic intellectual was mirrored  by the creation of a 
new hegemonic cu lture. 
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History was one academic d iscipline that acquired  a lead ing role in 
setting the bases for build ing this instrumental ideology. This process 
determined  the construction of a mythical past, the valorisation of the 
mediaeval trad ition, ancient languages and  Catholic trad ition s. 
Moreover, not only the contents but also the form of teaching history 
rad ically changed . In fact, the description of historical events was 
complemented  by their meta-historical narration, with a teleological, 
and  often theological, explanation. As a consequence, also philosophy 
of history and  metaphysics became the kernel of the humanistic 
education by provid ing the best instruments for legitimating the 
current regime in the light of the national past  and  its consequent 
destiny. Lastly, the synthesis between these d isciplines and  the 
purposes of the political power was assigned  to two new academic 
subjects: sociology and  political science.  
This part of the thesis analyses three d ifferent debates extremely 
interrelated  among one another aimed  to define the basic traits of the 
new culture purported  by the recently reformed university. In 
particu lar, they will be taken into consideration respectively the way in 
which the past was conceived  – through the case of the Roman and  
Spanish Empires – the significance of this past in relation to the general 
political interpretation of the present – through the philosophy of 
history – and , finally, the definition of the new philosophical 
scholasticism within the regime – via an analysis of the d iscourse which 
focused  on the figure of Juan Luis Vives. The whole analysis w ill be 
conducted  by always taking into consideration at the same time the 
d iscourse which was being developed  within the regime, and  the one 
autonomously proposed  by Ortega. Through this comparison it will be 
possible to comprehend  if, and  to what extent, the thought of the 
Madrilenian philosopher evolved  in relation to the institutional, 
political and  cultural changes of the circumstances in which he lived  
and  to the d ifferent aud iences he addressed  during this troublesome 
period  of his intellectual experience: from the Argentinean exile to 
Portuguese one.  
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Chapter 5. 
Build ing id entity. Humanities in the 
first years of Franco’s regime  
This chapter w ill focus on what was taught w ithin the Spanish 
academia in the first years of Franco’s regime, taking into account the 
construction of the national history as a political means for build ing a 
collective identity. To do this it w ill be analysed  in particular the 
creation of a new foundational myth which linked  the birth of the 
Iberian nation with the Roman Empire. Moreover, it will also be taken 
into account the posture of Ortega in relation to this debate that took 
place in particular during the period  of his Argentinean exile, from 
1940 to 1942. In his texts, contrary to the d iffuse opinion among his 
scholars, it is possible to notice his will to enter into this political and  
cultural d iscussion which were occurring in Spain and  of which he was 
sufficiently informed. In fact, he d id  not want to renounce to his 
influential role within the intellectual life of his country, even if the 
new academia was far from interested  in listening to the teaching of 
this vestige of the Republican past. Through this analysis it w ill be 
possible to compare the most significant strands of the academic 
production of the regime with the concurrent theorisation s of Ortega, 
so to comprehend  what was the concrete role that the Madrilenian 
philosopher still p layed  within this ren ewed cultural scenario. In fact, 
before speaking of Ortega’s collaboration, opposition or ind ifference in 
relation to the Franco’s regime – as often done by the scholars of the 
philosopher – it is necessary to begin by authentically comparing the 
two poles of the d iscourse, in order to avoid  slapd ash and  
predetermined  judgments. 
Thus the first part of this chapter analyses (§1) both the qualitative 
and  quantitative renewal of the Spanish academia, in particu lar in the 
case of the teaching of humanities, before focusing on the significant 
case of (§2) the narration of the imperial past of the nation that the 
university was purporting with evident propagandistic aims. The 
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intention to propagate this myth within the civil society , and  not only 
among the university students, is testified  by (§3) the popularization of 
this recently created  myth through mass media, and  in particu lar the 
newspaper and  the rad io, demonstrating the desire of indoctrinating 
the population in accordance with the new ideals that the acad emic and  
political worlds were developing. However, this apparently 
homogeneous ideology was in reality extremely fragile as proved  by 
(§4) the alternative visions of the Roman Empire purported  by d ifferent 
souls of the regime, such as the scientific and  cultural review Escorial, 
whose ed itorial line rad ically d iffered  from the one of the orthodox 
propaganda. The case of the notion of “empire” was indeed  just one 
instance of a broader historiography tendency which consisted  in (§5) 
constructing a new philosophy of history aimed  at justifying and  
legitimating the new political power. The analysis of this teleological 
theory of history would  later be compared  with (§6) the one that Ortega 
developed  during those same years, in constant confrontation with the 
rhetoric of the regime. Together with his completely d ifferent 
interpretation of (§7) the imperial past of Spain, the interest towards the 
theory of history in the case of the Madrilenian philosopher manifested  
the attention he paid  towards the cultural d iscourse which was taking 
place in Spain at, at the same time, the evident changes in his 
philosophical agend a produced  by that particu lar scenario. Changes 
that, however, would  never determine an abd ication from the main 
principles he always defended . Lastly, in order to comprehend  the 
relevance of Ortega’s theorisations on the Spanish context, the chapter 
will take into account (§8) the way in which his theories were received 
among the Spanish intellectuals, both those who were more akin to the 
philosopher and  of those who always manifested  a rad ical rejection of 
what he still symbolised .  
 
5. 1 N ovum O rganum  
No cabe más que un solo camino: el de llegar a la conciencia del hombre 
español y grabar indeleblemente en su espíritu  y en su corazón, la idea de 
su tremenda responsabilidad  ante el juicio inapelable de la Historia. Que si 
cada hombre es portador de un grado de valores espirituales y eternos […] 
si es preciso llegar a esta trasformación del pensamiento colectivo del 
pueblo, el espíritu  de cada individuo será la primera zona de acción de esta 
nobilísima empresa renovadora [Ibáñez Martín, 1942: 15-16]. 
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In spite of the significant d ifferences that characterised  the various 
communities of d iscourse which coexisted  within the regime, the 
construction of the new academia implied  a unified  attempt of tracing 
the contents of the culture of the New State. This process was realised  
through the definition of a new intellectual pantheon, of a specific and  
inescapable set of cultural references. Once the educative system of the 
recent past had  been completely d isquilifed , it was now necessary to 
replace it w ith a new one. 
The construction of this pantheon d id  not respond  to scientific and  
academic reasons, but rather to the political ends and  propagand istic 
aims of the regime
1
. Indeed , the academic production of the first years 
of the regime (1939-1943) focused  in particular on the definition of its 
new reference points w ithin the national history . In fact, all the 
pedagogical efforts of Franco’s regime during this period , at all level of 
the educative system, were oriented  towards the establishment of a 
normative political ideal, conceived  as ind ispensable for guaranteeing 
the social consensus
2
. In particu lar, the University was deemed 
responsible for the construction of the nationalistic guidelines of the 
new cu lture, i.e. the very concept of law, homeland  and  faith that 
would  later be propagated  to the rest of society and  to the youngest 
generations [Torres, 1941: 17]. 
Indeed , the teaching of humanities was now organised  accord ing to 
a unifying principle which put at the top of the educative process the 
study of theology. The CSIC was the main promoter of this reform that  
adapted  the image of Llull’s tree of Sciences to the new scientific 
theocracy promoted  by the regim e
3
. In this process of definition and  
                                                          
1
 As Gallego Margalef [2014: 789] has correctly written: «En la gran rectificación 
cultural del Nuevo Estado, la reafirmación de estos motivos no era un asunto 
de interés académico y ni siquiera de justificación elaborada por las elites, sino 
de necesidad  de completar el proceso de nacionalización de las masas».  
2
 For An overview of the role of education in primary and secondary  school see 
in particular Capellán de Miguel, [2006]. 
3
 «En las conyunturas más decisivas de su Historia concentró la Hispanid ad  sus 
energia espirituales para crear una cultura universal. Esta ha de ser también la 
ambición más noble de la Espana del actual momento, que, frente a la pobreza 
y paralización pasadas, siente la voluntad  de renovar su gloriosa trad ición 
científica. Tal empeno ha de cimentarse, ante todo, en la restauración de la 
clásica y cristiana unidad  de las ciencias, destruídas en el siglo XVIII. Para ello 
hay que subsanar el d ivorcio entre las ciencias especulativas y experimentales y 
promover en el árbol total de la ciencia su armonioso incremento y su 
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establihsment of a new ideology, humanities played  a vital role, being 
considered  as the kernel of the educative p roposal. They had  a 
predominant role in relation to the construction of the new scientific 
d isciplines, at least until the end  of WWII, when the situation rad ically 
changed  and  the need  of an urgent economic development imposed  to 
the regime the valorisation of technical and  industrial sciences [Sanz 
Menéndez, 1996]
4
. This was due to the fact that, during the first period  
of consolidation of the new establishment , the main worry was that of 
defining – through the help of professors, clergies, intellectuals and  
politicians – the new national cu lture. In this context, history and , 
generally speaking, the humanities d id  p lay a vital part. This is evident 
by considering that almost all the publications of the CSIC during its 
first year were devoted  to literature history, philosophy, theology and  
law, with no presence of relevant scientific topics
5
. 
Indeed , within the University they will be created  authentic 
historiographic myths, and  history became the most adequate means 
for legitimating the political power via a manipu lated  interpretation of 
the past. The course of history would  have to justify the present 
condition of Spain and , consequently, to orient its future. This implied , 
in particular, the vind ication of the importance of some figures, such 
the Catholic Monarchs of the Imperial Spain, in the definition of the 
national identity, and  the concurrent condemnation of the whole 
period  comprised  between the French revolution and  the II Spanish 
Republic, interpreted  as the most vivid  expression of the continuity of 
the pernicious effects of the communist germs within national history 
[Abós Santabárbara, 2003].  
The importance of history in the new academic and  political system 
is also testified  by the preminent role that , w ithin the UC ,acquired  the 
historian Pio Zabala y Lera, who would  be elected  as the rector of the 
University. By the end  of the civil war, the department of history of the 
                                                                                                                               
evoluciòn homogénea, evitando el monstruoso desarrollo de algunas de sus 
ramas, con anqilosamiento de otras». In Estructura y Normas del Consejo Superior 
de Investigaciones Cientìficas, Madrid , 1943: 7. 
4
 This trend  is proven also by the financial aids provided by the government in 
148 when the institute of philosophy of the CSIC received  a total of 298.000 
pesetas, the one of theology 280.000, while the institute of technology almost a 
tenfold  amount. See Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 23. 
5
 See Esplendida aportación del Consejo Superior de Investigación Científica a la Fiesta 
del libro, in «Revista Nacional de Educación», n. 5, 1941: 68-73. 
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UC was composed  only by four people, all of whom had  proved  their 
ded ication to the national cause during the war  [Pasamar Azuría, 1991; 
Parra Garrigues, 1956]
6
.  
For guaranteeing the normal functioning of the University after t he 
purges which affected  in particu lar the department of history, after the 
war many professors were tranferred  from peripherical universities to 
the centre of the Spanish academia. Consequently, as demonstrated  by 
the emblematic case of the professor of contemporary history Ciriaco 
Pérez Bustamente – who had  joined  the FN in Valladolid  during the 
civil war –, the selection of the new teaching staff was basically motivated by 
political reasons, looking at the devotion demostrated to the regime in the 
recent conflict [Pallol Trigueros, 2014]. However, the tranfer of some 
professors from a universtiy to another was not  sufficient to cover the 
huge amount of vacancies within the departments of history [Peiró 
Martín, 2013: 37-67]. For this reason, in particular in some peripherical 
univiersities, a new generation of young teachers, who had  recently 
obtained  their PhDs, cou ld  aspire to gain a post w ithin the academia, 
once proved  of not having been involved  in Republican experiences 
and  having demonstrated  their loyalty towards the regime. For 
instance, the new selected  professor of Primitive History at the UC, 
Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla, obtained  his post in 1939 without 
partipating to any competitive exam, once his tutor, professor 
Obermaier, decided  not to retu rn in Spain after the victory of the FN. 
Signficantly, one of Santa-Olalla major merits was that of having 
vehemently condemned  the Republican University in which he had  
been educated
7
. This renewal of the academic staff responded to the need of 
the regime of controlling the knowledge produced within the university, so to 
avoid undesired interpretation of the national history
8
. In 1941, almost 60% of 
the overall professors of history of the new Spanish academia had obtained 
their role after the civil war. 
                                                          
6
 They were: Antonio Ballesteros, professor of Spanish and  Latin American 
history; Antonio García y Bellido, Archeology; José Ferrandis, Numismatics; 
Zabala, professor of History. 
7
 Martínez Santa-Olalla, La Universidad y el separatismo, in «Libertad , Diario 
Nacional-Sind icalista», 10-XI-38. 
8
 Peiró Martín, 2013: 54: «En este sentido, más ilustrativo que una posible 
nómina de anécdotas son los 40 nuevos catedráticos que, entre 1940 y 1950, 
acced ieron a las cátedras de Historia existentes en las doce facultades de 
Filosofía y Letras repartidas por la geografía española». 
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The link between history and  politics was not only a professional, 
but also a personal one. The criteria of the selection procedures during 
these years d irectly implied  also a specific structure and  content of the 
teaching courses. In fact, no neutral narration was accepted , nor in 
relation to the contemporary history neither to the ancient one.  
 
 
5.2 The Span ish empire: t he creat ion  of a m y th 
 
The renewal of the staff and  the general framework  in which history 
was taught were complemented  also by a rad ical change in the topics at 
stake. In particular, two historical themes became trend ing topics 
within the academic d iscussion: 1) the concept of “civilisation” and  2) 
the nature of the Spanish Empire. In relation to the second  of these 
aspects, it has to be pointed  out that the concept of the Empire 
constituted  the normative ideal of the “new man”  not only in  the 
Spanish case, but also both in the Italian Fascism – the Roman empire – 
and  the German nazism – the Holy Roman Empire. The comparison 
aming the d ifferent conceptions embedded  in the notion of empired  
was aimed  to offer, as far as the Spanish rhetoric is concerned , an 
ind ividual national identity grounded  on a noble past, and , 
consequently, an appereance of legimitacy to the Franco’s regime. The 
Roman Empire constituted  an antecedent in respect to the Spanish one, 
but it could  not have been considered  as the best representation of the 
national identity. Similarly, the Spanish notion of Empire should  also 
d iffer from the German one, whose roots had  been found  by the 
German rhetoric in the ancient Greece, and  not in Rome [Gallego 
Margalef, 2014: 151].  
In the Spanish case, this concept was debated  both by the Catholic 
and  the Falangist groups participating to the definition of the new 
ideology [Tusell, 1990: 23-24]. In fact, the notion of “empire” also 
implied  a definition of a new form of humanism insofar as  it should  
have guarantee the construction of a common imperial past shared  by 
all the forces of the Axis. As Alfonso de Ascanio wrote in his influential 
book on the Spanish Empire:  
 
El fascismo imperialista italiano y el imperialismo racial hitleriano que late 
dondequiera que palpita la raza germánica, son manifestaciones de un 
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nuevo humanismo, fenómenos filosóficos-sociales que representan el 
prólogo de una nueva época histórica que se alza sobre las ruinas de la 
Edad Contemporànea, caduca, fracasada, moribunda. […] El humanismo 
abstracto de esta ed ad  contemporánea, absurda y destructora, es la escisión 
definitiva del hombre con la gracia; y por eso la tendencia humana se ha 
orientado en dos d irecciones, que son el ind ividualismo a ultranza, 
perturbador, tóxico y negativo, y el socialismo extremo, violento, 
atropellador y virulento. Ambos significan lo mismo: dos formas de 
atomización del hombre espiritu al; o sea, la descomposición violenta de la 
personalidad  y la violación de los p rincipios que rigen la sociedad  [Ascanio, 
1939: 6-7]. 
 
It was clear to the mind  of the new cultural establishment that for 
build ing a centralised  and  autoritative power it would  have been 
necessary to instil in the mind  of all the population a powerful myth 
that would  have to act as a source of legitimacy for the purposes of the 
regime. As Antonio Tovar [1941: 11] wrote:  
 
Un Imperio se construye a fuerza de conciencia y a fuerza de voluntad . 
Procuramos que llegue a todo el pueblo español, hasta sus últimas capas, 
hasta sus últimos rincones, esta vibración imperial de conocimiento del 
pasado español, de la incorporación de este pasado a la conciencia nacional, 
para que el pueblo sepa lo que quiere. 
 
The topic was so crucial in the definition of the essence of the 
national culture and  the teaching of humanities that, as in the case of 
the form that the University should  have acquired , several voices 
emerged  from within the political regime, offering d ifferent 
interpretations of the nature of the Spanish Empire; accord ing to the 
d ivergent political and  ideological interests at stake. The importance of 
this aspect of the Spanish history within the educative system had  been 
alread y pointed  ou t by the first minister of the Franco’s regime, Pedro 
Saínz Rodríguez, who, in 1938, had  established  the creation of a new 
subject in the secund ary ed ucation, called  History of the Spanish Empire
9
. 
                                                          
9
 See Ley de la Jefatura del Estado español de 20 septiembre de 1938 Sobre reforma de la 
Enseñanza Media, BOE 23-IX-1938, n. 85:1386: «Complemento natural de las 
humanidades clásicas han de ser las humanidades españolas. Es nuestra lengua 
el sistema nervioso de nuestro Imperio espiritual y herencia real y tangible de 
nuestro Imperio político-histórico. Como d ijo Nebrija en ocasión memorable, 
fue siempre la lengua compañera inseparable del Imperio. Sólo un profundo 
estud io de nuestro id ioma sobre sus textos clásicos y el aprendizaje de su 
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The introd uction of this new subject within the formal schooling 
system aimed  to instil in the high school students the perception of the 
existence of a glorious national past which had  to be emulated  and  
whose main features lay in its bureaucratic centralism, in its 
autoritarian trait and  religious outlook. In fact, the Empire magnified  
by the national propagand a, i.e. the Catholic Empire of the XVI century, 
represented  the full expression of the Spanish DNA, its international 
and  universal scope regulated  in accordance to a religious framework. 
This extremely ideological content was transmitted  in the high school 
manuals designed  by the educative authorities with the purpose of 
doing an instrumental use of history. A significant instance of this 
tendency is the high school manual written by the jesuit Feliciano 
Cereceda in which the au thor traces a strong continuity between the 
Roman and  the Spanish empires, w ith the explicit purpose of linking 
together their current political destinies [Cereceda, 41: 9]. However, the 
focus of this book, as well as of the m ajority of the concurrent texts 
written by religious members of the cu ltural establishment, 
substancially lay on the valorisation of the Catholic empire as a way to 
legitimate the cultural and  political role of the Church in the struggle 
for the hegemony. In this way, they vind icated  the fundamental role 
played  by the Church in the definition of the national identity. A 
similar strategy was ad opted , for instance, by Alfono de Ascanio in his 
very popular book on the imperial character of Spain:  
 
Lo que nos interesa y nos enorgullece es el descubrir que la Nueva España 
Nacional que estamos forjando con sacrificio y dolor en su triple perfil 
orgánico, autoritario y jerárquico, tiene su legítima e inconfundible solera 
en aquel Imperio nuestro de Carlo V y Felip e II que creó la Hispanidad  
hace cinco siglos, forjando la Raza en un cálido aliento precursor del nuevo 
humanismo llamado a caracterizar la nueva edad  histórica que alborea  
[Ascanio, 1939: 41]. 
 
The reference to the imperial past, and  in particular to the  moment 
in which the history of Spain acquired  a more definite Christian spirit, 
constituted  a normative example in relation  both to the ind ividual traits 
                                                                                                                               
empleo y de sus bellezas, puede darnos la seguridad  de que el presente renacer 
de nuestro sentido nacional y patriótico, labrado a golpes de dolor y 
adversidad , no sea una exaltación pasajera, sino algo permanente y sustantivo 
en el espíritu  de las generaciones venideras». 
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that each citizen should  posses and  to the actu al political attitude of 
Spain in relation to a new eventual imperialism. Indeed , the rhetoric of 
the regime aimed  at forging its citizens in accord ance to the ideal of a 
“Christian knight”. The expression had  been coined  by the Catholic 
intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu , and  was frequently used  also within the 
academia. This is the case of the inaugural d iscourse p ronunced  by one 
of the most d istinguished  members of the Republican University, 
converted  to Christianism after the civil war: Manuel García Morente 
[1942: 82], who would  have later served  the Francoist cause
10
.  
In relation to the collective traits of the Spanish identity , that the 
reference to the imperial past was aimed  to transmit , it is possible to 
identify in particu lar three important strand s in relation to the 
definition of a) the foreign politics – with the notion of Hispanidad; b) 
the national politics and  the cultural hegemony of the Catholic 
members of the regime
11
; c) the definition of a new form of humanism
12
.  
 
                                                          
10
 On Morente’s religious and  political conversion see in particular López 2010, 
accord ing to whom, p. 314: «La obra del último Morente, 1936-1942, es una 
justificación de la contienda, la legitimación del bando franquista, y la 
delimitación de los raíles por los que habría de d iscurrir el nacionalcatolicismo 
vencedor».  
11
 Ascanio, 1939: 43: «Hemos tratado de probar: 1) Que existe por el ancho 
mundo un vasto imperio espiritual hispánico viejo de cuatro siglos; 2) que la 
raza que lo puebla tiene la misma sangre, igual cuna y trad ición, idéntica 
religión y la misma habla, o lo que es lo mismo que los intereses morales de 
todos esos pueblos hispánicos son idénticos; 3) que por el mundo entero hay un 
despertar político y filosófico-social racista que orienta las sociedades humanas 
hacia las grandes confederaciones espirituales de igual raza e id ioma; 4) que 
existe una política, una cultura y u na influencia hispánica que jamás han 
cesado de latir, a las que España se debe en cuerpo y a lma». The razism of 
Ascanio was somehow mitigated  by some members of the Falange, as for 
istance, by Antonio Tovar who in 1940 wrote: «Cad a región española tiene una 
mezcla de razas, d iversas en proporción y elementos. Por eso la unidad  de 
España no va a ser ya nunca una unidad  racista, ni tampoco de lengua o de 
cultura, sino una unidad  de d estino, lograda a fuerza de romanidad  y viva sólo 
en los momentos en que España tiene conciencia de su destino universal». 
12
 Ibidem: 163: «El Nuevo Humanismo es de esencia spiritual y sobre él se ha 
basado la nueva concepción de la sociedad  y del Estado: jerarquía, autoridad , 
trabajo y trad ición: del pasado ha seleccionado las glorias, las virtudes, la fe, la 
poesía, los recios moldes de la continuidad  cultural e histórica, el cultivo y 
desarrollo progresivo del patrimonio moral». 
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5.3 The propagat ion  of the my th: the radio 
Interestingly enough, the myth of the Sp anish Empire constructed  
within the University was then transmitted  to the rest of the population 
through a cap illar system of national propaganda. A lead ing role in this 
process of d issemination was played  by the national rad io. Indeed , this 
mass-medium, largely used  for popular and  frivolous entertainment, 
also included  some programs of political and  cu ltural education, 
managed  by the members of the academic and  religious establishment. 
In fact, accord ing to the official statistics of the regime [Ibáñez Martín, 
1949: 710-724], almost 70% of the total broad casting was ded icated  to 
music, 15% to the news. In add ition , another 15% was ded icated  to the 
education of the aud ience, accord ing to the principles of the regime. 
The areas of knowledge included  were in  particular religion, 
humanities, science, literature and  theatre. In all these programs there 
was a relevant presence of academics and  clergies who contributed  to 
the d iffusion of the national propagand a in pills [Guard ia, 2006]. 
Indeed , as the minister of Education wrote, the National Radio 
represented  the “most advanced  voice of Christianity”.  
Thus, together with the creation of a repressive and  violent control 
of the means of communication the regime, since its very beginning, 
also created  an efficient system of propagand a. The contents of the 
culture spread  through this propagandistic instrument were largely 
created  within the University and  later transmitted  to the rest of the 
population [Sevillano, 2003]. The person in charge of this system, 
whose bases had  been set back in 1937, was Serrano Suñer, responsible 
for the Delegación del Estado para la Prensa y la Propaganda
13
. Since the end  
of the civil war, Serrano implemented  a very efficient and  totalitarian 
control of all the mass med ia which culminated , in 1942, in the creation 
of the Servicio Español de Auscultación de la Opinión Pública. This 
institution was responsible for constantly testing  the resu lts of the 
propagandistic system in  the build ing of the opinion of the Spanish 
citizens. Significantly, at the centre of the national propaganda it is 
possible to find  in particular the notions of Empire and  that of 
Hispanidad [Belmonte, 2006: 43]. 
In this context, the rad io represented  the main voice of the official 
propaganda, and , consequentlly, an analysis of the notion of Hispanidad 
                                                          
13
 For the legislative process see BOE, 27-III-37; BOE, 3-VI-37; BOE 25-X-37; BOE 
12-XII-37; BOE 17-IX-37 
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promoted  through this medium  would  reveal the proper aims of the 
regime in relation to this concept. The first d iscourse on this topic is 
that of the Jesuit Vagas Zúñiga, who gave a long d iscourse in 1941 on 
the nature of the Spanish Empire, connecting it with the Roman past 
and  vind icating its religious character as the main trait of the 
Hispanidad. His d iscourse was aimed  at guaranteeing a legitimate 
ground  for the foreign policy of the regime. In fact, in the name of the 
Catholic past, Spain was trying to construct an Iberian unity with  other 
nations, such as Portugal, and  a strict collaboration overseas with the 
Argentinian government [Berbeito Díez, 1989]. Through the notion of 
Hispanidad, the national propaganda wanted to instil in its citizens the 
conviction that it existed a natural and traditional tendency, governed by the 
will of God, to unify these countries within a unique empire [Zúñiga, 1941: 
23].  
The importance of the University and  the new intellectuals to 
construct and  propagate these myths is also proved  by the fact that 
several of the university professors, as members of the Consejo de 
Hispanidad, were invited  to give brief lectures on the rad io. Both the 
rector of the UC, Zabala y Lera, and  the professor w ho replaced  Ortega 
in the chair of Metaphysics, Juan Zaragüeta, gave their lectures on the 
concept of Hispanidad. Accord ing to the first, this concept represented  
the universalistic tendency of Christianity, that is: «el necesario 
principio de unid ad  superior que junte interiormente los 
entendimientos y los corazones» [Zabala y Lera, 1940: 7]. The 
valorisation of the Catholic past was complemented  by a strong 
condemnation of modernity. In fact:  
 
Iniciado en los primeros años del siglo XVIII y proseguido a lo largo del 
siglo XIX, cuanto el historiador aprecia es roptura de trad ición, censurable 
propensión a admirar lo extranjero, menosprecio de lo propio, olvido de 
cuanto habíamos sido cuando fuímos lo más, deshispanización, en suma, 
que nos llevó a la mengu a de trocar nuestro encumbrado puesto de 
caballeros del ideal por el harto más modesto de simples pajes de lanza de 
señores autoritarios y despáticos, que llegaron a dominarnos  [Ibidem, 5]. 
 
Similarly, Zaragüeta identified  the Hispanidad with the national 
duty of unifying the culture of all the Spanish -speaking countries under 
the leadership of Spain and  of its Catholic ideology: «en aquel vigoroso 
movimiento netamente español de revitalización del pensamiento 
escolástico al alborear de la Edad  Moderna» [Zaragüeta, 1940: 9]. The 
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glorious past that had  to be revitalised  was that of the second  
Scholastic, the works of Francisco Suarez, Domingo Soto and  Francisco 
de Vitoria.  
 
 
5.4 W hich Empire? R ev ista de Estudios Polít icos  
In spite of the apparent ideological homogeneity that the regime 
wanted  to transmit to its citizens through all these propagand istic 
media, the nature of the Spanish Empire, and  therefore the normative  
purposes of the New State, were constantly debated  within the cultural 
establishment, often prod ucing d ivergent interpretations. Indeed , the 
Revista de Estudios Políticos, review of the FE, among 1941 and  1943 tried  
to offer a d ifferent read ing of the national past and  of this particularly 
important notion for the national culture. There were in particular two 
points of d issension between this review and  the official orthodoxy: 1) 
the relevance of the theocratic component of the Spanish Empire; 2) the 
legacy of the Roman Empire. In fact, generally speaking, the Roman 
Empire played , accord ing to the REP, a far more relevant role than the 
Catholic one in relation to the definition of the Spanish identity. 
Moreover, the Empire was interpreted  as a degeneration of the 
monarchic power, in which the separation of power between the 
religious and  secu lar speheres was much more clearly established .  
The controversy started  in 1941 when Francisco Javier Conde 
published  a translation of Carl Schmitt over the na ture of the imperial 
power [Schmitt, 1941]. Given the d ifferent perspective adopted  by the 
German propaganda, the role of the Church and  the Catholic trad ition 
in the definition of the notion of Empire was extremely limited . 
Moreover, in the case of Schmitt, the concept d id  play a vital role in the 
international politics, but not in the same form of the  concept of 
Hispanidad. In fact, the notion of “imperialism” was conceived  as a form 
of foreign policies which responded  to the crisis of legitimacy that the 
modern notion of the State was undergoing. The trad itional appeal to 
the national unity, in the name of some basic cultural or natural traits 
(language, race), which on the contrary constituted  the kernel of the 
Spanish propaganda, was considered  as inadequate for the new 
political international movements. These, in fact, should  have built 
their legitimacy not on an old  trad ition but on the new voluntarism of 
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the people, not on an external imposition but on an internal w ill
14
. As a 
consequence, the Empire that the forces of the Axis had  to build  in 
opposition to the one purported  by the Allies should  hav e principally 
count, for build ing its legitimacy, on the notion of people rather than of 
the single d ictatorship in power.  
This perspective significantly lessened  the importance of the 
Church in the build ing of the new imperialist identity. This constituted  
a very heterodox position in relation to the official propagand a, and  for 
this reason it had  to be countered . Thus, some months later, in the same 
review, the young professor of History of Law at the University of 
Valencia, Alfonso García Galló, presented  a more orthodox perspective. 
Indeed , accord ing to García Galló, the grandeur of the Roman Empire 
had  been reached  thanks to the contribu tion of two Spanish emperors: 
Trajan and  Hadrian. They would  have contributed  to instil in the 
Roman Empire a trait typical of Spanish character: the millennial 
trad ition of the creation of an absolute and  inconditional power:  
 
España sostiene por trad ición antiquísima, la idea universal, con tal fuerz a 
y firmeza, que se busca entre los españoles – Trajano y Adriano – a los dos 
emperadores que han de fortalecer el Imperio y fundarlo sobre bases 
nuevas. Esta concepción del poder real que encontramos en la Península y 
que se exterioriza en la práctica es recogida como doctrina filosófica y 
ofrecida al mundo romano». [García Galló, 1941: 687, 690]. 
 
The form of government purported  by these emperors, accord ing to 
García Galló, was constituted  by a sort of paternal communitarianism 
in which the whole power was concentrated  in the hand  of a single 
person who d id  not have to give reasons for his actions. In this context: 
«El ind ivid uo se debe por entero a él [the emperor] y ha de sacrificar 
sus gustos con tal de que el emperad or viva» [García Galló, 1941. 697]. 
                                                          
14
 Schmitt, 1941: 99: «En un Derecho internacional nuevo el concepto ordenador 
es nuestro concepto de Imperio, que toma por punto de par tida en el orden del 
espacio un ámbito nacional muy extenso sustentado por un pueblo. Vemos en 
él la entraña de una nueva manera de pensar el Derecho internacional que 
arranca del concepto del pueblo y deja subsistir íntegramente los elementos 
ordenadores contenidos en el concepto del Estado, a la vez que hace honor a la 
noción actual del espacio y a la d isposición, de las fuerzas políticas; que mide 
con medida "planetaria", es decir, con la medida espacial de la  tierra, sin 
aniquilar a los pueblos y a los Estados y sin poner proa hacia un derecho 
mundial de cuño universalista e imperialista». 
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He coined  a new expression  that would  have been extremely popular 
in the definition of the relatioship between the citizens and  Franco 
during the first years of the d ictatorship. He defined  this form of total 
confidence in the paternalistic decision of the leader as the expression 
of an ancestral trait of the Spanish character, what he called : “devotio 
iberica”. This concept would  later serve to construct a propagandistic 
set of theories aimed  at legitimazing the authoritative power of Franco 
and  the conjunction of spiritual and  secular power he promoted  during 
his whole d ictatorship. Clearly enough, the teaching of history would  
have obeyed  to very precise political purposes, and  the exaltation of the 
Roman Empire would  have had  an evident instrumental function 
aimed  to reinforce the politics of the regime. In fact, the concept of 
“devotio iberica” app lied  to the essence of the Spanish people, perfectly 
traduced  the intentions of the Caudillo, who in his d iscourses on the role 
of the education in bu ild ing the new generations of citizens always 
revealed  his paternalistic temp er:  
 
La juventud  tiene que educarse, y lo mismo que la madre tiene el derecho a 
la educación de sus hijos y a formarles en unos principios espirituales y 
morales, la Patria, que es madre común, lo tiene para formar a sus 
juventudes en el culto al deber y en el servicio a Dios y a la Patria [Franco, 
1947: 143]. 
  
However, the ed itorial position of the REP largely d iffered  from 
Galló’s general accunt. Indeed , accord ing to the d irector García 
Valdecasas – a right-mind ed  ortegu ian who in 1932 found  the Frente 
Español and  later participated  into the FN [Cerezo González Cuevas, 
2006: 278-280] – the new State should  not have been the expression of a 
paternalistic and  d iscretionary power. On the contrary, it should  be 
based  on an established  institutional order. Va ldecasas, more than the 
role of the single d ictatorship , praised  in the Roman emp ire the 
bureaucratic apparatus that should  have been emulated  by the new 
political regime [García Valdecasas, 1942: 7]. Thus, the Empire, as in the 
case of Schmitt’s analysis, was not conceived  as the best realisation of 
the theological power, but rather as the most efficient response to the 
crisis of legitimacy of the modern liberal state of the XVIII and  XIX 
centuries, i.e. the creation of a totalitarian State
15
. This was conceived  as 
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 García-Valdecasas, 1942: 10: «La Sociedad  entra en .lucha permanente contra 
el Estado para fijar los límites dentro de los cuales la acción del Estado debe 
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the historical d uty that, accord ing to Valdecasas, the new Spanish 
Empire should  have to realise, marginalising the Church. The problem 
that the regime w ould  have faced  was that of avoid ing the risk of a too 
oppressive bureaucratisation that, as in the case of the Roman Empire, 
would  have produced  its own collapse. Significantly enough, this 
period  of decadence corresponded  to the reign of Consantine, the  first 
emperor to claim conversion to Christianity. The study in-depth of the 
Roman Empire, to Valdecasas, was extremely usefu l in order to have a 
model to which to compare the present, by underlying the prons and  
cons, so as to avoid  them. The imperial past was therefore considered  
as a legacy of the past which d id  not have to be excessively idealised , 
but rather critically stud ied :  
 
¿Es idéntica la situación presente a la del Imperio romano? Creemos que 
no, pero que tiene con ella temerosas analogías. Hay, sin embargo, factores 
d istintos. Hay, sobre todo, la experiencia histórica de lo que a aquel  gran 
organismo le sucedió. No está d icho que aquello fuera una fatalidad  
inexorable. En todo caso no tiene por qué repetirse siempre que los 
hombres prueben la capacidad  suficiente para sacar las enseñanzas de 
aquel pasado y vencer peligros semejantes a aquellos [Ibidem: 22]. 
 
The lead ing role p layed  by the University in the making of the 
political principles of the new State was vind icated  through the 
example of the Roman Empire, for instance by the professor of law at 
the University of Seville, Federico de Castro y Bravo. Accord ing to him, 
the ruling roman class was sustained  by some fund amental features, 
such as a strong military d iscipline and  an effective political 
propaganda. These were exactly the prerogatives of the academia in 
relation to his formal aspect – the university army created  by FET y 
JONS. But these necessary conditions were ultimately supported  by the 
creation of a precise rule of law, by a bureaucratic system established  
by the jurists. As Castro y Bravo wrote:  
 
Roma tuvo desde muy pronto una clase de hombres para servir al Derecho. 
Tres fueron las funciones más consideradas, las que significaban más alto 
servicio y llevaban a los más altos honores: la ciencia d el Derecho, la 
                                                                                                                               
encerrarse y, por tanto, el campo de libre acción que le debe dejar a ella. Este 
movimiento social tiende en su primera etapa a minimizar el Estado. El 
pensamiento liberal opera con las contraposiciones constantes: Estad o y 
sociedad , gobierno y pueblo, etc., como expresión de esa pugna permanente». 
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elocuencia [política] y la milicía. La jurisprudencia es, a d iferencia de 
Grecia, uno de los pilares de la vida romana; a ella debe una de sus fuerzas 
más eficaces, su ciencia organizadora. La superioridad  de Roma sobre 
Grecia no está en sus legisladores, sus filósofos, sus artistas, sus oradores ni 
siquiera en sus generales; estaba en la d iciplina militar y civil y en el modo 
de hacer cumplir las d isposiciones juríd icas [Castro y Bravo, 1942: 194]. 
 
To summarise, the ed itorial line of the REP consisted  in the 
valorisation of the Empire as a form of totalitarian government rather 
than a d ictatorial one. The positions among members of a same 
community, that is the academy, significantly d iverged  in relation to a 
crucial normative aspect of Franco’s regime. So, at least until the crisis 
of the spring 1943 which, as seen in chapter 4, determined  a significant 
move towards the predominance of the Catholic component of the 
regime, the REP gave voice to those academics who were more akin to 
the forces of the Axis, as proved  by the case of the d ifferent narration of 
the imperial Spanish history. Their aim was that of promoting a 
fascistization of the paternalistic and  religious regime of Francisco 
Franco. This attempt definitely failed  in 1943, when the affinity with 
Italy or Germany constituted  a political risk, which was reflected  in the 
growing stand ard ization of the dofferemt interpretations on the 
imperial and  mediaeval past of the Spanish Catholic origins
16
.  
 
5.5 Polit ia magist ra historiae.  
Independently from the d ifferent interests at stake, all the members 
of the academic community shared  the conviction accord ing to which 
the control of the national history would  have determined  the control 
of the national politics. This was not only the case of the ancient history 
but also, and  foremost, that of the contemporary one. In fact, even if the 
Alzamiento evidently constituted  a breaking point in the Spanish 
history, the university and  the research institu tes established  by the 
regime – such as the CSIC – tried  to propose a rad ically d ifferent 
interpretation of the recent even ts, tracing a path of continuity with the 
trad ition. This can be proved  by considering the evolution of the 
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 As Payne, 1996: 32 correctly wrote: «Los primeros síntomas del cambio 
notable en el equilibrio internacional de poder entre 1942 y 1943, debidos a la 
creciente fuerza de los Aliad os, comenzaron a modificar en seguida ciertos 
matices políticos del régimen español». 
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university teachings. For instance, since 1942, the University of Madrid  
established  the creation of a new course mand atory for all the students 
of Humanities: Historia Universal. Professor Ciriaco Bustamante was in 
charge of the course. Significantly, in the mand atory book of the course, 
that is the monumental História de la civilización española (1944), 
Bustamante depicted  an extremely ideological interpretation of the 
recent Spanish history.  
The history of the last two centuries was seen as a struggle between 
two opposite forces: the imperial trad ition and  the revolutionary one. 
The second , recently represented  by the Republican government and  its 
leader, Manuel Azaña, represented  the «prototipo del intelectual frío, 
resentido y amargado, incapaz de comprender nuestra gloria militar y 
la grandeza de nuestro Imperio» [Pérez Bustamante, 1944: 359]. The 
first and  victorious one, on the contrary, was represented  by the 
national movement, that had  vitalised  the glorious national imperial 
trad ition. Accord ing to Bustamante, this would  have been impossible 
without the help of some political thinkers who, in a period  dominated  
by the liberal hegemony, had  continued  to defend  the values of the 
imperial trad ition. These were, in particu lar, Marqués de Lozoya, 
deputy for the CEDA in 1936, and , before him, Menéndez y Pelayo. 
Singificantly enough, the very few doctoral thesis d iscussed  in this 
period  in the UC concerning topics of contemporary history all dealt 
with these figures and  their connection with the imperial past
17
. 
Significantly enough, it is possible to affirm that during this period  
the way in which History was narrated  was substantially regulated  by 
political reasons
18
. As written by Beneyto Pérez [1942: 15], professor of 
History of Law at the University of Salamanca and , at the same time, 
one of the most ou tstand ing figures of the falangist movement: 
 
Filósofos, políticos y juristas se orientan hacia la  historia de lo político como 
determinado por una doble corriente: la de rehuir los problemas concretos 
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 This very limited  pantheon of Spanish historians d iscussed  in these theses 
included , in particular, Balmes, Menéndez y Pelayo, Pradera, Vázquez de 
Mella. Donoso Cortés, Aparisi y Guijarro, Maeztu. Cfr. Sumarios y exctractos de 
las tesis doctorales leídas desde 1939 a 1944 en la sección de Historia, Universidad 
Complutense, Madrid , 1954-1955.  
18
 As correctly underlined  by Iáñez [2011: 131] in tracing the history of the 
review Escorial: «La cultura se convierte en el Nuevo Estado en un elemento de 
acción política». 
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de la d isciplina que profesan, y la de buscar en la historia – con superada 
versión – la lección para el presente.  
 
The past events were systematically d istorted  by the new organic 
intellectuals of the regime with the aim of constructing and  spread ing a 
determined  interpretation of the national destiny  among the young 
students [Valls Montés, 1983]. Moreover, the historical paths were 
included  into a teleological explanation aimed  at proving the 
legitimacy of the regime. One significant instance of this tendency is 
constituted  by the thesis realised  in 1944 by Rafael Gambra, a student 
of Juan Zaragüeta at the UC, entirely ded icated  to the philosophy of 
history
19
. A vast synthesis of the thesis would  later be published  in the 
official review of the CSIC, Arbor, being part of the theoretical 
framework which sustained  the overall philosophical account of 
history in accord ance with the national-catholicism of the regime 
[Prades Plaza, 2007]. In his article, Gambra vind icates the importance of 
the concept of “trad ition” , conceived  as the spiritual essence of a 
nation
20
. He affirmed  that each nation would  have to be ruled  by a 
spiritual immanent force which  would  have determined  the course of 
its history accord ing to an established  and  immutable path. The human 
interventions would  be ultimately unable to determine the histo ry of a 
country, whose destiny was considered  as determined  by this 
metaphysical principle. In other words, the role of human beings in the 
course of history would  only be that of correctly interpreting the 
d irection of these historic forces which governed  all events. 
Significantly enough, there would  have been exclusively one correct 
way of interpreting the historical events, since all were regulated  by a 
unique principle. Consequently, the only legitimate historical narration 
would  be the one which, per se, had  proved  to be able to give reason for 
an history explained  in teleological terms, i.e. Ch ristianism. As Gambra 
put it:  
 
                                                          
19
 Gambra Ciudad , R. La interpretación materialista de la historia [una investigación 
social-histórica a la luz de la filosofía actual], in Sumarios y extractos de las Tesis 
doctorales leídas desde 1940 a 1950 en las secciones de Filosofía y Pedagogía, Facultad  
de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad  de Madrid , Madrid , pp. 61-66 
20
 Gambra Ciudad , 1945: 558: «La trad ición es, simplemente, el reconocimiento 
de que la realidad  histórica de las naciones, de las culturas o civilizaciones, es 
de índole espiritual, y que, por tanto, su devenir está íntimamente ligado al 
tiempo, o más bien, es tiempo en sí mismo». 
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Tradición concreta, por antonomasia, significa para nosotros aquella en que 
nuestra civilización ha creído y se ha hecho fecunda, aquella cuyo 
contenido espiritual cristiano la ha conducido, por un camino de 
perfección, hacia fines e ideales eternos [Gambra Ciudad , 1945: 572]. 
 
Accord ing to Gambra, after the falsehood  of the Republican period , 
finally the truth was starting to clearly appear at the horizon , and  the 
duty of the historians would  ultimately consist in  making this clear. So, 
as proved  by the thesis of Gambra, almost ten years after the separation of 
Ortega from the University of Madrid, the philosophy purported within this 
institution had completely changed and no place was left to his theory of 
history. A  new generation of young students was being forged by a completely 
different cultural establishment whose theoretical framework radically differed 
from the one that Ortega had tried to transmit during the course of his long 
teaching career. In this new political and  cultural context, what posture 
d id  the philosopher maintain during his long exile? And how the 
history of philosophy he significantly developed  in this period  
interacted  with the new Spanish academic scenario? 
 
 
5.6 Ortega’s theory  of history  during the ex ile 
There is a large consensus among the Orteguian scholars about the 
fact that, since the beginning of the ‘30s, the Madrilenian philosopher 
put at the centre of his intellectual agend a the problem of the historical 
character of human being and , consequently, the historical character of 
the philosophical practice
21
. An instance of this tendency is consituted  
by the course he gave at the UC in 1933 on Galileo Galilei, a course 
which will be significantly published  in Spain in 1942 with the title 
Esquema de las crisis. However, not only in this famous text but also in a 
lot of other writings of the same period , he developed  a compelling 
d iscourse on the nature of historiography. Before analysing his writings 
it is important to d istingu ish between the theory of history proposed  by 
Ortega and  the current meaning of the word  historiography.  
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 Zamora [2013: 91], for instance, writes that: «La razón histórica se convierte 
desde los años treinta del siglo pasado en un tema constante de la llamada por 
el proprio José Ortega y Gaset su “segunda navegación”». The progressive 
interest of the philosopher for history and sociology is underlined  by all his 
critics. See for instance Morόn Arroyo, 2011; Savignano, 1984; Oses, 1989; 
Cerezo Galán, 2011.  
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In fact, the philosopher conceived  his activity as an anthropological 
enquiry aimed  at comprehending the theoretic conditions of possibility 
of the d iachronic development of the interpersonal and  social relations, 
and  not of the phenomenological occurrences of the historical events. 
Put it d ifferently, Ortega’s interest for history was not focused  on 
establising what actually happened  in a precise historical circumstance. 
On the contrary, he aimed  at comprehending how significant historical 
events can determine parad igmatic changes in the concrete lifes of the 
people who experienced  them. And, consequently, how historians 
interpret these parad igmatic events in relation to the ir own times. In 
fact, accord ing to Ortega, history cannot be comprehended  without 
taking into account the existential experience of every single person , 
who is always defined  in relation to the historical time in which she 
lives and  acts. The interest for  the study of history, in Ortega, 
constitutes a philosophical practice which consists in explaining the 
reasons why a particular event would  later produce a specific set of 
historiographical interpretations. H is analysis constitutes a sort of 
meta-history of the reasons underneath the historical narrations
22
. The 
meta-historical character of Ortega’s historiography is particularly 
interesting if we compare it with his own personal experience during 
those years, to understand  how his med itation s of history were related  
to the one hegemonically purported  by the Spanish academia.  
In fact, it is in 1940 when Ortega affirmed  to have almost finished  a 
«gran mamotreto filosófico» [OC, V: 657] on history which he called  The 
dawn of historical reason. Indeed , this is only one of the many unfinished  
projects of the Madrilenian philosopher. A sketch of what this long 
manuscript should  have been is offered  by the series of academic 
lessons he gave in Buenos Aires during the autumn 1940, entitled  Razón 
histórica, largely indebted  to the philosophy of Dilthey [Lévêque, 2008] 
In the very introd uction of his course he underlines the fact that  all his 
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 As Pérez Carrasco [2014: 322] correctly wrote: «Ortega non è mai stato uno 
storico della filosofia, quanto piuttosto un filosofo speculativo, che ha rivolto il 
proprio pensiero verso la realtà storica fino ad  affermare la natura storica del 
pensiero stesso, ma che non ha mai fatto concrete ricerche storiche. Ed  è forse 
per questo che oggetto della riflessione orteghiana non è tanto la realtà storica 
in se stessa, quanto i concetti che si utilizzano per dare conto d i quella realtà. 
Ortega non si preoccupa tanto della ricostruzione concreta del pensiero altrui, 
quanto delle condizioni di possibilità della ricostruzione d i quel pensiero; vale 
a d ire, egli si occupa più d i teoria storiografica che d i storia delle idee» 
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discussions on the nature of history constitute a chance for reflecting on 
some specific terms of the current political debate, on the slogans that 
characterised  the ideological debate of the period . They were all 
attempts of defining the meanings of the words forged  during the long 
course of history, whose inadaquate use, made by political leaders and  
intellectuals, had  rendered  them theoretically insignificant but  
politically powerful. As Ortega said  to his Argentinian aud ience 
presenting the course:  
 
Pues… ¿de qué se va a tratar? De eso – de eso mismo de que se trata en 
todas partes fuera de aquí, ahí, en calles y plazas, en hogares y casinos, en 
clubs, bares y tabernas, en las reuniones públicas y en las reuniones secretas 
de los gobiernos, en la soledad  del hombre sobrecogido y en la exaltación 
de la muchedumbre conglomerada, en tierra, mar y aire, debajo de la 
superficie del mar y por encima del aire, en la estratosfera – de eso, de eso 
se trata. Pero se va a tratar como corresponde a este sitio. En este sitio, que 
es una cátedra de lo que se llama “filosofía” no se habla de las cosas sino de 
lo esencial de las cosas. Bien que inodora, es ésta la cátedra de las esencias. 
Y frente a todos esos innumerables horrores y dolores, y fervores que pasan 
ahora, aquí se va a hablar de lo que en medio de ellos y bajo ellos es lo que 
esencialmente pasa [OC, IX: 477]. 
 
It could  seem senseless that, given these premises, the first three of a 
total of five lessons were ded icated  to a problem apparently related  
exclusively to the philosophy of knowledge. In particular, the 
replacement of the notion of the Cartesian cogito with a new ground ing 
principle of human rationality. However, it is exactly by replacing it 
with the notion of “vital reason” – through the replacement of the 
universal intellect with the ind ividual reason who acts accord ing to its 
needs and  wishes – that Ortega rigorously set the grunds of his 
reflection on the nature and  ends of history. In fact, given this premise, 
it is possible to comprehend  that the shipwreck suffered  by human 
beings in a world  that had  lost a definite meaning, determine the 
attempt of rebu ild ing a meaningful sense to the world  in which one 
lives. This implies the will of reasoning about the rules which regulate 
the life of every and  each person and  of the historical and  vital meaning 
of a society [Tejad a, 2003]. The human being is consid ered  as an active 
agent in the course of history since she constantly has to give a sense to 
her own existence. In fact, her life is not given to her once and  for all, 
but she always has to shape it over time. For this reason, history d oes 
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not only relates to the past, but also to the future both of a single 
ind ividual and  of the collectivity.  
Each ind ividual contructs his own history which, at the same time, 
is the prod uct of the collective history he inherits but , that does not 
constitute an end  in itself. The first consequence of this perspective is a 
clear rejection of any telological or – as in the case of Gambra – 
theological princip le grounding the development of history
23
. In fact, 
the meta-historical princip le ind icated  by the Madrilenian philosopher 
does not constitu te a religious premise, but rather  the vitalistic ground  
that ab origine sustains the life of every human being
24
. Far for 
establishing a sort of trascendental principle, Ortega argues in favour of 
the “circumstanciality” as the main trait of human existence, and  
therefore of the personal and  collective history. A problem that he 
perceived  since his very youth, but that he rad ically reframed during 
this period  [Tejad a, 2012]. 
Indeed , if the constitutive trait of human being is his historical 
d imension, both in the sense that he is forged  and  contribute to shape 
his own history, so, in d ifferent times, humanity has assumed d ifferent 
substantially forms which impede to determine a fix and  immutable 
nature or even a fix path of evolution. This basic thesis const itutes an 
antithetical philosophical account in comparison to the one that was 
serving as the parad igm of the francoist ideology: i.e. the trad itionalism 
of Eugenio d’Ors. In fact, d ’Ors identified  in some fix structures , that he 
called  eoni, the recurrent historical clusters that compose the history of 
humanities. A system of trad itions that would  constantly appear, again 
and  again, in the course of human history. Significantly enough, after 
the end  of the civil war, this constitu ted  the hegemonic parad igm  in the 
interpretation of history, a parad igm that d ’Ors propagated  within his 
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 As Savignano [1996: 100] argues: «La ragione storica rappresenta, pertanto, 
l’unico strumento ermeneutico adatto a narrare cià che all’uomo è accad uto e a 
rendere ragione d i quanto ha fatto in una determinata congiuntura vitale senza 
sconfinare in atteggiamenti teologizzanti, unilateralmente ottimistici o 
pessimistici, o addirittura in velleitarismi utopici». 
24
 Bertinetto, 2003: 123: «La filosofía transcendental es, entonces, al mismo 
tiempo, “razón vital” y “razón histórica”; razón vital porqué, comprendiendo la 
conciencia [la natural, como la filosófica] como construcción construida, como 
gebildetes Bild, muestra genéticamente operante en ella lo que llama absoluto [ o 
vida]; razón histórica porquñe muestra que las ideas – incluidas la idea de su 
propio principio – no son sino el producto del mismo proceso con el cual se 
construyen, a nivel fenomenológico (y a lo largo del tiempo), las “cosas”». 
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cultural circle gathered  in the so-called  Casa de la Sabiduria, composed  
by eminent historians and  intellectuals of the regime such as Pedro 
Laín Entralgo and  José López Íbor [Martínez Carrasco, 2013]. 
Accord ing to Ortega, history does not constitute a path to be 
followed , but just a fruitful example to be looked  at for understand ing 
the reason underneath the present. This implies that all the current 
habits, words and  so on, are obviously a product of the past and , to be 
rendered  comprehensible, it is necessary to explain the historical 
reasons that contributed  to their creation. Otherwise, the current world  
in which one lives would  result as intrinsecally meaningless. This is th e 
topic of another course Ortega had  given in 1940 at the Sociedad de 
Amigos del Arte of Buenos Aires some months before, and  which would  
constitute the basis of another very important course: Man and People. 
In fact, during this course Ortega dealt with the analysis of what he 
called  civilisation, that is to say the collective product of the ind ividual 
historical reason over time. These lessons start w ith a basic premise 
accord ing to which: «una enorme porción de nuestra vida se compone 
de cosas que hacemos, no por gusto, ni inspiración, ni cuenta prop ia, 
sino simplemente porque las hace la gente y, como el Estado, la gente 
ahora nos fuerza a acciones humanas que provienen de ella, y no de 
nosotros» [OC, IX: 303]. The apparent contradd iction among an 
explanation of the human behaviour as based  on ind ividual needs and 
the mechanic living in society does reveal a constitu tive problem of 
Ortega’s meditation on the relationship between ind ividuals and  their 
history. A problem he will later developed  in the course he gave in 
Madrid  in 1949 on the same topic. 
To Ortega, society, in its everyday life, would  not be the expression 
of a Volksgeist, as Schmitt had  put it. The single ind ividuals are not 
aware of the reasons why the act. They are just unconcious spectator s 
of an alread y written script
25
. Given this condition, Ortega’s proposal is 
that of calling for the importance of the intellectua l in the society as the 
person responsible for the creation of an historical awareness that 
would  aim at build ing the public op inion. As Ortega put it:  
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 «Pero, repito, que eso del alma colectiva, de la conciencia social, es arbitrario 
misticismo. No hay tal alma colectiva, si por alma se entiende – y aquí no puede 
entenderse otra cosa – sino algo que es capaz de ser sujeto y responsable de sus 
actos, algo que hace lo que hace porque tiene para él claro sentido. ¡Ah! 
Entonces será lo característico de la gente, de la sociedad, de la colectividad, 
precisamente ¿Qué son desmaldas?» [OC, IX: 304]. 
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Urge un poder espiritual nuevo, que no tiene por qué ser estatal. Pero un 
poder espiritual es necesario. ¡No faltaba más! El hombre, si quiere serlo, no 
puede abandonarse a decir cualquiera cosa que le pasa por la cabeza, por el 
alma – que es como el cuerpo: un mecanismo y nada más. Hay una ética del 
decir – que es urgente encunciar y propagar –, como hay una ética de todo 
hacer humano [OC, IX: 312]. 
 
It is evident, from this quote, Ortega’s critique to the p ropagandistic 
ideology and  to the totalitarian outlook that the organic intellectuals of 
the regime were purporting. Not only he criticises his academic 
colleagues, bu t he also p roposes a d ifferent way of exercising the 
intellectual activities and , in p articular, he proposed  a d ifferent way for 
being an historian. Accord ing to him, history cannot be stud ied  with 
the aim of find ing instrumental similarities with the p resent, but rather 
to understand  the basic d ifferences that exist between d ifferent epochs 
and  d ifferent context. In this way it could  have been possible to 
comprehend  the dynamic nature of human beings. The study and  
teaching of history does have to be useful, but not for propagandistic 
purposes. As he thought it was proved  by the recent history, the 
institutional, social and  therefore cultural changes are so evident that 
all analogy with the past would  be totally unfeasible. In fact: «Si 
comparamos el estado de creencias en que el hombre europeo se halla 
hoy con el reinante hace no más de treinta años, nos encontramos con 
que ha variado profund amente, por haberse alterado la convicción 
fundamental» [OC, VI: 49]. 
Thus, the considerable changes in the very set of beliefs and  habits 
of the modern society would  reveal the way in which historic 
parad igms do change over tim e. Significantly enough, it would  be by 
reasoning on the political and  cultural conditions of the ‘30s and  40’s 
that Ortega coined  the term “creencias” [beliefs] for ind icating the set 
of shared  op inions and  habits grounding the perception of the social 
and  intellectual reality possess by all and  each citizen [OC, V: 665]. To 
the questions of the way in which these sets of beliefs do change over 
time Ortega will devote his book Esquema de las crisis y otros ensayos 
(1942). In this book the philosopher ind iv iduates the d riving forces of 
the parad igmatic changes in the intellectual generations and  in the 
dynamic of intergenerational transmission of knowledge. In particu lar, 
accord ing to Ortega, all historical periods would  be characterised  by a 
struggle between three d ifferent generations with the aim of exercising 
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an hegemonic cultural and  social control. In particular, all historical 
periods would  be characterised  by a struggle between an hegemonic 
generation which has fought to replace the precedent one and  which, at 
the same time, is being questioned  by a new and  growing generation. 
Significantly enough, the older generations would  contribute to the 
formation of the new ones which, concurrently, define themselves in 
opposition to the formers. In this way, always interconnected , but 
necessarily opposing systems of values, would  end lessly struggle 
against one another for conquering the hegemony
26
. This struggle is not 
exclusively among generations. Indeed , it  can also be infra-generational 
in the cases in which, within a same period  of times, d ifferent 
perceptions of reality cohexisted . To explain this phenomenon Ortega 
traced  a d istinction between the relation of coetaneidad (sharing the 
same system of values within a same generation ) and  the one of 
contemporaneidad (belonging to the same generation of time, having  
d ifferent values) [Aróstegui, 2004: 109-142]. Evidently enough, the 
generational and infra-generational struggles were not a sort of 
metaphysical invention of a philosopher living in an Hyperuranion. On 
the contrary, they represent the translation in philosophical terms of 
the concrete problem suffered  by Ortega, an eminent representer of a 
recently failed  generation.  
The possible struggle between these forces could  have produced  the 
complete evaporation of a system of beliefs and , consequently, a 
structural crisis of a whole society. In fact «El hombre, desde que nace, 
va absorbiendo las convicciones de su tiempo, es decir, va 
encontrándose en el mund o vigente» [OC, VI: 391], but he unceasingly 
changes over time, since: «Ese mund o vigente […] hacia el cual y en 
función del cual vivimos, en vista del cual decid imos nuestras más 
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 The concept of generation and  its relation to the beliefs does constitute the 
trait d’union between the historical and  sociological meditations of Ortega 
during the ‘40s. As Moreno Pestaña wrote, [2011: 119]: «El concepto de 
generación permite, al menos, tres tipos de usos. Por un lado, ayuda al 
historiador o al sociólogo a analizar las condiciones espacio-temporales que 
permiten una cierta forma de ser. Por otro lado, en su uso político, propone o 
detiene la sucesión en los centros de poder, vinculándola a la puerilidad , la 
madurez o la senectud  de ciertos grupos humanos. En fin, la referencia a la 
generación propia y su confrontación con las ajenas permite ordenar los 
repertorios de creencias y ajustar los proyectos a ciclos temporales más o menos 
previsibles». 
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simples acciones, es el elemento variable de la vid a humana» [ OC, VI: 
398]. However, these parad igmatic changes in the course of history d o 
not occur abruptly. On the contrary, they are the result of a long 
process of sed imentation of a new system of thought able to orient the 
future generations
27
.  
The slow motion of the historical forces and  the following social 
acquisition of new habits and  beliefs would  exp lain the rad ical 
d ifference between the laws externally imposed  in a d iscrectionary way 
by changing governments – strong uses – and  the ones which are 
internalised  and  sed imented  through the historical process – weak 
uses. The latter would  ultimately constitute, accord ing to the 
Madrilenian philosopher, the ground  of the public opinion, while the 
former would  qu ickly d isappear each  time a new political power 
replaced  another
28
. The example provided  by Ortega to exp lain this 
d ifference is extremely significant, since he ind ividuates in the Roman 
salute the external imposition of an habits which is destined  to quickly 
d isappear not being grounded  on any historical or cultural d imension.  
So, the meditation on history conducted  by Ortega is both in its 
extent and  in its context much vaster and  evidently subversive in 
comparison to the one purported  by the Franco’s regime. In fact, by 
analysing the Spanish historiography of his time and  the political 
scenario in which he lived , Ortega proposed  a critical reflection on the 
current status quo through an historical and  comparative methodology. 
Moreover, by establishing the starting point of his historical meditation 
not in an external or universal principle but in the concrete life of sin gle 
ind ividual, he explicitely rejects any form of collectivism and  he does 
so in the name of the valorisation of a liberal and  ind ivid ual 
construction of the social world .  
Moreover, the analysis of the Madrilenian philosopher does not 
concern exclusively the Spanish case. This is just the point of departure 
he adopts for trying to comprehend  the reasons for the development of 
d ifferent totalitarianisms in the European continent . Thanks to this 
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 «La sociedad  es tard ígrada, perezosa, se arrastra despacio y avanza por la 
historia con lento paso de vaca, que a veces nos desespera por su morosidad». 
[OC, IX: 341]. 
28
 «Quién triunfa, quién triunfa a la larga, en la historia, los usos débiles y 
d ifusos o los usos fuertes y rígidos? Pensando – como he d icho – que todos los 
usos tardan en nacer y tardan en morir, n o es verosímil que acabe nunca por 
triunfar definitvamente un intento de cambio súbito» [OC, IX: 344]. 
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particu lar perspective, he d id  develop a far more compelling 
theorisation on history in comparison to the ideological one purported  
by the regime [Salas Ortueta, 2015: 92]. The analysis of the crisis of the 
European science, that Ortega had  pointed  ou t in his Mission of 
University, is now complemented  by the study of the political and  social 
crisis that emerged  as a consequence of the former. In particular, he 
develops a theory of the history of philosophy and  culture as a 
sequence of parad igmatic cultural and  social crises.  
This interpretation of the historical development of humanity is 
firstly sketched  in a very interesting text, that is the prologue he wrote 
to the History of Philosophy of Émile Bréhier, composed  in the winter 
1941-1942. This is the last text of his Argentinian exile , and  an attempt 
to develop an hermeneutics of the recent times. In his prologue Ortega 
offers a synthesis of his theory of history intended  as a d iscipline 
responsible for the comprehension of the historical forces of a given 
time: 1) the ind ivid uation of rad ically d ifferent cu ltural p arad igms
29
; 2) 
the comprehension of the reasons underneath the parad igmatic 
changes, that is the ind ividuations of the nature and  reasons of 
d ifferent sets of beliefs: «la tarea del historiador es descubrir, aun en los 
tiempos más atroces, los motivos satisfactorios que para subsistir 
tuvieron los contemporaneos» [OC, VI: 136]. So, neither a self-indulgent 
erud ition nor an instrumental use of history is what Ortega theorised . 
On the contrary, he vind icates the importance of the epistemic function 
play by this d iscip line in the comprehension of the social reality  and  
also of the intellectual experience.  
In fact, by understand ing the reasons for the historical evolution of 
humanity, it would  have been possible to connect the lifes of the single 
ind ividuals with the ones of the community, not only on the synchronic 
but also on the d iachronic level. If the life of every person is 
characterised  by the relation to his factual circumstances, the same can 
be said  in the case of the collective life. The consequences o f this 
theoretical shift in the study of the history of philosophy are very 
relevant. In fact, accord ing to Ortega, no au thentic philosophical idea 
could  actually emerge in a given time independently from the historical 
and  social contexts – i.e. the specific parad igm and  set of habits and  
beliefs – that characterise the life of each ind ivid ual thinker. This 
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 «La historia, en cuanto d isciplina intelectual, es el esfuerzo metódico para 
hacer de todo otro ser humano un alter ego, donde ambos término – el ego y el 
alter – han de tomarse en plena eficacia» [OC, VI: 142]. 
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consideration evidently counters any form of metaphysical narration of 
history, and  renders unfeasible the explanation of its development as 
the manifestation of a philosophia perennis, as purported  by the official 
philosophers of the new Spanish academia. In fact, accord ing to Ortega: 
«No hay, pues, “ideas eternas”. Tod a idea está adscrita 
irremediablemente a la situación o circunstancia frente a la cua l 
representa su activo papel y ejerce su función» [OC, IV: 151]. The 
observation of the social and  political material cond itions in which he 
was living offered  to Ortega the empirical stimulus to develop a new 
theoretical framework, aimed  to describe the general patterns of the 
historical evolution of societies, rejecting any form of teleologism. 
Moreover, his philosophical meditations was not only based  on a 
social analysis, but d id  also have some very relevant consequences on 
the socio-political sphere. In fact, the starting point of Ortega’s 
argument is the conviction accord ing to which  what determines the 
social habits and  rules of a society is always a determined  set of beliefs 
shared  by its members. In other word s, a common and  hegemonic 
philosophical point of view. This would  be transmitted  over time 
through an educative process always opened  to slow but substantial 
changes. As a consequence, philosophy d oes always have a public 
function, producing two contrad ictory aims: on the one hand  
philosophy can be practiced  1) in the interest of the State by organic 
intellectuals; 2) in the interest of the civil society by independent 
thinkers. Significantly enough, such problem is posed  by Ortega for the 
first time during these years.  
The creation of a new typ e of intellectual, exemplarly represented  in 
the Spanish academia, had  imposed  a new philosophical question: i.e. 
the d ialectic between dogmatism and  authonomous thinking. As a 
matter of fact, Ortega’s philosophy d o change in relation to the social 
and  political circumstances under which he lives. He d id  not escape 
from the instrinisc circumstanciality of philosophy that he himself had  
clearly and  recently theorised . This circumstances suggested  to Ortega 
the d ifference between an authentic and  a false way of philosophising. 
The first would  be the one which assumes the historical and  transient 
character of the social institutions and  beliefs, and  it’s able to critizise 
them when needed  in order to propose a new and  more adequate 
comprehension of reality. On the contrary, the second  would  be 
characterised  by the unquestioned  faith in the valid ity of the status quo, 
by a conservative thinking unalbe to comprehend  that no  social 
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construction constitutes an eternal reality , «no es definitivo, sino tan 
histórico y corruptible como cualquiera de sus hechos hermanos en el 
pasado» [OC, VI: 171]. The trad ition, that is to say the history of 
philosophy and  cu lture, is not the source of a universal concept of 
reality, but rather an instance of the evolution of the humanity which 
has to be comprehended  and  stud ied  without idealising it:  
 
El tiempo de hoy reclama los tiempos anteriores, y por eso una filosofía es la 
verdadera, no cuando es definitiva – cosa inimaginable – sino cuando lleva 
en sí, como visceras, las pretéritas y descubre en éstas el “progreso hacia 
ella misma”. La filosofía es así historia de la filosofía y viceversa  [OC, VI: 
171]. 
 
To summarise, in contrast with the dogmatic philosophy pu rported  
by the Spanish academia, Ortega proposed  a critical study of the past, 
which was aimed  at questioning the trad ition and  assuming the factual 
crisis of beliefs suffered  by the Spanish contemporary society.  
 
5. 7 Ortega on  the R oman  Empire 
The very close relation between the evolution of Ortega’s 
meditation during the ‘40s and  the cultural and  political Spanish 
context is also testified  by the particular attention he started  to pay in 
this period  to the question of the nature Roman Empire. A topic to 
which he devoted  a whole book, Del Imperio Romano (1941). This theme 
offered  to him the possibility to reflect on the nature of the social power 
by focusing on a topic extensively treated  within the Spanish academia , 
but of d oing it for a totally d ifferent perspective, rejecting the 
intellectual autarchy of the regime and  studying this question in 
relation to the European history
30
. Also the bibliography he ad opts for 
the stud ying ot this topic rad ically d iffers from the one used  by the 
regime. In particular, he largely refers to the works of Rostovtzeff – a 
russian historian  who in 1926 wrote an economic history of the Roman 
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 «La historia del Imperio romano es ya le primer estrato de la historia de 
Europa» [OC, VI: 85]. 
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Empire – and  to the classical works of Mommsen on the Roman 
history, together w ith a lot of other relevant sources
31
. 
Thus, the stud y of the Roman Empire offered  to him the possibility  
of putting in practice the very historiography he had  sketched  in his 
more theoretical writings, with all the sociological and  political 
consequences of the historiographical activity. He d id  not render the 
Roman Empire a sort of myth, neither  the most pure manifestation of 
the exercise of a totalitarian or d ictatorial power. Parad oxically, the 
Roman Empire d id  not even constitute the kernel of his book. Indeed , 
he traces a clear analogy with his own personal experience. As in the 
case of Cicero’s De re publica, also the book of Ortega had  been 
composed  «en plena guerra civil» [OC, VI: 87], in the moment in which 
the social reality was und ergoing a parad igmatic cu ltural and  social 
change. Thus, the main issue presented  in this work would  not be the 
Roman Empire, but rather the crisis of the precedent republican regime.  
In fact, the Roman Empire would  have arisen, accord ing to Ortega, 
in a moment in which the roman society had  lost its faith in the 
fundamental set of beliefs that grounded  the social life during the 
Republic. In particu lar, two basic traits that had  been regula ting the 
social life during that historical period  had  lost their strenght. The 
roman society had  lost 1) its harmony (concord ia) and  2) its liberty 
(libertad). The whole meditation of the philosopher is con structed  on 
the study of these two basic concepts. For this reason, the book 
constitutes a concrete study of a moment of crisis of a society, a 
moment in which the shared  beliefs lost their force and  valid ity. The 
concept of Empire, idealised  by the regime’s propaganda, was strongly 
critised  by the Madrilenian philosopher as the expression of the failure 
of the State:  
 
El Imperio es el Estado informe, sin límites, sin instituciones. Es la 
compresión o imperación mud a y sin más. Las instituciones son fórmuals 
de ornamiento, construcción de escatola sobre aquello que es lo único real
32
. 
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 In particular, as underlined  by Pino Campos, 2001: 286: «Entre los grandes 
especialistas en la cultura, historia, literatura, filosofía y lengua griegas y latinas 
cuyas obras leyó podemos citar a Otto Seek, Thomas Mommsen, Grote, Bopp, 
M. Bréal, K. Bühler, J. Burckhard t, B. Delbrück, A. Ernout, A. Meillet, Vendryes, 
Glotz, Howald t, Hrozny, A. Reyes, Schliemann, A. Schulten, Ed . Meyer, W. 
Jaeger, Kreschtmer, B. Snell, Solmsen, Toynbee, U. Wilamowitz». 
32
 Note Roma, in AOG, NT-11/ 2/ 1/ f9 
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He provocatively enters in the Spanish intellectual debate on  the 
nature of the Roman Empire by rad ically changing the general 
standpoint of the analysis. This case stud y would  reveal, accord ing to 
him, that no social reality can be produced  without the support of a 
basic condition of harmony among the members of the society. In other 
words, without a w idespread  social consensus. This cannot be imposed  
in a violent way. On the contrary, it has to be bu ilt and  transmitted  
through an intellectual activity. An imposed  political propagand a 
cannot prod uce any positive result in relation to the construction of this 
social consensus, since it would  not take into consideration the vital  
needs that ground  the construction of the very set of beliefs shared  by a 
society. As he put it, the national propaganda was only «el gas del 
apasionamiento, que proporciona a las almas una ilusión  aerostática» 
[OC, VI: 93]. Thus, in a period  in which the public consensus was 
undergoing a profound  and  substantive crisis, as in the case of the 
Roman Empire and  also in the the one of the undefined  New Spanish 
State that emerged  after the end  of the civil war, the society would  live 
in a period  of political and  cultural confusion, experiencing a pervasive 
lack of sense, w ith d isruptive political consequences: 
 
Para huir del vacío íntimo y para sentirse apoyado, corre a alistarse bajo 
cualquiera bandera que pasa por la calle. Con frecuencia es el más frivolo y 
superficial amor propio quien decide el partido que se toma. Porque, 
partida la sociedad , no quedan en Ella más que partidos. En estas épocas se 
pregunta a tolo del mundo si “se de los unos o de los otros”, lo contrario de 
lo que pasa en las épocas creyentes [OC, VI: 94] 
 
This words also reveal the attitude of the Madrilenian philosopher 
towards those who, since the very beginning of the civil war, had  
always tried  to call for his alignment in favour or against a specific 
party (Gracia, 2014: 567). In fact, he rejected  the idea that all public 
figures, and  in particular the intellectual, should  d irectly intervene in 
politics. On the contrary, they should  p lay an ind irect but constitutive 
role in the build ing of the construction of the basic political ground  
which would  later permit the expression of a regulate and  not 
d isruptive d issension
33
. Some scholars have pointed  ou t the possibility 
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 In this point the theory of Ortega could  be said  to purport a defense of the 
nation as the basic principle of unity of a society. As Llano Alonso [2010: 146] 
wrote: En el intervalo de tiempo que media entre el estallido de la Guerra civil 
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of noticing in this valorisation made by the Spanish philosopher of the 
social harmony a shift towards conservative positions that previously 
he would  have rejected
34
.  
However, his critique to the construction of the public opinion via 
political propagandistic means, as in the case of the Spanish academia, reveals 
the presence of a very important distinction between the position of the 
Madrilenian philosopher and the ones of the cultural establishment . And  also 
between his political view and  a sort of Conservatism. This can be 
demonstrated  in particular by considering the social role he ass igned  to 
the intellectual. The intellectual, accord ing to him, should  not educate 
the population in accordance to the interest of a particular party o r in 
order to maintaine the status quo. On the contrary, he should  always try 
to build  and  transmit a knowledge that would  be able to answer to the 
basic needs of the ind ivid uals who compose the society. 
Thus, by inverting the relation between ind ividuals and  community 
Ortega affirms that the intellectual d oes neither  have to purport the 
realisation of a political ideal nor fighting for its maintanance, but 
should  rather contribu te to the continuing redefinition of the normative 
ideal of the society in accordance to the historical and  vital reason
35
. In 
any case, it is certainly true that during this period  Ortega d id  maintain 
                                                                                                                               
española y el final de la II Guerra Mundial, forzaran la relectura y posterior 
reformulación de lo que algunos han denominado – a mi modo de ver de 
manera impropia – como “nacionología orteguiana”». However, as Aguilar 
[1998: 138-139] has correctly pointed  out: «Pese a las tensiones conceptuales que 
se advierten al estud iar en Ortega el significado de la nacionalidad , pese a sus 
derivaciones, acaso no medidas lo suficiente, entre relativistas, organicistas y 
eventualmente de tinte corporativo, su oposición al nacionalismo[…] no parece 
que pueda ser puesta de entred icho» 
34
 Díaz Álvarez, 2013: 268-269: «El “tercer liberalismo de Ortega habría que 
situarlo, en su encunciación más clara,en la posguerra española, aun cuando se 
arrastra ya probablemente desde su ruptura con la República y el inicio de la 
Guerra Civil. Respira decepción y conservadurismo y tiene como trasfondo una 
visión negativa, a veces claramente hobbesiana, de la naturaleza humana. El 
ensayo más representativo de esta última etapa quizá sea Del Imperio Romano 
(1940)». 
35
 Scotton, 2013: 279: «La funzione egemonica dell’intellettuale si traduce, nel 
lessico orteghiano, nella cap acità d i costruire ed  ed ificare ex novo i presupposti 
necessari perché si possa esercitare il comando (mando), il quale non è concepito 
dal filosofo spagnolo come mero esercizio del potere, ma si traduce piuttosto 
nell’effettiva “presión e influjo d ifusos sobre el cuerpo social”». 
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an ambigous position in his writings, with the aim of having the 
possibility to enter into the cultural debate that was taking  place in 
Spain. For this reason, not only he chose to talk about a very sensitive 
political theme, but he also winked  to the regime in elaborating the 
new normative ideal of which he was talking about. In fact, in his book 
on the Roman Empire he coined  a new expression, that of “totalitarian 
liberalism”, which constituted  an attempt to operate a synthesis 
between the new intellectual and  political fashion and  the core of his 
personal vision of politics. In other words, he tried  to propose his 
normative plans for the future of his own nation d uring a transitional 
period , persuaded  that in order to maintain the liberal core of his 
political and  philosophical doctrine it would  have been necessary to 
adap t it to the new forms of government which dominated  the 
European scenario [Villacañas, 2011: 747]. In this way it would  have 
been possible to avoid  the main risks of the new international scenario: 
populism and  authoritarianism.  
Ortega rejects a classical liberal view accord ing to which the social 
order would  be the resu lt of a spontaneous regulation. Indeed , to him, 
the human being is essentially anti-social and , for this reason, to live in 
a society, he has to be forced  to respect some norms. As he put it: «el 
derecho presupone la desesperanza ante lo humano» [OC, VI: 107]. So, 
a social pressure of the society over the ind ivid ual – that is the 
totalitarian character of liberalism – would  always be part of the correct 
relation between ind ivid uals and  collectivity. The nature of this 
totalitarianims would  consequently depend  on the d ifferent degree of 
pressure exercised  by the State: «No es, la presión misma que el Estado 
representa, sino la forma d e esa presión , quien decide si nos sentimos 
libres o no» [OC, VI: 116]. To Ortega, in some historical epochs the 
political institutions d irectly flow from the needs of the ind ividuals 
who live in a given society, determining a total correspond ance 
between the vital interests of the citizens and  those of the State. 
Sometimes, on the contrary, the latter are coercively imposed  to the 
ind ividuals and  do oppose, to a relevant extent, to their personal wills. 
In such circumstances, it would  be impossible to conceive any sort of 
spontaneous order, since the social reality would  just be imposed  but 
neither comprehended  nor produced  by the citizens. The State would  
therefore be perceived  by the ind ividuals not as a “natural skin”, bu t 
rather as an orthopedic support, that is  to say, an unnatural and  painful 
imposition [OC, VI: 126].  
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When this is the case, that is when a collectivity has lost its faith in a 
set of beliefs considered  as natural realities, than it is possible to 
degenerate in a totalitarian regime or, as in the case of the Roman 
Empire, in an intermediate and  transitional condition among liberalism 
and  totalitarianism. This was exactly what, accord ing to Ortega, was 
happening in Spain.  
The transitional solution proposed  by Ortega for the case of the 
New Spanish State is that of build ing a new politics which rad ically 
d iffered  from the totalitarian propaganda of the far -right. In order to do 
this, it would  have been necessary, firstly, to restore the role that the 
intellectual had  lost in the society and , secondly, to avoid  to impose to 
the population a new set of rules without having previously 
comprehended  what was actually needed  by the population. Once 
again Ortega ind ividuates in the intellectuals and  in particu lar in the 
university system the institution responsible for accomplishing this 
duty. As Ortega put it:  
 
Enfermedades corporales fueron incurables hasta un buen d ía en que una 
técnica ad  hoc, nada complicada, permitió dominarlas. ¿Es absolutamente 
impensable una técnica de la sociedad , una higiene, una med icina, una 
cirugía de lo colectivo? Pero estas cosas son posibles, serán de cierto, y por 
lo pronto, conocimiento y no lo contrario: política [OC, VI: 120]. 
 
He significantly identified  in the Roman Empire an analogous term 
of comparison which was considered  as responsible for mediating 
between the interests of the ind ividuals and  those of the State: that was 
the plebeian tribune. His analogy is aimed  to restore the role of the 
parliament in the normal function of the political debate and , in 
paricular, in defending the freedom of speech and  the “libertad  de 
Prensa” [OC, VI: 132]. In fact, it is essentially in the intellectual freedom 
and  in the freedom of teaching that he ind ividuates the possibility of 
constructing a sort of synthesis between liberalism an d  totalitarianism, 
creating a new form of political power.  
In conclusion, during his Argentinian exile Ortega d id  not observe, 
as often said , a total silence concerning the political and  cultural 
Spanish agenda. Indeed , on the one hand  he tried  to present a d ifferent 
and  authonomous point of view and , on the other, he tried  to do it in a 
not too controversial way, so to have the possibility of reaquiring an 
influential role within the new establishment. Moreover, he moved  
towards the nationalist circles, by meeting with some members of the 
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political entourage of the new Argentinian president Ramón Castillo, 
such as the abovementioned  César Pico [Giustiniani, 2007b: 7]. Thus, he 
d id  not refuse those interpretations of his thought that could  have been 
useful for the purposes of the regime. H is book on the Roman Empire, 
was indeed  published  in Spain in 1941 and  was perfectly apt to enter 
into the political and  acad emic debate on the n ormative ideal that the 
New State should  had  to follow. At the sam e time, the references to the 
need  of a parliamentary monarchy and  the vind ication of the 
importance of the freedom of speech as two basic institutional and  
cultural prerrequ isite of the new political regime, demonstrates the 
intention of the philosopher to ind icate h is normative proposal to the 
cultural establishment, and  in particular to those that still looked  with 
interest at his ideas. 
 
 
5.8 S aepe et iam in  proeliis faun i audit is. The recept ion  
of Ortega in  Spain  
Indeed , the books published  by Ortega in 1941, in particular Historia 
como sistema and  Del Imperio Romano d id  not pass unnoticed  in Spain. In 
particu lar, within the falangist review s, which more d irectly were 
trying to struggle for the political and  cultural hegemony . In particu lar, 
this is evident in the case of El Escorial, a review foundeed  in 1940 and  
d irected  by Pedro Laín Entralgo
36
. Ortega’s books, in fact, would  have 
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 The manifest of the review is an emblematic instance of the fascist ideology 
which characterised  this publication. The aim of build ing a restricted  minority 
of intellectual able to exercise an hegemonic control of culture was clearly 
stated  by Pedro Laín Entralgo in the manifest: «Primero: congregar en esta 
residencia a los pensadores, investigadores, poetas y erud itos de España: a los 
hombres que trabajan para el espíritu . Segundo: ponerlos – más ampliamente 
que pudieran hacerlo en publicaciones específicas, académicas y universitarias 
– en comunicación con su propio pueblo y con los pueblso anchísimos de la 
España universal y del mundo que queran reparar en nosotros. Tercero: ser un 
arma más en el propósito unificador y potenciador de la Revolución y empujar 
en la parte que nos sea dado a la obra cultural española hacia una intención 
única, larga y trascendente, por el camino de su enraizamiento, de su extensión 
y de su andadura cohonestada, corporativa y fiel. Y, por último, traer al ámbiro 
nacional – porque en una sola cultura universal creemos – los aires del mund 
tan escasamente respirados por los pulmones españoles, y respirados sobre 
todo a través de filtros tan aprovechados, parciales y poco escrupulosos». See 
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been reviewed  respectively by the very Laín Entralgo and  by Carlos 
Alonso del Real, who had  recently received  his PhD in classic 
philology. Alonso del Real is particularly famous for having denounced  
during the civil war to the national police his friend , and  d iscip le of 
Ortega, Julián Marías. Both Laín and  del Real recognised  the relevance 
of Ortega’s books in relation to the political context in which they 
appeared , underlying their relevance for the cultural debate which was 
taking p lace in Spain on that topic. As Laín put it: «Se debe destacar la 
oportunid ad  española al tema» [Laín, 1941c: 305]. While the national 
history was being converted  in a matter of political propaganda, the 
importance of comprehending the correct way of interpreting it and  
refusing «actitudes pseud ohistóricas» was the main aim of Laín. 
However, Laín is far from praising the attitu te of the philosopher and  
his theory of history. In fact, by considering his anthropological 
found ation of history and  the circumstancial character he assigned  to 
the human beings, Laín perceived  a great risk for the ideology 
                                                                                                                               
Manifiesto Editorial, in «Escorial», 1, 1940, p . 10. There is a very influent 
scholarship interpretation of this review as an experiment of liberalism in the 
d ictatorial context, largely indebbed  to the mytical narration done by the very 
Laín Entralgo, 1987: 287: «Mientras tanto, desde el Ministerio de Educación 
Nacional y a través del naciente Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
se acometía la impresa de reconstrución intelectual de España […] con un 
criterio d irectamente opuesto al nuestro: continuó implacable tal “depuración” 
y deliberada y sistematicamente se prescind ió de los mejores, si estos parecian 
ser minimanente sospechosos de liberalismo o republicanismo, o si por debajo 
de su nivel había candidatos a un tiempo derechista y ambiciosos». This 
interpretation has been efficiently countered  by Iáñez, 2011, accord ing to 
whom, [19-20]: «Escorial era una “revista de cultura y letras” ascrita a la Prensa 
del Movimiento, en tanto que apartado ideológico del partido único, Falange 
Española y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sind icalista. Segunda, que los 
representantes del grupo de Escorial, sus cabezas visibles y también las menos 
visibles, como se irá viendo, pertenecían en d istintos grados y con 
responsabilidades d iversas a la estructura de Prensa y Prop aganda de Falange 
Española Trad icionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Naciona-Sindicalista (FE-
JONS) y del Estado. Tercera, que, en correspondencia con las dos cuestiones 
anteriormente expuestas, los escorialistas desempeñaron una función orgánica 
en el seno del Nuevo Estado, en concreto en algunos de los resortes de poder 
cuyos intentos de control desataron los más encarnizados enfrentamientos 
entre los diversos sectores del bloque hegemónicos del franquismo. Su historia 
política es, por tanto, la historia de la lucha por el control […] de los aparatos 
ideológicos de la cultura del Nuevo Estado». 
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purported  by the regime. Namely, the replacement of the perennial 
character of the Christian teleology with an unpred ictable order of 
historical events [Laín, 1941c: 311].  
The concept of history presented  by Ortega was therefore generally 
rejected  by the members of the new cultural establishment. An 
exceptional case of a very positive reception of it is offered  by the 
article written in the same review by Antonio Maravall [1942]. In fact, 
in the books of Ortega he ind ividuated  a very useful resource for 
bulid ing a new national ideology. In general, however, the lack of a 
metaphysical outlook in the works of the Madrilenian philosopher was 
conceived as a demonstration of the impossibility of conciliating it with the 
national-catholic ideology.  
Particularly relevant for the purposes of annihiliating any possible 
use of Ortega’s philosophy would  be the articles written between 1941 
and  1943 by Joaquín Iriarte in the Jesuit review Razón y Fé, aimed  to 
completly delegitimate any reference to Ortega [Bolado Ochoa, 2011; 
Cerezo González Cuevas, 2009: 105-110]. Reviewing the p rologue to 
Bréhier, for instance, Iriarte labelled  the history of philosophy proposed  
by Ortega as anti-catholic [Iriarte, 1943: 108]. His historiography would  
finally end  up in a dangerous relativism, incompatible with a Christian 
dogmatism. Accord ing to the clergyman, the theory of Ortega could  
have also corrupted  the new generations of students, and  for this 
reason should  have been very strongly countered  to impede its 
spread ing among the university students, since:  
 
Los ánimos juveniles que lo oigan, p ues es considerable el ascendente que 
en ellos ejerce el pensador […] se van a imaginar que, mientras sigan 
creyentes, fieles a la fe de los padres, no han de quedar consagrados como 
filósofos. Y querrán comprar la aspirada aureola a precio de una apostasía, 
que será triste por lo que deja y triste por lo que da  [Iriarte, 1943: 117]. 
 
As far as the notion of Empire is considered , as alread y said , Alonso 
del Real wrote a review for El Escorial. Del Real had  been recently 
appointed  to the chair of Primitive History ad  the UC
37
. He understood  
the subversive character of the book written by Ortega
38
, and  also the 
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 AA.VV. Diccionario Biográfico Español Contemporáneo, Círculo de Amigos de la 
Historia, Madrid , 1970, I: 9. 
38
 Alonso del Real, 1941: 314: «Es seguro que si hubiese anunciado una serie de 
artículos, pongo por caso, “Sobre las instituciones políticas de la República 
Romana”, habría asustado a gran parte de los posibles lectores» 
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opportunistic reasons that had  brought him to select that particu lar 
topic: «es evidente la alta tensión de interés que en el hombre de hoy 
excita este nombre de múltiples resonancias: Impero Romano» [Alonso 
del Real, 1941: 315]. In his review, Alonso not only manifested  his 
approval towards the critique of the concept of liberalism purported  by 
the philosopher, bu t he also tried  to go a step further, interpreting 
Ortega’s text in the light of the need  of the young generations of 
readers who was looking for a cultural gu idance. In other words, 
Ortega was perceived  as a possible reference for this young generation 
of intellectuals who were trying to establish the bases of the orthod oxy 
of the regime. However, as far as the normative proposal advanced  by 
Ortega at the end  of his book was concerned  – that is the necessary 
institutional change that could  have been produced  to realise the so -
called  totalitarian liberalism – Alonso del Real rad ically d iffered . In 
fact: «el problema concreto si bien importante, no es de tal urgencia 
vital como para lanzar ese esperado ¡por fin!» [Alonso del Real, 1941: 
317]. So, even in one of the few reviews that, during the first years of 
the Franco’s regime, was paying attention to the works of Ortega , it is 
possible to notice a strong critique towards the political consequences 
of this theoretical framework.  
In conclusion, from this analysis it is possible to deduce that not 
only the self-proclaimed  silence of Ortega d id  not really exist, but also, 
and  foremost, that the new Spanish cultural establishment d id  not 
remain silent in respect to what Ortega was writing d uring those years. 
The questions which characterised  the cultural agenda of the regime 
also constitu ted  the kernel of Ortega’s meditations. He explicitely 
proved  to want to intervene in the new cu ltural scenario of h is country, 
even from abroad . Fom this reason, all of his writings always took into 
consideration the possible aud ience which could  have read  them, 
knowing that his intervention could  have been heard  only if it had  
previously adopted  the basic context and  structure that characterised  
the new hegemonic intellectual d ialogue. In spite of the d ifferences, one 
thing can be said  to associate Ortega to the new Spanish ruling class. 
That is the constant preoccupation towards the construction and  
tranmission of culture to the future generations, the education of the 
nation and  its citizens, and  the awareness of the cr ucial role p layed  by 
the University in all the processes of cultural production and  
communication. However, the purposes of the d ifferent actors rad ically 
d iffered .  
  
207 
In fact, in spite of the similarities in the general approach to the 
same question, the d ifferences do prevail. The analogy could  be 
maintained  only at an extremely superficial level. Indeed , b oth the 
political and  theoretical proposals are evidently incompatible . To 
extremely summarise: on the one hand  the defense of the need  of 
enhancing a critical education and , on the other, the proposal of a 
dogmatic and  orthod ox pedagogy. For this reason, the d ialogue that, as 
proven, Ortega was trying to realise at least with the youngest 
generations within the Franco’s establishment could  better resemble  a 
melancholy monologue, destined  to the political and  cultural 
marginalisation. Indeed , during the first years of the life of the regime, 
the struggle for the political hegemony within the University and  
through the cultural review s d id  not produce rad ically d ivergent 
opinions. On the contrary, the d ifferent perspectives depicted  in it 
always fell within a very limited  range. And  Ortega could  not have 
played  any concrete role in  it. 
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Chapter 6. 
What d oes to be a H umanist mean? 
On Juan Luis Vives 
In the previous chapter they have been  analysed  the main traits of the 
humanistic education propagated  within the University of the Franco’s 
regime through the case of the teaching of history and , in particular, the 
history of the Spanish Empire within the University of Madrid  and  the 
CSIC. This analysis has contributed  to explain the evolution of three 
basic humanistic d isciplines that gained  a significant relevance during 
that period : 1) national history, 2) philosophy of history and  3) 
sociology. All together, and  through the gu idance of theology, these 
d isciplines constitu ted  the totality of the humanistic knowledge 
organised  under the Llu llian tree. This chapter w ill focus on the final 
product of this new educative model.  
In fact, this new set of knowledge was implemented  by a new 
practice of the teaching activity. The concept of what a professor should  
be rad ically changed  in relation to the mutations in the ways in which 
the humanities were conceived . This process of definition of a new 
humanistic ideal will be stud ied  in this chapter by taking into 
consideration a significant philosophical debate that took place in the 
Spanish academia at the beginning of the ‘40s. It is the case of the series 
of stud ies ded icated  among 1940 and  1942 to the figures of Juan  Luis 
Vives, a member of the new academic pantheon. Indeed , the 
department of philosophy of the CSIC, which accord ing to the minister 
Ibáñez Martín was the most important of all, was ded icated  to him. 
The case of Vives also epitomises the way in which the academic 
debate developed  during this period . It was a debate characterised  by a 
series of very slight d ifferences on single shared  topics always treated  
in a similar way. The academic debate resembled  to a political one and , 
often, under the veil of small d ifferences it was possible to find  the 
seeds of incompatible d iscrepancies. 
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In order to reconstruct this debate this chapter w ill offer  (§1) a 
preliminary definition of the limit of this d iscussion, by taking into 
account the antithetical interpretations of the legacy of Vives offered 
respectively by Puid gollers and  Tomás y Samper , who can be said  to 
represent the in-group  and  out-group of the d ebate. Then by 
considering the legitimate position presented  within  the new cultural 
establishment, it w ill be u nderlined  (§2) the importance of Vives in the 
definition of a new form of humanism and  a new professorship which 
constituted  the representation of the orthodoxy of the regime. This 
largely homogeneous panorama will be compared  with the attempts 
made by Ortega to play a part in it by proposing a d ifferent 
interpretation of the author. An attempt made both (§4) in an ind irect 
way, through the mediation of his friend  Gregorio Marañon, and  in 
(§5) a d irect way, as proved  by the conferences and  articles he wrote  on 
Juan Luis Vives, in particu lar during his Argentinean exile. However, 
as it will be proved  in the last part of this chap ter, (§6) the theses 
sustained  by Ortega were substantially incompatible with the new 
cultural climate and , also d ue to his continuous attempts of enhancing 
the debate within the regime, he suffered  of a twofold  isolation: from 
his homeland  and  from the exiled  republican intellectuals. 
 
 
6.1 Juan  Lu is V ives. A  nat ion al(ist ) icon? 
The new University of the regime was grounded  on some sy mbolic 
references that were gaining an extremely important role in the 
definition of the hegemonic culture. Among them, the faculty of 
philosophy had  ind ividuated  in particular a figure that cou ld  have 
represented  the image of the new intellectual of the r egime: Juan Luis 
Vives. Thus in 1940, the fourth centenary of his death, gave to the 
philosophical community of d iscourse the possibility of unanimously 
focusing its hegemonic rhetoric on this particu lar au thor. This 
produced  a d ialogue in which, as in other cases, d ifferent positions 
struggled  one against the other for representing the lead ing correct 
interpretation of what a philosopher should  have ultimately been. In 
this way, within a shared  norm which defined  the in -group and  the 
out-group of the commu nity of d iscourse, a variety of proposals 
emerged . 
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In particular, the basic grounds of the d iatribe were set by a book 
published  that very year by Mariano Puigdollers. Since 1938 he had  
been an outstand ing member of the ACNdP, head  of the commission 
Cultura y Enseñanza of the New State, professor of law at the University 
of Valencia and , since 1941, at the University of Madrid . Moreover, 
since the creation of the CSIC in 1940, Pu igdollers had  been appointed 
as a member of the department entitled  to Ramon Llull, responsible for 
the organisation of all the humanistic departments of the research 
institute
39
. In other words, he was one of the best representatives of the 
ideology that the new regime wanted  to purport, an authority in the 
cultural scenario.  
In his text Vives becomes the symbol of the social, cultural and  
political authentic essence of Spain, in fact: «Luis Vives es nombre que 
llena toda una época, la más sugerente de todas las de la Historia 
Universal y especialmente de la de España, ya que entonces se labra 
con afanes de grandeza la Hispanidad» [Puigdollers, 1940: 9]. Not only 
he would  represent the history of Spain at its best, but would  also 
constitute the best representative of the essence of the normative ideal 
that the new theocratic State was realising in the present, since in him it 
would  be possible to identify: «lo que es médula y esencia la más pura 
de la Hispanid ad , lo que en tecnicismo escolástico llamaríamos “forma 
substancial del ser español”, y es la catolicidad» [Ibidem: 10]. Moreover, 
he would  also represent the fundamental traits of the au thentic 
intellectual and  teacher, since in his works and  in his life  he had  been 
able to combine a theoretical meditation with an irreproachable moral 
behaviour, been «un arquetipo, un ejemplar d igno de proponerse a la 
juventud  de todos los tiempos, y ciertamente de los actuales» [Ivi: 12]. 
He represented  both the norm of the perfect intellectual and  of the 
perfect citizen, combining the two main character s that all Spanish 
ind ividual should  posses to be part of the national community: being a 
good  falangist and  a good  Catholic. This would  be possible since his 
life manifested  a moral conduct aimed  ad parandam vitam and  also ad 
parandam virtutem, so combining secu lar and  sp iritual lifes in a single 
existence. His Christian philosophy would  have produced  a 
philosophy of history estremely akin to the one purported  by the 
regime, whose teleology was strictly related  to a theological 
interpretation of the Spanish destiny.  
                                                          
39
 See AGA, 32/ 14064, exp. 708573; AGUCM, P0655, 24; Archivo del Centro de 
Estudios Universitarios AGCEU, 2208. 
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Accord ing to Puigd ollers, in Luis Vives it would  have been possible 
to identify an excellent ped agogical theory that could  have enliven the 
Franco’s University system since he combined  a rigorous investigation 
and  teaching with the desire of shaping the personality of the young 
generations acord ing to his Catholic moral princip les [Ibidem: 16]. In 
fact, to Puigdollers, Vives did  not accept the Erasmus’ heresy, 
embracing a d ifferent concept of the intellectual and  humanist as a 
loyal member of the Roman Catholic Church, in fact a «deseo de un 
solo red il y un solo pastor gravitaba incesante en el corazón de nuestro 
humanista», against the “huracán de le herejía” which was spread ing 
during that period  all around  Europe [Ibidem: 19].  
To put it briefly, the Valencian humanist constituted  to Pu igdollers 
the perfect epitome of the ideal intellectual and  citizen that his 
association, the ACNdP, was trying to convert in the hegemonic ideal 
of the new State. In his text, it is possible to notice a continuous 
translation of Vives’ teachings to the contemporary political scene. 
Thus, his refusal of the protestan t heresies represented  the rejection of 
the educative and  social policies realised  in Spain by the Republican 
government and , on the other hand , the ind ividuation in the figure of a 
single leader which combined  secular and  spiritual power , i. e. the 
Caudillo – redil y pastor – the expression of the authentic nature of the 
Spanish humanism. The actualisation of the early modern humanist is 
explicitely proposed  by Puigdollers in particular in relat ion to his 
educative proposal as delineated  in the treaty De Discipliis (1531). In 
this book accord ing to Puigdolles, it would  have been possiblte to find  
«los gérmenes de los modernos Consejos Superiores d e Educación y de 
Cultura» [Ibidem, 218], of the recently born CSIC and  its department of 
philosophy. By ad apting the words of Vives to the concrete cultural 
and  political scenario in which he lived  – accord ing to Puigd ollers 
Vives would  have been a «partid ario de un Estado fuerte» [Ibidem: 214] 
– the member of the CSIC traced  the normative characters that the new 
University should  have followed  to restore the early modern grandeur 
of the Spanish humanism. In particular, this should  have to realise a 
new encyclopedic knowled ge oriented  by Christian values and  a total 
subjugation to the au thorities of the State and  the Church, being 
theology the basis of the new culture and  politics that the regime 
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should  have purported
40
. In its general traits, this interpretation 
purported  by Puigdollers constituted  the norm  which would  have later 
defined  the in-group of the community of d iscourse which contributed  
to the development of the d iscussion on Vives and , consequently, of the 
normative ideal that the new State should  have realised  following this 
example.  
A completely d ifferent perspective, that could  be said  to represent 
the out-group of this debate, is the one presented  during  the same year 
by the pedagogue Rodolfo Tomás y Samper, an exiled  republican 
intellectual, educated  in the same liberal university of Ortega y Gasset 
and , during the ‘20s, one of the most ou tstand ing representatives of the 
movement Escuela Nueva in Spain [Carpintero, 2014]. In 1924 he 
founded  the Instituto Samper, and  during the civil war he lost his chair. 
Once returned  in Spain in 1940, he founded  the Unión de Intelectuales 
Libres in Madrid , w ith the attempt to propagate his liberal pedagogical 
ideas. His attempt constituted  an evident failure and  soon after the 
publication of his book on Vives he was imprisoned  for three years, 
until 1943 [Moratinos, 1988]. So, as Puigdollers can be considered  as 
one of the best representatives of the new national-catholic pedagogical 
ideology, the same can be said  of Tomás y Samper in relation to the old  
republican one. 
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 As some years later, in the official review of the CSIC, Arbor, the 
Catholic intellectual Raimund o Paniker would  have synthetise 
[Paniker, 1944: 21], this should  have been the general organisation of 
the new national culture, sustained  by the tranmission, first of a moral 
teaching: 
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His book on Vives is a very short pamphlet tought to be used  by the 
primary teachers in their classes when preparing their lessons for 
celebrating the centenary of the death of the Spanish humanist  [Tomás 
y Samper, 1940]. The aim of this book is that of offering to the teachers 
an alternative read ing of Vives which could  have opposed  the 
hegemonic one so efficiently propagated  by the regime. An attempt of 
intellectual resistance to the political power and  an exercise of freedom 
of speech. In fact, the legacy of Vives to pedagogy, accord ing to Tomás 
y Samper, cannot be ind ividuated  in  any patriotic and  political aim. His 
pedagogical innovation, indeed , should  have been found  in the 
methodologies he ad opted , for instance in the mnemonic techniques he 
elaborated . In add ition, his importance would  lay on the central role he 
gave to students as the pillars of the educative process, leaving the 
teachers in a secondary ground . The ethics of his teaching and  his life, 
vehemently praised  by Puigdollers, would  not possess any religious 
traits accord ing to Tomás and , moreover, could  not be conceived  as a 
defense of the Catholic ortodoxy. In add ition, his ped agogy was strictly 
linked  to the elaboration of a new European  culture of which Spain was 
a part, and  not the centre, during the early modern period .  
Thus, the only possible continuity of Vives in relation to the Spanish 
present cou ld  have been ind ividuated  in the affinity between his 
pedagogical ideas and  the ones represented  by the Escuela Nueva, 
which constitu ted  the bases of the Spanish liberal educative proposal 
during the ‘20s and  the ‘30s. In fact:  
 
Vives representa algo más que el entronque del mundo medioeval con el 
mundo moderno y su labor cultural: inaugura un nuevo período. […] Es 
que comprendió el valor del método experimental en la ciencia, d e donde 
resultó su defensa del principio de in tuición en la enseñanza [Tomás y 
Samper, 1940: 23-24]. 
 
The attempt of Tomás y Samper is that of using Vives to rehabilitate 
the educative trad ition of the ILE, of his ped agogical method s and  
political outlook, and  of doing this through the reference to an 
intellectual figure largely present in the rhetorical d ebate of his time. 
His position was evidently marginalised  by the regime, condemned  to 
the silence. In fact, for the normative ideal of the New State, the  
intellecual and  the education he purported , Tomás y Samper was 
sentenced  to jail in 1940. The new political and  cultural climate d id  not 
permit any sort of d irect and  decise opposition to the hegemonic 
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thought, in particular in the name of republican and  liberal values. And  
the control of the education was perceived  as ind ispensable for 
exercising an effective political power. 
 
 
6.2 The pat riot ic philosopher 
 Thus, Vives became the symbol of the authentic and  orthodox 
philosopher of the new State. This is evidently clear by analysing the 
long series of books and  scientific articles that the Spanish academia 
produced  between 1940 and  1942. Among them it is possible to identify 
four basic complementary ways of praising his legacy: 1) as a political 
thinker; 2) as a pedagogist; 3) as a Catholic model; 3) as a nationalist.  
The first aspect was promoted  for instance by the Franciscan Juan 
Bautista Gomis, founder of the review Verdad y V ida. In his book 
[Gomis, 1941], starting from  the premises of Puigd ollers, he underlines 
the importance of Vives in relation to the definition of the concept of 
Hispanidad
41
. In particular, what accord ing to Gomis deserved  to be 
particu larly mentioned  was the importance of the early modern 
humanist in defining the character of the n ew political normativeness. 
As he put it: 
 
Felicisimo, en efecto, será el Pueblo español, si aprovecha la coyuntura 
presente y providencial, para seguir los cauces abiertos por Luis Vives en el 
campo de la ciencia política, que conducen las aguas sociales al mar de la 
felicidad ; felicisimo, si se deja moldear en el troquel ideológico de su hijo 
preclaro [Ibidem: 20]. 
 
The first instance of Vives’ importance in relation to the definition 
of the national ideology would  be provided  by his anti-communist and  
anti-socialist outlook. In fact, with a clear and  rid iculous anachronism, 
Gomis affirms that the communists were «conocidos y flagelados en su 
libro De communione Rerum» [Ibidem: 21]. For this reason, the duty of 
the new State in relation to this eminent figure of its great past would  
have consisted  in continuing the struggle against the communist 
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 In the works of Vives, in fact: «estan reconcentradas todas las esencias 
generosas de la Hispanidad , que cad a espanol debe asimilarse, entranandoselas 
y, sobre todo, debe aduenarse de ellas, fecundand ose el Estado, la Nacion y la 
Patria» [Gomis, 1941: 2]. 
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intellectuals of the republican period . Consequently, the valorisation of 
the Catholic nature of Vives’ teachings was aimed  at build ing a new 
political force: «El destino de la España Nueva debe ser instituir y 
ejectuar el testamento id eológico de Luis Vives que devolvería a 
Espana el Principado del Mundo que tuvo en otros siglos» [Ibidem: 26].  
A similar valorisation of the political legacy of the Renaissance 
intellectual is provided  by the professor of law of the University of 
Valencia, Salamanca and  Madrid , Wenceslao Gonzalez Oliveros, an 
outstand ing members of the FE [Miguel-Motta, 2012: 473-475], who also 
led  the national courts that established  the intellectual p urges within 
the university, obtaining prestigious award s such as the Gran Cruz de 
Alfonso X
42
. Significantly enough, his book on Vives, firstly written in 
1937 and  then re-ed ited  in 1940, should  have been just a translation and  
scientific comment of Vives’ De Communione Rerum. However, not only 
the translation does occupy exclusively one tenth of the total 
manuscript, but it is also characterised  by an extremely partisan 
d iscussion of his work. The read ing of Vives is almost grotesque in its 
ideological use. As the very subtitle stated , the book of Vives would  
have constituted  the first anti-communist monograph written by a 
Spanish thinker [González Oliveros, 1937: 3], «en cuya vasta y genial 
producción se halla contenido – en germen, flor o fruto – tod o lo que la 
Falange Española Trad icionalista y de las J.O.N.S. ansía y algo más» 
[Ibidem: 8].  
The anticommunism of Vives could  be legitimatly deduced , 
accord ing to Oliveros, by his opposition to More’s Utopia, interpreted  
as the source of the communist thou ght. The early modern opposition 
of a Spanish thinker to the heresy of communism was consequently 
conceived  as the prove of a sort of predestination of the Spanish 
intellectuals, who would  had  been elected  as the guard ians of the 
political Catholic orthod oxy against any form of communist and  laical 
thinking. As Oliveros wrote, Vives would  represent the: «¡Vocación 
singular de nuestra Patria, siempre en la vanguard ia histórica de las 
letras y las armas para detener – en los umbrales mismos de la tierra y 
el espíritu  cristiano occid ental – el temoroso ataque de la Bestia!» 
[Ibidem: 10]. Moreover, Vives would  have been the representer of a 
new form of humanism in opposition to a degenerated  hominismo. The 
latter would  represent the political and  cu ltural ideology purported  by 
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the communists, which consisted  in  aband oning all transcendent 
visions of human destiny, eliminating any reference to the spiritual 
nature of human beings
43
. 
A complementary interpretation of the teachings of Vives was the 
one traced  by the Franciscan Rafael Alventosa Garcia. In his book on 
the nature of the New Francoist University [1940] it is possible to 
identify the valorisation of the pedagogical relevance of the humanist 
thinker. In particular, he adopts the educative model of Vives to argue 
in favour of the need  of transmitting a Christian education to the future 
generations, what he called  sabiduría crisitiana, Moreover, he thinks that 
this should  have been done through a paternalistic educative 
methodology. In fact, the professor should  have be conceived ed , 
accord ing to Alventosa, as an ind ispensable guide and  censor able to 
ind ividuate and  eliminate from the cultural scenario in which a young 
student is educated , all those theories which could  have been in 
contrast w ith the established  orthod oxy. He thus justify the practice of 
censorship since:  
 
Para el joven, en edad  universitaria, d ificil tarea sería la labor de juzgar con 
acierto lo bueno y lo malo de cada libro, y así que Vives para ellos ofrece 
una más segura norma, la del maestro. Desea que le preced a en el camino 
persona instruída e íntegra en quien se confie como en caudillo que lo aleje 
de los peligros, ya sin darle noticia de ellos, ya d iciendo claramente, a 
quienes así convenga, cuál es el mal que se halla ocultar, permitiendo  a 
cada cual sólo aquello que le sea ventajoso, teniendo bien conocida la 
capacidad  de cad a uno de los que van bajo su d irección  [Alventosa, 1940: 
47]. 
 
A more secu lar perspective in relation to the educative process, 
which pu t the religious character of Vives on the background  of the 
political d iscourse, is offered  by some articles published  in the review 
Escorial, in particular by the professor of law of the University of 
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 Ibidem, 178: «Porqué el comunismo soviético es inconciliable con el 
humanismo; pero, en cambio, puede compadecerse bien con el hominismo. Ese 
hominismo en virtud  del cual ciertos católicos marxistoides hubieran preferido 
que el Caudillo Franco, en vez de alzarse en nombre del Espíritu  contra la 
Bestia marxista, se hubiera conformado con buscar un arreglito con ella, una 
vez aguantado su primer desfogue, con el fin de evitar las molestias y daños de 
una larga y dura y gloriosa guerra de Independencia y Salvación de España y 
del Orbe civilizado». 
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Granad a, José Corts Grau , a personal friend  of Laín Entralgo
44
. In his 
article he argues in favour of the importance of Vives’ pedagogy in 
relation to the new University of the regime. In fact, he praises the 
rigorous ethics of Vives both as a scholar, a professor and  a student. 
This, more than his religiosity which however d oes still constitu te the 
basic ground  of Grau’s reflection , would  be the most relevant basis of 
the theorisation of Vives, and  would  constitu te a guidance for the 
national future: 
 
El conocimiento oriéntase de suyo a una finalidad : ayudar al hombre a ver 
más claramente sus fines y, por consiguiente, a ser mejor y más feliz. De 
aquí el nervio ético de la filosofía vivista, que trasciende a toda su 
concepción del Derecho, de la organización social, de la política y de  las 
relaciones internacionales [Corts Grau, 1940: 60]. 
 
At the same time, Vives is used  by Grau for defining the new 
political parad igm of the regime: that is its authoritarianism conceived  
as its fundamental ground , rejecting any form of authentic liberalism. 
In fact, accord ing to Grau: «La verdadera y suma libertad  es someterse 
a la autoridad  legítima y acudir presto y de grado al llamamiento de las 
leyes y de los gobernantes» [Ibidem: 65]. In brief, accord ing to Grau 
and  the ed itorial line of the Escorial, Vives represented  the epitome of 
the intellectual, the teacher and , also the student, characterised  by an 
extraord inary ability to focus on relevant problems and  of doing it w ith 
an extremely rigorous moral d iscip line. The same d iscipline which 
characterised  his total obed ience to the political power, ultim ately an 
authentic nationalist. 
Among the falangist intellectuals, in fact, it is possible to notice a 
more evident propensity to praise the nationalist legacy of the 
intellectual activity of Juan Luis Vives. This is, for instance, the case of 
the Professor of law  of the University of Salamanca, Juan Beneyto 
Pérez. Accord ing to him, Vives was the symbol of the patriotic 
intelectual entirely devoted  to the defense of his nation
45
. As a 
consequence, he adopts this intellectual attitude in his interpretation 
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 Indeed , after the his initial purge from the University, it w ill be Laín, head  of 
the national propaganda during that period , to testify in favour of the loyalty of 
Corts Grau to the regime. See AGA 21/ 20503; Archivo Central de Educación 
(ACE -Alcalá de Henares), 93968-048; ACE 92640-41. 
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 [Beneyto Pérez, 1941: 9]: «El intelectual que se ensambla en el destino de su 
Patria». 
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and  actualisation of Vives’ legacy, in  particular in  relation to the 
international politics of the regime. In fact, the example of the 
Valencian intellectual is used  by Beneyto to underline the important 
role the philosopher, as counselor of the politicans, had  to play in 
favouring a condition of peace in Europe in a period  characterised  by 
continuous conflicts. In particular, he describes the European context in 
which d ifferent nations were fighting against one another while 
Charles V was observing a neutral position in defense of peace. In this 
way, Beneyto proposes a clear analogy with the case of Spain under the 
government of Franco and  the neutrality observed  by the country. As 
he wrote: «Carlos es Caud illo de la paz cristiana […] y pide en la forma 
más emocionad a y de más eterno sentido la conciliación de Europa 
frente al Asia, la unid ad  de los cristianos contra los infieles» [Beneyto, 
1941: 14].  
The defense of the Catholic character of Spain in the name of Vives 
was therefore instrumentally ad opted  to defend  the international 
politics of the regime. The same strategy was also used  by the very 
Caudillo, who defended  his authoritative policies as a religious mission 
aimed  to guarantee a condition of peace inside the Spanish boarders 
and  to fight communism at the interntational level [Olivié, 2006]. Vives, 
for Beneyto, would  represent the source of legitimation of the 
international politics of the regime. 
Thus, since 1940, V ives had been instrumentally used by the cultural 
establishment of the regime with the purpose of tracing the basic traits of the 
new patriotic intellectual who acted in the interests of the nation. M oreover, 
through his example, they would have been also set the cultural guidelances of 
the humanistic education purported by the New State. Vives was constantly 
used  to speak about university and  pedagogy, and  he was also an 
object of study within the university, in particular in the facu lties of 
philosophy and  law. The importance of Vives in forging this new 
culture was given by the encyclopedic nature of his general teaching, 
that comprehended  all the humanistic d iscip lines, as underlined  by the 
dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Murcia, Battle Vázquez, 
in his monographic course on the Valencian humanist [Battle Vázquez, 
1942:11-14]. A universal thinker thanks to the vastity of his knowledge, 
and  an authentic Spanish and  Catholic intellectual for the scope and  
purpose of his investigations and  teachings. As example for the New 
State and  the new intelectual community. 
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6.3 The fain t  crit icism s of Gregorio M arañ on  
This majoritarian interpretation of the legacy of Juan Luis Vives 
within the academic and  intellectual world  implied  the concept 
accord ing to which the intellectual should  always serve the interests of 
his nation, being a p atriotic citizen who would  never oppose to the 
political and  cultural status quo of his country. A mod erate criticism to 
this w idespread  view of the intellectual as subjugated  to the political 
power is presented  by one of Ortega’s friend , the doctor Gregor io 
Marañon, who in 1942 gave his contribution to the intellectual debate 
over Vives. Marañon, after a brief exile during the civil war, in 1942 
had  returned  in Spain, where he continued  to publish books, articles 
and  exercise his profession. In spite of his liberal past, he was 
substantially tolerated  by the regime thanks to his public endorsment 
to the national front he d id  in winter 1937, in the middle of the civil war 
[Lopez Vega, 2008]. 
Interestingly enough, Marañon ironically used  Vives as a sort of 
masque to talk about his personal condition and  that of his friend  
Ortega. In fact, in Vives he identifies the person who lives in a  
condition of exile, experiencing the existential d ifficulties related  to the 
possibilities of coming back to his homeland  and  the worries of not 
being able to p lay an influential role in his own country. In fact, the 
fundamental premise of Marañon’s essay can be ind ividuated  in  the 
very definition of the intellectual he offers. In fact, to Marañon, being 
an intellectual implies being an influential person within the cu ltural 
debate of a country: «un intelectual es una parte de la conciencia de su 
Patria durante los años de su vida mortal» [Marañon, 1942: 119]. Now, 
the problem evidently emerges when an intellectual voluntarily 
decides to aband on his homeland  – as in the case of Vives – not being 
totally in accord ance or in strong opposition with the culture purported  
in it. Accord ing to Marañon, here it lies an evident problem, namely 
that of combining the largely praised  patriotism of Vives with his 
decision to leave his country and  exercise his intellectual influence 
within a larger context, i.e. the European one.  
Marañon’s approach to the study of the legacy of Juan Luis Vives 
was therefore evidently in contradd iction with the apologetic literature 
of the academic world , since the patriotic du ty of the intellectual, 
accord ing to him, should  not consist in a a priori defense of his country, 
but rather in the «crítica de la patria» [Ibidem, 121]. In fact, such honest 
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critique is considered  by Marañon as «la consideración imparcial o 
apasionada de la vid a de su país, y en ella caben tanto los juicios 
favorables como los adversos. Ahora bien, esta crítica es más que otra 
cosa un deber auténtico d el intelectual» [Ibidem, 122]. The authentic 
intellectual does not have to be subjugated  to the contingent political 
power since his historical mission does not have to respond  to partisan 
interests
46
.  
In his text Marañon affirms that the intellectual should  not merely 
be the propagator of the beliefs and  norms imposed  by the society. On 
the contrary, he should  react against these norms, and  in particular 
against those he does not consider as adequate, being an independent 
and  free thinker. Accord ingly, Marañon d oes not share the idea 
purported  by the regime accord ing to which every criticism would  
correspond  to an anti-Spanish attitude and  should  therefore be strongly 
countered  as heterodox and  dangerous. This, in fact, was the case of the 
regime’s propagand a against the so-called  generation of 1898 [Abellán, 
1996: 519-524]. On the contrary, to Marañon, an honest critique should  
always be considered  as a sign of respect towards the object critised , 
and  in the case of the political critique of the intellectual, it should  have 
been regarded  as a valid  suggestion made in the interests of the nation. 
In fact, this intellectual activity cou ld  serve to better compreh end  the 
problems that a nation was experiencing, facing and  trying to solve 
them. The critical education, and  the promotion of it done by the 
intellectual, would  be the most effective instrument for promoting the 
amelioration of the society, not by adopting an acritical attitude towad s 
the political situation. Significantly enough, the description of the role 
of the intellectual as exercised  by Vives evidently resembled  to the one 
that also Ortega was proposing during the same years. The analogy 
between Vives and  Ortega also related  to the concrete biographical 
conditions of the two authors.  
In fact, describing the exile of Vives Marañon wrote that: «Vives 
suspiraba pensando en España. En una carta a Vergara, su  amigo , que 
algún tiempo después la Inquisición había que procesar, le decía que 
todos los defectos de los españoles se remediarían a fuerza de leer» 
[Marañon, 1942: 132-133]. Both the reference to the u tility of education 
as a means of political and  social development and  the reference to 
Vives’ letter to Vergara and  his Spanish nostalgia constituted  veiled 
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references to Ortega’s case. In fact, just some months earlier, at the 
beginning of 1942, Ortega had  written to Marañon to inform him that 
he was thinking about the possibility of returning in Europe, in 
Portugal, after a long Argentinian exile. Ortega motivated  his decision 
on the basis of his nostalgia for his friends and  for the life in Spain. As 
Ortega wrote to Marañon: 
 
Desde la entrada de la guerra de este continente pierde, almenos en unos 
meses, todo sentido mi vida aquí, la adquiere en cambio buscar contacto 
con los míos y, en general, con ese continente que, a pesar de todo, sigue 
siendo el único que posee algun contenido
47
. 
 
In Marañon’s interpretation , Vives constitutes the epitome of the 
intellectual duty of not obeying to the imposed  norms of the socie ty, 
but rather of criticising them  and  defend  the importance of a critical 
education for the social development of the nation. So, the Renaissance 
intellectual mirrors the biographical experience of the very Marañon 
and  Ortega, manifesting his preoccupation towards the reception that 
could  have attended  Ortega once returned  in  Madrid . In fact, an hostile 
cultural establishment would  have to decide if and  to what extent to 
reintegrate both Marañon and  Ortega in the new intellectual climate in 
which very few, if any, liberty of speech was conceded
48
. 
 
6.4 A n  act ive spectator: O rtega in  A rgen t ina 
Dedico todo 1940 a dar la batalla a la vida intelectual insubord inada y 
hostil a España desde aquí
49
. 
Far from his homeland , politically and  culturally marginalised , 
Ortega, since 1939, was living in Argentina. There he d id  not interrupt 
his intellectual activity and , even if he was not in charge of any official 
post, he continued  publishing articles, giving conferences, seminars 
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and  lessons. He also participated  to a rad io show. At the same time, he 
was frequently invited  also in other Latin  American country. From the 
Venezuelan minister of Education he also received  a formal offer of a 
chair at the national University
50
. At the beginning of his stay the 
information he received  about the Spanish cultural and  political 
situation were extremely fragmented . What, on the contrary, he clearly 
perceived , was the great suspicion that the international community 
manifested  towards Spanish neutrality during the war. A suspicion he 
attributed  to far-left political positions. Thus, in a letter to his friend  
Azcárate, Ortega, in spite of the scarce information he possessed , d id  
demonstrate to understand  the d ifficulties that the new State was 
experiencing to establish a precise ideology and , therefore, to 
consolid ate his political power:  
 
De España no sabemos aquí nada […] Todas mis noticias se reducen a lo 
que me ha d icho hace poco José Fernando en una única carta que me ha 
escrito en estos meses […] en estos últimos seis meses, es decir desde que 
comienza la vid a-después-de-la-guerra se expresan [mis amigos] con 
infinitamente más cautela. […] Pasa, después de todo, lo que tiene que 
pasar, a saber, que pasará bastante en estabilizarse suficientemente la vida, 
en reconstruirse la unidad  efectiva del mando, el poder normal del Estado . 
 
The confusion and  instability experienced  by the Spanish politics 
implied  evident consequences in relation to the cu ltural production  of 
which Ortega was aware. In this state of confusion he thought it w ould  
have been possible to elaborate new political and  philosophical 
doctrines which could  have provided  the basic guidelines of the future 
State. Similarly to his precedent intellectual and  biographical 
experience, he was persuad ed  that he could  have played  the role of the 
intellectual advisor to the political power, and  so he d id  not d iscard  the 
possibility of being part of the new intellectual establishment of the 
Franco’s State. In this context he was particularly sensitive in relation to 
the intellectual niche of freedom that the regime could  have guaranteed  
to its thinkers. In fact, as he wrote to Azcárate, he was looking with 
interest at the project of publishing a new cultural review that appeared  
to be formed by some of his friends
51
. Since the spring 1940, Ortega 
                                                          
50
 Letter by Azcárate to Ortega, Caracas, 15-III-1940, in AOG, C-55/ bis-6c. 
51
 «Se va a publicar una revista de tono elevado de que será d irector Sánchez 
Mazaz, subdirector Marichalar y secretario Maravall». Letter by Ortega to 
  
224 
started  to receive more and  more information about the cultur al 
situation of his country, in particu lar thanks to the intermediation of 
Fernando Vela. He, for instance, informs Ortega that: «algunos 
escritores, entre ellos García Gomez y Gerardo Diego, han constituid o 
una Academia llamada “Musa, musae” y proyectan u na revista que se 
titu lará “Los españoles” que d irigirá Sánchez Mazas»
52
. 
Not only he frequently started  to receive up to date information 
about the Spanish cultural scenario, but he was also involved , or at 
least invited  to take part, in the development of one of this cultural 
project. In fact, in November 1940 Antonio Maravall wrote to Orega a 
very enthusiastic letter invitied  him to write and  publish with urgency 
a sociological treaty which could  later have been used  to orient the 
construction of the new State. Such book, that Ortea had  alread y 
announced  some years before but finally d id  not realise , could  have set, 
accord ing to Maravall, the ed itorial bases for the review – i.e. Escorial – 
to which he was collaborating and , hopefully, for the ideology of the 
regime that the review aimed  to forge
53
. The interest of Ortega towards 
the new Spanish cultural scenario was therefore, at least at a minimum 
extent, mutual.  
Ortega’s interest towards his nation was motivated  by the hope and  
desire by taking part again to it as a possible intellectual and  to 
continue to gu ide the political debate from within . This invited  him to 
partially change the topics of his philosophical meditations, orienting 
them towards the new intellectual trend s, without renouncing to 
express his critical points of view. Significantly, in the light of the 
recent changes in the political scenario, in September 1940 he wrote to 
Azcárate that the top ics of which he wanted  to talk about were in 
particu lar: «socied ad , uso, costumbre, opinión pública, vigencia 
colectiva, derecho, Estado, Nación»
54
. To put it briefly, Ortega clearly 
perceived  the new d irection that the Spanish cultu re was assuming 
after the end  of the civil war and  the victory of the National Front, and  
even if he was demonstrating his scepticism about the new political 
regime, he d id  not d iscard  the possibility of taking part in it through an 
intellectual activity.  
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He manifests this intention not only in his private letters, but also in 
his public writings, even if in a more ind irect way. This is the case of 
the Prólogo a un diccionario enciclopédico abreviado he wrote by the end  of 
1939 in Argentina, who should  act as an introd uction to a new ed itorial 
project he was realising through the ed itorial Espasa Calpe [OC, V: 631-
639]. In this text he critically referred  to the Franch encycloped ists 
defining them as false intellectuals since their main preoccupation lay 
on the propagation of cultu re rather than on its creation, of rendering it 
popular rather than profound . The critique of Or tega is d irected  against 
the type of the organic intellectual of the regime and  its superficial 
attitude which converts everything in mere propaganda. However, at 
the same time, his critique does follow the general trend  within the new 
academia of criticising the Enlightment period  – in the case of the 
regime ideology because of its ind ividualist scepticism. This formal and  
not substantial wink to the widespread  ideology was therefore done in 
order to move a more d irect and  violent attack  against it. Namely, to 
criticise the dogmatic ideology of the regime and  the  progressive 
replacement of the intellectual freedom for a politically imposed  
thinking. In fact, against the frenetic rythm of the political struggle he 
vind icates the importance for the intellectu al to reflect with calm and 
ease: 
 
El pensamiento creador tiene su tempo, que no es posible acelerar. Pero la 
propaganda, la pedagogía, la “ilustración”, son faenas mecánicas que 
invitan a ser realizadas lo más pronto posible. De aquí la prisa de Diderot, 
el aire de Fa presto que toma su labor y la de sus colaboradores – un poco 
fullera, como todo lo apresurado. Además, ¿porqué no decirlo aquí de 
paso? Como la transformación del hombre y la sociedad  prevista por los 
“filósofos” traía consigo el predominio d el intelectual, estos intelectuales 
tenían prisa por llegar al poter. Este apetido de mando de los intelectuales 
d ieciochescos ha sido el gran pecado y la gran deserción en la historia de la 
intelectualidad  [OC, V: 636]. 
 
Ortega does manifest his strong cr iticism against the increasing 
identification of the intellectual with the politician , an identification he 
had  always openly criticised . For this reason , he decided  to maintain 
his political neutrality, at least from a public point of view. His  only 
interest was that of having the opportunity to exercise an intellectual 
influence among the élite and  the civil society. Thus, instead  of 
focusing on political questions, with the help of his sons Miguel and  
José, he was trying to organise the re-opening of the publication of the 
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Revista de Occidente in Madrid . H is public neu trality and , at the same 
time, his proximity to Spain , was proved  also by his decision to move 
to the formally neutral Argentina [Rapoport, 1988].  
However, the relevant presence of Spanish exiles in Argentina was 
contributing to reproduce in another d ifferent context , the same 
contrapositions between Republicans and  Nationalists which had  
poisoned  the Spanish scenario [Spektorowski, 2003; Goldar, 1996], even 
if the end orsement and  support to the Axis was evidently inferior in 
comparison to the Spanish case. In fact, in September 1940 Franco had  
met Hitler to d iscuss the eventual entry of Spain in the War, a 
possibility that ultimately failed  due to the excessive conditions 
imposed  by the Fürher for the Spanish participation to the conflict 
[Carotenuto, 2005]. Ortega, significantly enough, d id  always 
maintained  a very ambiguous political position, nearing to the right -far 
Argentinean movement, and  criticising the exiled  republican 
intellectuals [Campomar, 2016].  
In any case, at the very least, the geographical d istance of Argentina 
from the European context permitted  to the philosopher to enjoy that 
minimum degree of tranquillity and  ease that he considered  
ind ispensable for practicing all intellectual activities. In fact, since the 
summer 1940, with the successes of the Axis, on the international point 
of view, and  the removal of Sanchez Masas from governmental charges 
– considered  by Ortega a man that, even if at a minimum level 
«representaba la defensa de lo intelectual»
55
 – he perceived  the 
substantial impossibility to play an active role in the Spanish scenario. 
 
 
6.5 V ives, or el m atarife 
The debate over Juan Luis Vives that took place in Spain in occasion 
of the fourt centenary from his death, gave to Ortega the possibility of 
entering in the intellectual debate of his country. In fact, the Spanish 
Cultural Institute of Buenos Aires invited  him to give a conference on 
the top ic on November 12, 1940
56
. In spite of talking to an aud ience 
composed  by d istinguished  members of the Spanish political 
establishment, Ortega offered  an interpretation of Vives rad ically in 
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constrast to the one which was being spread  by the official culture. In 
fact, even if also for the Madrilen ian philosoper Vives constituted  an 
examplary figure which permits to comprehend  the role and  end  of the 
intellectual activity within society, he considered  his legacy important 
for very d ifferent reasons. Indeed  his relevance was due, to Ortega, not 
to the trad itional values he would  have impersonated , but rather to the 
critical way in which he faced  the most relevant problems of his time. 
The analysis of his conference in Buenos Aires permits to point out 
three main argumantative d irections that Ortega followed  to orient his 
critique towards the official cu lture purported  by the regime: 1) 
anthropological; 2) historical; 3) educative.  
In fact, Vives is considered  by Ortega as an exemplary figure first of 
all insofar as he always tried  to give a sense – secular and  not religoius 
– to the existential d rama that characterises the life of every human 
being. In fact, he had  to face, along his whole life, the d ifficulties related  
to the need  of conforming his personal vocation to the adverse social 
circumstances. In this way he would  have demostrate to what extent: 
«La vida consiste en un combate fiero – por muy pacífico de gestos que 
a veces parezca – entre ese yo que es un perfil de aspiraciones y de 
anhelos, de proyectos, y el mund o, sobre todo el mund o social en 
derredor» [OC, IX: 445-446]. 
In virtue of this existencial character of his intellectual experience , 
he would  perfectly represent the condition of all human beings, whose 
biographies are substantially forged  by the historical and  cu ltural 
circumstances in which they live, in particular in epochs of crisis. To 
Ortega, Vives lived  in one of those critical periods in which trad itional 
values are put into questions and  it is necessary to build  a new set of 
beliefs and  habits for orienting the life of the single ind ividuals and  the 
society. In this trait of Vives’ experience Ortega ind ividuates the most 
significant aspect of his modernity. In fact:  
 
Por fortuna o por desgracia hablo delante de hombres que, como yo, han 
asistido a un cambio tan súbito y tan rad ical de la figura en que  la vida 
colectiva, el sistema de los usos intelectuales, morales, económicos, políticos 
y estéticos consiste, que no será necesario encarecerles hasta qué punto la 
historia es eso: cambio [OC, IX: 447]. 
 
With these words Ortega d oes not refers in particu lar to the political 
changes of the Franco’s regime, but rather to the so -called  scientific 
crisis, later propagated  to the domain of the cu ltu ral values, that 
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affected  the whole European continent d uring the first decades of the 
XX century. However, there are several aspects of this conference that 
directly link Ortega’s d iscourse with the concurrent intellectual debate 
that was taking place in Spain.  
Indeed , the times in which Vives had  to live were characterised  both 
by a cultural and  a political change. For this reason, his Catholicism, 
that the Francoist establishment was unceasingly pra ising, was in fact a 
doubtful credence which was rad ically d ifferent from the mediaeval 
Catholicism that the regime was depicting as the source of his cultural 
and  historical legitimacy. As Ortega ironically put it , criticising the 
d isappointing level of the Spanish academic cultural d ebate: «En el café 
o en el d iario – scrive Ortega – se presumirá haber d icho algo estricto 
cuand o se ha d icho de alguien que es cristiano, pero en verdad , no se 
ha hecho más que usar una palabra equívoca que significa innumeras 
cosas» [OC, IX: 453]. Ortega questions the nature of Vives’ faith, and  
also affirms that the very essence of a religion is not fixed  and  
determined  once and  for all, being on the contrary always shap ed  by 
the political and  cu ltural changes produced  in a given time. No concept 
possesses a timeless nature, and  at the same time no social practice h as 
a life independently from its historical moment.  
As far as the religion of Vives was concerned , the heterodoxy of 
Ortega’s position is also testified  by his affirmation accord ing to which 
the Valencian humanist was a follower of Erasmus, a synonym, in the 
educative teaching of the Franco’s cu ltural hegemony , of a non-aligned  
intellectual and  free thinker who interpret the religious d ogma in an 
heterogeneous and  wrong way [Castillejo Cambra, 2014: 556-557]. This 
cultural reference d id  have a clear political consequence. In fact, the 
dogma of the new regime was ind ivid uated  in th e words of the Caudillo 
and  the religious institutions. The possibility of accepting d ifferent 
interpretation of his wishes – similarly to the way in which Erasmus 
offered  a d ifferent interpretation of the Bible – would  have determined  
a loss of the authentic meaning of the word s of the general and  of the 
teaching of the Spanish Church.  
Moreover, to Ortega, not only the theoretical beliefs but also the 
religion practiced  by Vives, his devotio moderna, would  testify the 
d ifferent sensibility characterising the Spanish humanist in relation to 
the previous mediaeval parad igm. In fact, whereas the former assigned  
a positive values to the human life exclusively insofar as it was 
orienting towards a spiritual end , the Renaissance sensibility , in which 
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Vives lived , completely overturned  this hierarchy. This overturn would  
later be converted  in a doctrine aimed  to conquer the political power 
through a militia Christi – a clear allusion to the Jesuit hegemony in the 
new Spanish State through the Opus Dei. On the contrary, the 
Valencian humanist, whose sensibility was antithetical to the one later 
purported  by the Jesuits, offered  a completely d ifferent perspective. A 
valorisation of the cultura animi, that is to say the refusal of a political 
struggle and  the withdraw al into the study of humanities aimed  to 
cultivate his spirit not for a life afterlife, but rather for his current 
mund ane existence [OC, IX: 460-465]. 
As a consequence, also as far as the educative project of Vives is 
concerned , he would  not have shared  the ped agogical framework of 
the Jesuits. His ideal of ed ucation included  the need  of studying «sine 
querella» [OC, IX: 467], d istanciating himself from the frenetic political 
d iatribes. The lost of a social and  cultural consensus and  the contrasting 
opinions should  not impose to the intellectuals and  the students a 
partisan attitude. On the contrary, as Vives proved , the mission of the 
intellectual should  always be that of reflecting with ease and  
tranquillity on the new historical circumstances in which he  lives to try 
to offer an overall interpretation of them and , consequently, proposing 
possible solutions to the scientific and  social crisis of values. In the case 
of the Renaissance thinker: «Una nueva e intacta tarea ve antes sí: 
ciencia vigorosa y empírica, técnicas sociales – política, educación, 
organización del pauperismo –; en suma, un estud io positivo de lo 
humano – ind ividual y colectívo –, una antropología» [OC, IX: 470]. A 
mission that, nead less to say, had  a lot in common with  the one that the 
very Ortega was trying to realise during those years.  
After this conference Ortega continued  to use Vives for talking 
about the role of the intellectual more than in the Renaissance past, in 
his current times. He d id  so in a series of articles he published  for the 
Argentinean newspaper La Nación. In these texts he rad icalised  the link 
between intellectual theories and  cultural and  historical circumstances 
in which he lived , also underlining the relevance of the political 
scenario in changing the topics at the centre of the agend a of every 
authentic intellectual. This, in fact, should  face them without actively 
taking part in the struggle for the political hegemony. In fact, in the 
political sphere, in the realm of ideology, accord ing to Ortega, the 
words of the philosopher are rendered  meaningless and  constantly 
banalised . So, in particu lar in period  of political struggle and  
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intellectual crisis, the real philosopher  should  refrain from a d irect 
intervention in the political arena. During such period s his d uty would  
consist in trying to rebuild  the basic set of beliefs tha t ground  the social 
coexistence. For doing this, he should  reject any d ogmatic statement 
and  systematically exercise a sceptical investigation. Thus Ortega 
neatly d istinguishes between the role of the intellectual and  that of the 
propagandist. The latter would  represent just the trivialization of the 
authentic intellectual practice, of the effort for the clarity in the 
d iagnoses and  possible solutions to the social problems
57
.  
This lack of an authentic intellectual outlook, accord ing to Ortega, 
d id  not only characterised  the Spanish scenario, but was also a trait that 
marked  the new international self-consciousness of the philosophical 
practice. Indeed , he also accused  of political partisanship  the British 
intellectuals who judged  over the Spanish situation. His critique was 
indeed  twofold : on the one hand  he criticised  the new culture that was 
spread ing inside the new Spanish regime, and  on the other he 
defended  the national interests in relation to the international scenario. 
Clearly enough, he d id  so with the aim of having the possibility of 
influencing the cultural debate of his country, criticising it from within.  
His critique to the organic intellectual was extremely precise and  
violent. Indeed  he assigned  to the real intellectual and  to the teacher a 
role incompatible with the purposes of the pedagogical reform of the 
regime. The intellectual, to Ortega, was characterised  by a sceptical 
attitude that unceasingly put all social norms and  th e status quo into 
question, doing this in a violent way which resembled  the activity of a 
butcher. As Marañon wrote about Vives, Ortega was therefore 
criticising the new cultural hegemony of his country for possibily 
ameliorating and  not for destroying it. As Ortega put it:  
 
El mundo con que el Intelectual se encuentra le parece estar ahí 
precisamente para ponerlo en cuestión. […] A primera vista parece que es 
un destructor y se le ve siempre con visceras de cosas entre las manos, 
como un matarife. Pero es todo lo contrario. El Intelectual no puede, 
aunque quiera, ser egoista respecto a las cosas. Se hace cuestión de ellas. Y 
esto es el síntoma máximo del amor  [OC, V: 628]. 
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6.6 Ortega’s isolat ion  
The ideal of the au thentic intellectual presented  by Ortega w as 
evidently incompatible with the Spanish cultural establishment that 
had  excluded  or marginalised  relevant intellectual figures for much less 
than this [Claret, 2006b]. As in the case of his books on history and  the 
Roman Empire, Ortega’s texts on Vives and  the role of the intellectual 
received  a similar, or worst, treatment. In fact, also the revista Escorial, 
which in general had  proved  to be receptive to his id eas [Ferrary, 1993: 
140-146], in this occasion d id  not express any attention to Ortega’s  
definition of a pecu liarly patriotic intellectual. The only case in which 
his concept of the intellectual is mentioned  is by referring to his 
Meditaciones del Quijote and , moreover, by trivialising his proposal and  
presenting the ideal of the intellectual as a saver of his own nation. 
This is the case, for instance, of the d iscourse pronounced  by the 
professor of History of Law at the University of Zaragoza, Minguijón y 
Adrián, at the Real Académia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas in Madrid . 
This text was so pop ular in relation to the way in which the intellectual 
of the new regime was conceived  that it was consid ered  as a cononic 
text to be read  by all the University student in the humanistic facu lties 
[Artigas, 1943] Accord ing to Minguijón, the intellectual should  have 
saved  his country by favouring the resurgence of the Christian 
trad ition and  by giving to it a new metaphysical order [Minguijón 
Adrian, 1941]. The new regime was conceiving the intellectual as an 
instrument of propagand a, and  the university educa tion as the place in 
which his teaching had  to construct a d ogmatic and  acritical vision of 
reality. Indeed , the reform of the University, in 1943, had  established  in 
the curricu lum of all the humanistic facu lties the creation of a three-
years course of political ed ucation, in which the stud ents should  have 
learnt the basic political and  cultural dogmas of the regime which 
could  not have been critically d iscussed
58
. The social reality should  
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have been explained  accord ing to metaphysical principles and  should  
have excluded  any sort of critical reflection. 
This was clearly incompatible with the idea purported  by Ortega 
accord ing to which the intellectual should  have to critically reflect on 
the most common linguistic and  social realities so that to reform the 
common and  uncritical opinions that the society imposed  to the 
ind ividuals
59
. In fact, accord ing to Ortega:  
 
Los decires del hombre, señores, van hoy a la deriva, y tras ellos va a la 
deriva todo su destino […]. Urge un poder espiritual nuevo, que no tiene 
por que ser estatal. Pero un poder espiritual es necesario [OC, IX: 312]. 
 
In contrast to the widespread  opinion represented  by Minguijón, 
Ortega affirmed  the necessity of considering social phenomena as 
totally human facts, without any trascendental featu re, since they are 
the product of a totally human activity. As a consequence, being the 
result of a human activity that does not ground  on metaphysical 
premises, the social reality and  the social norms d o possess the same 
ontological status. Thus, the intellectual would  not be the interpreter of 
a d ivine order, but rather of a totally human one. In spite of his veiled  
criticism against the cultural parad igm imposed  by the regime, the lack 
of a d irect attack to the new political power established  in Spain, h is 
prudent attitude, caused  to Ortega the condemnation of some of his old  
d isciples and  students who had  been exiled  in Argentina or in other 
Latin American country. In fact, the exiled  intellectual d id  not 
recognise in Ortega an interpreter of the new duty of intransigent 
opposition the exiled  should  have accomplished  in this new cultural 
and  political scenario. For instance, one of the most loyal friend  and  
d isciple of Ortega, the philosopher María Zambrano, during the years 
of the civil war d irectly attacked  his master’s attitude towards the 
regime, accusing him of being a conformist bourgeois proned  to be 
subjugated  by the regime [Zambrano, 1998: 130-133]. As a matter of 
fact, Ortega also vind icates, during the exile, his intellectual duty of 
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neutrality in relation to political questions
60
. A prudent attitude which 
determined  his progressive isolation from both the intellectual fronts: 
the one of the new Spanish establishment and  that of the old  republican 
friends, represented  by the intellectual of the exile. This caused  in 
Ortega a sense of complete isolation and  impotence. He felt as: 
«cayend o en los espacios interplanetarios sin saber a que agarrarme»
61
. 
The political neutrality always manifested  by the philosopher was 
conceived  by him as the necessary safety d istance that the intellectual 
should  have observed  in order to maintain a critical attitude towards 
the established  power. A theory that, as already said , he had  explained  
for the first time back in 1927, in his book on Mirabeau. This d oes not 
mean, as on the contrary he always affirmed , that d uring his exile he 
had  remained  silent without ind irectly but frequently expressing his 
own – broad ly speaking – political ideas. It just reveals that he 
preferred  not to be part of a political struggle, avoid ing any sort of 
d irect censorship that should  have definitely imped ed  him to play a 
role in the cultural debate of his country, hoping of reforming it from 
within. For this reason, he often practiced a sort of self-censorship
62
, not only 
during his exile in Argentina but also, and foremost, during his stay in 
Portugal. In the case of the Argentinean exile, it is possible to find  in his 
personal correspondence a lot of instances of Ortega’s acceptance of all 
the possible suggestions made by the official propaganda to “sweeten” 
his writings. And  also of his practice of self-censorship , as in the case of 
the letters he sent to his ed itor in Buenos Aires, Espasa Calpe, and  its 
d irector, Manuel Olarra.  
For instance, concerning his book entitled  Ideas y Creencias, he 
accepted  all the suggestions made by the official censorship, exhibiting 
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a totally collaborative attitude. As he wrote to Olarra: «Me hago muy 
bien cargo –scrive il filosofo – de la árdua faena que es el ejercicio de 
una d iscreta Censura y todos debemos coadyuvar a su posible 
perfección»
63
. However, in particu lar due to economic d ifficulties and  
personal d isagreements, finally the relation between Ortega and  Espasa 
Calpe came to an end
64
. He also chose not to publish during his life a lot 
of texts he had  written, such as the text of the conferences on Vives, in 
order not to appear as a subversive thinker that the regime had  to 
condemn. For this reason, the most d irect manifestations of opposition 
of Ortega to the regime can be found  in few words pronounced  d uring 
some conferences or lessons which were not conceived  for a big 
aud ience, but rather for restricted  circles. All his ed itorial projects, such 
as the new Argentinean project of his Revista de Occidente and  thenew 
collection of book, Biblioteca Conocimiento del Hombre, finally failed
65
 
[Campomar, 2010]. The same also happened  to another ed itorial project 
that Ortega was trying to realise during that period , the Enciclopedia 
Autodidáctica
66
. The constant intellectual failures and  the growing 
isolation he was experiencing determined  the final decision of the 
philosopher to nearing to Spain by moving to Portugal in February 
1942. There he continued  to observe with interest and  in a critical way 
the Spanish intellectual debate, offering his alternative position on the 
role of the intellectual and  education in society.  
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Chapter 7. 
Nearing Spain: the Lusitanian exile 
In 1942 Ortega came back to Europe. What should  be a provisional stay 
near the boarders of Spain , in Portugal, finally turned  out to be his 
home for more than 3 years, from the spring 1942 to the summer 1945. 
Also in the following years the philosopher would  officially reside in 
Lisbon, symbolically marking his d istance from the Franco’s regime. 
This period  of his life has always been considered , in continuity with 
the first years of his exile, as a period  of substantial absence and  silence 
in relation to the cultural debate that was taking place in his own 
country. However, both his public activities – such as conferences and  
writings – and  the personal relationships he maintained  with 
outstand ing figures of the Spanish cu ltural entourage, do reveal that 
Ortega continued  to develop his philosophical theory and  his educative 
practice in tight connection to what was happening in Spain. Moreover, 
he can also be said  to have actively contribu ted  to purport a significant 
transformation in the political and  cultural atmosphere of Spain in a 
period  in which the international scenario was drastically changing. For 
all these reasons, his Lusitanian exile can  be labelled  as an experimental 
period  of his life, ind ispensable for preparing  his return in Spain.  
This affirmation will be proved  firstly (§1) by analysing the reasons 
that determined  Ortega’s choice of returning in Europe and  stay in 
Portugal. For this purpose, they would  be taken into considerations the 
geopolitical characteristics that rendered  this country a suitable place 
for nearing – not only geographically speaking – Spain, and  develop 
fruitful relations with other Spanish intellectuals. After that they will be 
analysed  (§2) two significant writings of the philosopher published  in 
Spain during this period , both of which revealed  the strategy used  by 
Ortega to express his veiled  criticisms toward s the regime without 
being accused  of d irectly opposing to it. This will be proven in 
particu lar by considering (§3) his posture in relation to the Spanish 
academic system during those years. As it will be p roved , he d id  not 
renounce to the main pillars of his educative theory and , in a period  in 
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which a sceptical attitude d id  not find  any place inside the Spanish 
academia, he vind icated  the need  for the real intellectuals to intervene 
in the political debate in a d ifferent way. His main theses and  criticisms 
towards the regime will be illustrated  in particu lar (§4) by taking into 
consideration the course he gave at the Lisbon University in 1944, 
which was complemented  by (§5) a series of cultural initiatives that he 
tried  to realise in order to put into practice his theoretical meditations. 
While the WWII was approaching to an end , (§6) the international 
political scenario d id  significantly change and  all these transformations 
d irectly spilt into the Spanish political and  cultural life. Ortega  partially 
benefitted  from these mutations but at the same time (§7) the regime 
saw him as a possible instrument for acquiring a new international and  
democratic allure. The Madrilenian philosopher, in the meanwhile, (§8) 
was continu ing to reinforce his political and  cultural contacts, 
scrupulously preparing his return so to have the possibility of playing 
again a significant role within the Spanish academia.  
 
 
7. 1 Ortega in  Lisbon  
When Ortega moved  to Lisbon during the spring of 1942, Antonio 
Salazar’s d ictatorship had  already been in charge since more than 
fifteen years, since the coup d’état of May 28
th
 1926. Under such 
circumstances the cu ltural situation of the Country, accord ing to 
several scholars, resembled  to a gloomy wasteland  [Joâo Medina, 2004]. 
Indeed , there were very few, if any, cu ltural activities and  the political 
scenario was characterised  by an intense rad icalisation between 
“Salazarians” and  Marxists. On the contrary, from an international 
point of view, the formal neutrality of Portugal – even if somehow 
sympathetic with Franco’s regime [Rodríguez Garoz, 2005] – appeared  
to be much more cred ible to the international community in 
comparison to the Spanish case. This was due in particu lar to the 
critical positions end orsed  by Portugal since the very beginning of the 
II World  War [Kaczorowski, 2015]. Without any d oubt, this was one of 
the main reasons which brought Ortega to decide to move to Portugal, 
along with the possibility of nearing to his homeland . In this way he 
hoped  to finally have the chance to take part into the Spanish cultural 
debate, without abandoning his intellectual independ ence. Accord ing 
to the majority of his biographers, such period  of his life was generally 
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characterised  by ease and  tranquillity, that is, by those two basic 
conditions which, accord ing to him, would  have rend ered  possible an 
intensification of his philosophical activity [Herrero, 1991]. 
However, in spite of the very important d ifferences in relation to 
their international positions, Salazar’s regime had  a lot in common with 
Franco’s d ictatorship. Eve Giustiniani [2008: 733-735], for instance, 
pointed  ou t five basic features shared  by the two Mediterranean 
establishments: 1) an authoritarian character, 2) a military support to 
the political power, 3) the mobilisation of an ample variety of political 
and  social forces, 4) a steady process of fascist institutionalisation and  
lastly, 5) a reactionary ideology. 
Since the end  of the civil war Lisbon had  also welcomed a 
considerable number of Spanish intellectuals and  political figures with 
whom Ortega would  have the chance to get in touch during his three-
years exile in the Lusitanian country. Among them José Torán, Antonio 
Marichalar, the Count of Yebes, the eventual monarchy heir Juan de 
Bourbon, the Spanish ambassad or Nicolás Franco and  Eugenio Montes, 
the d irector of the Spanish Institute in Lisbon and  previously a student 
of Ortega, who supervised  his doctoral thesis. The cultural and  social 
milieu which surrounded  the philosopher during his Lusitanian exile 
was enriched  as well by the frequent visits of his sons and  friends  such 
as Julián Marías, Antonio Maravall and  Luis Díez del Corral. Thus 
during this period , Ortega received  an increasing amount of news 
about his homeland  and  started  to converse again, and  more intensely 
than during his Argentinean exile, with important  politicians and  
intellectuals. He had  strict relationships with those who were more 
akin to the regime and  with those who were trying to construct an 
opposing power by restoring the monarchy. For instance, in his late 
book about the reign of Juan de Bourbon, the first ministry of education 
of Franco’s regime, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, affirmed  that Ortega and  
the future king developed  a strong friendship during their common 
exile in Portugal. This friendship increased  over time, both before and  
after the famous Manifesto of Lausanne, written by Juan de Borbon in 
1945, w ith which the prince called  for an institutional change in the 
Country after the end  of WWII [Sáinz Rodríguez, 1981]
67
.  
Despite these influent friendships Ortega d id  not perceive himself 
as a politician and  d id  not want to actively participate neither in the 
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Portuguese nor in the Spanish political debate. On the contrary, he was 
far more interested  in playing an influent ial role into the cultural 
atmosphere of his Country, and  partially in Portugal; even if he was 
well-aware of the practical impossibility of doing it [Ferreira Patrício, 
2014]. As he wrote to his friend  Gregorio Marañon in May 1944, he had  
to face the most tragic experience that cou ld  occur to an intellectual: 
that of lacking the freedom of writing and , moreover, of lacking a 
proper publicity:  
 
Me desanima entrever que las cosas en que verdaderamente trabajo estos 
años van a tardar nucho en poderse publicar en España. Y no porqué sean 
tremebundas – siempre he detestado la tremebundez – sino porque se 
refieren precisamente a los temas hoy más perseguidos: lo que es el destino 
humano y lo que son las entrañas de la sociedad
68
. 
 
For this reason, he devoted  himself to study rather than writing or 
teaching, even if he d id  not abd icate completely to his intellectual 
function and  always maintained  a proactive attitude. Indeed , he was 
persuaded  that the proper mission he had  to accomplish as a 
philosopher was exactly that of comprehending the critical situation 
that not only Spain, but in general the whole Europe, was facing, and  of 
trying to define problems and  possible solutions. This, accord ing to 
Ortega, d id  not imply exclusively a political reform – which, in any 
case, was surely rendered  necessary by the end  of the global conflict. 
On the contrary, the most urgent problem to face was related  to the 
need  of a cultural change in relation to the habits, the mentalities, the 
common lives of the average men (as he wrote in the book La caza 
solitaria).  
Given the limitation of freedom of speech he was suffering during 
this period , and  in order to express his point of view without touching 
the most sensible nerves of the cultural orthod oxy of the regime, 
Ortega significantly decided  to ad opt a new communicative strategy: 
he moved  towards apparently more neutral themes, expressing 
through the veil of the futility his critical points of view .  
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7.2 The Lusitan ian  writ ings 
The strategy ad opted  by Ortega is patently evident by considering 
the very few works he published  during his Lusitanian exile. In  fact, 
apart from a new ed ition of some of his articles written during the late 
twenties, he only published  two new original works, both in 1943: the 
Prólogo a Veinte años de caza mayor del Conde de Yebes, and  the Prólogo a 
Aventuras del capitán Alonso de Contreras. The two prologues both focus 
on apparently frivolous topics, but it would  be a mistake not to notice 
the blatant strategy adopted  by Ortega to enter into the Spanish 
cultural debate through these writings. The first of them represents an 
essay on hunting. The second , on the other side, constitutes a reflection 
on the life of a sold ier and  a functionary of an absolutist State. The two 
topics were both of enormous interest for the Spanish public opinion. 
In fact, accord ing to a survey conducted  by the national Institute of 
Public Opinion during that year , the most interesting top ics in the 
opinion of the newspapers’ readers were precisely the war and  
hunting, followed  by sports news, articles and  chronicles about 
bullfights
69
. Evidently, Ortega manifested  the intention to continue to 
be a reference point for the Spanish public op inion, not only at its 
highest level, i.e. within the university system  where he was impeded  
to do this, but also and  foremost among the general aud ience. Through 
these writings he tried  to spread  his thought in pills , offering an 
heterodox perspective on very common and popular themes.  
For instance, the writing on hunting was a brief introduction to his 
anthropology, and  in particular to the notion of “vocational hobby”. 
This term is defined  by Ortega as the quest and  practice of a suitable 
d ivertissement, considered  as the most characteristic trait of human 
beings. In other words, each person, accord ing to Ortega, had  to find  
her own fulfilment in the practice of a freely chosen activity, not 
imposed  by any external law . Hunting is considered  in his writing as 
the best expression of this human tendency and  as a desire of escaping 
from the external world , from the daily routine, and  concentrating into 
an apparently unnecessary occupation. This anthropological 
consideration brings Ortega to take an ind irect move towards the 
political sphere. In fact, given this premise, human beings are 
considered  as irreducible entirely to their political, social or cultural 
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dimension. As it can be deduced  from his writing, this general outlook  
implies a strong critique of the idea of an absolu tist State in which the 
ind ividual lives would  only count insofar as they could  be useful to 
pursue the end s of the State.  
This is not the only interestin g aspect which emerges from the 
read ing of this prologue. In fact, Ortega’s analysis of the behaviour of 
the hunter represents the counterpart of what, accord ing to him, the 
philosophical aptitude should  ultimately be: a p red isposition of 
unceasingly reconsidering each problem without giving anything for 
granted . This represents, to him, the most important trait of the 
intellectual, and  it is exactly in force of this argument that he moves a 
critique to the cu ltural hegemonic habit of Franco’s establishment , i.e. 
the unquestioned  cult of the trad ition: 
 
En efecto, solo piensa de verdad  quien ante un problema, en vez de mirar 
sólo por derecho, hacia lo que el hábito, la trad ición, el tópico y la inercia 
mental harían presumir, se mantiene alerta, pronto a acep tar que la solución 
brinque del punto menos previsible en la gran rotundidad del horizonte. 
Como el cazador en el fuera absoluto que es el campo, el filósofo es el 
hombre alerta en el absoluto dentro de las ideas, que son también una selva 
indómita y peligrosa [OC, VI: 333].  
 
A similar veiled  critique to the basic features of the Franco’s cultural 
scenario can be noticed  also in his prologue to the life of Alonso de 
Contreras. The topic chosen by the philosopher in this writing is the 
biography of a professional sold ier. The romantic life of this adventurer 
represents to Ortega nothing more than the expression of the common 
living of a functionary of XVII century Spain. Antonio de Contreras is 
basically deprived  of an authentic vocation, being continuously  
engaged  in end less adventures without following his own will, but 
rather obeying to the strict impositions which flow from his social role. 
He simply served  the State Reason without questioning it, committing 
the worst crimes with a reckless d isregard  to their consequences. 
Contrary to this behaviour, that is the action for the sake of the action , 
which is the main trait of Contreras’ life, Ortega affirms the necessity of 
acting always for the sake of a personal end , looking for the realisation 
of one’s ow n vocation. The philosopher offers his very heterod ox point 
of view by changing the usual perspective: from the predominance of 
the State on the ind ividuals to the intrinsic value of human 
independence and  freedom.  
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This is likely to be considered  as a very scarce critique of a 
totalitarian or absolutist regime, but this seems to be what Ortega 
thought he cou ld  communicate to his readers in Spain at the  moment of 
his Lusitanian exile. Indeed , his worries about the effects of these 
writings on his reputation  were proved  by the fact that he preferred  to  
public his prologue on Contreras anonymously. In this new peculiar 
way, through a careful selection of the top ics and  a delicate prose , he 
tried  not to lose the grasp with his Spanish aud ience.  
 
7.3 A  crit ical spectator of the new University  
In add ition, it is possible to find  in  other writings and  conferences of 
this period  in Portugal, that  neither were published  in Spain nor during 
his life, some of the most interesting features of the evolution of 
Ortega’s thought during these years. In particu lar, one of the main 
problems which he continued  to analyse during this period  was the 
problem concerning the function of the intellectual and  education in 
society. This is a crucial question, insofar as it is exactly by considering 
it that it will also be possible to clarify what type of society Ortega was 
supporting during this period . The first instance of this tendency is 
given by the invitation of Julián Marías to write a short introduction to 
his book entitled  History of Philosophy (1942). Indeed , this offered  to 
Ortega the pretext for reflecting on the very role of the intellectual and  
the philosopher in society. 
Julián Marías had  been one of Ortega’s student during the 
beginning of the ‘30s, and  in his letters to  his professor he frequently 
recalls that period  of lost happiness. He considered  himself as one of 
the few real d isciples of the philosopher, who had  been the symbol of a 
free and  open-minded  university
70
. This aspect, accord ing to Marías, 
represented  the most valuable prod uct of the republican cultural 
trad ition epitomised  by Ortega. It was a trad ition that he thought it 
could  have been possible to restore: «la de la Facultad  nuestra; creo que 
ha sido algo real y valioso y que a pesar de las aparencias no está 
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muerta, por lo menos, la siento viva en mí»
71
. Ortega never recognized  
in Marías, at least during his Lusitanian exile, a real d isciple and  he 
always was extremely critical about all his attempts to speak on his 
own behalf. 
Ortega was indeed  particularly sceptical about the possibility of 
having a relevant role in the new Spanish intellectual scenario, and  for 
this reason he considered  utopian Marias’ belief of an eventual rebirth 
of the previous university atmosphere. However, he accepted  to write 
an introduction to his book, which time by time grew – as Ortega wrote 
to Marías – till the extension of a big book of 400 pages. In this text he 
formalised  some of the main reflections on philosophy of history. The 
final manuscript, currently preserved  at the Ortega’s archive, is awfully 
shorter then what Ortega declared . At the same time, it is extremely 
useful in order to comprehend  what, accord ing to him, the proper 
activity of the philosopher should  have been.  
In these pages it is possible to notice a d irect critique to the 
dogmatism of the new Madrilenian Faculty of Philosophy, where the 
critical thinking had  been substituted  by a very rigid  orthod oxy. Ortega 
knew he was the constant target of some of the most aggressive attacks 
of the new establishment, in particular by some of the catholic 
members of the regime. One of the lead ing figures of this catholic 
group was without any d oubt the Jesuit Joaquín Iriarte who vivid ly 
attacked  the main ideas of Ortega, without even critically assessing his 
thought due to the fact that, accord ing to him, it was absolutely null  
[Iriarte, 1941: 102]. He d id  this in a series of articles published  in Razón 
y Fe in 1941 and  then collected  in a book in the following year
72
.  
The theses purported  in that book had  a relevant influence within 
the catholic propaganda against Ortega during the ‘40s, becoming 
widely accepted  among the advocates of the cu lture of the New Spain
73
 
which began to identify in the philosopher an opponent of the nation
74
. 
Accord ing to Iriarte, Ortega was the symbol of the philosopher 
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«incredulo»
75
, without any sort of faith or belief, and  he consequently 
represented  the worst example of the sceptical ap titude in philosophy.  
The response of Ortega to these critics lies precisely on the Epilogue 
of Philosophy which significantly begins with an attack to the 
dogmatism and  a defence of scepticism as an intellectual habit since:  
 
El que presume poder instalarse en una doctrina antigua – y me refiero, 
claro está, solo a quien se da cuenta de lo que hace – sufre una ilusión óptica 
[…] Si no podemos alejarnos de las filosofías preteritas no tenemos más 
remedio que intentar ed ificarnos otra [OC, IX: 584]. 
 
For this reason it is necessary, accord ing to Ortega, to develop  a 
critical thinking and  to question all the d ogmas in order to construct a 
more solid  philosophy. Therefore, scepticism is considered  as the 
constant exercise of thought that each authentic philosopher should  
always practice. Ortega, in tracing the history of philosophy, attributes 
the word  “scepticism” a specific meaning: i.e. the correct philosophical 
practice that the authentic investigator  d oes realise. Starting from this 
premise he develops a strong critique to the professionalization of 
philosophy which would  have reduced  this critical activity to a 
functionary role. Contrary to any sort of scholasticism within the 
academia, the notion of philosophy that he purports in this writing is 
therefore that of a vocational practice which should  never be 
completely institu tionalised  and  never become a mere profession. Had  
it happened , the intellectual would  have lost his ability to positively 
contribute to the development of new ideas, to critically question the 
established  power. This would  produce the reduction of philosophy to 
an activity of mere repetition of imposed  dogmas lacking a true 
meaning for the single ind ividual as well as for  the whole society.  
The most evident instance of this phenomenon of bureaucratisation, 
accord ing to the philosopher, would  be given by language, which 
could  be at the same time the most powerful and  generalised  social use 
as well as the most significant expression of one’s own ideas, feelings 
and  ind ividuality. In fact: «la lengua es precisamente lo que el 
ind ividuo no crea sino que halla establecido en su contorno social. […]  
Hablar es, por lo pronto, usar una vez más ese uso significativo, decir lo 
que ya se sabe, lo que todo el mund o sabe, el consabido». But, at the 
                                                          
75
 J. Iriarte, La novísima visión de la filosofía en Ortega y Gasset , in Razón y Fe, 127, 
1943, p . 117. 
  
244 
same time: «Sólo uno mismo tiene a la vista la “nueva cosa” y, al elegir 
un vocablo para nombrarla, sólo uno entiende éste. Asistimos, pues, a 
una función del lenguaje que es lo contrario de la lengua o hablar de la 
gente o decir lo consabido» [OC, IX:616].  
So, Ortega clearly d istingu ishes among a social and  a personal use 
of the language
76
. This d istinction, considering the context in which 
Ortega elaborated  it, also implies a very neat duality between two ways 
of being a professor: as a mere functionary or as a proper thinker. His 
critique to the scholasticism d irectly reflects his preoccupation towards 
the growing relevance of a dogmatic form of philosophising within the  
new Spanish academia. It is also worthy to remember the fact that, 
during this very period , Ortega was developing a more vivid  interest 
for etymology. Indeed  he considered  it as the most powerful means to 
critically reflect on language as a social use
77
. To summarise, it is 
possible to affirm that the attention devoted  to this problem emerges as 
a sort of side effect of Ortega’s confrontation with the new intellectual 
regime of Franco’s university. Indeed , the Epilogue of Philosophy 
constitutes a d ialogue between Ortega and  his main critics in Spain, a 
d ialogue in which he defends his own positions and  calls for a 
restoration of an authentic intellectuality in his Country. The one that 
the propagand a of the regime was contribu ting to annihilate. 
 
 
7.4 Teachin g again : a paradigm at ic course 
Between the end  of November and  the beginning of December 1944 
Ortega gave some lectures at the University of Lisbon which formed 
the course entitled  La razón histórica. This would  have represented  
another very significant instance of the intellectual posture of the 
philosopher during his Lusitanian exile. This series of lessons had  been 
rendered  possible thanks to the mediation of Vitorino Nemesio and  
Oliveira Guimarães, the d irector of the Lisbon  Faculty of Literature and  
Philosophy. Nemesio informed Ortega that, given the political 
sensitivity of the topic, he had  previously asked  for an opinion 
concerning the viability of inviting him to speak about this matter 
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directly to the office of the Minister of National Education. Everything 
would  have been supervised  by the Policía de Vigilancia y Defensa del 
Estado
78
.  
Ortega knew that his words would  have been heard  not only  in 
Lisbon, but also in Madrid . As a matter of fact, the very Spanish 
Minister of Education, Ibáñez Martín, was constantly informed of 
Ortega’s lectures. Indeed , the 30
th
 November 1944 he received  a letter 
from the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon concerning the first of Ortega’s 
lesson, which was very scru pulously detailed  both in its contexts and  in 
its reception
79
.  
Given the personal sympathy of the d irector of the Spanish Institute 
in Lisbon, Eugenio Montes, towards Ortega, the report would  clearly 
be favourable to the philosopher. The lessons of Ortega were of public 
domain in Spain, thanks to a serious of articles which appeared  in the 
main newspapers of the time, such as ABC, Nueva España and , 
Informaciones
80
. In fact, in spite of his apparent fu tility , the top ic chosen 
by Ortega was of great relevance within the new academic scenario in 
which the narration of the past had  become a matter of political control. 
Moreover, the constant attacks against the historical aptitude of Ortega 
constituted  one of the main concerns of his critics within the Faculty of 
Philosophy of Madrid , where he was constantly reproached  for lacking 
an ontological and  metaphysical point of view in the study of history
81
, 
as alread y seen in chapter 5.  
There are at least four main features of Ortega’s acad em ic course on 
historical reason that give an hint of the relevance of this text in relation 
to the political context and  of his subversive posture in regard  to the 
Spanish cu ltural scenario. Indeed , in this essay it is possible to find : a) a 
critique to the current political situation; b) a d irect attack to the 
university community; c) an analysis of the reasons for the crisis of the 
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intellectual; d ) a set of basic guidelines for promoting a  new upheaval 
of the intellectual in society. 
Regard ing the first of these aspects, Ortega show s to be aware of the 
fact of being speaking to a far more larger aud ience than the one that 
was attend ing to his lessons in Lisbon. For this reason he takes the 
chance to d irectly communicate to his eventual aud ience in Spain and , 
broad ly speaking, w ithin the international scenario. This is proved  by 
the fact that d uring the third  of his six conferences he pauses his 
d iscourse about the role of the intellectual in society to read  in minute 
details – something quite unusual to him – a text in which he 
reproaches the international lack of recognition of th e right of 
neutrality. As usual, he speaks in a quite ambiguous way. However, 
the main points of his arguments can be summarised  as follows: 1) the 
international community should  safeguard  the existence of th e basic 
political and  economic right of neutrality among the nations; 2) the 
neutrality of Spain during the II World  War should  be internationally 
recognised ; 3) the States should  respect this right in relation to the 
activities of their citizens, not intervening in their personal affairs
82
.  
Whether the first two considerations constitute an overt defence of 
Spain in relation to the international scenario, the last constitu tes a 
reproach to his country as well as to Britain , given by the fact that 
Ortega d isapproved  the intrusive control of the postal service, which 
had  affected  him personally, at least from 1939, as revealed  to him by 
his friend  Fernand o Vela
83
. Ortega’s statements clearly reveal an 
attempt made by the philosopher to legitimate his own count ry in the 
post-war scenario from an international point of view , while remaining 
critical as far as the internal cultural and  economic policies were 
concerned . 
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Indeed , his critique to the lack of neutrality from an economic 
perspective represents also a cr itique to the autarchic and  monopolistic 
market developed  during the first phase of Franco’s regime
84
. A policy 
that the very Caudillo, some months later in June 1945, would  have 
partially stigmatised  within a new political scenario in which the 
totalitarian powers had  already collapsed
85
. Indeed , as Richards [1998: 
95] put it: «autarky was a freely chosen option selected  by primarily for 
ideological reasons». So, even if in this occasion Ortega partially 
defends the foreign policy of the regime, nevertheless he does not 
renounce to his liberal standpoint both about politics and  economics. 
Accord ing to him, the duty of the State should  have always been that of 
not intervening within the private and  economic sphere of its citizens, 
to which a minimum level of freedom should  always be guaranteed  
independently of the government in power
86
. 
When he pronounced  this words in Lisbon , during November 1944, 
the war was just coming to its end : the Normand y land ings of June 
1944, the Russian offensive in the Balkan region and  the Allies 
campaign in Italy had  started  to determine a progressive reduction of 
the Axis’ power. In this context the recognition of Spanish neutrality 
during the war was clearly crucial for the purposes of the regime and , 
in general, beneficial to the country. Ortega does not remain silent 
during this period . On the contrary, he was trying to obtain some 
recognition in his country in which, as already seen, he still wanted  to 
be part of an intellectual and  cultural community. For this reason , he 
publicly endorsed  the foreign policy of the regime.  
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However, this constituted  only one of the most relevant features of 
Ortega’s course in relation to the political and  cultural context of the 
period . Indeed , whereas he manifests his acquaintance towards the 
Spanish foreign policy, at the same time he reproaches its cu ltural 
internal policy. He d irectly attacks the university system by pointing 
out that the intellectual had  passed  from being a gu ide for his nation, to 
simply being one of its functionary. This fact determined  a complete 
loose of the authentic role of the professors who renounced  to be 
masters for the future generations, thinking exclusively to the 
realisation of their personal, social and  economical ambitions. 
Regard ing to this point Ortega’s critique is twofold : on the one hand  he 
criticises the submissive role of the University in respect to the political 
power and , on the other, he criticises the impoverished  academic 
d iscourse about the most urgent philosophical and  social questions. 
Accord ing to him, the University should  have played  a more important 
role in society, both by orienting the decision makers and  by 
ameliorating the cond itions of the masses: «La Universidad  no es un 
colegio – no es ni siqu iera solo para los estud iantes. Toda la nación 
debe vivir, más o menos, la vida universitaria y lo sensible es que a ella 
tengan d ificultad  para asistir los obreros con mente alerta» [OC, 
IX:655]. Contrary to the francoist University, conceived  as a place for 
propagating a dogmatic ed ucation to a restricted  – both qualitative and  
numerically speaking – élite, Ortega proposed  a completely d ifferent 
normative aim for this institution. So, also in this period  he d id  not 
renounce to his democratic ideal of University which he purported  in 
his Mission of University more than fifteen years before. Moreover, he 
considers that the academicians who were workin g within this new 
University were not up to their role, as demonstrated  by the fact that: 
«los que hablan a toda hora de lo colectivo no revelan tener noción 
alguna clara sobre lo que esa palabra significa ni sobre los problemas 
que ella incluye y arrastra» [OC, IX:651]. 
Ortega moves a critique both to the cultural Spanish scenario and , 
more generally speaking, to the growing d istancing of the intellectual 
from the society. This separation was due, accord ing to the 
philosopher, to the crisis of the intellectual which started  from the 
beginning of the XX century and  which produced  a complete d ismissal 
of his importance within the general aud ience as well as within the 
political elites. Both the citizens and  the governors had  renounced  to 
the suggestions of the intellectual, till the point of considering 
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absolutely superfluous his very existence. As Ortega put it, this 
situation had  determined  the will of comp letely eliminating the 
intellectual from the human life, conceived  both from a personal and  a 
political point of view
87
: «Los intelectuales han pasad o de serlo tod o a 
no ser nad a» [OC, IX:631]. It is possible to notice in this moan a neat 
resentment toward s his melancholy condition. His role within Spain, 
especially in comparison to the ‘30s, had  been significantly limited , the 
University appeared  to be no longer interested  in his works and  
everything that came up  from his philosophical framework was 
strongly criticised  as an heterodox and  d angerous point of view. 
However, he d id  not renounce to play a role in this context and  in this 
text he explicitly sets the main traits of what could  have represented  his 
own intellectual activity in the country.  
This constitu tes the fourth and  last of the features mentioned  at the 
beginning of this paragraph: the definition of the function of 
intellectual in society. Accord ing to Ortega, the intellectual should  
always freely express his opinions and  always be an example for the 
whole community. For this reason, contrary to the current state of 
affairs and  the condition of the University which was dominated  by a 
dogmatic nationalism, he thought that the philosopher should  have 
opted  for exercising his role not as a profession within the University 
but as a vocational activity. Furthermore, the intellectual had  the duty 
of not obeying to the political power and  neither to the public op inion. 
The intellectual, as Ortega put it, is by his own nature, unpopular , and  
his mission is that of amending public opinion in order to free the 
citizens from their mistakes
88
.  
This general description provided  by Ortega does imply some 
relevant consequences in relation to the concrete possibility of the 
intellectual to be effective in society. In particular, if the philosopher 
lacks both the political and  the popular support his efficacy would  
clearly be extremely reduced . In other words, if the intellectual were 
not helped  neither by an institutional nor by a civil support, how could  
he really intervene in a significant way within society? The answer to 
this question is qu ite naïvely provided  by Ortega, but it clearly reveals 
his own purposes: accord ing to him the philosopher has to consider 
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himself as a outsider and  the only instrument he possesses to 
effectively produce a change within society is his own speech.  
He would  have to strenuously oppose and  criticise the institutional 
regime if it was needed  and , at the same time, he would  have to seduce 
the general aud ience in order to gain its respect not by saying what 
people want him to say, but rather by convincing them of his own 
point of view: «He aquí, esbozado en su fond o y en su forma, para qué 
están ahí los intelectuales, qué es lo que han venido a hacer sobre la 
tierra: oponerse y seducir» [OC, IX: 652]. Opposing and  persuad ing. 
This, accord ing to Ortega, is what the intellectual had  to do d uring 
those years, and  this is what he himself w ould  have tried  to do. He 
affirmed  and  put into practice his theory, considering  that when the 
philosophical activity is rad ically put into question and  deteriorated , as 
in the case of the Franco’s University, the only thing that he could  
meaningfully do would  be reacting against this state of affairs since: 
«Cuand o la situación sufre un cambio rad ical […] la filosofía no tiene 
más remedio que ser una reacción también rad ical» [OC, IX: 663].  
Put it d ifferently, he thought that the only philosophical solutions to 
the current political problem should  have been that of enhancing the 
research of rational solu tions also during irrational times, given the fact 
that men always are exposed  to the risk of descending to a condition of 
brutality: «La razón o racionalid ad  es un imperative inexorable del 
hombre, una llamad a o grito que resuena en su más profund a y 
auténtica intimid ad  haciéndole llegar el mand ato: tienes que ser 
racional» [OC, IX: 700]. 
 
 
7.5 Cu ltural act iv it ies 
In spite of the theoretic defence of the intellectual isolation 
purported  by Ortega, the Madrilenian philosopher was aware of the 
necessity of find ing a minimum of consensus and  social recognition in 
order to play a critical role within society in an effective way. For this 
reason, he maintained frequent relations with a lot of the members of the 
cultural and political establishment of his country, and in particular with 
those who were starting to seriously put into question, quite more often for 
personal rather than for ideological reasons, the absolute rigidity of the regime. 
A proof of the strong will of the philosopher to take part into the 
cultural debate is the long series of cultural activities that Ortega 
carried  out soon after returning in Europe. During his exile in Portugal 
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he tried  to establish a plan of intervention through the publication of 
cultural reviews, in particular thanks to a new ed itor project he was 
trying to build  up: Azar. For this purpose he contacted  several of his 
d isciple who had  remained  in Madrid  during this period  to realise this 
project, such as Julián Marías, Fernand o Vela (who was in Tangier), 
and  Rodríguez Huéscar, but obtaining limited  support. Through his 
son, José Ortega Spottorno, he also tried  to persuade the censorship of 
the Francoist establishment to permit this publication. This is revealed  
by a letter of his son to Santiago Montero Díaz who acted  as a mediator 
between Ortega and  the d irector of the Propagand a, Gabriel Arias 
Salgado
89
. Moreover, in a personal note he sent to Manuel Halcón, 
responsible of the Consejo de Hispanidad, he underlined  that through this 
review he wanted  to continue to act as a liberal intellectual, and  that he 
was absolutely sure of the fact that: «lo único y lo más que al presente se 
puede intentar para conseguir un comienzo de nueva influencia era 
operar sobre el flanco con una labor nad a ruid osa y soliviantad ora, 
pero que sostuviese y, tal vez, impusiese por la superiorid ad  y 
duración de sus esfuerzos».  
Indeed  he thought it would  have been possible to obtain a new 
intellectual relevance only through a very precise critique to specific 
aspects of the regime: «No puede pensarse hoy por hoy en otra clase de 
eventual influencia que la que provenga del orden intellectual y aun 
esta solo podría obtener alguna probabilidad  de buen éxito si  se incoa 
en muy determinado y reducido modo»
90
. He was persuaded  that the 
only possibility to skew in the society of that time would  have been that 
of realising a prominent intellectual activity. For d oing this he should  
have to counter both the public opinion and  the established  power, 
offering an independent and  critical point of view in a time of political 
rad icalisation. This aptitud e was clearly expressed  in all of his works 
published  and  written during his Lusitanian exile.  
During all this period  he tried  to identify possible allies to realise his 
projects, w ithout d iscard ing the possibility of fin d ing a concrete 
support and  some spaces of freedom for his intellectual activity  inside 
the very regime. However, albeit the initial support of Halcón and  the 
d irector of the Instituto Español del Libro, José Pemartín, the project will 
be blocked  by the negative opinion of the Jord ana-Sousa, Foreign 
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ministry of Franco’s regime among 1942 and  1944
91
. So, the ed itorial 
project of Azar did  not obtain the support of the regime, neither 
economically nor ideologically, and  Ortega faced  several d ifficulty in 
publishing only one book at the end  of 1943 – Homo Ludens. However, 
Ortega’s desire to return to be a lead ing voice able to guide the Spanish 
public op inion had  not d isappeared .  
In March 1945, thanks to the mediation with the regime of his son 
José Ortega Spottorno, the Revista de Occidente scheduled  the publishing 
of the Complete Works of the philosopher. But also this new project 
was realised  with extreme d ifficulty and  not without the oppressive 
control of the regime, and  a far completed  ed ition of his works was 
started  to be published  only almost two years later, in 1946-47
92
. The 
first ed ition of the first volume was limited  to 4000 copies
93
. In the 
following years, after a long pause in 1947, due to health problems, 
[Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 480] he intensified  his public interventions and  
founded  new intellectual projects. Amon g them, the most interesting 
would  be that of the Institute of Humanities he founded  in Madrid  in 
1948.  
 
7.6 The new  in ternat ional scenario 
The possibility to intervene in the cultural debate was also offered  to 
the philosopher by the external conditions imposed  to the national 
politics by the end  of the war. In particular, the changes in the global 
political situation, which had  recently been determined  by the end  of 
the second  World  War, opened  the way to the possibility of new and  
unexpected  scenarios within the Spanish cultural politics.  
The end  of the war and  the defeat of the Axis in the following year 
determined  significant changes both from an international and  a 
national point of view. Ind eed , the Yalta conference, which took place 
in February 1945, set the basis of a new international balance of power. 
Franco’s regime, considered  as d irectly linked  to the fascist ideology, 
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was ind irectly condemned  in that occasion by the three m ain political 
powers in the final declaration of the conference which states that:  
 
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister 
of the United  Kingdom and  the President of the United  States of America 
have consulted  with each  other in the common interests of the people of 
their countries and  those of liberated  Europe. They jointly declare their 
mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period  of instability in 
liberated  Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the 
peoples liberated  from the domination of Nazi Germany and  the peoples of 
the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their 
pressing political and  economic problems
94
. 
 
Thus, in this new international state of affairs, Franco’s regime 
would  have represented  just a temporary form of government which 
should  have shortly been replaced  by a democratic one. Not 
surprisingly, all the d ifferent Spanish political forces which had  been 
continuing to organise themselves abroad  saw in this statement the 
possibility of restoring either a republican or a monarchical power in 
the country. Both the republican government exiled  in Paris and  the 
Prince, Juan de Borbón, who was at that moment in Portugal, thought 
that, thanks to the international contribution, Franco’s regime was 
finally coming to an end .  
In particular, the possible heir to the Spanish throne, a month after 
this declaration, the 19 March 1945, published  in Lausanne his 
Manifesto against the regime, calling for the restoration of the monarchy 
in Spain. In this text he speaks d irectly to the Spanish population, but at 
the same time he d ialogues with those foreign political leaders who 
preferred  not to intervene in Spain because of the risk of determining a 
second  and  more dramatic civil war. For this reason , Juan de Borbón 
underlined  both the antid emocratic character of Franco’s regime and  
the extremism of the Republic, and  identified  with the monarchy the 
only political power which could  have been able to guarantee the pea ce 
within a democratic institu tional framework
95
. The total incompatibility 
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of the Monarchy with Franco’s regime had  been previously declared  by 
the very Prince during an epistolary interchange with the d ictator  in 
1943-1944. In fact, immediately after the fall of Mussolini in the summer 
of 1943, Juan de Borbón had  written to Franco to formally asking him to 
renounce to his power
96
. In 1945, the heir to the throne clearly changed  
his strategy and  decided  to leave apart the personal suasion of the 
d ictator preferring to publicly call for the collaboration of the 
population and  the international forces.  
The Manifesto had  a good  echo outside the Spanish border, but 
obtained  very few results. Apart from the demission of the Duque of 
Alba as the Spanish ambassad or in Great Britain, it neither produced  
evident reactions against Franco’s regime, nor determined  the step back 
of the d ictatorship  that the international community expected . The 
common wish of removing Franco from his power was indeed  
expressed  at the end  of the San Francisco Conference the 26
th
 June 1945 
and  then in the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference of the following 
month in which the regime was explicitly condemned  for its 
antidemocratic trait [Sola Ayape, 2015]. This decision would  have been 
reiterated  also by the Assembly of the United  Nations the 9
th
 February 
1946 which determined  that no international recognition and  support 
could  have been conced ed  «to States whose regimes have been 
installed  with the help of armed  forces of countries which hav e fought 
against the United  Nations so long as these regimes are in power»
97
.  
Following the creation of the UN , another international organization 
appeared  in the same year: the UNESCO. The UNESCO was funded  in 
London the 16
th
 November 1945 at the end  of a long plenary meeting of 
                                                                                                                               
peligro; y una nueva República, por moderada que fuera en sus comienzos e 
intenciones, no tardaría en desplazarse hacia uno de los extremos, reforzando 
así al otro, para terminar en una nueva guerra civil. Sólo la monarquía 
trad icional puede ser instrumento de paz y de concord ia para reconciliar a los 
españoles; sólo ella puede obtener respeto en el exterior, mediante un efectivo 
estado de derecho, y realizar una aromniosa síntesis del orden y la libertad  en 
que se basa la concepción cristiana del Estado». Manifesto of Lausanne, in 
Sainz Rodríguez, 1981: 324. 
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the Conference of A llied Ministers of Education
98
. This organisation began 
its activity in 1942, in the middle of the war, thanks to the in terest of the 
British minister of Education Richard  Austen Butler
99
. The UNESCO 
was created  with a neat political target, that was to promote a new 
culture of peace which could  have been able to contrast the 
propagandistic education of the Axis, offering an attractive model from 
an economic, sp iritual and  cultural point of view for the post -war 
period
100
. This aim is clearly stated  in its very Constitution. The article 
1.1 in particular declares that:  
 
The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and  security by 
promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and 
culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law 
and  for the human rights and  fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for 
the peoples of the world , without d istinction of race, sex, language or 
religion, by the Charter of the United  Nations
101
. 
 
The primary interest of the UNESCO was that of supporting via , an 
educational program, the end  of the UN, favouring a global 
alphabetisation aimed  at setting the bases of the cu lture of peace
102
. 
Spain was initially exclud ed  to this organisation, as well as from the 
UN and  the European recovery Program of the following years.  
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To contrast this very d angerous attack, Franco opted  for a formal 
restyling of the government, changing several ministers and  approving 
a new general law which cou ld  have given an appearance of 
democracy to his regime: the Fuero de los Españoles, officially approved  
by the Cortes the 17
th
 July 1945. In this text, some of the basic human 
and  civil rights of the modern liberal democracy were officially 
recognized , but exclusively from a very formal point of view. Indeed , 
all the articles concerning freedom of speech, reunion, postal secret, 
and  freedom of movement were explicitly subjected  to possible 
changes, as stated  in article 35 of the Fuero
103
. In this way, the very 
legislation of the country was indeed  a formalisation and  perpetuation 
of a de facto State of exception which characterised  the despotic power 
of Franco. The new image presented  to the internat ional community 
after WWII was far from being considered  democratic. The apparent 
d rastic change had  finally ended  up in a simple make-up of the regime 
[Tusell, 1984], which implied  also some changes in relation to the 
members of the government, with the inclusion of some ministers 
which belonged  to Catholic association. In  this context the Church 
represented  the only source of legitimacy to the regime within the 
international scenario [Casanova, 2005]. For this reason, Franco 
nominated  Martín Artajo, which came from the Asociación Católica, as 
the new Foreign minister of his post-war government. In this way the 
d ictator started  to move towards a formal rejection of the fascist 
principles, leaving apart, at least formally, the ideology of the Falange.  
 
7.7 Ortega as a polit ical resource  
The new apparently democratic outlook of the regime d id  not 
persuade the majority of the members of its ow n establishment. In 
particu lar, many of them  thought that the new “democracia organica” 
proposed  by Franco – a term used  for describing his paternalistic and  
authoritarian form of governm ent
104
 – was substantially unacceptable 
both accord ing to the ideology of the Falange and  for the international 
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community. Franco used  this term for the first time during an interview 
he realised  for the United Press the 7
th
 November 1944, while partially 
opening to the possibility of a popular referendum on the opportunity 
to establish a form of monarchical power
105
. Accord ing to him, Spain 
represented  a very peculiar form of democracy, the one which consists 
in: «la ejecución del Evangelio, que nosotros fielm ente perseguimos»
106
. 
Not all the members of the establishment shared  the same view 
purported  by the General, who was persuaded  that his government 
could  have remained  into power desp ite the international pressure. The 
most patent manifestation of this internal d issension is given by the 
letter sent to Franco by his former Foreign minister Serrano Suñer on 3
rd
 
September 1945. Suñer had  been one of the most relevant supporters of 
fascism during the previous decades, and  his opinion was highly 
respected  by the most devoted  members of the Falange [Garriga, 1986]. 
In his letter he presented  to the d ictator the possibility of an eventual 
operation of the Allies w ithin the Spanish borders, inviting Franco to 
abandon his political role:  
 
No se puede ahora inventar una Falange democrática y aliadófila sin faltar 
a aquel respeto. […] Ayer fuimos nosotros los posibles salvadores. Dejemos 
que hoy lo sean quienes pueden serlo. Adopte el Estado una nueva 
fisionomía, pero de verdad  y sin pueriles malabarismos
107
.  
 
In the same letter, Suñer suggested  to Franco to leave the power to 
new political figures which could  have likely been approved  by the 
international community, such as Gregorio Marañon, Cambó or the 
very Ortega y Gasset [Serrano Suñer, 1977]. In a following interview, 
during the 80s, Suñer revealed  that after that letter he met Franco, who 
showed his scepticism about the possibility for the philosopher of being 
a good  minister for the new government
108
. This d id  not mean neither 
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that Ortega wanted  to participate in any government nor that he was 
d irectly informed of this possibility. On the contrary, it simply reveals 
the fact that the international and  internal conditions in which Spain 
was lying during those years insinuated  to some outsiders  of the 
Franco’s establishment the need  of a rad ical change toward s a real 
democratic government. In this sense, Ortega y Gasset was perceived 
as a possible resource. 
This was evidently stated  by the right-wing newspaper Arriba in the 
occasion of the return of the philosopher in Sp ain d uring the summer 
1945
109
. Accord ing to the author of this article: «El reencuentro del 
hueso y la sangre con el paisaje y alma de la Patria sera más gozoso 
todavía cuando vida e Historia sean una sola. España está aquí y es, 
justamente, lo que es. Y, porque lo es, Ortega vuelve a ella»
110
. This 
words reveal the instrumental use the regime intended to do of Ortega, whose 
mere presence in Spain could have been perceived as a blatant demonstration 
of his support to the status quo. However, as it has been proven, it is more 
likely to be the case that Ortega envisaged  the possibility of supporting 
a restoration of the Monarchy rather than the persistence of Franco into 
power [Giustiniani, 2008: 926-930]. The political situation seemed to be 
headed  towards this new institutional change. Anyway, the d ictator 
d id  not step back from his power, in sp ite of the growing international 
pressing against his regime. He succeeded  in surviving to this 
international situation  in particu lar by underling the anticommunist 
                                                                                                                               
del momento, aunque sea sólo por instinto de conservación, yo no sería quien 
te aconsejara que de pronto d ieras un salto en el vacío y d ijeras: ahí queda eso. 
Pero una cosa es no dar el salto en el vacío, no entregarse sin más, y otra 
desconocer la realidad  cierta de que no se puede seguir así, de que así esto va a 
acabar mal”. Entonces comentamos algunos puntos de mi carta. Le hablé de los 
hombres nuevos que yo proponía como gobernantes: “Sí, hombres cuyo 
nombre tiene eco y resonancia en el mundo, porque hoy en d ía, Marañón, 
Ortega y Cambó son personas internacionalmente conocidas, a la inversa de 
estos ilustres seudofalangistas o tecnócratas, que no conoce nad ie”. Fue 
entonces cuando él, que era muy dado a la anécdota, me pregu nta: “¿Tú  crees 
que Ortega valdría para ministro?”. Y añadía: “Yo creo que sería un mal 
ministro”. Y yo le d ije: “Es un hombre eminente de quien puede esperarse una 
gran obra, y si resultara que lo administrativo y burocrático le aburrieran, ya le 
pondríamos un buen subsecretario”. In Saña, 1981: 282-285. 
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and  catholic character of Spain in a period  in which the cold  war 
appeared  as the new conundrum of international politics.  
When Ortega decided  to return back to his homeland  he could  not 
pred ict the d irection of the national politics in the following months, 
but he was certainly aware that in order to have a minimum space of 
intellectual freedom he had  to accept to have close relationships with 
those members of the establishment who where contributing to the 
political make-up  of the regime. His son, for instance, [Ortega 
Spottorno, 1983: 176] remembered  that during that period  his father 
had  the possibility to meet in at least two d ifferent occasions three very 
important members of the regime: Fernando María Castiella, José Félix 
Lequerica and  José María de Areilza, respectively the d irector of the 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos, the former foreign minister and  a loyal 
Falangist.  
All of them shared  a significant expertise concerning foreign policies 
issues. These meetings demonstrate that Ortega was conceived  by the 
regime as a very useful instrument in order to gain international 
respect and  cred ibility during a period  of d ramatic isolation. It is also 
plausible that Ortega knew he could  be helpful in this respect, agreeing 
not to d irectly opposing the regime in  a way that could  have damaged  
its foreign policy. This is what he actually d id , as it has been previously 
demonstrated  by analysing his writings and  speeches. He probably d id  
so in order to have the possibility of playing again an intellectual 
influence in the country, exercising a soft power he was sure – as it will 
be proved  in the next pages – it cou ld  have produced  important results.  
 
7.8 Preparing the in tellectual return  
In the meantime, this international situation  was producing some 
ad justments in the Spanish cultural world . In sp ite of conserving a very 
rigid  censorship and  a very strong repressive apparatus, the same 
establishment of the regime revealed  some little signs of moderate 
appeasement. These tiny signs appeared  more evident within the ar ts 
and  the painting [Gracia, 2006], whether, as far as the philosophical 
production is concerned , they showed up in particu lar via the 
permission conceded  to the Revista de Occidente to ed it again its books. 
This represented  a sort of appeasement between the regime and  
Ortega’s family which was epitomised  by the publication, in 1945, of a 
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collection of essays written by García Morente d uring his whole life
111
. 
That is to say, both before and  after his conversion to Catholicism and  
his endorsement to the regim e. Four of the nine essays published  in this 
occasion d irectly concerned  the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset and  the 
majority of them dealt specifically with his theory of ed ucation. 
Moreover, Morente was presented in the prologue, written by Manuel Granell, 
as one of the last d irect d isciples of Ortega, having the «id oneid ad  para 
la comprensión y exposición de los logros metafísicos de Ortega»
112
. A 
quite obscure sentence which evidently affirms that Morente’s 
interpretation of Ortega’s thought cou ld  have been  considered  as the 
most suitable read ing for the philosophical scholasticism and  catholic 
dogmatism endorsed  by the new University of the regime. Evidently, 
the return of Ortega in Spain had  to be scrupulously prepared  in order 
to obtain the desired  effect. 
This partial breach in the cultural atmosphere of the regime and  the 
prudent preparation of Ortega’s return are also proved  by the creation 
of some new cultural reviews such as Cuadernos de Adán and  La Estafeta 
Literaria, both funded  between 1944 and  1945. In particular, the first of 
these two review s gave quite an ample space to Ortega y Gasset, 
publishing one of his previous essays in the first volume (Ni vitalismo ni 
racionalismo, wrote in 1924), and  an essay by the famous writer José 
Augusto Azorín ded icated  to the philosopher in his second  volume 
published  in 1945, entitled  Ortega o el orador. In this text he describes the 
great expectation caused  by a conference of the Madrilenian 
philosopher and  his impressive ability to capture the aud ience: «El 
tiempo no existe para el aud itorio cuand o habla Ortega. Presos en la 
sutil red  de sus razonamientos y de sus imágenes, el tiempo pasa sin 
que nosotrso, los que escuchamos, lo advirtamos. Y cuand o al cabo de 
hora y media llega al final, ¿es que realmente estamos en el final?»
113
. 
Ortega’s oratory ability is significantly compared  to that of a very 
authoritative politician of the past: Maura. Every person read ing this 
article cannot bu t hope to have the possibility to d irectly ad mire this 
great public speaker during his life. This article clearly produces a great 
expectation after Ortega’s return in Spain in relation to  his public and  
teaching activity. An expectation which would  have produced  an 
enormous interest in all his following appearances also in the new 
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generation of students that so far had  not had  the opportunity to listen 
to him.  
During his Lusitanian exile, Ortega had  never ceased  to cultivate 
strong cu ltural relations with some intellectuals with strong connection 
with Franco’s regime. His letters reveal several of these frequentations 
which have been also underlined  by José Ortega y Spottorno, the son of 
the philosopher, in his biography. In particular, he mentions among the 
most influent proponents of Ortega’s return in Spain Luis Diéz del 
Corral and  Antonio Maravall [Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 395]. These two 
figures have a lot in common. Both the authors took part in the project 
and  realisation of the Escorial and  both privileged  a political and , 
broad ly speaking, sociological rather than philosophica l perspective. 
Both conceived  political theory as an instrument of legitimacy of a 
political regime, and  both joined  the FET y JONS since its very birth 
[Santos, 2002; Fresán Cuenca, 2003]. When they were organizing his 
return Spain they were both engaged  in a project of theoretical 
legitimacy of Franco’s government after the end  of WWII. In fact, the 
end  of the war caused  the logical interruption of a state of exception 
and  the need  of posing the bases of a legitimate form of political power.  
To do so, Antonio Maravall wrote Los fundamentos del derecho y del 
Estado (1947) in which, starting from the concept of life as presented  by 
Ortega in his writings, he constructed  a social theory concerning the 
way in which the social relations are constructed  and  maintained  over 
time. Starting from the concept of the human life as an ongoing project 
to be realised , he argues in favour of a communitarian account in which 
the freedom of the ind ividuals is constrained  and  reduced  to the 
common desire of a community to reach a unified  goal. For this reason, 
the State would  represent a “community of destiny” which includes the 
desires and  ambitions of the single ind ividuals
114
. His interpretation of 
the thought of Ortega constituted  a justification of a communitarian 
regime in the sense of an authoritarian power very similar to the 
“democracia orgánica” presented  by Franco in those very years.  
Similary, Diez del Corral’s book on the liberal doctrinarism [1945] 
constitutes a study of the premises of conservatism within a liber al 
framework, that is to say an attempt to conciliate the freedom of the 
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ind ividual with the imposition of the State or the community. He 
himself traced  the offspring of his interests in the d octrinarian liberals 
in the words of Ortega and  his Prólogo a los francéses (1937). When he 
published  his book, in 1945, immediately after he sent a copy to the 
philosopher as a tribute to his influent mastery
115
. 
Albeit the oppressive mainstream condemnation of Ortega – due to 
his lack of religiosity, metaphysical interest and  systematic thought
116
 – 
some of the members of the establishment, and  especially those who 
had  partially been left apart from the new national-catholic hegemony, 
started  to instrumentally adopt Ortega and  other intellectuals of the 
past two decades to claim for a lead ing role within the francoist family. 
At the same time, due to the changing political circumstances, the 
rescuing of Ortega’s thought – or rather of his personal figure – was 
conceived  as useful for the survival of the regime. Within the 
international community Ortega enjoyed  a representative role, and  his 
return constituted  the possibility of ennoble the Spanish government.  
At the same time, he was also exalted  by those intellectuals who 
were completely excluded  by the regime orthod oxy but wanted  to play 
an active role in it. The most famous case of this group is that of Julián 
Marías. This Ortega’s d isciple wrote in 1945 a short article defending 
the general philosophical account of his master against those who: 
«suelen reprochar a Ortega que no ha dad o forma más rigurosamente 
científica a sus ideas filosóficas»
117
. This double and  opposite tendency 
in the reception and  narration of Ortega’s philosophy during the 
decade of the 40’s significantly marked  the d ifferent reactions to his 
return in Madrid  after his long exile. This was also due to the fact that 
the philosopher d id  not want to play a second ary role within the 
cultural debates of his country, and  strongly desired  to gain back his 
lead ing intellectual role.  
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So, even when the chances to intervene within the public sphere as a 
free and  independent intellectual were consistently limited  by the 
circumstances, Ortega d id  not renounce to play what he thought is his 
philosophical duty. Moreover, the information he received  from his 
friends in 1945 seemed to him to suggest that the regime was changing 
its autocratic and  totalitarian outlook, in particular as far as the 
freedom of speech and  publication was concerned  [Gracia, 2014: 577]. 
Thus, he obeyed  to his imperative of authenticity and  decided  to return 
in Spain and  continue his intellectual activity in order  to invite both the 
Spanish cultural elites and  the public opinion to critically reflect on the 
current political situation. The end  of WWII constituted  to him a relief. 
He thought that after more than ten years in which his role had  been 
strongly d iminished  by the circumstances, it could  have been possible 
to restore a proper d ialogue with his aud ience. A d ialogue which he 
conceived  as viable both inside and  outside the University.  
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PART IV 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CULTURAL H EGEMON Y.  
The theory of the generations of Ortega was the expression of his most 
profound  understand ing of the relations of power exercised  among 
d ifferent groups competing for the cultural, political and  social 
leadership of the new Spain. He assigned  to his theorisation a great 
explanatory power in regard  to the regulation of the social life. This 
also reveals the importance he assigned  to the need , for all the 
intellectuals, of being part of a specific and  vital generation in order to 
have an influential role w ithin society. For this reason, both before, 
during and  after his return in Spain , Ortega always looked  not only for 
an aud ience, but also and  foremost for possible collaborations who 
could  have concretely helped  him to reaffirm his intellectual status 
within the Spanish society. In particular, he sought to find  consensus 
among the youngest generations which, even if included  within the 
regime, had  been manifesting d iscomfort in relation to an excessively 
oppressive and  dogmatic cultural control. This operation of persuasion, 
in particular after the end  of the war and  the beginning of a new 
political phase, both from a national and  an international point of view, 
appeared  to be a concrete possibility  for the return of the philosopher. 
Indeed , he intensified  his d ialogues with exiled  monarchists as well as 
with young intellectuals included  in the new cultural establishment but 
d id  not entirely embrace its ideology. To converse effectively with them 
Ortega partially accepted  to ad apt his language to the id iom spoken 
within the new academia, choosing the themes by looking to the 
cultural debates that were spread ing in the country and  also by 
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adopting a basic common language. At the same time, however, he 
tried  to modify it when possible, to transform it in order to put in it the 
seeds of his d issension, as he d id  in the case of his definition of 
liberalism. The political question still remained  open and , as it w ill be 
proved  in the course of this chapter, Ortega tried  to offer his 
contribution to one of the most debated  top ics within the regime: i.e. 
the legitimacy of an exceptional power, not really grounded  in the 
respect of the rule of law, as it was the case of Franco’s d ictatorship. 
During the period  of his return in Spain, and  until his death, Ortega 
fought for conquering a relevant influential role in the Spanish cultural 
scene. A struggle that finally turned  out to be a total failure , but that 
reveales the desire of the philosopher of never abandonin g his country. 
In fact, he wanted  to push it into the new European cu ltural debate that 
started  after the end  of the war with the purpose of includ ing Spain 
within the new continental scenario. And , in continuity to all his 
precedent meditations, he was persuaded  that in ord er to this, before 
realising a political change, it would  have been necessary to produce a 
cultural conversion.  
This section takes into consideration the period  comprised  between 
Ortega’s return in Spain, in  1945, and  his death in 1955. In adddition, it 
also analyses the legacy of his philosophical and  ped agogical theory in 
the Spanish academia d uring the following years. After a first and  quite 
d isappointing return, the second  coming of Ortega  in 1948 constituted  
a very remarkable attem pt of taking part into the Spanish cu ltural 
scenario through the creation of the Institute of Humanities. For this 
reason, a central part of this section is devoted  to the analysis of the 
political scenario in which this project was realised , of the relations that 
rendered  it possible, of its aims and , finally, of the reactions to it of the 
political regime, the young generations that started  to compose it and  
the general population that, d irectly or not, had  the chance to 
participate in it. In this w ay, and  also by taking into consideration the 
following developments of Ortega’s theory and  practice of education in 
relation to the national and  international contexts, this section 
contributes to shed  light on a p eriod  of his life usually underestimated , 
both by his biographers and  by the scholars of his philosophical ideas. 
A period  that, as it will be proved , has to be scrupulously taken into 
account for comprehending the evolution of the philosophical and  
academic debate in Spain at least until its transition to democracy.  
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Chapter 8. 
A provisional return  
The end  of the war represented  another watershed  both for the life of 
Spain and  for the personal existence of Ortega y Gasset. The University , 
and  the very notion of philosophy and  humanity  purported  within it, 
underwent another significant change that subverted  the hierarchy 
within the regime. Thus, the apparent homogeneity of the cultural 
Spanish scenario revealed  its extremely fragmentation and  conflict ive 
character. The academia represented  once again the battleground  of 
this new political struggle in which, for the first time, emerged  a group 
of intellectuals and  politicians which defined  itself as proper d isciples 
of Ortega. They operated  in a context in which, starting from 1944, 
Franco’s d ictatorship  started  to live a profound  crisis which could  have 
ended  with its replacement in favour of the Bourbon monarchy. This 
was not the case of a regime that lastly assumed a new  democratic 
appearance represented  by the publication of the Fuero de los Españoles 
and  the Ley de sucesion (1945). The return of Ortega in Spain after more 
than ten years of exile, represented  a significant symbolic gesture and  
an attempt to contribute to the modernisation, at least at a superficial 
level, of the regime.  
This chapter investigates to what extent the return of Ortega in 
Spain met the needs of the regime, contribu ting to its regeneration, and  
to what extent this had  been intentionally or unintentionally d one by 
the philosopher. Indeed , during these years, Ortega enhanced  his 
struggle for recovering a d irect contact with the Spanish academia and  
public op inion, revealing the wish to re-establish a cultural normality 
within a broken country. After examining the reasons that led  Ortega to 
return back in Spain through an analysis of his writings and  letters (§1), 
the position of the official journal of the regime’s academia towards 
Ortega will be analysed , in particu lar by taking into consideration the 
articles published  in the two most influential scientific journal on the 
humanities and  political sciences: Arbor and  Revista de Estudios Políticos 
(§2). These positions will later be contrasted  (§3) with the one presented  
by new journals and  reviews founded  during this period  of the Spanish 
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history and  which were far more akin to the Orteguian perspective, 
having among their members some d irect d isciples of the philosopher. 
These reviews are in particular Ínsula and  Leonardo. The first public 
appearance of Ortega after this exile (§4) undoubted ly represented  a 
braking point for the philosopher: his d reams and  desires collided  with 
the d ramatic reality of a country in which each form of cultural 
expression was still rigid ly controlled  and  censored . This , on the one 
hand , caused  a new voluntary exit of the philosopher from the country 
and , on the other, determined  his increasing interest  for the new 
problems that the post-war global society had  to face in terms of 
humanistic education and  intellectual responsibility (§5). In the 
meanwhile, the Spanish academia was developing a new form of 
sectarian communication, overcoming the previous nationalist ideology 
with an exclusively religious one, giving birth to a sort of third -
Scholasticism (§6). The total rejection of Ortega and  of this form of 
philosophising and  educating a new generation of students (§7) d id  
constitute one of the main reasons that stimulated  the philosopher not 
to aband on completely Spain to its own destiny, trying to continue 
exercising his cultural influence, unceasingly looking for an active 
collaboration with, at least, the few members of the academia who he 
still had  in great esteem (§8).  
 
8.1 Ortega back in  Spain  
Ortega came back in Spain in August 1945 after more than nine 
years of exile. No sensationalism accompanied  his retu rn that had  been 
keenly understated  by the regime. The very Ortega preferred  to 
preserve a sort of anonymity during his first return in the country, 
conceiving it as a sort of experiment primarily aimed  to get in touch 
with his family and  friends rather than to intervene d irectly in the 
public debate (Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 397-398). For this reason he d id  
not enter in Madrid  until the autumn of 1945, after having spent the 
whole summer in the Basque Country. In any case, the press d id  report 
the news at the very beginning of August
1
.  
                                                          
1
 Here it is a non-exhaustive list of newspapers that reported  this news: El 
Alcazar, 8-VIII-1945; Pueblo, 8-VIII-1945; Unidad, 8-VIII-1945; Jornada, 8-VIII-
1945; La Voz, 8-VIII-1945; Información, 9-VIII-1945; Arriba, 9-VIII-1945; Ya, 9-VIII-
1945; ABC, 9-VIII- 1945; Redención, 11-VIII-1945. In AOG.  
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On August 12, 1945, the newspaper Arriba published  a longer article 
on Ortega’s return in which the philosopher was significantly depicted  
as the initiator of the regime’s ideology . His decision to come back in 
the country was interpreted  as an endorsement to the new political 
establishment
2
. He received  a warm welcome by this newspaper, a 
reception which concealed  a secret agenda: inviting Ortega to serve the 
national cause during a period  in which Spain was increasingly 
isolated  from the international scenario. This plan was covertly 
d isclosed  by the newspaper which affirmed  that: «No podía faltar 
nuestra bienvenida en este momento del regreso a la lar. Pero menos 
aún pod ia faltar la expresión de nuestro deseo más férvido: el que D. 
José Ortega y Gasset sepa tod o cuanto hay implícito en esta 
bienvenida»
3
.  
Ortega was therefore supposed  to play a significant role in de fence 
of Franco’s establishment from an international perspective. Far more 
questioned  was his right to contribute to forge the Spanish public 
opinion accord ing to those educational principles that could  have been 
in contrast w ith the dogmatic pedagogy offered  by the regime. The 
words of the priest Sánchez Villaseñor clearly revealed  the 
preoccupation, from a Catholic point of view, towards the possible 
dangers that the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset could  have caused  
within a young generation of students. In fact, his philosophy would  
constitute the expression of a “pseud o-humanism” which would  not be 
apt to build  the consciousness of the post-war humanism. In fact: «A la 
actitud  antropocéntrica d eberá oponer la concepción católica del 
mund o y de la vid a. Al racionalismo y existencialismo, incapaces de 
integrar jerárquicamente el intelecto y la vitalidad , la g rand iosa sintesis 
de la filosofía perenne» (Sánchez Villaseñor, 1943: 335). 
Nevertheless, Ortega d id  not share this view. Manuel Aznar, in one 
of his letters he wrote to the Madrilenian philosopher  after its return in 
Spain, gives us an hint of what was the goal that Ortega pursued  by 
coming back to his country. He wanted  to favour and  lead  an 
intellectual d ialogue among the d ifferent souls of the regime, with the 
                                                          
2
 See, Se habla de Ortega y Gasset, in Arriba, 12-VIII-1945: «Ortega ha podido 
hacer comenzar una etapa que en la historia de España arranca quizás de él 
mismo y termina con nosotros, los que hemos ganado el fresco laurel de la 
juventud  por intentar una revolución para los demás». […] «España está aquí  y 
es, justamente, lo que es. Y, porqué es lo que es, Ortega vuelve a ella». In AOG. 
3
 In Maricel, 24-VIII-1945. In AOG, PB-232/ 82. 
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aim of constructing a new cultural minority able to promote a 
transformation in the social, political and  intellectual scenario
4
. Indeed , 
some months after his retu rn in Madrid , from autumn 1945, Ortega d id  
start to get in contact w ith the intellectual circles of the cap ital, in 
particu lar thanks to the mediation of his son José who reopened  the 
activity of the Revista de Occidente and  his frequent meetings (Gracia, 
2014: 578).  
By the beginning of 1946 he had  already managed  to realise a great 
amount of works and  activities both in Spain and  abroad . He starts to 
collaborate with several Spanish reviews such as Leonardo, the Revista de 
Psicología General y Aplicada and  p lanned  the possibility of w riting a 
prologue to a book of Erasmus for the review Zodíaco. Not only he 
restarted  to act as an intellectual entirely devoted  to publish both 
within scientific reviews and  popular journals, but he also d id  it having 
a clear concept of his role in a Spain , a country that he perceived  at a 
rad ical turning point of its political history. As he wrote to the d irector 
of the Revista de Psicología, José Germain, in March 1946 he was 
persuaded  that a form of active and  honest collaboration with the 
government would  have been nonsensical insofar as «el Gobierno, claro 
está, no lo merece y además está moribund o»
5
. For this reason he 
deliberated  to collaborate with a review officially based  ou tside the 
Spanish boarder, in Tangier, where Fernando Vela was collaborating 
with a journal, España, that had  the great chance of escaping from the 
control of the still rigid  Spanish censorship. During this period  Ortega 
perceived  the possibility of using this stratagem to begin  to influence 
with greater independence in Spain. For this purpose, he planned  a 
very scrupulous plan of intervention that he shared  with his friends 
and  collaborators
6
. 
Ortega’s project to establish a continuous collaboration with España 
would  not have been put in practice and  he only published  an article 
                                                          
4
 «No hago sino pensar en todo su plan de restablecimiento del d iálogo entre 
intelectuales, y en sus proyectos de d irigir un  tremendo llamamento a las 
minorias. Letter by M. Aznar to Ortega, 29-VIII-1945, in AOG, C-55bis/ 8k. 
5
 Letter from Ortega to Germáin, 2-IV-1946, in AOG, CD-G/ 56. 
6
 «Es preciso que organizemos con un perfecto mecanismo de funcionamiento 
rapid ísimo, el envio constante de libros. Esta necesidad  se convierte en extrema 
al meterme a hacer esto artículos de periód ico que acaso sepa voy a hacer y que 
serán, por ahora, tres al mes». Letter by Ortega to Castilla, 18-III-1946, in C-
50/ 18. 
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significantly entitled  Llevo doce años de silencio. In this short article – that 
should  have introduced  a series of essays that would  had  to be 
published  during the whole year (1946) – Ortega declared  that after so 
many years of silence and  limited  speech he could  finally return to 
speak, or rather to “say” and  declare (decir) the tru th
7
. He also claimed  
for the necessity of fitting his d iscourse to the new historical, political 
and  social circumstances, d ue to the fact that no philosophical idea can 
be though independently from the context in which it is produced
8
. The 
basic tenets of his new intellectual intervention within the Spanish 
cultural scenario had  been clearly posed  by the beginning of 1946. He 
possessed  fresh arguments, the attention of some mass media and  was 
starting to ind ividuate a possible aud ience among which he cou ld  have 
spread  his ideas. The basic cond itions for starting his intellectual 
activity appeared  to be finally realised , and  the main problem he faced  
– i.e. an adverse political regime – seemed to be opened  to a rapid  and  
substantial transition (Portero, 1989, 27-55).  
 
8.2 The polit ical background: A rbor an d Rev ista de 
Estudios Polít icos 
With the end of the WWII the cultural d iscourse within the 
Spanish boarders slightly changed . Undoubted ly, the freedom of 
speech and  the likelihood  of producing a significant cu ltural innovation 
still remained  unfulfilled  ambitions shared  by a very limited  
intellectual minority. A minority to which Ortega belonged . At the 
same time, some evidences of a new negotiation of the general outlook 
of the regime can be noticed . In particular, two d ifferent aspects 
deserve to be briefly sketched . On one hand , within the academia, and  
in particu lar in the faculty of philosophy of the UC, it is possible to 
observe a significant move toward s an intensification of the Catholic 
character of the Spanish cu lture. This move was aimed  to preserve the 
                                                          
7
 «Decir no es, pues, verbalizar sino de-clarar la verdad , hablar en forma. En el 
auténtico decir no se expresa una necesidad , una emoción o un capricho 
privados, sino formalmente una d octrina. Ahora bien, esto es lo que no ha 
podido hacerse en ninguna parte del mundo durante estos d iez años» (OC, IX: 
705). 
8
 «No es uno, se me ocurre, qu ien debe ser consecuente con sus ideas, sino sus 
ideas quienes deben ser consecuentes con la realidad» Ibidem. 
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cultural status quo by aband oning any sort of reference to a fascist 
ideology and  replacing it with a dogmatic scholasticism (Abellán, 2005: 
159).  
On the other hand , the necessity of modifying some of the basic 
tenets of the regime’s ideology , rendering them more akin to the new 
international scenario, appeared  to many as a viable possibility for 
reforming the d ictatorship from within, with the ultimate goal of 
replacing it with the monarchy (Gallego Margaleff, 2014: 789). A third  
posture was the one represented  by the rad ical opposition to the 
regime that was expanding ou tside the Spanish boarders and  in 
particu lar in France by the international socialism  (Payne, 1996: 43-50; 
Ortuño Anaya, 2002: 19-21). 
Ortega’s return was evidently connected  with the second  of these 
attitudes towards the regime. He wanted  to change it from within, but 
he was persuaded  that to do this he would  have to count on a new 
intellectual community that supported  his efforts. Indeed , several 
scientific journals and  reviews was starting to be created  in th e period  
that followed  the end  of the war . The cultural scene was still qu ite 
static, but at the same time isolated  groups started  to appear in the 
public scenario through new intellectual projects, such as oases in the 
desert (Díaz Hernández, 2007: 218). Some of them reflected  the 
dominant ideology of the regime, as the review of the CSIC, Arbor. 
Other, such as the Revista de Estudios Políticos, d irected  from 1943 by 
Fernando Castiella, constituted  an attempt to re-establish a continuity 
with some Spanish liberal authors. Others, such as La Estafeta literaria, 
tried  to import in Spain the new trend s of literature, both by giving to 
some young authors the possibility to present their works and  by 
reviewing foreign books (González Ariza, 2010). Lastly, some of these 
reviews, such as Ínsula or Leonardo, apart from provid ing fresh news on 
the European culture, also tried  to revitalise the thought of Ortega y 
Gasset. In this way they aimed  at being the ind ispensable background  
that cou ld  have sustained  the new intellectual action of the 
philosopher. This statement can be proved  by analysing some of the 
articles published  in these reviews between 1944 and  1946. 
The treatment that Arbor reserved  to Ortega was generally 
extremely critical. The theological humanism largely purported  by the 
review was undoubted ly incompatible with the thought of the 
philosopher. An article by Jiménez Duque at the end  of 1944, 
Humanismo y mística, clearly testified  it. In this text, the author traces a 
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history of humanism from the late antiquity to the present d ay and  
depicts Ortega as one of the contemporary philosopher who – 
revitalising the anthropocentrism of the early modern period  in the XX 
century – had  contributed  to the deterioration of the concept of truth 
due to the relativism of his “raciovitalismo”
9
. No culture outside 
religion. This cou ld  be the lemma of the this article
10
 and , in general of 
the review, which reflected  the posture of the regime. In other word s, 
no political power could  have been exercised  without the support of 
the Church and  Arbor, a review basically guided  by the Opus Dei, 
constituted  the manifest of this ideological view . During the same year, 
in fact, the friar Lopez Órtiz, the founder of the review, ded icated  a 
whole article to the papal bull Divino Afflante Spiritu that he interpreted  
as the manifestation of the possibility of using the sacred  tests as 
methodological and  authoritative tools to be app lied  in the scientific 
research and  in particular to the study of history
11
.  
From October 1946, the review started  to slightly change its ou tlook 
since the entrance of Calvo Serer in the ed itorial board . Calvo Serer was 
a monarchic professor who, since his encounter with Juan de Borbón in 
1945, collaborated  to the restoration of the monarchy in Spain (Díaz 
Hernández: 2008, 48-53). From a philosophical perspective he strongly 
d isagreed  with the concept of culture defended  by Ortega and  always 
sustained  the necessity of posing the bases of a catholic philosophy 
which could  have served  the national cause (Ibidem: 73). Arbor reflected  
the sp irit of this new member of the ed itorial board . Indeed , it started  
                                                          
9
 «Todo se derrumba. Y la realidad  del yo viviente, que se siente y se impone 
como sea, se agarra desesperada a lo que puede por tratar de explicarse. 
Pragmatismo a lo James, fenomenología a lo Husserl, intuicionismo 
inmanentista a lo Bergson, vitalismo a lo Ortega y Gasset, existencialismo a lo 
Heidegger…». Jiménez Diáz, 1944: 51. 
10
 «¿Qué es el humanismo? El estud io del hombre completo el estud io de su 
ideal. Para que se construya una pedagogía correspondiente. […] El concepto 
del humanismo es así de hecho, necesariamente, un concepto relativo. Pero 
exige una solucción objetiva, absolu ta, en la que puedan convenir todos los 
espíritus serenos y humildes. Una mirada a la verdad  cristiana nos pondrá la 
calma en el sosiego ardiente» (Ibidem: 53). 
11
 «Ahora la encíclica Divino Afflante Spiritu nos sorprende gratísimamente por 
la plena seguridad  con que sanciona la utilización en la ciencia sagrada del 
instrumental científico y los resultados de esa hermana menor en la gran 
familia de las ciencias que es la historia». (Lopez Órtiz, 1944: 412).  
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to ded icate a section to the international scenario reporting the main 
intellectual news, in particu lar in relation to the humanities.  
The main themes treated  by the journal slightly changed  from th e 
scientific topics (as in the line of the CSIC) to the role of the humanistic 
education in the new society of the second  post-war. In this context the 
propagandistic and  pedagogical preoccupations acquired  a great 
importance for the review. Significantly, the professor of aesthetics at 
the UC and  d irector of the review , Sánchez de Muniaín, ded icated  a 
whole article to describe the basic traits that the effective propagator of 
culture should  have to possess
12
. At the same time, the review was 
starting to deal with problems such as the creation of the European 
Union
13
 or the responsibility of scien tists in the age of the atomic bomb. 
However, the official ideology represented  by this journal was still 
embedded  in an orthodox defence of a form of national-Catholicism, 
and  in particu lar the one purported  by the Dominican priest Santiago 
Ramírez
14
, who would  be one the greatest antagonist of Ortega soon 
after his return in Spain and  long after his death. Indeed , Ramírez was 
chosen to substitu te Ortega at the Chair of Metaphysics, but he 
renounced  to this possibility permitting to Zaragüeta to d o it
15
. 
Accord ing to Ramírez, the philosophy presented  by Ortega could  have 
corrupted  the youngest generations and , consequently, should  have be 
banned  by the regime
16
.  
Another review exercised  a great influence in the cultural scenario 
of that time: the Revista de Estudios Políticos, the review of the Instituto de 
Estudios Políticos that in 1945, with the presidency of Castiella, was 
living a new phase of its long history. The REP, basically a product of 
the Facu lty of Political Science and  Economics of the UC (Muñoz Soro 
and  Sesma Landrin, 2014), served  as the main instrument for defining 
and  legitimating the institutional order of the regime. The aim of the 
review was basically that of offering to the d ictator a justification of the 
political regime and , at the same time, advising him on the best 
                                                          
12
 Sánchez de Muniaín, 1946. 
13
 Azaola, 1946. 
14
 Palacios, 1946. 
15
 In fact: «La opción del Estado franquista por Santiago Ramírez consolidaba 
una posición teórica tanto como un modelo social de filósofo». Pestaña, 2013: 
82. 
16
 «La filosofía se convierte así en apoteosis de la cuquería: es ésta misma 
elevada al cubo, es decir, una cuquería refinada». Ramírez, 1958: 303. 
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decisions to take in a changing international contest. If ruling a country 
was firstly a pedagogical and  educative function, as written by the 
professor of public law at the University of Oviedo Fernández -
Mirand a
17
, then the very Caudillo – or the eventual fu ture monarch – 
should  have been supplied  with a comprehensive political doctrine. 
And  this was exactly the aim of the review.  
Provid ing a theoretical insight on political questions basically meant 
to define the normative goals of the regime, as explained  in a dense 
philosophical article written by the professor of Logic at the UC 
Eulogio Palacios (1945). In his article he rejects the ratio-vitalism of 
Ortega, but not d isqualifying it with the same ad personam arguments 
provided  by his colleagues of Arbor, but rather motivating his position 
with philosophical reasons
18
. In this text he also presents the basic 
tenets of his conception of politics as a form of prudence. With this 
expression he d id  not mean that the regime should  have prudently 
confide in God to survive in a turbulent political scenario, as wrongly 
written, for instance, by Gregorio Morán
19
.  
On the contrary, Palacios’ opposition between art and  prudence 
serves as a tool to support the institutionalisation of a sort of state of 
exception based  on theological and  moral principles. This was 
conceived  as the correct way to govern the country, unceasingly 
adap ting the laws to its changing needs and  the external 
circumstances
20
. Consequently, the theorisation of Palacios focused  on a 
                                                          
17
 «La labor del Príncipe, del conductor o de la minoría d irigente es, pues, un 
d irigir y encaminar las actividades humanas que integran el organismo de la 
comunidad  política, en su doble faceta de actividades creadoras y funcionales, 
hacia la meta de la perfección social y personal de la vida humana. Labor 
altamente política y esencialmente educativa y pedagógica». Fernández- Miranda, 
1944: 587. 
18
 «La razón práctica nos permite saber hacer y  ejecutar, pero es siempre a partir 
de un fin que es trascendente a ella. Si, en mi concepción, la razón práctica no 
es autónoma, tampoco lo será la razón vital e histórica, identificable con ella. 
Esto es un ind icio a la d iferencia básica que separa mi concepción de la de 
Ortega». Eulogio Palacios, 1945: 59. 
19
 «El objetivo no es otro que d ar soporte metafísico a algo tan vulgar como la 
necesidad  de le España de Franco de confiar “prudentemente” en que Dios les 
va a echar una mano si son perseverante». Gregorio Morán, 1998: 132. 
20
 «Ante el tema de la política se plantea a veces la cuestión de si es un arte. Yo 
creo que debería plantearse de un modo más completo: si es arte o si es 
prudencia. Es indudable que, sea cual fuera la respuesta, deberá basarse sobre 
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more rad ical question: how to guarantee the legitimacy and  
maintenance into power of a State that rejects the rule of law but does 
not yearn to base its power uniquely on the army? This question was 
vitally important for the community of d iscourse that composed  the 
IEP and  the REP, since it characterised  the concrete existence of a 
political power that always rejected  a constitutional framework 
(Giménez Martínez, 2015). For this reason, the general ou tlook of 
Palacios d id  find  an extremely positive reception within th is 
intellectual circle, as proved  by the notes of Azorín, Corts Grau and  
others (Morán, 1998: 133).  
Such concerns over the necessity of offering a new political ideology 
that rejected  fascism and  embraced  an apparently softer form of 
authoritarianism were overtly recognised  by Antonio Maravall. In a 
long essay, largely indebted  to the book of Diez d el Corral on the 
nature of the doctrinarian liberalism, he theorised  a normative goal of 
the regime which cou ld  have been adequate for the rapid ly changing 
times
21
. In this way he proposed  a justification for the legitimacy of the 
regime conceiving it as a form of moral liberal democracy. With this 
complicated  and  quite parad oxical term he defined  a form of 
government that, by guaranteeing exclusively an extremely limited  
form of participation to the population (sporad ic plebiscites
22
) and 
found ing its own legitimacy in transcendent and  immutable values 
(moral character
23
), would  have aim to foster the liberty of the citizens 
                                                                                                                               
la d istinción susodicha: la de tener o no reglas fijas. Si la política posee 
procedimientos invariables, es un arte; si, por el contrario, sus normas son 
flexibles y ocurrentes, pertenecen a la prudencia». (Eulogio Palacios, 1945: 65).  
21
 Maravall, 1945: 7: «En la situación de hoy una cosa es evidente: que hay que 
replantear el problema catolicismo-libertad , no porque se trate de una 
adaptación a los tiempos, cosa que en muy precisos límites sería lícito a la 
prudencia cristiana, sino porque los momentos de la Historia cambian de faz 
constantemente, y enfocados con una idea que no cambia dan, sin embargo, 
panoramas d istintos». 
22
 Ibidem: 28: «Se mantiene un mínimo de participación popular en las funciones 
públicas – que ya hemos visto que no repele a un recto entendimiento del 
gobierno, y añadamos que está en la evolución natural del Movimiento 
español, declarada, desde el principio y comenzada a aplicar». 
23
 Ibidem: 44: «Hemos de afirmar hoy la existencia perenne de un orden de 
bienes y de fines objetivos, válidos por encima y aun contra la voluntad  
humana, que cuando se aparta de ellos yerra. […] La voluntad  ind ividual es 
infalible para el logro de los intereses sociales y políticos más altos».  
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conceived  not as an end  in itself, but rather just as a means for 
promoting a flourishing life which would  have ultimately be 
established  by a paternalistic power .  
During this period , the same view was supported  and  shared  by all 
the most representative members of the review, such as Corts Grau , 
who in his articles presented  a very controversial thesis accord ing to 
which the Right and  the Law would  always pre-exist to the concrete 
establishment of a State
24
. Interestingly enough, the criticisms toward s 
the liberal rhetoric were conducted  in this case by using the words of 
the very Ortega who was now conceived  as a valid  philosophical 
source to combine a democratic with an authoritarian framework: this 
would  correspond  to the idea of a Christian community that the REP 
was proposing as a new legitimating tool for  the regime amidst the 
growing influence of the USSR in the international scenario (Sesma 
Landrín, 2004).  
To summarise, REP shared  with Arbor a common ideology based  
on the vind ication of the importance of Catholicism as a source of 
legitimacy and  a viable cultural ideology. However the two reviews 
rad ically d iffered  in two basic aspects: the ind ispensability of Franco’s 
survival in the post-war scenario – which was d iscarded  by the REP – 
and  the way of approaching the thought of Ortega. This was much 
more critical in the case of Arbor, whereas, on the contrary, the REP 
tried  to ad opt it to the new political circumstances.  
 
 
8.3 Ínsu la: an  ortegu ian  n iche.  
Since its birth, in October 1945, Ínsula represented  a significant 
novelty in the Spanish cu ltural scenario. It was indeed  the first journal 
of the new State that had  not been created  d irectly by the political 
regime but rather sprang autonomously by a group of intellectual who 
basically shared  a common ad miration towards Ortega y Gasset , in 
particu lar Enrique Canito and  José Luis Cano (Mora García, 2006). The 
aim of the review was not that of countering the regime, neither from a 
political nor from a cultural perspective. On the contrary, the aim was  
                                                          
24
 Corts Grau, 1946: 12: «El Derecho es anterior en sus fundamentos a toda 
organización estatal, y su  universalidad  prevalece sobre las singularidades 
estatales» 
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just that of revitalising the cultural scenario. For this reason, together 
with the texts of some of the most prominent intellectuals akin to the 
regime, the review  devoted  a great attention to some of the exiled  
writers who had  p layed  a significant political or cultural role during 
the II Republic (Tusell, 2004: 667). The review not only w as totally 
independent from the regime, but was also looked  askance by the 
political establishment (Ferrary, 1993: 270). However, from an 
international perspective, the regime benefited  from this publication 
that appeared  to concretise the pacifist words p ronounced  by the 
Caudillo since 1945 toward s the exiled  intellectuals (Larraz, 2009: 23). 
Indeed , the review constituted  a great innovation in the Spanish 
cultural scenario. In a period  in which a very limited  set of fix au thors, 
chiefly Spanish, constituted  the intellectual globe, Ínsula proposed  to its 
readers, for the first time after the victory of the National Movement, 
the works and  theses of philosophers and  intellectuals such as Gide, 
Nietzsche, Valery, Pio Baroja, María Zambrano, Unamuno, etc. The 
review had  a relevant success. Its cost grew time by time passing from 
the 1.5 pesetas of the first number published  in 1946, to 3 pesetas in 
1948 and  finally to 5 in 1953. Ínsula was d irectly linked  to the activity of 
the ed itor Revista de Occidente, and  since its first number it advertised  
both the new ed ition of Ortega’s España Invertebrada, and  it forecasted  
the publication of his complete works. Marías – one of the greatest 
contributors to this review , having published  during its all life 62 
articles – affirmed  that Ínsula enjoyed  a pecu liar freedom since its very 
birth, probably given by the fact that its main interest was not related  to 
the political but rather to the cultural sphere (Marías,1983).  
However, interestingly enough, the first appearance of the name of 
Ortega in this review is not due to the contribution of one of his d irect 
d isciples or friend . His first evocation is made by the d irector of the 
United  State Information Library in Madrid  from 1945 to 1947, Lesley 
Frost Ballantine – daughter of the famous poet Robert Frost. Ortega is 
significantly mentioned  in relation to his pedagogy. In fact, reporting 
the recent monographic ed ition of the Saturday review of Literature, Frost 
presents the status quaestionis of the educative debate in  America and  in 
particu lar the educative reform for the post-war period  recently 
proposed  by the Educational Policies Association of New York. In this 
context, she underlined  the fact the Ortega was internationally 
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considered  as an extraord inary example of an intellectual whose 
though perfectly embeds liberalism into a pedagogical proposal
25
.  
This international openness is revealed  also by a long article 
published  by the d irector of the British Institute in Madrid , Walter 
Starkie, concerning the state of the Hispanic stud ies in UK. Starkie, in 
fact, was also one of the main correspondents of Ortega y Gasset since 
the beginning of the ‘30s, collaborating to the publication of his works 
and  articles in Great Britain. The role that the Madrilenian philosopher 
could  have played  within the post-war scenario in Spain constitu ted  for 
the British government a topic of great  interest. This is testified  also by 
an interview that took p lace between Ortega and  British journalist Tom 
Burns in September 1945. The interview was later transmitted  to the 
British ambassad or in Madrid , Victor Mallet, who manifested  his 
fascination and  admiration for the philosopher
26
. He reported
27
 the 
plans of Ortega to intervene within the Spanish public life  as well as his 
doubts concerning the effective possibility to play an influent role in 
the cu ltural scenario. The final impression of the British government 
about the philosopher was extremely positive, even if all his concrete 
projects and  vision about the future of politics in Spain appeared  as 
extremely utopian
28
. 
                                                          
25
 Frost, 1946: 4: «Afortunad amente desde hace poco una educación liberal se va 
asociando a la cultura en el sentido en que usa esta palabra Ortega y Gasset en 
su Misión de la Universidad , donde dice que esta es “el sistema de las ideas 
vitales de que vive una época».  
26
 Spanish affair, conversation between Presse Attache and Señor Ortega y Gasset , in 
AOG, «He is one of the few outstanding Spaniards with a truly Eu ropean 
outlook and  is generally accepted  as representative of liberal culture at its 
finest».  
27
 «It had  become more or less dangerous for a man to say what he thought: he 
ran a risk which varied  from that of ostracism to that of the firing -squad  or the 
concentration camp, accord ing to the political climate in which he happened  to 
be living. […] One day he hoped  to find  a really neutral territory and  launch 
once again his Revista de Occidente which he would  try and  make into a sort of 
forum for detached  thinking from all countries – as long as he was not 
suspected  of political intent. He said  he thought of Tangier as the most suitable 
place». Ibidem. 
28
 «This is an interesting despatch, but I cannot wax an enthusiastic about it as 
does Mr. Sloan. Señor Ortega y Gasset is a philosopher, and  in his conversation 
with Mr. Burns he has said  a lot of true things fairly clearly and  incisively. But a 
lot of what he says is pure unpractical philosophy. […] If Señor Ortega y Gasset 
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Not only Ortega constituted  a reference point for the international 
community, but also for some members of the Spanish cultural scenario 
that lived  in the country even if they had  a very marginal role within 
the Francoist establishment. In the fifth number of the review , a long 
article was also ded icated  to the close friend  of Ortega, Gregorio 
Marañon. Moreover, Ínsula would  later contribute – since the end  of 
1946 – to d iffuse and  publicise all the intellectual activities that Ortega 
carried  out in Spain, and  also abroad . Both his books and  his 
conferences were extensively reviewed  in the journal and  his 
philosophy was always strenuously defended  by intellectual figure 
who would  have later taken part in the Institute of Humanities, such as 
Marías, Garagorri or Bleiberg. The review d id  constitute a vitalising 
element within the study of the humanities in an extremely static and  
oppressive cultural situation. The relative freedom of speech and  
independency enjoyed  by this publication
29
 would  soon cause the 
strong opposition of the most trad itionalist and  established  members of 
the regime and , as it will be proved , the bone of contention would  
always be represented  by Ortega y Gasset and  his concept of university 
and  humanistic education.  
 
8.4 The A teneo’s con ference 
In May 1946 Ortega finally gave his first public speech in Madrid  
after his long exile. As proved  by the harsh debate that surrounded  his 
return – both within the scientific journals and  the popular newspapers 
– he was still p laying a very powerful symbolic role within the national 
culture. The invitation to give a lesson in Madrid  came from the 
                                                                                                                               
were likely to play an active part in Spain in the future, his views might be of 
some value, but his criticisms seem to me to be purely destructive, and  he 
seems cast for the rol of a philosopher-cynic living in retirement». Ibidem. 
29
 This freedom was indeed  extremely limited  and  pertained  exclusively to 
matters that d id  not relate d irectly to political questions. As written by Ferrary, 
1993: 200: «El panorama cultural de los primeros años de la posguerra ind icaba, 
pues, que era posible llevar a cabo una activid ad  intelectual creativa y 
voluntaria, previa aceptación de (al menos de hecho) una serie de 
condicionamientos externos, dentro de los cuales, el más claro lo  constituía la 
existencia de una única crítica intelectual oficial verd aderamente decisiva y, 
consecuentemente, la existencia de un sistema impositivo de censura». 
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director of the national propaganda and  recently elected  president of 
the Madrilenian Ateneo, Pedro Rocamora, ideologically akin to the 
ACNdP. The Ateneo, originally founded  in 1835, was a private cultural 
institution, based  in the centre of Madrid , devoted  to the propagation 
of science and  literature among vast sectors of the population. The 
institute had  a very d istinguished  liberal and  laic trad ition (Abellán, 
2006). For instance, in 1936, a peculiar election took place in order to 
decide among the members of the A teneo if God  existed  or not. 
Significantly enough, the result of the election ratified  the inexistence of 
any d ivinity. The fame of this institute, during its long existence, had  
spread  also outside the national borders. For this reason, the reopening of 
its activities in the spring 1946 aimed at representing to the international 
community the new open-minded outlook of the Spanish political regime after 
the end of the war (Sánchez García, 2005: 872). 
Ortega’s conference was one of the first events that took place in the 
Ateneo after the end  of the war and  was extraord inary publicised  by 
Franco’s propaganda, evidently with a clear instrumental purpose 
(Giustiniani, 2007: 62). The conference was surrounded  by a great 
expectation and  an enormous crowd attended  to the event in the Calle 
del Prado [see Annex 6] as reported , for instance, by the journalist José 
Montero Alonso who wrote that «La masa empuja, pugna por entrar en 
tropel, amenaza con romper la Resistencia de los empleados»
30
. Among 
the aud ience there were also some of the most d istinguished  members 
of the political, intellectual and  academic establishment
31
. Ortega was 
escorted  by Pedro Rocamora and  one of the lead ing intellectuals of the 
ACNdP, José María Pemán [see Annex 7]. Everything had been 
scrupulously prepared so to offer to the public a clear representation of an 
eminent intellectual converted to the new political ideology, and willing to 
defend the values of the national-Catholicism. Significantly enough, when 
in 1949 the minister of Education Ibáñez Martín would  recall the 
activities of the Ateneo since 1946, he used  the verb “desfilar” – i.e. to 
                                                          
30
 José Montero Alonso, Don José Ortega y Gasset, tras casi un cuarto de siglo, vuelve 
a la tribuna del Ateneo, in «Madrid», 6-V-1946. In AOG, PB-238/ 118. 
31
 In particular those political figures who belonged  to the first generation of 
falangists such as Serrano Suñer, Sánchez Mazas, Fernando Castiella, 
intellectuals such as Gregorio Marañon, Emilio García Gómez, Eugenio d’Ors, 
Azorín, Julián Pemartín, and  members of the university community, such as 
the new professor of Metaphysics at the UC Juan Zaragüeta. In AOG, PB-
238/ 118. 
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parade – to ind icate these public events in which d istingu ished  figures 
of the past took part in conferences or lectures
32
. 
Ortega’s intention was surely not that of being part of a mere show, 
as proven by the introduction to his conference that he pronounced  on 
that occasion. Indeed , he conceived  his intervention as an attempt to 
reacquire his lead ing role as an intellectual and  a philosopher by 
speaking in a context apparently more informal than the one of the 
university. For this reason, he ded icated  the whole preamble of his 
lecture on theatre to the importance of recreating the conditions for 
regaining a fruitful d ialogue with a new generation of students. He 
underlined  the necessity of continuing the educative mission he was 
forced  to interrupt almost fifteen years before. His emotional d iscourse 
beckoned  the importance of reconstructing the cultural atmosphere that 
preceded  the instauration of the new ed ucative system, without 
nostalgically calling for an an achronistic return to the past. Indeed , the 
whole d iscourse reveals the desire to set the premises for the 
development of a next intellectual intervention, aimed  to propose a 
new normative political, social and  educative ideal. As he put it: 
«Continuar no es quedarse en el pasado, ni siquiera enquistarse en el 
presente sino movilizarse, ir más allá, innovar pero renunciando al 
brinco y al salto y a partir de la nada» (OC, IX: 880). 
Moreover, the reference to the precedent brilliant epoch of the 
Spanish culture of the Edad de Plata constitu ted  also for Ortega a pretext 
for presenting himself as a viable brid ge between two completely 
d ifferent eras of the national history. For this reason , he vouched  for the 
Spanish future in a very complicated  and  problematic international 
scenario. He affirmed  that, from an historical – not political – point of 
view, Spain had  passed  relatively unharmed through the WWII and , 
consequently, enjoyed  a better  status in relation to the majority of the 
                                                          
32
 Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 758-759: «Es hoy día el Ateneo de Madrid  el primer 
centro de d ifusión intelectual española, de carácter no oficial. Nunca como 
ahora podría aplicárse con más razón esa especial, significativa y, al mismo 
tiempo, popular denominación con que suele conocerse tanto en  nuestra Patria 
como en el extranjero: la de Docta Casa. Nunca como en los últimos años ha 
coronado con tanto éxito sus esfuerzos, ni ha reunido tal cantidad  de 
estud iosos, como a partir del momento en que aceptó su presidencia el director 
general de Propaganda. [...] Por la tribuna del Ateneo, estos años, han desfilado 
Ortega y Gasset, don Ramón Menéndez Pidal, el doctor don Gregorio 
Marañon, por sólo citar a tres maestros de nuestra cultura».  
 
283 
other European nations. Spain, accord ing to Ortega, enjoyed  a «casi 
indecente salud » (OC, IX: 881). This affirmation would  later be 
interpreted  by the propaganda as an overt end orsement to the regime 
(Giustiniani 2007: 75-78). However, the explicit desire expressed  by 
Ortega was – rather than promoting and  publicising the regime – that 
of offering his positive contribution for the development and  following 
instauration of a new institutional framework. He said  this with 
extreme clarity:  
  
Es menester que estemos alerta y que todos, noten ustedes la 
generalidad  del vocablo, noten ustedes el vocablo generalísmo, todos 
tengamos la alegría y la voluntad  y la justicia, tanto legal como social, 
de crear una nueva figura de España apta para internarse saludable en 
las contingencias del más azaroso porvenir. Para ello es menester que 
todos nos apretemos un poco las cabezas, agucemos el sentido para 
inventar nuevas formas de vida donde el pasado desemboque en el 
futuro, que afrontemos los enormes, novísimos, inauditos problemas 
que el hombre tiene hoy ante sí […] (OC, IX: 881). 
 
So, not only Ortega vind icated  the continuity of his intellectual 
activity in relation to the University he had  so extensively contributed  
to build  during the republican period . On the same time, he supported  
the necessity of guaranteeing the ed ification of a legislative framework 
which had  to overcome the emergency government that had  
characterised  the first life of the regime. He called  for the part icipation 
of all the political forces to the design of a new institutional outlook 
which could  have been easily integrated  within the European and  
global context. Interestingly enough, he pau sed  his d iscourse on the 
word  “generalísmo”, overtly addressing to the General Franco. A new 
rule of law should  have replace the State of exception implemented  in 
Spain since the end  of the civil war. The definition of this new rule 
should  have been the new mission that the intellectuals, leaving apart 
partisan interests and  propagandistic roles, should  have to accomplish 
for helping the democratic development of the nation.  
Even if Ortega was aware of the fact that his conference dealt with 
an apparently superfluous topic, he considers his talk in the Ateneo 
mainly as a way to interact again with a community of students and  
intellectuals who, in the previous decade, had  either ignored  or 
strongly criticised  him. For this reason , he presented  the conference as 
an introduction to the development of future lectures and  con ferences 
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in Madrid . He said  so by talking to the students who gathered  in the 
Ateneo, revealing that his main interest still remained  the education of 
the young generation: «Sobre lo que es política […] tenemos que hablar, 
jovenes, ¡y mucho!». He also announced  the topic of his next lectures, 
i.e. politics. In sp ite of the indeterminacy of both the content and  the 
date of these future meetings, Ortega presented  them as a concrete 
possibility. As he put it: «No ahora – tiempo adelante – no sé bien 
cuánd o – un d ía entre los d ías. Pero hemos de hablar, jóvenes, larga y 
enérgicamente» (OC, IX: 882). 
However, the reception of the conference was qu ite d isappointing 
for the philosopher, mainly for two reasons. The first was d ue to the 
incred ible manipulation of his words made by the Francoist 
propaganda. For instance, the newspaper Informaciones
33
, underlined  
that Ortega’s preamble was just an overt end orsement to the clement 
regime that permitted  his return. So d id  the majority of the 
newspapers, such as La Vanguardia Española, accord ing to which Ortega 
had  finally be recovered  for the national cause
34
. The second  reason for 
Ortega’s d isappointment was due to  the scarce attention paid  to his real 
message, not only by the establishment but also by the young stu dents. 
Apart from some letters of his friends he d id  not receive many 
congratu lations or expressions of interest after his conference. On the 
contrary, he receives various violent letters of people who felt  to have 
been betrayed  by his attitude towards the regime
35
. Ortega understood  
                                                          
33
 «Su insobornable fondo de patriotismo au téntico se expandió al contacto 
renovado con el público. […] La conferencia terminó ahí, en los primeros 
párrafos, intencionados y rotundos, que lo decían todo, sin necesidad  de 
reiterar tozudamente las posiciones […] Bienvenido el filósofo a su solar y a su 
pueblo. Diez años después de la sacudida sísmica, la convivencia nacional que 
permite todo régimen auténticamente fuer te, abre sus puertas al d iálogo, a la 
d isertación y a la libertad  auténtica del espíritu». Ortega, en el Ateneo, in 
«Informaciones», 6-V-1946. In AOG, PB-232/ 117. 
34
 «Recobrado íntegramente para la perdurable grandeza del pensamiento 
español». De la conferencia de Ortega y Gasset. Signos de la unidad Nacional, in «La 
Vanguard ia Española», 7-V-1946. 
35
 «Atendiendo a su invocación a vernos las caras, ruegole desiste de cultivar la 
polítiac, y sobre todo de marcarnos camino y meta. Hablo en nombre de los 
padres que perd ieron a sus hijos y hasta de quienes en nuestra modestia no nos 
equivocamos cuando el ilustre Ortega y Gasset con otras personalidades nos 
llevó a todos los fracasos y todas las amarguras. En el mundo hay más que su 
filosofía, maestro». Letter by Federico García Sanchiz to Ortega, 6-V-1946, in 
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he had  been used  by the regime and  when , in October 1946, he was 
invited  again by the Ateneo, he rejected  the invitation saying that: «Tal y 
como siguen las cosas en nuestro país y especialmente como se sigue 
ejerciendo la censu ra […] no es sino contraproducente. La eficacia de la 
palabra hablad a o escrita vive de toda una serie de condiciones en el 
entorno social donde se ejercitan. Cuand o esas cond iciones faltan el 
proyecto mejor intencionad o no hace sino causar daño»
36
. From then on 
Ortega decided  to live mainly in Lisbon and  renounced  to any other  
d irect intervention in his country until the end  of 1948 when he 
founded  in Madrid , together with Julián Marías, the Institute of 
Humanities.  
 
8.5 A  renewed philosophical ou t look 
The great d isillusion that followed  the conference that took place on 
May 1946 in Madrid  prod uced  a d ouble reaction. On the one hand  
Ortega experienced  a period  of depression and  apathy that forced  him 
to aband on all the projects related  to his intervention  in Spain (Gracia, 
2014: 588). On the other, he d id  not cease to look at the international 
scenario as both a source of inspiration and  a possible receptor of his 
philosophical thought. However, in both cases the production of essays 
and  conferences that he conceived  as ind ispensable to reacquire his 
social role and  a cultu ral status would  have been drastically 
interrupted  until, at least, the beginning of April 1947, when he 
prepared  his text for a new conference in San Sebastián on the occasion 
                                                                                                                               
AOG, C-62/ 19b. «Deje a tipos tan graciosos como los Eugenio D’Ors, los 
Montes, los Laín Entralgo, los Lizarrague el papel de filósofos al servicio de 
quienes les pagan. Ud. Don José, es de otra raza.[…] Se desilusionará Ud. ¡y 
muy pronto!, herido en su conciencia, advertirá que no valía la pena haber 
salido de Portugal» Letter by Eleuterio Guzmán Expósito to Ortega, 14-V-1946 
in AOG, C-126/ 30; Letter by Antonio Salvat Navarro to Ortega, 18-V-196; Carta 
Amarga de un “Rojo” a don José Ortega y Gasset  to Ortega, 7-V-1946: «Observe Ud. 
lo que es la vida intelectual española. Lea la basura que se publica en d iarios y 
revistas. Enterese hasta donde llega Falange y la Iglesia en la censura de libros, 
a qué bajo nivel ha descendido la enseñanza, la “depuración” de profesores y 
maestros, la intervención y privilegios del SEU, infórmese por los libreros de 
cómo los lectures se refugian más que nunca en las traducciones». In AOG, C-
126/ 5. 
36
 Letter by Ortega to Eugenio Mediano Flores, 29-X-1946. 
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of a philosophical meeting organised  by the Real Sociedad de Amigos del 
Páis Vasco
37
.  
Since the end  of the war Ortega had  started  to  investigate the new 
tendencies of the philosophy of his time, focusing in particu lar on the 
philosophy of culture as purported  in the UK and  the United  States. 
The new geopolitical scenario called  for a reform of education and  
politics, that could  no longer be based  on the German trad ition and , 
consequently, had  to find  a new universal parad igm  accord ing to 
which to promote the development and  fulfilment of ind ivid uals and 
societies (Tiana Ferrer, 2011). For this reason, whereas this new period  
of Ortega’s meditation  was often d isappointing as far as Spain was 
concerned , on the contrary it corresponded  to a period  of extreme 
ferment and  enthusiasm in relation to the international context.  
As proven by the several press articles and  books that Ortega 
collected  during that period
38
, the two main philosophical and  social 
problems that attracted  the philosopher’s attention from the end  of 
1946 were a) the role of education, and  in particular of the schooling 
system and  the university, in promoting a new ideal of humanity and  
b) the need  of consolid ating a culture of peace through a rad ical change 
of the geopolitical situation, in particular by constructing a new 
confederation of State in Europe. Indeed , Ortega showed to be 
particu larly interest in the opinion of the political leaders w hose 
nations had  won the war and  were consequently responsible of the 
new global order. He regularly read  the speeches and  articles of 
Churchill and  Roosevelt in which these themes always constitu ted  the 
kernel of the political d iscourse. Moreover, another  interesting proof of 
Ortega’s attention towards the role that the intellectual should  had  to 
play within this new international scenario is constituted  by a long 
report conserved  in his Archive, written by the Dean of the University 
of Chicago, Robert Hutchins, entitled  “Science and  Wisd om” 
concerning the moral duty of the intellectuals in relation to the problem 
of the atomic bomb.  
                                                          
37
 As Ortega wrote to Marías: «He tenido durante ese tiempo que escriborrear el 
discurso para San Sebastian […] Al d ía siguiente de enviarla, en cambio, 
comencé a sentirme en plena normalidad , como hacia d iez meses no me sentía. 
Esto no quiere decir que esté completamente confiado pero me parece 
indudable que las cosas de mis salud  han pasado ya a otro clima». Letter by 
Ortega to Marías, 11-IV-1947, in AOG, CD-M/ 56. 
38
 See AOG, Recortes de Prensa. 
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Not only Ortega was extremely curious and  receptive in relation to 
the rad ical changes that were occurring in philosophy and  society, but 
he was also considered  as a very relevant figure by the intellectual 
international community. For instance, the construction of a new 
European identity represented  the topic of the first Rencontre 
internationale de Genève in 1946. The rencontres constituted  an 
international forum that gathered  scientific and  cultural European 
leaders in the Swiss capital to d iscuss the most relevant top ics at stake. 
The participant of the first meeting were Julien Benda, Georges 
Bernanos, Karl Jaspers, Stephen Spender, Jean Guéhenno, Francesco 
Flora, Denis de Rougemont, Jean De Salis and  Georg Lukacs. Ortega 
received  an invitation for participating in those meetings both in 1946 
and  in September 1947, when the top ic concerned  the status of the 
moral and  scientific European progress
39
. He finally declined  these first 
invitations due to his precarious health
40
, and  in the second  occasion he 
was substituted  by Eugenio D’Ors.  
Ortega enjoyed  a great consideration abroad , in particular due to 
the novelty represented  by his theory of education. In fact, its main 
pillars could  have largely fit the proposals of democratisation and  
popularisation of culture promoted  during that period  by the 
UNESCO, as pointed  out in Latin America by his friend  and  d isciple 
Lorenzo Luzuriaga (Scotton, 2016). However, by that time Ortega still 
perceived  he had  to accomplish  his intellectual mission within the 
Spanish boarder and , as soon as his health ameliorated , he started  to 
project new form of interventions within his country, obeying to the 
imperative of continu ity he had  vind icated  during his conference in the 
Madrilenian Ateneo. 
 
8.6 The Scholast icism  of the M adrilen ian  philosophy   
However, while Ortega was dealing with the more urgent problems 
connected  to the necessary reform of education in a post -war scenario, 
the pedagogic and  philosophical reality in Spain was still grounded  on 
trad itionalist roots. For instance, the research promoted  by the CSIC, 
                                                          
39
 See Invitation by Rencontres Internationales de Genève to Ortega y Gasset, in 
AOG, C-128/ 37a. 
40
 Telegram by Ortega to Rencontres Internationales de Genève, 17-VIII-1946, in 
AOG, C-14/ 23. 
 
288 
which by the time was actually a fiefdom of the Opus Dei (Bolado 
Ochoa, 2011), within the humanities focused  exclusively on the 
importance of the Catholic and  Scholastic philosophy as the most 
effective and  valid  form of thinking. This philosophical parad igm 
implied  both a very strict and  rigid  election of the top ics at stake and  a n 
extremely fixed  form of argumentation. As a consequence, in the faculty 
of philosophy, the very way of writing had remarkably changed and the 
essayists, creators of a new and experimental way of thinking, had been 
replaced by the commentators of a rigidly defined philosophical canon mainly 
based on mediaeval and Christian authors. A very significant instance of 
this tendency is offered  by the Dominican priest Santiago Ramírez who, 
between 1942 and  1947 published  a very influential trilogy, in  latin, on 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (Ramírez, 1947). As Eulogio Palacios wrote 
in a review of Ramírez’s books, this theological comment to Aquinas 
represented  the most profound  and  solid  contribution that the Spanish 
philosophy could  have produced  to the d iscussion on the new 
educational and  political order, since: «La técnica necesita hoy 
encuadrarse en la moral teológica. Y España, que nunca ha sido el país 
de la técnica, sino de la teología, es hoy, más que nunca, necesaria para 
la moralización del orbe» (Palacios, 1946: 451). The same Scholastic 
model had  been introd uced  by the very CSIC within the University as a 
pedagogical method , in particular thanks to the publication of Pacios 
López’s Filosofía de la educación (1947). The entire work constituted  an 
attempt to adapt Thomism and  its terminology to the new Spanish 
educational context. The pedagogical activity was consequently stud ied  
in terms of efficient, formal and  final causes within a rigid  theological 
framework. 
Not only d id  this way of reasoning impose itself in the humanistic 
research within the CSIC, but also at the Universidad  Central of 
Madrid , and  in particular in the case of the Faculty of Philosophy. In 
1946, the professor of Metaphysics Juan Zaragüeta (1946) wrote a 
modern introduction to Scholastic. In this book he presented  a 
comprehensive history of philosophy from the ancient Greeks until the 
French existentialism, d oing this by adopting the Thomism 
terminology. This represented  the new common language spoken by 
the very closed  academic community responsible for the study and  
promotion of humanities in Spain immediately after WWII. In spite of 
the apparent anachronism , this intellectual community d id  try to find  
its place, and  consequently, the place of the Spanish Catholic ideology, 
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within the international context by d iffusing its philosophical 
perspective also outside the Spanish boarders.  
A clear instance of this attitude is given  by a very relevant cultural 
circumstance: the international philosophical conference that took p lace 
in Rome in November 1946, and  to which participated  some of the most 
prominent European intellectual figures of that time, such as Jaspers, 
Benda, Marcel, Aron, Abbagnano, Pareyson, Banfi, Troilo, Della Volpe, 
Del Noce and  many others (Garin, 1963: 209-211).  
The Spanish academia participated  to the conference with all the 
most prominent members of the philosophical community: Juan 
Zaragüeta, Santiago Ramírez, Corts Grau, Calvo Serer, González 
Álvarez, Eugenio D’Ors and  Millán Puelles
41
. The three topics at stake 
in the course of this meeting were a) the historical materialism of 
Marxism, b) the nature of existentialism; c) the ground ing principles of 
science. Interestingly enough, the Spanish delegation participated  in a 
substantial way exclusively to the third  panel and , within this, only by 
posing questions related  to the use of language, and  in particular 
concerning the definition of a philosophical terminology, conceived  in 
scholastic terms.  
Indeed , both Marxism and  existentialism were not really d iscussed  
respectively by Calvo Serer and  Corts Grau . In fact, in their conferences 
the two Spanish intellectuals merely criticised  a priori these theories in 
virtue of a theological conception of reality. The Spanish group  
appeared  unable to significantly contribute to a debate that was 
probably extremely d istant from its real preoccupations and  interests, 
focusing exclusively on the relevance of a Catholic philosophy within 
the new global scenario. The mission of the Spanish delegation was that 
of proposing not only a philosophical but also a comprehensive vision 
of the scientific reality of the country since, as written by the Ibáñez 
Martín (1947b, 18): «La genialid ad  teológica española, que floreció para 
servir a la catolicid ad  de la fe, ha de ocupar también en este supremo 
instante la primera jerarquía del renacimiento cientìfico. Nuestra 
ciencia actual – en conexión con la que en los pasados siglos nos definió 
como naciòn y como Imperio – quiere ser, ante tod o, católica».  
The evident cohesion of the Spanish  members revealed  the existence 
of a common ideology based  on  very strict metaphysical premises, on 
some undisputable principles that grounded  a debate that, in 
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 For a detailed  chronicle of the conference see in particular Millán Puelles, 
1946. 
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comparison to their European colleagues, seemed to be excessively 
focused  on an anachronistic system of ideas. Whereas the world  was 
moving towards a new form of scientific and  evolutionary humanism , 
promoted  by the recently founded  UNESCO and  its d irector Julian 
Huxley, Spain was continuing its campaign against atheism and  any 
form of non-religious thought
42
. Thus, in September 1946, while in San 
Sebastián Ortega was read ing his conference on Velázquez – a sort of 
autobiographical vind ication of intellectual freedom and  independence 
(Gracia, 2014: 594-597) – nearby, at the international catholic 
conference, Juan Zaragüeta was pronouncing his lecture on the 
construction of a Christian community of philosophers aimed  at 
propagating worldwide the importance of Thomism and  Scholasticism 
(Zaragüeta, 1947). 
Only by looking to marginalised  members of the est ablishment it is 
possible to appreciate some very slight signs of openness towards the 
Orteguian perspective. Ind eed , in 1947, Julián Marías published  with 
the ed itor Revista de Occidente a long introd uction to the history of 
philosophy (Marías, 1947), a book that would  have an enormous 
fortune within the Spanish academia in the following years. This 
introd uction constituted  an explicit attempt to d ivu lgate the main ideas 
of his master, Ortega y Gasset, in particular in relation to the historical, 
circumstantial and  vital reason, using them to interpret the history of 
Western thought. In spite of being a very marginal figure within the 
Spanish academia – his doctoral thesis had  been rejected  by Zubiri in 
1942 – Marías and  his book obtained  a notable success. This is proven  
also by a long review of the text published  by Juan Zaragüeta during 
the same year. In his review the professor of Metaphysics underlined  
the value of this book, an evidence of the greatness of the Spanish 
philosophy «aún para quien d iscrepe más o menos de sus orientaciones 
doctrinales» (Zaragüeta, 1947b: 319). With subtle argumentations 
Zaragüeta concluded  his review criticising Marías’ book, in particu lar 
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 As Luis Sierra (1947) wrote in an article published  in Arbor, the UNESCO did 
represent a problem and  a relevant danger for a trad itionalist and  Catholic 
doctrine, since, accord ing to Huxley: «La vision del mundo creado por Dios la 
sustituye por la de un mundo en eterna evolución de la sustancia viva, que 
ignoramos qué sea, y para el cual es preciso encontrar una nueva forma social y 
cultura; en un mundo en que los filósofos y los hombres de ciencia sustituyen a 
los sacerdotes como mediadores y el instrumento es la educación, 
especialmente la educación de masa». 
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its orteguian allure, ad opting the instruments of scholasticism. The 
overall positive evaluation of the book is thus functional to underline 
the existence of great d iscrepancies between the official philosophy 
purported  by the University and  the one proposed  by Ortega and  his 
recognised  d isciples. Such d iscrepancies could  have ultimately been 
eliminated  by depurating those subversive arguments through a 
bathing in Thomism. 
 
8.7 Ortega’s an t i-scholast icism  
However, such attempts of instrumentally read ing Ortega’s ideas in 
a scholastic framework were strongly rejected  by him . Indeed , on the 
occasion of an invitation by the d irector of the Madrilenian newspaper 
library, Eulogio Varela, to give a talk in Madrid  on Leibniz, Ortega 
started  to compose – during 1947 – a long essay he never finished , 
entitled  La idea de principio en Leibniz. The book, the first attempt made 
by the philosopher to write a proper philosophical treaty accord ing to 
the fashion of that time, was published  only posthumously, in 1958, 
and  constituted  a d irect attack to the way in which the philosophical 
inquiry was cond ucted  in Madrid  (Conderana Cerillo, 2013). Julián 
Marías, who soon received  a first d raft of Ortega’s manuscrip t from the 
very author, recognised  this overt critique to the Spanish academia, and  
also suggested  some variations to his master in order to sweeten some 
of his most rad ical expressions
43
. However, this work of Ortega d oes 
not only appear d rastic and  subversive in the adoption  of some insolent 
epithets he used  to ind icate the members of the Spanish academia, in 
particu lar those who were more akin to a religious thinking. Indeed , 
the text also represents a rad ical critique of a way of conceiving 
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 «Por supuesto, su interpretación de la Escolástica me par ece aguda y 
justícisma. Dice usted  todo lo bueno que hay que decir de ella, con toda 
holgura y generosidad , pero todo eso dentro de su rad ical limitación, si no se 
advierte la cual son funestas sus propias excelencias. No sé cómo caerá; será 
malentendida, suscitará enojo; pero no importa; es verdad  y está justificad a, y 
basta. Tal vez fuera bueno, por eso mismo, omitir alguna expresión que, 
aunque procede de buen humor de usted , se entenderá y se exhibirá como 
prueba inequivoca de saña, od io, etc.; así “frailazo” y alguna más. Creo que es 
concederles un tanto de ventaja, sin beneficio sustancial». Letter by Marías to 
Ortega, 7-VIII-1947, in AOG, C-31/ 19. 
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philosophy as a dogmatic defence of some categorical princip les either 
concerning metaphysics, ethics, politics or education.  
In particu lar, he traced  a d istinction between dogmatic principles 
and  grounding princip les. Whereas the first are undispu table and  
considered  true in every and  each situation, on the contrary the second  
do not possess this absolute valid ity, and  they are conceived  as 
principles only insofar as their premises can bring about relevant 
consequences (OC, IX: 936). The constructivism that emerges from 
Ortega’s book (Ovejero Bernal, 2003) is an evident attack to the 
excessive orthod oxy and  d ogmatism of the Spanish philosophy of that 
time which, adopting a scholastic and  Catholic framework , d id  
consider principles as true realities and  not just as means for further 
investigations. In fact, accord ing to the philosopher, scholasticism 
would  suffer of a «esterilid ad  constitutiva» (OC, IX: 1025) that rendered  
it a useless philosophy. On the contrary, the methodical doubt 
introd uced  by Descartes should , to Ortega, always be incentivised  by 
the philosophers and  was indeed  the main instrument used  by  very 
Aristotle, the father of the scholastic trad ition
44
.  
Without entering in the details of this extremely compelling 
philosophical piece it is important, for the purposes of this work, to 
shed  light on some of the most intriguing notes made by Ortega in 
regard  to the scope and  end  of the philosophical activity per se and  in 
relation to the frequent criticism  he received  from a vast part of the 
Spanish academia. In particular, apart from the critiques to the 
scholastic trad ition, it is possible to put forwards some strands of this 
book which give a perfect clue of Ortega’s posture towards both the 
Spanish and  the global philosophy of that time: a) his defence of 
imagination and  fantasy as inner traits of the philosophical reasoning; 
b) his vind ication of the unpopularity and  counter-intuitiveness of 
philosophy; c) the strongly related  sociological d istinct ion between 
ideas and  beliefs. 
a) In this book Ortega proposes a completely d ifferent account of 
what philosophy should  properly be in comparison to the Spanish 
scenario. In fact, accord ing to him, it  should  neither be a form of 
commentary of authoritative texts nor the expression of a rigorous 
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 «Aristóteles, como hombre de ciencia que era ante todo, fue un pensador 
rad icalmente naturista y profano. Que un hombre así se haya convertido en el 
filósofo oficial del catolicismo es uno de los hechos más extraños, más confusos 
de la historia universal». In OC, IX: 1022. 
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logical thinking, but rather a form of imagination  (OC, IX:1017). The 
thesis purported  by Ortega basically constituted  a defence of his 
peculiar way of writing that he knew was strongly criticised  in Spain as 
excessively poetical and  not rigorously philosophical
45
. This ad hominem 
argument against his philosophical account is interestingly countered  
by Ortega who argues that poetry and  philosophy do have something 
in common: they can be said  to represent a true and  scientific vision of 
the world , without pretend ing to be the truth. At the same time, this 
account which arises from “local” problem does have relevant 
philosophical consequences that would  characterise all the last years of 
Ortega’s meditation in relation to the role of humanities in the post -war 
period . In fact, this self-proclaimed  limitation – which poetry 
contributes to d isclose as an inner character of any human enquiry and  
way of thinking such as in the case of philosophy – permits to consider 
all the d isciplines encompassed  within the humanities as partial, 
relative and  debatable forms of knowledge. This confers to them a hint 
of uncertainty that, however, does not end  in a tragedy: on the 
contrary, this partiality permits to consider all culture and  its products 
– i.e. civilisation – as a tentative way of assigning a proper meaning to 
the lives of human beings, knowing that this activity would  never be 
tragic, but rather w ill resemble to a p layful preoccupation unceasingly 
open to its own end less reconstruction. In particu lar, the analysis of the 
concept of metaphor conducted  by Ortega, reveals that philosophy 
shares with poetry a same tendency to create new ideas thanks to an 
operation of transposition of meaning wh ich opens up new 
perspectives on reality. Therefore, the same poietic skill possessed  by the 
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 «Pensar que durante mas de treinta años – se d ice pronto – he tenido d ía por 
d ía que soportar en silencio, nunca interrumpido, que muchos pseudo-
intelectuales de mi país descalificaban mi pensamiento, porque «no escribía 
más que metáforas» – decían ellos. Esto les hacía triunfalmente sentenciar y 
proclamar que mis escritos no eran filosofía. ¡Y claro que afortunadamente no 
lo eran! si filosofía es algo que ellos son capaces de segregar. Ciertamente que 
yo extremaba la ocultación de la musculatura d ialéctica definitoria de mi 
pensamiento, como la naturaleza cuid a de cubrir fibra, nervio y tendón con la 
literatura ectodérmica de la piel donde se esmeró en poner el stratum lucidum. 
Parece mentira que ante mis escritos – cuya importancia, aparte de esta 
cuestión, reconozco que es escasa – nad ie haya hecho la generosa observación 
que es, además, irrefutable, de que en ellos no se trata de algo que se da como 
filosofía y resulta ser literatura, sino por el contrario, de algo que se da como 
literatura y resulta que es filosofía». in OC, IX: 1136. 
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poet is required  to the philosopher who would  have to invent his own 
style. Consequently, philosophy and  poetry can be thought as two 
declinations of a same method  and  aim of enquiry which only d iffer  
due to the fact that the description purported  by philosophy is usually, 
but only contingently, considered  to be more akin to truth than the 
other. 
b) The critique of Ortega to the scholasticism is also significantly 
conducted  by criticising some aspects of Aristotle’ philosophy. He d id  
so in particular in the second  part of the book in which it is possible to 
notice a clear shift from an epistemological to a sociological account. In 
particu lar, he considers Aristotle’s defence of endoxa, that is of the 
common opinion which ground s the truth of the principles, as an anti-
philosophical attitude: «La filosofía aristotélica […] es la filosofía del 
sentid o común, el cual, conste, no es inteligencia, sino asumpción ciega 
por suggestion colectiva» (OC, IX: 1097). Indeed , every proper 
philosophical activity, accord ing to Ortega, arises from a situation in 
which there are not fixed  principles and  shared  beliefs, a situation of 
rad ical crisis that impels one to counter what is generally assumed by 
the population but that has lost its legitimacy. Contrary to Aristotle, 
«hombre del pueblo» (OC, IX: 1058), who defend s the public op inion , 
he affirms that the mission of the philosopher and  the intellectual 
should  be that of being an «enemigo del pueblo» (OC, IX: 1056), who 
counters the false presuppositions and  beliefs with the aim of 
ameliorating the society in which he lives. Scholasticism, on the 
contrary, is characterised  by a political conservatism typical of a 
receptive philosophy which renders impossible to d irectly face the 
problems that a society is actually suffering, since: «El problema d e 
entender la solución preexistente y dad a imposibilita de raíz el sentir y 
ver los problemas auténticos, originarios, de que la solución lo es o 
pretende serlo[…] La deficiencia más grave de la filosofía escolástica es 
su incapacid ad  para plantearse los problem as filosóficos, que son 
siempre los últimos y extremos» (OC, IX: 1067, 1073). Ortega’s critique of 
Aristotle is consequently also a critique towards demagogy, traditionalism and 
conservatism, all aspects which were ideologically mirrored in a philosophia 
perennis that both epistemologically and politically speaking represented, 
according to Ortega, the most evident ignominy of the new Spanish academia.  
c) Moreover, this lack of authenticity and  critical thinking that is 
expressed  in the philosophy of the regime implies, accord ing to Ortega, 
a very relevant problem in the social sphere. In fact, by accepting the 
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truth of an apparent reality and  assuming in a d ogmatic way the 
valid ity of certain principles, Scholasticism and  its consequent 
pedagogical attitude would  imply the accep tance of a rigid  set of norms 
without d iscussing them. This would  therefore cause an uncritical 
acceptance of any sort of imposed  rules. Pu t it d ifferently, such d octrine 
would  ultimately d ismiss any critical thinking by replacing an idea 
with a mere belief, unconsciously confusing the former with the latter . 
In fact, as Ortega writes: «El hombre, en cuanto viviend o los usos 
colectios, es un autómata d irigido por la sugestión social[…] y la 
filosofía aristotélico-escolástica […] resulta ser una filosofía de 
catalépticos, esclavos psíquicos del “lugar común”» (OC, IX: 1099)
46
. 
Ortega compares this attitude with a blind  faith, accusing it to be in 
contrast w ith any form of authentic rational inquiry
47
. In fact, a real 
philosophy could  only start w ith a rad ical doubt , and  this critical 
attitude was what, accord ing to Ortega, should  have been transmitted  
to the youngest generations, to the university students and  the general 
public opinion (OC, IX: 1115). Not only the real intellectual is the 
person who puts everything in question, as Ortega put it, but this 
activity is so ind ispensable for the life of every single ind ividual since 
«tendrían todos el deber inexcusable de ser intelectuales» (OC, IX: 
1108). His accusation towards the Madrilenian philosophical circle is 
for the first time explicit in this text . It lies precisely on the progressive 
numbness of the critical attitude that, since the beginning of the civil 
war and  in particular d uring the forties, had  caused  d isruptive 
consequences on the intellectual climate of the capital: 
 
La vida intelectual ha descendido tétricamente de nivel en todas partes 
pero, en países donde nunca fue normal y saludable, la degeneración de los 
caletres es superlativa y el nivel anda ya por debajo del mar como en el 
largo Asfaltites. Madrid  ha perd ido el poco de alerta en la idea que logró 
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 To define this tendency of Scholasticism to rely on the common sense he 
provocatively uses the term “communism” or “communist sense”, an 
expression that should  have clearly bothered  the sensibility of the religious and 
academic audience to which he addressed. 
47
 «Cuando los escolásticso al decir que ellos tienen la superioridad  sobre toda 
la filosofía moderna […] lo d icen con la soberbia y la petulancia cerrirel, 
“aldeanas”, tan típicas del ambiente confinado en que se vive dentro de los 
conventos, siente uno sincera pena, no por creerse poseedor, a su vez , de una 
verdad  superior aquella […] sino por presencial lo que es lisa  llanamente una 
crasa ignorancia de que tengan o no razón con su sentencia». (OC, IX: 1107).  
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despertarse en él: ha vuelto a ser del todo el eterno aldeón manchego que 
siempre en el fondo fue y le ha salido a la cara su infuso e indeleble 
Madridejos. Madrid  ha sido entregado, como se entrega una buena oveja a 
las alimañas, a los “intelectuales” provincianos y a los aficionados (OC, IX: 
1147).  
 
Ortega, in virtue of this critical attitude embedded  in every true 
philosophical practice, denounces his repugnance towards any form of 
partisanship in the intellectual activity . The analysis he presents in this 
text on the role of beliefs in constructing the social reality and  
intellectual life would  constitute the kernel of his last philosophical 
theorisation aimed  to underline the relation between the objective 
construction of cu lture and  the subjective and  personal life of the 
ind ividuals (Larrea, 2003). Starting from these premises, Ortega also 
reveals to be perfectly aware of the instrumental use that of his figure 
had  been recently done in Madrid : «el filósofo nunca fue de un partido 
y todos qu isieron ad jud icárselo después» (Ibidem).  
To summarise, Ortega’s book on Leibniz is a clear instance of his 
posture towards the cultural situation of his country and , at the same 
time, concerning the necessity of a general reform of the humanities in 
the post-war period . Both of these preoccupations constituted  the 
kernel of his public intervention in the following years. Even if Ortega 
d id  not publish this long essay during his life  he d id  not renounce to 
express his op inions in other occasions soon after having written these 
words. Indeed , through the activities of the Institute of Humanities he 
founded  by the end  of 1948, he rad ically opposed  to the philosophy 
purported  in his country, promoting d ifferent social analyses and  
claiming for a more critical pedagogy.  
 
 
8.8 Towards a dialogue: seeds for new projects 
Ortega’s conference on theatre – in spite of the delusion it caused  
both in the survivors of the II Republic and  in the young falangists who 
aimed  at gaining a more influential social power within the regime
48
 – 
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 As Laín Entralgo (1989: 363) wrote in his autobiography recalling that 
conference: «Doble error cometió Ortega ante su propria exigencia: presentarse 
ante los españoles en un Ateneo regido por Ibáñez Martín, lo cual por fuerza 
había de debilitar la atención hacia él en las mejores almas de la juventud 
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did  contribute to mobilise new energies within the Spanish culture. Not 
only some of Ortega’s disciples, mainly through the review Ínsula, 
begun to promote a new image of his figure, but also outside his more 
intimate circle a more conciliatory position started  to emerge. In the 
first case, thanks to the unceasing efforts of Julián Marías to establish a 
fruitful conversation with the philosopher, by the beginning of 1946 
Ortega accepted  to actively collaborate with his d isciple in the 
development of new ed itorial and  public interventions
49
. Ortega’s will 
was indeed  that of continuing and  ameliorating some of the projects, 
such as the Biblioteca de Cien libros, that he had  carried  about during his 
exile in Portugal. In particular he planned  to publish a new collection, 
called  Estudios de Humanidades, for the ed itor Revista de Occidente, with 
the aim of offering recent views on the topic that most interested  him 
during that time with the collaboration of other Spanish intellectuals he 
felt more akin with
50
. 
During one of these frequent conversations with Julián Marías and  
Ortega’s son , José, emerged  a new and  compelling id ea for p lanning a 
new intervention of the philosopher in Madrid . Since the beginning of 
the forties, Ju lián Marías and  his wife – Dolores Franco –, José Ortega 
and  his sister Soled ad , together with other young Spanish teachers, had  
founded  the Aula Nueva. This was a private academy preparing 
students in their last year of bachillerato to their final exam (Ortega y 
Spottorno, 2002: 398). By the end  of 1946 the Aula Nueva was going to 
d isappear, mainly due to economic problems, and  the very Marías, in 
one of his letters manifested  his doubt regard ing the future of this 
institution: «No sé si lo mejor sería suprimirla, o hacer alguna profond a 
                                                                                                                               
española de entonces, y hablar acerca del teatro. En una España depauperada, 
estremecida por el todavía inmediato recuerdo de la guerra civil, tensa de un 
modo o de otro ante la situación que le planteaba el tan reciente término de la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial, el teatro no podía ser, ni para Ortega n i para los 
españoles de 1946, “el tema de nuestro tiempo”. Un grave y exigente programa 
de vida cultural –un programa acorde con las palabras antes transcritas – 
deberia haber sido en mi opinion el contenido de su conferencia». 
49
 «Mis deseo sería trabajar solo o casi exclusivaemnte en relación con usted , 
para la Revista [de Occidente] o en otras tareas que usted  proyecta: el 
Diccionario de Labor, el que José planteaba, los Estudios de Humanidades, si al fin 
llegan a ser». Letter by Marías to Ortega, 29-VIII-1946, in AOG, C-31/ 15. 
50
 In his letter to Marías Ortega mentioned  in particular Zubiri, Gaya, Fernando 
Sains, Mindán, Valdecasas and  Diez del Corral. Cfr. Letter by Ortega to Marías, 
11-IV-1947, in AOG, CD-M/ 56. 
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alteración»
51
. The wish to maintain alive this project by renovating it 
would  later end  up in the creation of the Instituto de Humanidades that 
was established  within the complex of the Aula N ueva. The project 
would  have been realised  more than a year later, in the autumn 1948. 
During the period  not only the group guided  by Marías and  Ortega’s 
sons prepared  the material conditions for rendering it possible, but it 
also set the ground  for creating the great expectation and  widespread  
acceptation of Ortega’s new return in the capital. 
At the beginning of 1948, Ínsula published  an issue entirely 
ded icated  to the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset w ith the contributions 
of the very members who were collaborating for the creation of the 
Institute. Among them Marías, Lafuente Ferrari, Dolores Franco and  
Paulino Garagorri. The attempt to introduce the philosopher in the 
cultural scenario is evident in the article written by Marías, who affirms 
the importance of studying Ortega for the great incitement he produces 
in his readers, for the quality of his prose and  for the valid ity of his 
theoretical framework
52
. The homage of the review to the master d id  
clearly constitute an attempt to prepare the path for his immediate 
entrance in Madrid  and  for promoting the activities he would  have 
soon realised  in the Institu te of Humanities.  
During the same year, another review was found ed: Cuadernos 
Hispánicos. The review presented  a far more conciliatory aim in 
comparison to all the rest of the official publications of the regime with 
the recent republican past and  with the previous generation of 
intellectual to which Ortega belonged: the generation of the ’14. As t he 
d irector of the review, Ped ro Laín Entralgo, wrote in his first ed itorial, 
the review: «ha nacido para servir al d iálogo». In the first publication 
the name of Ortega appears exclusively in one bu t very significant 
                                                          
51
 Letter by Marías to Ortega, 29-VIII-1946, in AOG, C-31/ 15. 
52
 «Ortega tiene tres cualidades que lo hacen especialmente apto para 
experimentar la contextura espiritual de los hombres que entran en contacto 
con su obra: en primer lugar, su incomparable poder de incitación y sugestión 
que procede tanto de su riqueza in terior como de la absoluta generosidad  con 
que ha usado de ella; en segundo término, sus dotes literarias, capaced  de 
llegar a los españoles en aquel punto en que su sensibilidad  es tal vez más viva; 
por último, el valor de pura teoría – en forma más estricta, es decir, filosófica – 
que tiene sus escritos, unida a la claridad  máxima, de suerte que la 
comprensión de Ortega es buen instrumento para medir la capacidad  para el 
pensamiento teórico y en especial para la filosofía». Marías, 1948: 1.  
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article written by the Argentinean philosopher César Pico on the 
mission of Spain in the post-war period . In this case, Ortega is 
presented  as a «genial filósofo, gloria de Europa y de las Españas». The 
whole essay constitutes an analysis of Ortega’s d istinction between 
ideas and  beliefs and  its consequences in relation to religion and  the 
political situation of Spain. Interestingly , the thought of Ortega is used  
to counter what are defined  as two form s of excessive rationalism, i.e. 
the nationalism of the regime during the war period  and  the 
international cosmopolitanism of Marxism. The proposal of Pico , who 
adopts Ortega to prove it, consist in a sort of syncretism among 
d ifferent positions, with the aim of replacing the nationalist ideology of 
the regime with an internationally accep table one. A ideology that was 
ultimately based  on the defence of Catholicism
53
. 
So, in sp ite of the still largely homogenous ideology of the Spanish 
academia during the end  of the forties, the perception of the role that 
Ortega could  have played  within the new political scenario 
significantly changed . In many reviews, his name was no longer 
perceived  as a taboo and  was not aprioristically criticised  by the whole 
spectrum of the regime’s establishment. More than an enemy tout 
court, he was perceived  by many as a possible source that cou ld  have 
positively influence the cultural and  political life of the nation. Whe ther 
this would  have implied  a complete acceptance of his philosophical 
framework (Marías) or an instrumental use of it (Laín), it would  still be 
d isputed . In any case, this new trend  within the Spanish intellectual 
life, largely due to international circumstances, constituted  the basic 
conditions that rendered  possible the realisation of the most ambitious 
project of Ortega since the creation of the Agrupación a Servicio de la 
República: the creation of the Instituto de Humanidades. 
  
                                                          
53
 «La fidelidad  al character nacional, a la id iosincrasia modelada a través de las 
vicisitudes históricas; la justa jactancia en las propias virtudes contrastadas por 
la propia y gloriosa perduración a través de los infinitos embates del tiempo, 
debe compaginarse con una postura abierta, con una mentalidad  porosa a las 
ajenas cualidades. En otros términos, la custod ia y salvaguard ia del propio ser 
debe estar d ispuesta a acep tar aquellas perfecciones extrañas que aseguren la 
futura síntesis ecuménicas. […] Por eso España, eterna misionera apostólica 
puede levantar enhiesto y señero, con el de la Fe d ivina asociada a los valores 
humanos fundamentales». Cfr. César Pico, 1948: 50, 61. 
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Chapter 9.  
The Institu te of Humanities 
As alread y seen in the previous chap ters, since the civil war Ortega had  
been systematically marginalised  by the formal University system and  
frequently criticised  by a large part of the cultural establishment of the  
political regime. His second  coming in Madrid  in 1948 constituted  his 
most audacious attempt to continue exercising his intellectual influence 
in Spain, assuming the fact of being an outsider in relation to the 
official educative policies purported  by the Spanish government. This 
implied  the need  of inventing d ifferent and  new means to  transmit his 
philosophical and  pedagogical theories, without counting on any 
official support. So, between 1948 and  1950, Ortega realised , with the 
help of some of his friends and  d isciples, the Institu te of Humanities as 
an alternative educative institution involved  in the teaching to 
university students and  ad ults. The institute counted  exclusively on the 
vocational participation of the civil society and  the desire of a restrict 
group of intellectuals of d elving into significant social and  scientific 
problems independently from  the oppressive orthodoxy of Franco’s 
University. This project undoubted ly represented  one the most 
effective realisation of the theoretical principles about the practice of 
philosophy and  the importance of education in the bu ild ing  of the civil 
society that Ortega had  been developing at least since his Mission of the 
University. His classes and  seminars were not a mere repetition of his 
previous teachings. On the contrary, they constituted  an interesting 
enrichment of his sociological and  historical meditations in the light of 
the new international scenario. In spite of the lack of critical stud ies 
focused  on this last Orteguian educative project, the Institute d id  
constitute a significant attempt of introducing an experiment of 
freedom of expression within an intellectually closed  and  censorious 
d ictatorship. An experiment which collapsed  in Spain, but which was 
very strictly entangled  with the attempt of constructing a global 
education of peace after the second  World  War, akin to th e project 
purported  by several international institutions. Through the case of the 
IH this chapter aims at understand ing and  questioning the role of this 
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cultural institutions in the challenging of the political leadership and  
social consensus in Franco’s Spain. 
The IH will be stud ied  first of all by taking into account (§1) the 
cultural and  political cond itions which rendered  this project possible. 
The social circumstances surrounding the Institute were indeed  so 
pervasive in the development of the project  that (§2) it became the new 
battlefield  of the struggle for the cultural hegemony between two 
opposite fronts of the establishment in a period  of international crisis 
and  isolation for the regime. The d iatribe between Pedro La ín Entralgo 
and  Calvo Serer is a clear instance of this harsh contrapposition. 
However, (§3) the interests of Ortega in realising this project were not 
exclusively limited  to the local Spanish context. On the contrary, he 
conceived  the Institute as a ped agogical experiment that wanted  to 
constitute a possible path for the upheveal of humanities in the post -
war scenario. In particular, Ortega proposed  a reform of these 
d isciplines based  on two main pillars, d iscussed  respectively in the first 
and  the second  course of the IH : (§4) the relevance of history as a way 
to comprehend  the ind ivid ual and  collective nature of human beings; 
and  (§5) the consequences of this stud y for  sociology. Then, (§6) they 
will be taken into account the strong connections of this project with 
the new international worries toward s the definition of a new 
humanistic education, before considering (§7) the concrete effects 
produced  within the Spanish cu ltural debate by this brief but 
significant educative experiment w ithin  a d ictatorial government. 
Lastly, (§8) they will be presented  the reasons underneath the end  of 
this project, also by countering the current and  more popular 
explanations presented  so far by Ortega’s scholars.  
 
9.1 The birth of an  ambit ious project  
During 1948, in his frequent journeys and  stays in Madrid , Ortega 
consolid ated  his relationships with the Spanish academic and  political 
establishment (Gracia, 2014: 615). H is public end orsement to one or 
another political movement continued  to be contended  by d ifferent and  
opposing fronts. In fact, in spite of their d ifferences, all these 
movements shared  the common idea accord ing to which, 
independently from the real opinion of the philosopher, his figure per se 
would  have surely benefited  their cause. Thus, Ortega was considered , 
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at the same time, as the most suitable representative of the Spanish 
culture
54
 and  as a p lausible defender of the Monarchical cause by the 
proponents of a necessary alternative to Franco’s regime
55
. However, 
whereas Ortega’s attempt of playing an active role within the Spanish 
politics had  evidently failed  in 1946, when pronouncing his conference 
at the Ateneo of Madrid , the intention to continue inspiring new 
generations of young students and  lead ing the intellectual debate still 
represented  his main preoccupation.  
The regime had  understood  that Ortega would  not have been easily 
assimilated  to its ideology and  would  not totally serve its cause, at least 
as the internal politics was concerned . At the same time, his presence in 
Spain had  proven to guarantee a relief from the point of view of the 
international perception of the country in relation to the cultural 
atmosphere and  the freed om of expression. For these reasons, when 
Ortega decided  to create in Madrid  an Institu te of H umanities through 
the help and  logistical support mainly of his son José Ortega y 
Spottorno and  Julián Marías – after the failure of publishing the 
collection of the Estudios de Humanidades (Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 418) –, 
his activity was neither supported  by the Spanish establishment nor 
completely ostracised . This attitude was reflected  in the treatment 
reserved  by the national newspapers in presenting , in the autumn 1948, 
the activities that would  have been carried  out by the Institu te. As 
Marías (1983) wrote, the censorship of the propaganda obliged  all the 
newspapers to ded icate exclusively very few and  descriptive lines to 
this new intellectual project brought about by Ortega. However, the 
intimate circle that surrounded  this activity could  count  on the 
sympathy of some members of the establish ment that had  a very 
influential role in the propagation of culture. Among them Laín 
                                                          
54
 An instance of this tendency is offered  by the occasion of the arrival in 
Madrid  of the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel, when Ortega was invited  by 
the d irector of the Hispanic Institute in Madrid , Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, to a 
conference and  banquet organised  by the CSIC for representing his own 
country among the most eminent Spanish intellectu als. Letter by Ruiz Giménez 
to Ortega, in AOG, C-71/ 42a. 
55
 As demonstrated , for instance, by the letter sent to Ortega by the antifrancoist 
Luisa María Narváez y Macías, duchess of Valencia: «La finalidad  de este 
trabajo y su d ivulgación no es otra que la de llevar al convencimiento de qu ien 
corresponde la necesidad  de pasar a la Restauración de la Monarquía por via 
pacífica y terminar con este período excepcional de totalitarismo para bien de 
España». Letter by Magallanes to Ortega, in AOG, C-130/ 31. 
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Entralgo, Dioniso Ridruejo, Antonio Tovar (González Cuevas, 2009: 
111). The very Laín, in his memories, admitted  that he d id  not take part 
in the activities of the Institu te, but that he always looked  at it with 
empathy, hoping that it could  partially open an inner debate within the 
intellectual community over the new course that the Spanish politics 
could  have ad opted  in order to remain alive in a context of 
international turmoil (Laín Entralgo, 1989: 364).  
Morevoer, some other intellectuals, teachers, professors or influent 
political or public figures surrounded  Ortega during those years, 
among them: Fernand o Vela, Pepe Tuled a, José Ruiz Castillo, Emilio 
Garcia Gòmez, José Vergara, Antonio Huescar, Luiz Diez del Corral, 
Alfonso Garcìa Valdecasas, José Maravall, Antonio Diaz Cañabate, 
Domingo Ortega, Ju lio Camba, José Germain  and  Fernando Chueca 
(Abellán, 2005: 150). In particular, José Germain, an old  professor of the 
Republican university, represented  for Ortega a very fruitful reference 
point. Indeed , the doctor Germain – who collaborated  with Ortega also 
to the project Azar and  enjoyed  a great intimacy with a lot of the 
members of the Falange (Gracia, 2014: 582-583) – since 1946 was the 
d irector of the Revista de Psigología General y Aplicada and  not only 
repeated ly invited  the philosopher to contribute to the review, bu t he 
also promoted  the d iffusion in it of the Manifesto of the Institute of 
Humanities. Moreover, in spite of what Marías recalled  in his memories, 
some longer articles d id  appear in the national press between October 
and  November 1948 presenting the new project of the philosopher  that 
would  have been inaugurated  by the beginning of December. In 
particu lar, a long article was published  in ABC – directed  by Ortega’s 
friend  Luis Calvo – and , in several other newspapers, it was 
reproduced  also a quite long note written by Enrique Casamayor
56
. So, 
in spite of the very stringent censorship imposed  by the regime and  the 
lack of any form of d irect and  explicit support by the establishment, the 
Institute was finally realised  and  promoted  between the summer and  
the early autumn 1948. 
The absence of ideological support implied  also a lack of economic 
aid  to this new ambitious project. For this reason , this private initiative 
had  necessarily to count on the matriculation fees of its students and  
participants. However the material condition s of the general 
population and  the middle class would  not permit a vast participation 
                                                          
56
 In AOG, Recortes de Prensa. 
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to these meetings as wished  by the proponents of the Institute. In fact , 
during the period  comprised  between 1945 and  1950 the consumers 
market in Spain had  not significantly improved  in comparison to the 
war period , and  while in 1935, before the civil war, the private 
consumption was equal to 12000 pesetas per person, in 1948 it d id  not 
reach 10000 (Maluquer de Motes, 2005: 1253). In this context , the call for 
an ample participation to such cultural project, whose matriculation 
fees corresponded  to 1300 pesetas, was clearly utopian. For this reason 
the Institute not only decided  to award  some funding to persons in 
need  or with a particu lar merit, but the funders also decided  to include 
a series of free talks and  public speeches so to expand  the aud ience of 
these colloquia. This decision responded to a special desire manifested by the 
very Ortega, that is the wish to attract to these meetings and lessons those who 
were more likely to be excluded from the possibility of acquiring a decent 
education, and this was a problem that, according to Ortega, was shared at the 
same time by the university students – educated by a contemptible propaganda 
– and by the low-class. Thus Casamayor, in advertising the Institu te, 
specifies that the lessons have been thought «facilitánd ose la asitencia a 
universitarios y obreros interesados en seguir lo estud ios». 
In any case, the reception to this new ortegu ian project within the 
civil society was largely positive and  often quite enthusiastic. The 24-
pages manifesto of the Institute of Humanities, after havin g passed  the 
control of the censorship
57
, was rendered  public on November, 6 1948 in  
Ínsula and  in the Revista de Psigología General y Aplicada. Moreover, it 
was also rendered  public and  sold  in a lot of bookshops in Madrid  and  
other Spanish cities, with a circulation of 1000 copies. After the 
publication of the prospectus of the Institute the organisers, Marías and  
Ortega, received  a lot of letters and  manifestations of interest from all 
over Spain. They were sent not only by the members of the upper 
society (ambassadors
58
, professors
59
, politicians and  ministers
60
 or 
                                                          
57
 Instancia en solicitud de autorización para imprimir la obra “Prospecto del 
Instituto de Humanidades”, in AGA, Exp. 5376-48 Sig 21/ 08499. Accord ing to 
the censor (Batanero), the manifesto: “no contenece nada censurable. Se limita  a 
exponer la razón del titulo y contenido a desarrollar en la actividad  del centro 
de cultura e investigación que crean, programa, matricula etc.”  
58
 Letter by Ruiz Morales (secretary of the Foreign minister) to Ortega, 6-XI-
1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 2-1. 
59
 Letter by Lopez Ibor to Ortega, 30-XI- 1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 52. 
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university students
61
) but also by the general population that had  
longed  for the return of Ortega
62
. The numerous requests for not paying 
the tuition fees due to economic problems or to obtain substantive 
d iscounts could  not have been totally attended  by the organisers. 
However, it is possible to notice a special attention towards the 
conditions of the university students, the group of people that w ithout 
any doubt constituted  the centre of Ortega’s attention and , for this 
reason, d id  receive a conspicuous support for attend ing the courses. 
Indeed , the institute assigned  five full scholarships and  a d iscount of 
the 50% to all the university students
63
. There was a great expectation 
around  the positive effects that the Institute could  have brought about 
in the Spanish cultural atmosphere. At the same time, there were also 
some scepticisms over the concrete possibility that Ortega and  his 
collaborators could  have really contributed  to enhancing the 
humanities w ithin an obscurantist society that systematically 
manipu lated  any forms of intellectual freedom
64
. Undoubted ly, the 
creation of the Institute d id  coincide with a moment in which the 
political confrontation among the d ifferent souls of the regime had  
reached  his climax and  the international scenario seemed to lead  to an 
imminent institutional reform. 
 
9.2 In  the polit ical arena, beyond Ortega’s in ten t ions  
The political and  ideological instability that characterised  the 
country, by the end  of 1948, can surely be epitomised  by the d ispute 
that took place among two outstand ing members of the establishment: 
the d irector of Escorial and  Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, Laín Entralgo, 
and  the d irector of Arbor, the review of CSIC, Calvo Serer. In October 
                                                                                                                               
60
 Letter by Matons Colomer (secretary of the Institu to Nacional del Libro 
Español) to Ortega, 10-XI-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 4. 
61
 Letter by SEU to Ortega, 10-XII-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 81. 
62
 «Mi fé no me defrauda, maestro. En esta espera estoy y de ella recibiremos la 
nueva aurora. Repito mi adhesión, fervorosa, como será la de muchos obreros 
españoles que le admiran, con la esperanza de un porvenir mejor». Letter by 
Ramón Busto Toyo to Ortega y Gasset. 3-XII-1948. In AOG, PB/ 366-63 
63
 Letter by Instituto de Humanidades to Luis Teigell (Jefe SEU Madrid), 2-XII-
1948, in AOG, PB/ 366-57. 
64
 Anonymous to Ortega, 10-XII-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 78. 
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1948 Laín collected  a series of conferences and  articles he had  realised  
during the summer of that very year and  published  a book significantly 
entitled  España como problema. The problem ind icated  by Laín 
concerned  the very essence of the country. As he put it, it was an 
historical problem between “to be” or “not to be”, that is a problem 
regard ing the normative existence of Spain (Laín Entralgo, 1948: 12). 
The problem of Spain is identified  by Laín with the everlasting 
d ichotomy between trad itionalism and  modernity, the first 
characterised  by a respect towards religion and  the values of 
Catholicism and  the second  by the cult of laicism and  the desire of 
Europeanizing the country (Ibidem: 27-28).  
The very strong opposition between these two fronts, accord ing to 
Laín, cou ld  have been overcome only through a sort of syncretism 
between them, with the aim of constructing a third  way that could  have 
promoted  the development of the nation avoid ing the reiteration of this 
conflicting tendency. This third  perspective, accord ing to Laín, was 
epitomised  by the attitude of Menéndez Pelayo
65
 and , succed ingly, by 
the generation of ’98, in particu lar by Miguel de Unamuno, 
characterised  by the wish of effectively reforming the country bu t 
without imposing to it an external Europeanization
66
. This, in fact, 
represented  a new trend  in the Spanish cu lture developed  during the 
following years, in particular since the beginning of the fellowship  
programs abroad  of many young university students, among them the 
very Ortega y Gasset, considered  by Laín as «el más representativo de 
los hombre que integran el grupo» (Ibidem: 83).  
Interestingly enough, Ortega is taken by Laín as the example of a 
positive way of conceiving the role of the intellectual in society, that is 
as an analyst of reality and  a proponent of a political and  social reform 
that was considered  as ind ispensable for the benefit of the nation. 
Moreover, the revalorisation of the generation of the Madrilenian 
                                                          
65
 «La esperanza de don Marcelino consistía en la posibilidad  de hacer en 
España algo verdaderamente “sustantivo y humano”, apoyando la acción 
creadora en tres supestos: la capacidad  inexhausta del hombre español (o, como 
entonces se decía, la energia de la raza”), la realidad  de nuestra historia, 
entendida sin mixtificaciones progresistas o reaccionarias, y la situación 
histórica del espíritu  humano en el último cuarto del siglo XIX». Laín Entralgo, 
1948: 35. 
66
 «Todos sueñan con una nueva época de la historia de España, en la cual ésta 
seria a ala vez fiel a si misma y a la altura de nuestro tiempo» (Ibidem: 61). 
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philosopher made by the falangist doctor included  very d ifferent 
intellectuals and  political figures, some of them akin to the regime (as 
Herrera Oria or Eugenio D’Ors) and  some of them incompatible with it, 
such as the republicans Pérez de Ayala or Azaña. The pedagogical 
appeal of the philosopher is interpreted  by Laín as the instrument that 
permitted  him to pass from the utopia of the previous generation to the 
real construction of a new Spain. The political scope and  aim of 
education is therefore considered  as a valid  resource in order to forge 
the nation, and  Ortega’s proposal is not totally d ismissed  in this text as 
heterodox, but rather as an example that deserved  to be imitated : «La 
minoría entusiasta y eficaz; he ahí el primer objetivo de la operación 
transformadora de Ortega. El period ic, la revista, el libro, la conferencia 
y la “privada plástica” serán los instrumentos inmediatos de este 
germinal equipo salvador» (Ibidem: 102).  
Thus, in this book, Laín proposes an analysis and  an appreciation of 
Ortega’s thesis, with the aim of partially overcoming them as far as the 
construction of a new minority was concerned . In other word s, he uses 
Ortega as a theorist of the importance of build ing an hegemonic 
thought and  a lead ing minority able to rule the country, and  propose 
himself and  his circle as the most suitable entourage  – nephews of the 
generation of ’98 – which would  have been responsible for the new 
national reform in a period  of political uncertainty. The duties of this 
new cultural and  political elite would  have been those of resolving the 
problem of the d ichotomy between trad itionalism and  modernisat ion 
by actualising the values of the falange w ithin a new European and  
international scenario, und erlining the Catholic strand  of the European 
history and , consequently, the adequacy of Spain to this canon (Ibidem: 
161).  
The book of Laín was far from being offensive or heterodox in 
relation to the hegemonic thought that inspired  the politics of the 
regime after the second  world  war. However, it was ferociously and  
immed iately countered  by the representative of another intellectual 
and  political circle represented  by the review Arbor: Calvo Serer. He 
acted  as the spokesman of Pérez Embid , member of the ACNdP, 
d irector of Arbor and  found er of the ed itorial Rialp . In 1949 Calvo Serer 
polemically published  a book entitled  España sin problema. Accord ing to 
Calvo Serer, Laín’s interpretation constituted  a too eclectic read ing of 
national history. In fact: «Mientras para los españoles sea un problema 
su conciencia nacional, estarán agarrotados, lánguidos, afanánd ose 
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inútilmente en atormentarse» (Calvo Serer,1949: 10). In add ition, Laín 
had  committed  another great mistake accord ing to him, that is  bringing 
back to the public debate and  cu ltural scenario many of those 
intellectuals that the regime had  repeated ly tried  to annihilate  since its 
very found ation. In fact, Laín, in his book seemed to have left  apart the 
contribution by the members of the catholic family of the regime, in 
particu lar Herrera Oria and  the ACe, to the construction of the national 
identity (Gallego Margalef, 2014: 872). Thus, as Larraz has rightly 
pointed  out (2009: 79), even if this d iscussion d id  not put into question 
the overall ideology of the regime, it d isputed  the very nature of its 
trad ition and  history, therefore, of its future normative aim . In fact, in 
1947, Calvo Serer had  published  a Manifesto for a new generation of 
intellectuals, whose purposes and  trad itions rad ically d iffered  to the 
ones later presented  by Laín in his book, in particular in relation to the 
interpretation of Ortega’s legacy (Díaz Hernández, 2008: 122). Whereas, 
accord ing to Laín, this would  have to correspond  to a form of 
conservative syncretism , to Calvo Serer it was luckily to be better 
represented  by a rigid  Catholic orthod oxy. Moreover, the theory of 
Laín seemed to open the way to a new d uality within the community of 
d iscourse which composed  the regime and  to the consequent struggle 
for the cultural hegemony (Ferrary: 1993: 298-303). This struggle was 
evidently confined  to the domain of culture (Gallego Margaleff, 2014: 
920), but, since 1951 it assumed the traits of a political d ispute, in 
particu lar through the new academic policies implemented  by the new 
minister of education Ruiz Giménez
67
. 
In this context, the Institute of Humanities, founded by Ortega in Madrid, 
represented  a dangerous occasion that could  have contributed  to 
promote the vision of Laín and  his entourage, to the detriment of the 
group represented  by Calvo Serer. This fact constituted  a great 
preoccupation of the d irector of Arbor , Pérez Embid , who by the end  of 
1948 was repeated ly writing to Calvo Serer to solicit the publication of 
his book due to the growing influence that Ortega was acquiring, in 
particu lar within the new generation of students:  
 
                                                          
67
 As written by Martín Puerta, 2013: 272: «Lo que era hasta 1951 una p olémica 
religioso-cultural, pasó desde ese año a adquirir un rango político, pues el 
nuevo ministro de educación nacional, Joaquín Ru iz-Giménez, nombró rectores 
de las universidades de Madrid  y Salamanca a dos d istinguidos aperturistas 
culturales: los falangistas Pedro Laín Entralgo y Antonio Tovar».  
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Mientras tanto Ortega, Marías, García Gómez, Sambricio y otros han 
abierto en “Aula Nueva” una especie de Facultad  libre de Filosofía con una 
serie de clases y cursillos monográficos sobre los cuales se han volcado 
todos los estud iantes de la Facultad , y todos los Licenciados jóvenes que 
andan por ahí como alma en pena
68
. 
 
From then on, all the activities of the group orbiting around  Arbor 
were characterised  by a forceful anti-orteguianism with the clear aim of 
contending to the Madrilenian philosopher his role of master for the 
new university generation (Diáz Hernández, 2008: 177). The control 
over the educative system was indeed  also the priority of Laín 
Entralgo, as revealed  in his Políptico Universitario (1949). In this short 
pamphlet he points out the necessity for the University to play a more 
vital role within social life, both from a qualitative and  quantitative 
point of view. Accord ing to Laín, the mission of the university should  
have basically been that of lead ing the civil society, bu ild ing the public 
opinion. For reaching these targets he considered  as ind ispensable to 
act as a compact group with a precise goal, and  to d o it quickly and  
efficiently: «Es necesario – he wrote – que la penetración de la 
Universid ad  en nuestra vida social sea más amplia y vivaz» (Laín 
Entralgo, 1949: 13). By frequently quoting the texts of Ortega, and  in 
particu lar his Misión de la Universidad, Laín presented  an overall 
concept of what the university should  have been, taking into 
consideration the role of the teachers, students, society and  Sta te. He 
offers a very clear vision of what, accord ing to him, this institu tion 
should  be. A clearness and  precision that contribu ted  to exhibit to the 
opposing fronts the risk of being outclassed . For all these reasons, the 
Institute of Humanity acquired  a great significance within the Spanish 
cultural scenario, even beyond  its proper intentions and  goals. Ortega 
was again unwillingly converted  in a pretext by the components of a 
fragmented  regime for build ing a new cu ltural hegemony.  
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9.3 W hy  the Inst itu te? From the local t o t he global  
When Ortega conceived  and  realised  the Institute of Humanities he 
was looking for a d irect cultural intervention in his country. Indeed , his 
main aim was that of retu rning to teach in Spain and  to continue his 
activity as an independent scholar. For this reason , he refused  any sort 
of public end orsement to his project, and  chose not to give his lessons 
in the University, accep ting the d ifficult task of build ing a new 
educative institu te w ith a complete d ifferent scope  and  purpose in 
respect to the official academia. For the same reason, he also decided  to 
refuse the financial help that the Rockefeller foundation had  offered  
him, so counting exclusively on the matriculation fees of the Institute’s 
student
69
.  
The problematic status of the philosophy and  the humanities in the 
post-war period  was indeed  a crucial preoccupation of many 
intellectuals at a global scale. The very Ortega was asked  by the 
American scholar Clara Urquehart to collaborate by writing an article 
for a book she was preparing on the role of the intellectual in a broken 
world  characterised  by a lack of critical and  ind ividual thinking
70
. Even 
if Ortega, at the end , d id  not take part in this book – to which 
collaborated  intellectuals such as Günter Anders, Erich Fromm, 
Bertrand  Russell, Salvatore Quasimodo and  Albert Schweitzer – this 
problem would  constitute the kernel of all the lessons he gave at the 
Institute of Humanities. Moreover, the very structure of the Institu te 
and  its organisation represented  a clear response to the growing 
insignificance of the teaching and  learning of humanities in a 
depersonalised  society. 
 This can be comprehended  first of all by taking into consideration 
the prospectus of the Institute of Humanities that Ortega and  Marías 
published  at the beginning of November 1948, for presenting their 
future cultural project. Ind eed , the theoretical preamble of the text is 
constituted  by a long meditation concerning the meaning of the word  
“humanities” in the European  cultural and  academic trad ition. In 
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 In a letter to Jaime Benítez Ortega, in October 1951, wrote that: «La 
Rockefeller Foundation quiso, hace dos años y medio, financiar un instituto en 
Madrid . Yo rehusé ese apoyo porque no sabía cual sería la actitud  del Gobierno 
Español ante la labor del instituto, sobre todo si el instituto tenía d inero», in 
AOG, CD-13/ 31.  
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particu lar, Ortega rejects both the French definition of humanities as 
moral or political sciences – due to the vagueness of the second  term
71
 
and  the limitation of the first
72
 – and  the German trad ition that 
conceives humanities in terms of Geistenwissenshaften, that is in terms of 
spiritual sciences, a term that had  recently acquired  very d ifferent and  
contrasting connotations during the recent conflict. The implicit 
problem underneath the partial refutation of the German trad ition was 
mainly motivated  by a general perception after WWII of the idealistic 
philosophy as a d angerous intellectual posture. As John Dewey wrote, 
it was possible to perceived  in it the existence of «underlying strains of 
continuity connecting the creed  of Hitler with the classic philosophic 
trad ition of Germany» (Dewey, 1942: 69). Contrary to these lead ing 
trad itions, Ortega offers a new and  original definition of humanities. 
For doing this he ad opted  the Roman sense of the word  and  replaced  
the plurality that connotes it in the form “humanities” – that is a cluster 
of d isciplines – with a unified  notion of Humanity. With this very basic 
shift he underlines the relevance of the term in relation to the concrete 
life of every single ind ividual and  the community , moving the 
perspective from the d isciplines taught within the academia to the 
concrete persons involved  in the comprehension  and  actualisation of 
culture (Almeida Amoed o, 2001: 116). Ortega defines the humanities as 
the totality of the human facts and , therefore, he thinks that to speak of 
humanities means to speak both of the facts that pertains to the human 
beings and  of the stud y of these facts cond ucted  by the scholars in the 
field  of humanities (OC, VI: 538). In a society ruled  by fanaticism and  
extremism, by a depersonalised  existence and  the predominance of a 
sort of philosophical pessimism represented  by existentialism, Ortega 
tries to construct in Madrid  an oasis for the practicing of philosophy. 
This project could  have seemed utopian, but it evidently sprang from 
the intimate desire of the philosopher to accomplish to the intellectual 
mission he taught he could  not have d iscarded .  
The terminological premise that opens the prospectus reveals at 
least two important and  apparently opposed  features of the project 
carried  about by Ortega y Gasset: a) the global scope of his theoretical 
analysis, not limited  to the Spanish scenario bu t opened  to  a constant 
confrontation with d ifferent philosophical trad itions and  d isciplinary 
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 «Lo humano no es solo costumbre. Hay, junto a ella, lo desacostumbrado, lo 
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perspectives; b) the intention to delve into the concrete living 
conditions of the post-war society, and  of doing this specifically in 
Spain. These two purposes are both implicitly presented  in the 
invitation to the Spanish public that Ortega includes in the following 
pages of this manifesto. At the same time, it is also possible to see them 
mirrored  in the practical organisation of the whole activity of the 
Institute.  
Regard ing the first aspect, Ortega, in line with his precedent 
meditations (Monfort Prades, 2010), pointed  out the necessity of 
defining humanity as an interd isciplinary reality which, under its 
unifying philosophical concept would  include d ifferent approaches 
such as that provided  by lingu istic, philology, ethnology, 
historiography – as Ortega called  it, historiology – and  economy. The 
philosopher presents the institute as a collaborative project rendered  
possible by the activities of d ifferent scholars and , hopefully, students, 
aimed  at analysing relevant problems for contributing to shed  light on 
a complex and  fragmented  reality. As Graham (2001: 426) correctly put 
it, the prospectus is indeed  an “essay on interd isciplinary” both in 
principles and  in the subsequent practice of the institu te. Moreover, the 
global scope of the project is also manifested  by the overwhelming 
amount of foreign intellectuals that Ortega invited  to take part in the 
activities of the institu te. Among them Gabriel Marcel, Heinz 
Heimsoeth, Wilhelm Röpke, Arnold  Toynbee, Pierre Jobit, Ernst Fritz 
and  many others
73
. 
The second  of the abovementioned  features is rendered  evident by 
the recurrent references made by Ortega to the Spanish cu ltural 
scenario. Not only for his continuous criticisms towards the scholastic 
trad ition, but also, and  foremost, for the d irect invitation he d id  to the 
Spanish public of collaborating in his project. In the d umb (OC, VI: 541) 
cultural atmosphere of the cou ntry Ortega was aware of the political 
prudence that he had  to observe to avoid  any sort of repression to his 
Institute. For this reason, from the one hand  he vind icated  the 
aristocratic character of such intellectual project – which, accord ing to 
him, d id  not aim neither to proselytise the Spanish society to a new 
creed  nor to influence the national life – but on the other hand  he 
overtly hoped  for the possibility of a widespread  interest within the 
civil society towards his new experiment:  
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No desdeñamos al publico, lo que sería una actitud  estúpida. Lo que 
hacemos es no contar con él, porque, queramos o no, ya lo hemos d icho, la 
mayor parte de nuestras labores excluye su participación, y además porque 
no se le puede ped ir ni constancia ni ded icación. Lo que haremos, si esa 
anormal abundacia de oyentes afluyese a algún curso, sería trasladar éste a 
un local de ocasión, suficientemente amplio, fuera de nuestro domicilio en 
Aula Nueva (OC, VI: 543). 
 
This extraord inary affluence what was ultimately occurred , at least 
in the case of the courses taught by Ortega that had  to be moved  to the 
conference hall of the Unión Mercantil, for giving to the approximately 
650 people who wanted  to assist to his lessons the opportunity to d o it  
[See Annex 8]. Not only his personal figure bu t also the general project 
of the Institute of humanities was able to reach the interest of a great 
aud ience and  this permitted  the full development of all the foreseen 
activities during its first year.  
In particular, the activities of the institute during the course 1948-
1949 were d ivided  in four courses, two research seminars and  four 
colloquia, characterised  by an inverse proportion of openness and  
participation, being the colloquia limited  to a restricted  number of 
participants and  implying a matricu lation fee of 100 pesetas per 
colloquium. The courses were organised  in a lesson per week and  
could  run for 1 to 3 months, during this first year, from December to 
March. The themes for the courses were: Universal histor y (Ortega y 
Gasset), Arabism and  classical philology (Emilio García Gómez), The 
historical method  of the generations (Marías) and  The culture of 
Mohenjo-Daro (Benito Gaya). The two research seminars focused  
respectively on the works of Goya (Ortega y Gasset and  Valentín de 
Sambricio) and  on the empirical application of the historical method  of 
generation (Marías). Lastly, the four colloquia dealt with themes of 
economy (the social structure of price), philology and  lingu istic 
(modism) and  philosophy (the clouds of Aristophanes)
74
. Moreover, the 
activities of the Institute of Humanities were supplemented  by the 
publication of a Bulletin which provided  short information regard ing 
its program and  invited  the aud ience to take part in an active debate 
over the Institute. In the first of these short publication s Ortega 
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explained  the reasons for the tripartite organisation of the activities of 
the Institute, and  in particular the importance of the colloquia as a 
experimental form of teaching and  learning. These forms of d ialogue 
among scholars and  a restricted  aud ience of experts were mainly 
conceived  as an attempt to realise a complete knowledge on specific 
themes through an interd isciplinary method . This was indeed  the only 
viable means that could  have countered , accord ing to Ortega and  his 
collaborators, the constitutive inadequacy of the modern man of 
science, characterised  by an extreme specialisation and  consequent 
impossibility of reaching a comprehensive and  meaningful knowled ge 
on an ample and  substantial problem of the human existence. By 
joining d ifferent perspectives and  partial knowledge it could  have been 
possible to reach an overall and  more complete view on this questions, 
since: «Si se qu iere que las d isciplinas de Humanidades vuelvan a 
cobrar su  auténtico vigor es preciso intentar la reintegración de la 
ciencia en su  unidad  organica, procurand o compensar por tod os los 
medios posibles su d ispersión especialista que es, por otra parte, 
inelud ible» (OC, IX: 1179). 
In summary, the Instituto de Humanid ades constituted  Ortega’s 
response to some of the main problems concerning the role of the 
intellectual, the academia and  philosophy in the contemporary society . 
A question that he faced  during the course of whole his life in the 
d ifferent periods of his long intellectual career. By 1948 Ortega dealt 
with new rad ical problem s both concerning the cultural situation of his 
country – substantially deprived  of a real freedom of speech and  of a 
democratic participation, but at the same time living in a period  of 
possible transition from an institu tional regime to another – and  the 
global situation in which the intellectuals were trying to regain a 
function after the d rama of the WWII. Given the predominance of the 
masses in the political and  social life, the intellectuals, accord ing to 
Ortega, had  suffered  a consequent loss of prestige, and  their vocational 
activity was merely becoming a profession among others. In spite of 
this and  of the crisis within the scientific domain, Ortega d id  not think 
that any intellectual intervention would  have been inadequate or 
useless. On the contrary, he affirmed  the necessity of posing once again 
significant and  ample questions that could  have offered  to the 
intellectuals the chance to get in touch with a general public and  face 
the most relevant problems of the society through a contemplative 
perspective. As a consequence, it is possible to affirm that the Institute 
 
316 
of Humanity was clearly the realisation of Ortega’s most powerfu l 
vocation. 
 
 
9. 4 The first  lessons: on  “historiology” 
 The first course taught by Ortega in the Institute of Humanities 
dealt w ith the book A study of History, by Arnold  Toynbee
75
. In spite of 
Ortega’s promise of analysing and  criticising in dep th the book of the 
British scholar, this ultimately served  to Ortega as a pretext to talk 
about some of the main topics he had  treated  during at least the whole 
decade of the ‘40s. These can be basically summarised  in two main 
strands: a) the concern for the development of an overall theory of 
history which would  have connected  the personal existence of the 
ind ividuals with the social life of the community  and  b) the strictly 
related  socio-political problem of the way in which the social consensus 
is built and , in particular, the problem of legit imacy. Many of the 
considerations that the Madrilenian philosopher included  in this text 
derived  from precedent courses and  lectures he gave during his long 
period  of exile. In particu lar , he offers a synthesis of the theses he 
presented  in his conferences on the Historical Reason and  his book on 
the Roman Empire. However, the confrontation with the recent 
publication of the British intellectual gave him the possibility to delve 
into some historiography and  sociological problem s he had  not 
considered  so far and  which reveal a new preoccupation of the 
philosopher towards the theoretical and  historical premises of the new 
social order that both globally and  locally speaking was being 
implemented  by that time.  
The local interest of his meditations is constantly and  stead ily 
denied  by Ortega, evidently for practical reasons, being all his lessons 
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registered  and  accurately scrutinised  by the censorship  (Marías, 2008). 
For this reason, and for avoiding the regime’s repression, when  explicitly 
talking about politically sensitive problems, Ortega always pretends to move 
from the national to the international level, or from the contemporary to the 
ancient world, with the aim of avoiding any possibility of actualisation of his 
words. Indeed , since the first lesson he poses the classical question of 
the best form of government and  of its proper end , before analysing in 
detail the case of the Roman Empire for the following lessons
76
.  
The ambiguity of his references reached  its acme in the central part 
of the course. In fact, by the end  of the fifth lesson , Ortega introduced  
the theme of illegitimacy when talking about the d ictators in the 
Ancient Rome, affirming that the exceptional power they had  was not 
strictly speaking neither legitimate nor illeg itimate, in the sense that it 
was exercised  without any reference to a right of law  and  also without 
a clear endorsement from the population
77
. Immediately after stating 
this provocative and  ambiguous thesis about the illegitima te role of the 
“Jefe de Estad o”, Ortega pointed  out that he was not referring to the 
Spanish scenario. He denied  that his words could  have been 
interpreted  as veiled  allusions to Spain  since: «No solo no lo son sino 
que no pueden serlo. Porque a ese que llamo desazonad or, pavoros 
ámbito de la ilegitimidad  constitutivo no puede en ningún caso llegar 
un pueblo solo. El terrible fenómeno es demasiad o profundo para que 
pueda producirse sólo en una colectivid ad» (OC, IX: 1275-1276). 
However, during the following lessons, he insisted  in using the Roman 
Empire as a parad igmatic case for understating the essence of all 
political governments, and  to affirm that only the constitutional 
monarchy would  – historically speaking – constitute a legitimate form 
of government (OC, IX: 1288). Whereas on the one hand  it is extremely 
d ifficult to establish the extent to which Ortega was concretely trying to 
promote a political and  institutional change – even if he exp licitly 
presents his sociological theory of state legitimacy as of great interest 
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for one outstand ing recent opponent of Franco such as Serrano Suñer , 
(OC, IX: 1336) –, on the other hand  it is patent from the very evolution 
of Ortega’s course that the ambiguity of some of his affirmations was 
inspected  with extreme suspicion and  mistrust by part of the regime. 
Thus, from the seventh lesson, not only Ortega affirms that he would  
firmly steak to the text he had  prepared  to avoid  further 
miscomprehensions, bu t he also vind icates the independency of his 
political theory from the current Spanish scenario, accusing his critics 
of being excessively focused  on the national case, being unable to look 
at the larger p icture: «La causa de tod o esto, señores, es el trist e 
aldeanismo en que ha recaído buena parte de la vida intelectual 
española. Con él ha reaparecido tod o su conocido repertorio: la 
explosión de las envid ias, la pueril eyección de insolencias y la vana 
agitación» (OC, IX: 1300).  
Indeed , that the scope of Ortega’s meditation was vaster than what 
many Spanish critics affirmed  was proved  both by the relev ance of the 
themes treated  by him and  by the particular perspective adopted  by the 
philosopher to analyse them. In fact, the general framework within 
which Ortega developed  his argumentations was the constant 
confrontation with the recent internationalism. This new trend , 
accord ing to the philosopher, was in fact setting the agend a of the 
intellectual and  political debate during the post -war period , 
constituting the theoretical ground  that legitimated  the creation of 
supranational entities responsible for the regulation of the d ifferent 
national interests. Thus, his course also represents an analysis of a new 
political condition that, accord ing to Ortega, too quickly had 
established  the death of the national States and  the birth of a new 
global order
78
. The unification of the whole world  population under the 
name of a unique civilisation was, accord ing to the philosopher, an 
utopian and  unrealistic political idea. This was not due to some 
immutable characteristics of the nations and  to their “eternity”, but 
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rather to the fact of constituting the collective history and  therefore the 
actual system of convictions that regulates the life of every ind ividual . 
Accord ingly, the nation would  represent the basis of social consensus 
acting, at the same time, as an ind ividual and  as a collective 
consciousness (Aguilar, 1998: 117-120). The globalisation, to Ortega, d id  
not straightforward ly imply the homogenisation and  sharing of this 
system of beliefs, since the material change of the conditions of living 
had  to be combined  with the common faith in a shared  past able to 
sustain the fu ture co-existence of a community of ind ividual beings. As 
a consequence, the problem posed  by Ortega in this course d oes have a 
global facet insofar as it offers a response to an urgent problem: i.e. the 
way in which this new social consensus could  have been built once 
accepted  the fact that, as proved  by the war, it had  evidently vanished .  
To render intelligible the p roposal of Ortega it is necessary to focus 
on two main aspects of his course: his “historiology” and  his theory of 
social consensus. Accord ing to the Madrilenian philosopher , all 
relations of power are grounded  on historical premises (Laved án 
Ferreiro, 2012) and  for this reason, to understand  the everyday social 
life, it is necessary to delve into the history of that particu lar society. 
Ortega d istinguishes between history as erud ition (historiography) and  
history as human self-comprehension (historiology). Once this 
d istinction is made it is evident that it is the latter what he tried  to 
promote throughout the Institute of Humanities. In fact, accord ing to 
Ortega, this: «Es un institu to de historia, mas por historia entiendo el 
estud io de la realidad  humana desde el más remoto pasado hasta los 
hombres hoy vivientes, inclusive» (OC, IX: 1253). He conceives history 
as a meaningful narration of the past that manifests itself through a 
linguistic sed imentation. For this reason, not only in his course – 
through a recurrent use of etymology
79
 – but also in all the activities of 
the Institu te, he underlines the importance of lingu istic and  philology 
for shedding light on the past and , consequently, for understand ing the 
present (Cruz, 2014). H istory is a social reality that is transmitted  
through another social instrument: i.e. language. Therefore language, 
far from being the expression of an inner consciousness, is a public 
reality that is available to all and  which has a shared  and  common 
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w ill be proved, has eviden t political consequences.  
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meaning that forges the social world . Moreover, d ue to the 
multid imensional essence of history and  the impossibility of confining 
it in the past, it is intrinsically linked  with the construction of social 
consensus, thought as a dynamic force. As Ortega put it:  
 
La razón histórica, que no consiste en inducir ni en deducir sino lisamente 
en narrar, es la única capaz d e entender las realidades humanas porque la 
contextura de éstas es histórica, es historicidad . […] De lo d icho se 
desprende que toda realidad  humana, por su  historicidad , consiste en venir 
de algo pasado e ir hacia algo futuro. Por tanto, que es una realidad 
sustantivamente móvil. (OC, IX: 1266). 
 
For this reason, the legitimacy of any form of government cannot be 
grounded  on a social contract of a system of abstract rules set once and  
for all, but on a stratified  set of historically developed  practices that 
needs to be recast every single day by the ind ividuals and  which had  to 
be grounded  on a common wish shared  by the citizens, a wish which 
could  became an active p rinciple of cooperation within society. The 
consensus, accord ing to Ortega, d oes not manifest itself in the mere 
agreement of the members of a society on specific themes, but rather on 
the expression of a shared  Weltanschauung produced  during the history 
and  consciously – or unconsciously – endorsed  by all ind ividuals. In 
the same years in which Ortega was developing his theory, also 
another philosopher, Wittgenstein, was delving into the 
epistemological analysis of common sense. Similarly, even if from a 
d ifferent perspective, also Wittgenstein pointed  out the importance of 
the historical trad ition as the basic ground  of this vision of the world . 
Indeed , for the German thinker: «I d id  not get my picture of the world  
by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied  of its correctness. No: it is the inherited  background  against 
which I d istinguish between true and  false» (Wittgenstein, 1969-1975: 
§94)
80
. Accord ing to Ortega, this shared  belief is what ultimately 
grounds and  renders possible all social relations, the right, the norms 
and  the political institu tion s. For this reason, he separeted  himself from 
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 The complex relation between Ortega and  Wittgenstein on common sense as 
the basis of the public opinion (Peris Suay, 2009), has been interestingly 
d iscussed  in particular by Ariso (2013), who points out that: «Si bien Ortega y 
Wittgenstein ha contribuido sobremanera al desarrollo de lo que Mulligan 
denominó “certeza primitiva”, hay profundas d iferencias que subyacen a sus 
respectivas versiones de la susodicha “certeza primitiva”».  
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Kelsen, who assigned  to the right a rational found ation, affirming that 
the legitimacy of the political power is grounded  «en cierta situación 
total de la vida humana colectiva. De aquí que al quebrarse la creencia 
común se resquebraje la legitimidad » (OC, IX: 1321). Consequently, 
accord ing to Ortega, the right is neither grounded  on a fix set of rules 
and  principles nor on a violent imposition of norms. On the contrary, it 
is based  on a progressive and  changing set of habits and  social 
conviction that the citizens, through their active participation to the 
historical flux, are ultimately responsible of unceasingly reforming. 
This process of bu ild ing consensus represented , accord ing to the 
philosopher, the crucial problem that the Western civilisation was 
facing during that period , and  to this question he would  devote in 
particu lar the second  of the courses he gave at the Institu te of 
Humanities, entitled  Man and  People. 
 
 
9.5 Indiv idu al and society  in  a state of except ion   
In November 1949 Ortega started  his second  course in the Institute 
of humanities. The great affluence of the aud ience rendered  necessary 
to change the location of the conference: neither the Aula Nueva nor the 
Hall of the Unión Mercantil could  host the event. For this reason the 
lessons took place in the Barceló cinema, that could  have given space to 
approximately a thousand  people. For this new course Ortega  had  
planned  twelve lessons about the relationship  between ind ividuals and  
society. Accord ing to the program  – that he ultimately d id  not follow in 
its entirety –, it would  have to present his ideas as it follows: 1- The 
human being, human life; 2- The human being, we; 3- The people; 4- The 
greeting; 5- The speech of the people, the language; 6- The social 
gathering; 7-The State; 8- The right; 9- The society and  its form; 10- 
Nation, ultra-nation and  inter-nation; 11- Animal and  human societies; 
12- Humanity
81
.  
The topic represented  one of the main preoccupation of Ortega at 
least since the second  half of the ‘30s, since his conference in Rotterd am 
in 1936. However, far from being an exhaustive and  final presentation 
of his sociological reflections, the course he presented  at the Institute 
was an in fieri project that he continued  to ameliorate and  partially 
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change also in the following years and  d uring d ifferent conferences he 
gave, in particular in Germany, during the ‘50s. Indeed , during his 
lectures at the Institute he completed  approximately only the first half 
of the themes he had  prospected  in his previous project. Moreover, the 
final and  ampler version of the book he was preparing during 1954-55, 
and  that should  have been composed  by 15 or 18 chap ters
82
, would  not 
be completed . By those years he was planning not to publish the book 
in Spain, due to the censorship, but rather in America, Netherlands and  
Germany. In any case, this theme represented  a central problem for 
Ortega during almost twenty years, that is for the whole course of the 
period  that followed  his exile until his death. As a consequence, it is 
possible to conclude that the more profound  sense of the Institute can 
be grasped  by referring in particu lar to this course.  
That the sociological interest of the philosopher arose with 
particu lar emphasis during the years of the civil war and  the global 
conflict is proved  by the very first lesson of this course. In fact. for 
preparing it, he used  the p revious conference he gave in Buenos Aires 
in 1940, entitled  Ensimismamiento y Alteración
83
. The confusion and  
d isorientation he perceived  both in the public op inion and  among the 
intellectuals on the social phenomena that were occurring during those 
years was still considered  by the philosopher as a question of 
tremendous urgency in the national and  international post-war 
scenario, due to the widespread  «inep titud  sociológica» (OC, X: 142), 
both of the masses and  of the intellectuals.  
Interestingly enough, in this course Ortega connects in a extremely 
precise way his anthropology with his social theory, devoting the first 
half of it to the study of the personal and  interpersonal life , and  the 
second  to the structure of the society. The human relations, accord ing 
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 Letter by Ortega to Lunt, 28-I-1955, in AOG, PB-315; letter by Ortega to 
Klipper, 15-VII-1954, in AOG, CD-K/ 30. 
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 Contrary to the previous Orteguian course in the institute of Humanities, the 
ed itors of his complete works (OC, X: 139-326) have chosen to adopt 
extensively and  quite exclusively the manuscripts that the philosopher had 
prepared  during the course of the years or specifically for the conference. In 
doing so they had  frequently cancelled  all possible references to the concrete 
cultural, political and  social circumstances under which the course d id  actually 
take place in Madrid  among November 1949 and  December 1950. For this 
reason the analysis of this text will be enriched  by taking into consideration 
other archival sources and  texts written by the philosopher and  w hich had  not 
yet been published .  
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to the philosopher, largely d iffer from the social ones which are not 
bound  to the same rules, i.e. do not share the same epistemic and  
ontological status. Particularly, accord ing to Ortega, whereas all 
personal and  interpersonal relations are grounded  on a rational basis , 
on the contrary the social norms – uses – are characterised  by their 
irrationality, or rather by being imposed  behaviours that, customarily, 
each and  every one ad opts in her social and  public life , without 
thinking about the reasons grounding her actions
84
. The move from the 
ind ividual actions to the social ones would  consequently imply a 
progressive reduction of authentic involvement of the person who 
accomplishes those actions. As Ortega put it: «la colectividad es, sí, algo 
humano; pero es lo humano sin el hombre, lo humano sin espíritu , lo 
humano sin alma, lo humano deshumanizad o» (OC, X: 257). This is due 
to the fact that all social actions lack the two main characteristic of the 
real human actions: i.e. the comprehension of the reasons beneath that 
act and  the free will and  desire to accomplish it (OC, X: 266).  
The basic d istinction traced  by Ortega between human and  social 
actions brings about a further consequence in relation to the way in 
which he conceives the problem of the creation and  legitimacy of the 
political power. In fact, given the irrationality and  mechanical character 
of the social existence, more than on a compact and  rational system of 
rules set in a particular moment by a definite group of people, the 
social relations are more effectively regulated  by costumes, habits, uses 
and  commonly accepted  rules of thumb. These are also called  by 
Ortega beliefs, opposed  to the ideas. The role played  by beliefs and  
values in defining the legitimacy of social actions and  facts had  often 
been stressed  by him. Ind eed , to this theme he devoted  an important 
essay, Ideas y Creencias, firstly published  in 1936. In this book he 
underlined  the very strict link between beliefs and  social uses or, to pu t 
it in other words, between an ep istemological point of view and  a 
political one. Social uses, norms and  institutions, accord ing to Ortega, 
put pressure on the subject by d irectly or ind irectly imposing him a 
certain way of behaviour. This common way of behaviour implies some 
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 As Ferreiro Lavedán, (2005: 180) pu t it: «La irracionalidad  del uso no significa 
que éste carezca por completo de sentido, sino, eso sí, que funciona con 
independencia de él. De forma que el que yo entienda la norma jurídica, las 
instrucciones de funcionamiento de mi televisión o el por qué del vaso, no es 
algo necesario, pues bien puedo limitarme a usarlos; y, de hecho, es lo que 
normalmente hago».  
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positive consequences: for instance, it permits to foresee the behaviours 
of the other social agents and , in add ition, it rend ers possible the 
development of the society accord ing to a coherent and  unified  project.  
A social norm, to Ortega, is in fact valid  and  active within society 
when it is concretely used . As a consequence, he speaks of social norms 
as vigencias, since they imposed  themselves in the concrete world  and  
are effectively present within society, constituting the basic norms of 
social relations. This implies that the legitimacy of a society is not 
grounded  on something as a social contract, but rather on the valid ity 
of this system of vigencias. As Ortega put it: 
 
El fenómeno sociológico fundamental que es la vigencia y que se da no sólo 
en la opinión sino en todo uso, que es, por tanto, el carácter más sustantivo 
del hecho social y de la sociedad  como conjunto de hechos sociales, la 
vigencia, no consiste en la adhesión ind ividual, tanto o cuanto numerosa 
(OC, X: 319). 
  
The power of the State is consequently grounded  on the consensus 
which depends on the a-rational acceptance of a set of beliefs. The 
production of such set of beliefs is not conceived  in the same way of a 
system of rules and  does not obey to the same proced ures that regulate 
the creation of the Right. To explain this point Ortega traces another 
d istinction between strong and  weak uses. Whereas the State and  the 
Right belong to the former, the public opinion – i.e. the compact system 
of beliefs that ground s the social norms – pertains to the latter. This 
does not mean that the forces of the weak uses is inferior to that of the 
strong ones. What is really weak or strong is the eventual sanction that 
can be imposed  to the person who does not respect such use. In  fact, in 
the case of the strong uses, such as the right, the sanction is more rigid  
and  stronger, since the infringement of the law would  determine the 
repressive intervention of the State. On the contrary, the sanction which 
is implied  by the contravention of a weak use does not express itself 
neither through a coercive repression by the State nor by the imposition 
of a precise sanction (OC, X: 293). Therefore, accord ing to Ortega, State 
and  society have to be thought as two d ifferent entities. Whereas the 
first is exclusively the expression of a fix set of positive rules 
established  by a government on a given time, the second  would  be the  
result of a long process of crystallisation of ideas which have been 
considered  useful for the purposes of the social life. Interestingly 
enough, it is in the latter that Ortega identifies the p lace in which the 
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public opinion is forged  and , consequently, the basis of political 
legitimacy. 
The counterintuitive thought of Ortega is elucidated  by the 
philosopher in particular through two examples: the greetings and  the 
language. Both these social uses are considered  as instances of the way 
in which, in an a-rational and  mechanical way, people act in their social 
relations during their everyday life. The language spoken within a 
country, for instance, clearly epitomises the effectiveness of a social 
norm which permits to communicate among one another within a 
common set of mind , even if those who adopt this norm possess a more 
or less critical knowledge of the language and  even if d ifferent subjects 
do have very d ifferent speaking abilities. This fact would  also imply 
that being all social norms the result of a process of consolidation of the 
uses which are considered  to be valid  and  therefore accepted  within a 
society, the fact that they are respected  per se would  manifest the 
existence of a common public opinion, which is responsible for the 
legitimacy of political power or, to say it d ifferently, which renders 
possible the existence of a stable form of social coexistence. The 
problem for the legitimacy of a political power clearly emerges not only 
when strong and  weak uses evidently d iverge, but also and  foremost in  
all those cases in which no shared  system of beliefs is present within a 
society and , as a consequence, there is not public opinion . Notably, the 
relation within weak and  strong uses – i.e. the right, national and  
international – and  the lack of the basic ground s of legitimacy that 
characterised  the European societies since the ‘30s, should  have been 
the topics of the last lessons of the course that, at the end , Ortega d id  
not pronounce.  
It is possible to find  several instances of the probable development 
of his lectures in some following conferences he gave during the fifties, 
such as Cómo muere una creencia, Un capítulo sobre el Estado or Individuo y 
organización. In all these texts, in fact, Ortega underlines the d istinction 
between State and  society, that is between rationally and  abruptly 
imposed  norms and  irrational and  customary uses, repeating and  
expanding some of the main theses included  in Man and People. 
However, the circumstances in which he pronounced  these conferences 
clearly d iffered  from the occasion of the course in the Institu te of 
Humanities that was inserted  in a d ifferent historical and  political 
context.  
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The lack of a transcription of the course does not  permit to analyse 
with precision the d irect references of the philosopher to the polit ical 
and  social context and  to say with certainty what was his aim and  
intention. However, it is likely to be the case that the course offered  to 
him the opportunity to covertly formulate both his criticisms and  his 
proposals concerning the way in which the Spanish State was being 
regulated . Indeed , the regime, by that period , represented  a sort of 
State of exception. It lacked  an authentic and  definite regulation but at 
the same time the control of the police and  the bureaucracy was a d irect 
representation of what Ortega called  an hyper-extension of the State. In 
fact, as the historian Julio Aróstegu i (1996) underlined , Franco’s regime 
constituted  in those years an anti-jurid ical system whose very existence 
implied  relevant problems concerning both its institutional framework 
and  its legitimacy
85
. Given these premises, it seems correct to affirm that 
Ortega d iscourse had  three main goals, the first descriptive and  the 
other two normative. In fact, on the one hand  he stud ied  how the social 
coexistence cou ld  be possible when lacking a positive jurisd iction – 
which undoubted ly was the case of the very recent Spanish history. On 
the other, he tried  a) to set the limit for the in tervention of the State in 
the social life, being an orthopaedic but not totalitarian instrument; and  
b) to offer his contribution towards the theorisation and  practice of the 
influence of the intellectuals and  ru ling class in the formation of the 
civil society independently from the State.  
Both of these purposes it is possible to find  evidences in the various 
notes – preserved  in his personal archive – used  by Ortega to prepare 
his conferences at the Institute of Humanities which, in their majority, 
dealt with the abovementioned  questions. In particu lar, the normative 
claims of the philosopher in relation to the n eed  of limiting the 
intervention of the State and  of guaranteeing at least a basic intellectual 
freedom of speech are set out in a note he prepared  for Man and People, 
on the relation between ind ividuals and  community, entitled  Contra el 
colectivismo y el totalitarismo. In this brief note he affirms that: «Tod a 
realid ad  social es uso. Pero el uso tuvo antes que ser invención del 
                                                          
85
 As Sánchez Recio (1999: 37) has correctly written: «La d ictadura franquista se 
mantuvo hasta 1947 en la más completa indefinición respecto a la forma de 
Estado; el régimen era simplemente d ictadura o, de manera más precisa, puro 
estado de excepción, y para la pretendida legitimación interior y el 
reconocimiento internacional era necesario, aunque fuera sólo como referencia, 
especificar la forma política del Estado que se estaba configurando». 
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ind ividuo y cultivo de un un grupo. Si se implide la actuación de estos 
la socied ad  morirá cuando muera el gobierno»
86
. Ortega’s vind ication of 
the weight of the intellectuals in the construction of the public opinion 
was based  on the very idea purported  by the philosopher of the 
d istinguished  role p lay by education and , in particular, by humanities, 
in the life of the single ind ividuals and  the society. The  aim of IH was 
indeed  that of realising a new form of collaboration not only among the 
intellectual class but also between this and  the general public opinion. 
This intervention was based  on a precise educative and  socialising 
project that Ortega was promoting through the Institu te.  
 
 
9.6 Reforming human it ies and forgin g in tellectuals 
In fact, the design of the activities that took place at the IH had  been 
very scrupulously planned  by Ortega, Marías and  their collaborators. 
This institution should  have transmitted  to the students, just by 
throwing a glance to its very structure, the kernel of Ortega’s view 
about the need  of reinforcing a relation of reciprocity and  mutual 
understand ing among the intellectuals and  the civil society. Moreover, 
as emphasised  in the prospectus, the Institute advocated  for the need  of 
revitalising the stud y of the humanities to use them as a means for 
comprehending the society, considering them a prerequisite for 
changing the material conditions under which one lives. This 
fundamental intention of the philosopher was mirrored  in all his 
lessons, and  in particular in his new consideration of the role of the 
intellectual in the light of his historical and  sociological theories. 
Indeed , the two courses that Ortega taught at the IH were very tightly 
intertw ined . As a matter of fact, the historical essence of human beings 
constituted  the premise for comprehending the social d imension of the 
ind ividuals’ personality and , at the same time, this consciousness 
should  have propelled  one to question the very foundations of the 
society in which she lived . This thorny affirmation can be elucid ated  by 
taking into consideration in particular one aspect that both courses 
analyse from d ifferent perspective, i.e. the nature of language. This 
feature of Ortega’s meditation would  later be connected  to his cent ral 
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argument in defence of the revitalisation of the study of a peculiar form 
of the humanities as a cu ltu ral and  political necessity
87
. 
The language serves to Ortega as an excellent example for 
illustrating what a social use properly is. In fact, it posses ses a double 
nature: on the one hand  it is an imposed  set of grammatical, phonetic, 
syntactic and  pragmatic rules and  therefore is perceived  as totally 
external to the ind ividual; but on the other hand  the language is also 
the most effective means that each person has to express herself, and  
consequently is perceived  as a private property. However, accord ing to 
Ortega, language is not created , but rather learnt by the ind ividuals and  
is the prod uct of a long-lasting historical process of changes and  
ad justments. The colloquia on the mod isms that took place in the IH – 
i.e. on the slang and  figures of speech – wanted  to investigate exactly 
the reasons that had  determined  the meaning of an expression that, per 
se, would  not be intelligible without taking into account its social use
88
. 
This apparent inexplicability implies the activation of rational process 
that would  aim at clarifying the way in which, in the course of history, 
a particular expression has acquired  a specific meaning through its use. 
This “narration” represents the only way through which a social use, 
that is imposed  to the ind ividuals and  unconsciously used  by them, 
would  acquire a meaningful sense for their concrete existences 
(Lévêque, 2008)
89
. 
This is the point of departu re of the long med itation on the nature of 
language that Ortega developed  in Man and People. He reaffirms the 
possibility of rationally motivating a social use by comprehending its 
history, and  in doing so he adopts the example of etymology as the key 
for understand ing the most widespread  social use, i.e. the language 
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 «El Instituto de Humanidades, si logra consolidar su existencia, se propone 
una reforma profunda de las ciencias que estud ian lo humano, y esta reforma, 
que empieza por serlo de su mismo contenido científico, continua por ser una 
reforma en el modo de vivir de la ciencia, en el modo de existir del cuerpo 
social» (OC, IX: 1296).  
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 As D’Olhaberriague Ruiz (2009: 59) put it: «En las expresiones id iomáticas 
parece reconocer una suerte de racionalidad  lingüística singular, anárquica y 
enmascarada, propicia como pocas para ser desentrañada y esclarecida por la 
razón narrativa y sólo por ella». 
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 For this reason Ortega affirmed that the main aim of the IH  would  have been 
that of constitu ting an hermeneutical experiment consisting in «determinar  a 
qué todo suficiente hay que referir una palabra para que su sentido pierda el 
equívoco» (OC, IX: 1209).  
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(OC, X: 275-276). At the same time he goes further in using the example 
of the language in order to delve into the sociological problem that he 
was investigating and  that brought him to analyse the essential 
requisites that a legitimate social power should  possess. In particular, 
Ortega assumed that the language is both an imposed  norm  and  a 
reality that can change over time through the intervention of the 
speakers.  
In this text he purported  in particu lar two theses which are 
extremely important in relation to his sociological theory. The first is 
the one accord ing to which a language of a given society can 
substantially change over time if some of its members sweep 
themselves away from the rest of the population. This would  bring 
them to develop  a specific and  d ifferent id iom which would  served  as a 
means for the construction of their own identity. The second  is that also 
within a single group the language does actually evolves over time. 
This evolu tion would  be regu lated  by a precise dynamic accord ing to 
which a group of very proficient speakers would  be able to influence 
the use of the language by dominating its rule and  attributing a proper 
meaning to new words that would  later enter into the common 
language of the lower classes (OC, X: 297-298). 
By applying these theses concerning the creation and  transmission 
of a language to Ortega’s sociological theory it is possible to affirm that 
,in the second  course of the IH, the philosopher: 1) assigns to 
ind ividuals and  groups a more active role in the found ation of the 
society; 2) places the responsibility of this change in an intellectual 
activity: forging new ideas. This implies that the social uses are not 
considered  as irrational per se. They had  been rationally created  before 
passing through a long process in which they lost their proper rational 
meaning for the majority of the population , gaining at the same time 
force and  valid ity (vigencia). The framework set by Ortega in this book 
deals with a question that he felt as extremely urgent, that is: how it 
would  be possible to construct a new set of uses and  beliefs when the 
old  had  lost their valid ity?. In other words, this was the problem of 
build ing the identity of a nation conceived  as a cohesiv e group of 
people sharing a common set of social norms and  beliefs (Visone, 2013). 
The solution Ortega offered  to this question lies in the new concept of 
the role he assigned  to the intellectual in society  through the 
reformation of humanities.  
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Indeed , the intellectual and  philosophical activity is always 
conceived  by him not only as a theoretical insight into the social world , 
but also as a way of changing it. The philosopher strongly refuses to 
conceive culture as something separated  to the con crete life of human 
beings
90
, as an academic practice which merely dealt w ith erud ite 
questions. In the case of a state of political exception and  cultural crisis 
such as that which characterised  the Spanish reality and  – to a certain 
extent – the international scenario, Ortega assigned  to the intellectual 
the task of constructing the new set of beliefs and  uses that would  
render possible the social life when this had  d isappeared  (OC, IX: 
1325). The stud y of humanities, to Ortega, is therefore ind ispensable 
both to comprehend  the society in which one lives
91
 and  reform it. For 
this purpose, the philosopher often called  for an active collaboration of 
the participants to the IH in the development of the institute’s 
activities, and  in particular of the young students who attended  his 
lessons. He conceived  the role of the intellectual as a mediator between 
the rational life of the ind ividuals and  the apparently imposed  norms of 
the society. This ped agogical aim responded  to the perceived  crisis of 
value of the post-war society and , at the same time, of the importance 
of cultivating a critical thinking as the main effective means through 
form of populism and  totalitarianism (Simeoni, 2013). Ortega’s 
meditations on these crucial aspects became more and  more frequent 
during the ‘50s, not only in Spain within the IH, which interrupted  its 
activities in the summer 1950, but abroad , in particular through a long 
series of relevant conferences and  publications. Before analysing the 
theoretical developments of Ortega’s thought it is essential to 
understand  what were the reasons underneath the end  of the IH and  
what its contribution to the Spanish cultural life.  
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 «Toda mi obra, desde sus primeros balbuceos, ha sido una lucha contra esta 
actitud , que hace muchos años llamé BEATERIA DE LA CULTURA, porque en 
ella se nos presentaba la cultu ra, el pensamiento, como algo que se justifica a sí 
mismo, es decir, que no necesitaba justificación, sino que es valioso por su 
propria esencia, cualesquiera sean su concreta ocupación y su contenido» (OC, 
X: 152). 
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 «Si al practicar un uso, advertimos que no entedemos, en absoluto o apenas, 
el sentido del acto que ese uso nos obliga a ejecutar, nos encon tramos con un 
problema nuevo […] Como el acto, por sí, no revela su sentido, no tenemos más 
remedio que explicar su existencia, hacernos inteligible por qué lo hay, porqué 
está ahí, en suma, explicarlo y esto es teorizar» (OC, X: 289-290).  
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9.7 The react ions to t he Inst itu te: a balance 
The reception of the IH  by the Spanish civil society, and  in 
particu lar by the middle-upper class, can be defined  as generally 
positive, both in quantitative and  qualitative terms. As far as the first of 
these aspects is concerned , it has to be pointed  out that each lesson of 
the second  course given by Ortega had  been followed  by 
approximately 1300 people. Evidently, his teachings d id  not reach only 
the university population but also the general public. This can be 
argued  by taking into account the fact that the students matriculated  in 
the Faculty of letters and  philosophy of the UC by that time were less 
than 600 (Sánchez Montes, 1949). Moreover, by considering the costs of 
matriculation and  the vocational character of these lessons – only 1 out 
of 8 students matriculated  in the University would  have terminate her 
stud ies – it is p lausible to affirm that only a limited  part of them would  
have taken part in these lessons. Indeed , as in the case of the conference 
in the Ateneo of Madrid , Ortega’s lessons were public events that 
gathered  the high society. Whereas this opened  the way to harsh 
criticisms against the cu ltu ral level of his lessons in comparison to the 
d ifficult and  serious lectures that were taking place in the same period  
within the University
92
, Ortega always vind icated  with pride the fact of 
dealing with an heterogeneous aud ience which represented  the general 
composition of the civil society.  
The vast interest that surrounded  the IH was also complemented  by 
a general positive attitude of the civil society at all its  level. The several 
letters received  by Ortega and  Marías reveal the great expectation as 
well as the supportive stance of the public toward s the IH. Thanks to 
the ample résumés that were published  in some cultural reviews and  
newspapers, such as Ínsula and  ABC, Ortega’s teachings were followed  
with fascination in many parts of Spain  by an heterogeneous public 
which overcame the limits of the formal schooling system. Thus, for 
instance, a group of young students and  self-taught people from 
Barcelona wrote to express its gratitude to Ortega for renewing the 
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 Torrente Ballesteros, 1950, XI: «La música de Zubiri es d ificil y sus cursos no 
se ven favorecidos, como los de Ortega, por los sombreros femeninos más 
lindos de Madrid : yo me atrevo a lamentarlo, pero comprendo y hasta 
d isculpo, la ausencia de nuestras elegantes». 
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interest towards the Humanities
93
. A similar ad miration was manifested 
by a group of prisoners incarcerated  in San Miguel de los Reyes, 
Valencia, which defined  itself as: «un grupo de presos de d iversas 
regiones de España que escuchamos un poco y reflexionamos cuanto el 
aletear de nuestro espíritu  nos permite»
94
 [See Annex 9].  
The fame of the Institute d id  propagate also outsid e the Spanish 
boarders: it received  many expressions of interest from the UK. In 
particu lar, due to the top ic of his first course, Ortega had  been invited  
to publish his lessons on Toynbee by the same ed itor of the book of the 
British historian
95
. The international appeal of the IH, due in particular 
to the innovativeness of his methodology and  style, was 
emblematically manifested  in a short article written by an American 
spectator of these courses, Ed it Helman, accord ing to whom:  
 
The fervent and assiduous support of the Institute reveals the need  that 
many thinking individuals of all ages and  classes feel for help in 
confronting the world  they find  themselves in. In Spain , to be sure, other 
special factors explain in part the extraord inary success of the Institute: it is 
an oasis in the desert and people have long been thirsty; it is the only 
meeting place of people who have in common at least a preoccupation with 
cultural problems and  who linger after lectures to d iscuss the questions that 
have been raised ; and  last, but most im portant, probably, everyone is 
attracted  by the personality, prestige, and  the magic word  of Ortega
96
. 
 
The reception of the IH in the Spanish journals was hard ly ever 
enthusiastic. An example of an extremely negative reception is that of 
Arbor, the official journal of the CSIC, that willingly ignored  the IH  
until the end  of the first year of its activity , to avoid  advertising this 
instituion. When the journal broke its silence on the IH  in April 1949 it 
d id  so by vehemently criticising Ortega, deemed  responsible for 
propagating a laic and  anti-Catholic thought via «un ensayismo 
aparentemente inocuo»
97
. Arbor was basically repeating the criticism of 
one of the main censors of Ortega’s book: Joaquín Iriarte, who in 1949 
devoted  himself to an unceasing demolition of Ortega through a series 
of articles published  in Razón y Fe. His critiques were d irected  in 
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particu lar against the historicism, the laicism and  internationalism  of 
the philosopher. As Iriarte wrote, judging the IH: «He aquí las líneas 
fundamentales de una filosofía que es la d isolución de toda fórmula 
religiosa, moral y filosófica, y que sin objetividad , sin ejes fijo ni lastre, 
vuela vagarosa por los campos de la historia»
98
. 
A more neutral reception of Ortega’s philosophy and  his IH was the 
one of the Revista de Filosofía of the UC. The ed itorial line of the review 
was that of avoid ing any sort of extremism both in advertising an d  in 
condemning the Institute. So, in April 1949, the review published  a 
very syntethic summary of the purposes of the IH and  Ortega’s 
conferences, without any critical examination of the pros and  cons of its 
contribution to the Spanish culture
99
. Moreover, it d id  not present 
exclusively the view of Ortega’s opponents, but also of his friends and  
d isciples, reviewing with complacency Marías’s book on the idea of 
“living-reason” in Ortega y Gasset  (Láscaris Comneno, 1949). The very 
review of Iriarte’s essays in 1950 reveals this tendency of objectivity 
and  neutrality affirming that: «La revisión del “problema” Ortega sería 
imposible, mientras no se abandonara la crítica fácil, fustigante y 
malintencionada o la admiración incondicional, entusiasta y exaltad a» 
and  d irectly reproaching Iriarte for committing th e first of these 
mistakes (Perdomo García, 1950: 532). 
Lastly, an example of unconditional support to Ortega and  the IH is 
that of the review Ínsula which had  been responsible for advertising the 
creation of this institution since the end  of October 1948 and  decided , in 
accord ance with Ortega and  under the supervision of Marías, to 
period ically publish a chronical of its activities. Many collaborators  of 
the IH were at the same time contribu tors of the review: among them 
Julián Marías, Pau lino Garagorri and  German Bleiberg. Bleiberg was 
the person responsible for writing the long chronicles about the IH that 
reached  so many people within and  ou tside th e Spanish boarders. He 
d id  so always using enthusiastic expressions of ad miration towards 
Ortega and  his «inagotable riqueza de pensamiento que siempre fluye 
de la palabra escrita o hablada» (Bleiberg, 1949: 2). Thus, since Ortega’s 
creation of the IH and  until his death, Ínsula’s guid ing princip le would  
be that of propagating and  defending the activities that the philosopher 
was carrying about both in Spain and  abroad .  
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By the beginning of the second  year , the IH had  already obtained  a 
great popularity and  resonance within the civil society and , w ith 
d ifferent nuances, among the intellectual world . As a consequence, its 
creator had  gained  more confidence about the relevance and  impact of 
his project in the Spanish cultural atmsophere, as Ortega put it in an  
interview he was being giving to ABC before the beginning of the 
course Man and People: «Quería ver con rigor de laboratorio cuál ea la 
reacción de mis compatriotas, y ella fue tan clara, entusiasa y d iré que 
torrencial, que me infundió ánimo para prosegu ir y responder, como 
creo que debo, a esa amabilidad  que tanto agradezco»
100
. Ortega was 
gradually acqu iring more importance and  relevance within the Spanish 
debate that, as demonstrated  by the d ifferent percep tion of the main 
cultural reviews of the period , was extremely polarised . These contrasts 
would  contribu te to the instability of the IH, that by the end  of the 
spring 1950, interrupted  its activities. An interruption which would  
have marked  the end  of Ortega’s intervention in Spain. 
 
 
9.8 The end of the Inst itu te 
Julián Marías, during the course of his long life, had  frequently 
recalled  the activities of the IH and  provided  the reason s for its final 
closing. He ind ividuated  in particular four main causes: 1) the 
economic d ifficulties of the IH; 2) the lack of political support; 3) the 
unsufficient attend ance and  participation of the youngest generations 
to its activities; 4) the international appeal of Ortega’s philosophy and  
his consequent frequent travels abroad  (Marías, 1983). Whereas some of 
these reasons appear to be grounded  on the historical facts, others d o 
not stick adequately to reality. For instance, the first of these, i.e. the 
financial hardship of the IH, is unlikely to be real. In fact, the total 
income of the matricu lation fees during the second  year of the activity 
of the IH amounted  to 247805 pesetas, while the total expenses – 
salaries, advertising and  infrastructures – amounted  to 158741. The net 
income of the IH was almost 90000 pesetas
101
. The positive trend  in the 
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matriculation, from the first to the second  year, when Ortega – the 
major source of income for the Institute – had  almost doubled  his 
aud ience, should  have surely reassured  about the possibility of 
consolid ating the existence and  expand ing the activities of this recent 
cultural institution
102
.  
Concerning the participation of the youngest generations, w ithouth 
any doubt they showed a great interest in particu lar in the courses of 
Ortega, but he d id  not perceive it as sufficient both form a quantitative 
and  qualitative point of view. Indeed , Ortega received  several letters by 
students who manifested  their appreciation for his teaching soon after 
the beginning of the courses
103
. However, the type of involvement of the 
students that Ortega was seeking to obtain through the IH should  have 
been qualitative d ifferent. As he wrote to Julián Marías:  
 
Lo que quieren que haga es que dé conferencias o lecciones y que ellos 
estén sentados escuchándome. Y nada más. Cuando yo le decía que no se 
puede estar empezando siempre por mi parte y que si los demás – por 
ejemplo, aunque solo como ejemplo, los jovenes – no hacían algo por su 
parte, no era posible que se lograse nada. […] No habían respondido los 
jóvenes en la forma y medida necesarias para que representansen una 
fuerza activamente fertil
104
. 
 
Ortega was in particular impressed  by the lack of active 
participation he perceived  among the youngest students, in the sense 
that he had  hoped  for their help  for contributing to change the cultural 
and  social situation of his country. He und oubted ly hoped  it would  
have been possible to gather a group  of people, a new generation, able 
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to positive influence in the civil society , and  the academic system , as it 
had  always been the case of the teaching activity he had  realised  during 
his long career.  
Then, in relation to Ortega’s supposed  international engagement it 
has to be pointed  out that by the end  of 1950 and  the first half of 1951 
Ortega d id  not travel more than during the period  in w hich the 
Institute was in activity. In the long pauses during 1949, for instance, 
Ortega had  been to Germany and , for the first time in his life, also in 
the United  States, in Colorado, at the recently founded  Aspen Institute. 
Indeed , the more vivacious period  of travelling of the Madrilenian 
philosopher started  no earlier than the summer 1951, that is more than 
a year after the interruption of the activities of the IH . He went to UK, 
Germany, France, Switzerland  giving an incred ible number of 
conferences, but by that d ate the project of the In stitute had  already 
been abandoned . By that time also Julián Marías, who would  have to 
organise the IH in all its practical aspects, was planning to move 
abroad , in particular in Mussachussets, at the Wellesley college that 
had  invited  him as visiting professor for a semester
105
.  
The more plausible reason underneath the interruption of the IH’s 
activities has to be found in the lack of political support . This d oes not 
merely mean that there w ere not the conditions that wou ld  have 
rendered  possible the creation of an intellectual group  of people which 
could  have propagated  the ideas of the institu te. More than this, what 
to Ortega was the real cause of the impossibility of following with his 
project was the growing suspicion of the regime towards the Institute 
and , generally speaking, towards any form of intellectual freedom 
which manifested  even the slightest sign of heterodoxy. This was 
attributed  by the philosopher to a substantial change in the 
international politics of the regime. As Ortega wrote to Marías:  
 
Sin que yo haya conseguido averiguar la causa, motivo o pretexto de ello, el 
gobierno se ha puesto más áspero, no sólo con nosotros, sino con todo le 
mundo y coincid iendo con esto aunque tal vez independientemete de esta 
actitud  del gobierno, se ha hiperextesiado la censura eclesiástica en forma 
como hac mucho tiempo no observábamos. Repito, ninguna causa, motivo, 
pretexto internos de nuestro país justifica esto. Pero el hecho es 
incuestionable
106
. 
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Indeed , in November 1950 the UN had  revoked  the resolution 
against the Spanish regime. The anti-communist outlook maintained  by 
Spain had  proved  to be effective in determining the cond itions that 
rendered  possible the end  of the international isolation of the country. 
At that time, the U.S. voted  for the entrance of Spain in the 
international community since Franco's government could  have helped  
in the fight against communism  (Jarque Iñiguez, 1994; Güell, 2009). The 
cold  war was, during that period , reaching its acme and  a conflict 
between the two blocks d id  not sound  as a totally improbable ch ance. 
Spain started  to be considered  as a resources and  not as an obstacle for 
the defence of the Western values. The integration process of the nation 
within the international system was extremely fast: in less the three 
years it was admitted  to all the m ajor international institutions and , in 
1955, it took part to the UN (Fernández García, Pereira Castañares, 
1995: 134-137). Whereas it could  seem that this change, together with 
the replacement of the Minister of Education Ibáñez Martín with a self-
proclaimed  admirer of Ortega – Ruiz Giménez – should  have favoured  
the presence of the philosopher in Spain
107
, this d id  not happen. From 
an internal perspective, this was mainly due to the resistance of the 
very Franco and  the Opus Dei to a real modernisation of the country. In 
other words, the more religious sectors of the regime saw  with clarity 
that the international recognition could  have given the possibility of 
provid ing to the theocratic-hispanism represented  by the Caud illo a 
full legitimate status. By that time the struggle between two very 
d ifferent concep ts of modernity was being gained  by the Catholic front, 
as proved  by the agreement with the Roman Church signed  in 1953 
(Sanz, 2003). This would  determine an even more rigid  control of all the 
cultural and  intellectual activities w ithin the Spanish boarders, as 
denounced  by Ortega in his letter. An article published  in Arbor, by 
Calvo Serer, by the end  of 1951, clearly reveals that the opposition to 
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Ortega and  his d isciples had  reached  its acme
108
. In this context, as 
Ortega had  perfectly perceived , the end  of the international Spanish 
isolation would  have guarantee to the orthod oxy of the regime the 
possibility to substantially repudiate any form of independent and  
critical thinking.  
These were the main reasons that forced  Ortega to aband on his 
project of the IH. However, his educative and  philosophical proposal 
was perceived  as extremely compelling outside the Spanish boarders. 
The new fame he acquired  during this period  as a symbol of 
intellectual freedom gave him the opportunity to d ivulgate his 
humanistic reform in a transnational context  and  to continue to act as a 
reference point in his own homeland  for some marginalised  
intellectuals, that in the following years would  have contributed  to the  
government of the so-called  “technocrats” (Tusell, 2007). 
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Chapter 10. 
The end  of hope? IH  in continu ity  
The theory of education and  the cu ltural activity developed  by Ortega 
during his second  coming in Spain d id  not find  a good  acceptance 
within the regime. At the same time, as alread y seen in the previous 
chapter, this activity was strictly in d ialogue with the ambitious project 
of build ing a new global peace through education that international 
institutions purported  after the end  of the WWII.  
In this section it w ill be analyzed  the continu ity of the philosophy of 
education of Ortega y Gasset in and  ou tside Spain, so as to stud y the 
fourth and  final mutation of this theorization in relation to historical 
and  political changes: from the period  of formation of a young student 
at the University of Madrid , to the context of the Second  republic, later 
during the period  of the Francoist regime and , finally, end ing with the 
post-war international context.  
Ortega’s frequent travels abroad  that took place during the fifties, 
most of them in the occasion of conferences and  courses – in Germany, 
Switzerland , England , Portugal, Italy, Argentina and  USA – gave him 
the possibility to continue to express his ideas and , at the same time, to 
try to influence the opinions of other intellectuals and  political actors.  
This was due in particular to (§1) the relevance that  his ideas had  in 
relation to the international context and  their concrete contributions in 
giving birth to new educational practices. Indeed , as it will be proved  
in the following pages, the educative proposals realised  by Ortega d id  
find  a very responsive ground  in particu lar in the US, through the 
mediation of Robert Hutchins, professor of the University of Chicago 
and  founder of the Aspen Institute in Colorad o. In sp ite of the possibility 
recently opened  to the philosopher at the global level, Ortega focused  
his attention in particular on the European context. As it  will be 
demonstrated  (§2) his theory of education constituted  the premise for 
the consequent meditations on the role of the intellectual in the 
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construction of a super-national identity, a prerequisite for the build ing 
of a European unified  society. As a matter of fact, (§3) the relevance of 
the reform of humanities he was purporting through the IH  was 
perceived  as so compelling by the very Ortega that he also tried  to 
export the format abroad , in Munich. At the same time, he presented  
his ideas in many d ifferent occasions, such as the Rencontres de Genève, 
in which d ifferent positions on education and  on the role of humanities 
were d iscussed  by philosophers such as Marleau-Ponty and  others. As 
a consequence, this section will present a study of the relevant function 
of the intellectual and  the philosopher within this new political 
scenario and  within a new political ideology which still grounds our 
concept of education in democratic society. However, the reception he 
received  abroad  was not comparable with the one he received  at home. 
In fact, (§4) the scarce appeal of his theory in Spain is proved  both by 
the failure of his candid acy at the literature Nobel p rize in 1951 and , 
moreover, by the muffled  celebration of his official retirement from the 
University in 1953. All these events contribute to explain (§5) his 
thought would  have been so controversially interpreted  after his death: 
condemned  by the members of the academic establishment and  
idealised  by a young generation of students which called  for a 
renovation of the educative system within a stagn ant cultural scenario. 
A contraposition which, after the end  of Franco’s regime, permitted  a 
new instrumental use of the philosopher as the father of a liberal and  
democratic revolution. 
 
 
10.1 The in tern at ional appeal  
The IH aroused  a significant global interest in a context in which the 
processes of internationalisation in education were marking the post - 
war period . Indeed , Ortega’s proposal coincided  with two 
complementary international phenomena which contributed  to  render 
his project very attractive outside the Spanish board ers. The first was 
the creation of UNESCO on November 16th 1946, which determined  a 
growing attention towards the definition of the basic guidelines of a 
global education for peace promoted  by Western countries (Singh, 
2011). The second , strictly related  to the previous one, was the 
rad icalisation of the Cold  War and  the consequent d esire of the US to 
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establish its cultural and  political superiority at a global scale. The 
Machiavellian pragmatism of the American internationalisation d uring 
those years (Mazower, 2012) was indeed  supported  by a very effective 
cultural strategy. As Alfred  Reisch (2013) has proved , America tried  to 
win the Cold  War also through a cultural policy, by the help of books – 
at the beginning addressed  to intellectuals and  then to students – as the 
most effective tools to spread  ideas and  values among people living in 
communist countries. The very UNESCO, since its creation, more than 
by neutral philanthropic aims was moved  by  the political wish to bu ild  
a culture of peace able to counter the German model, rendering it more 
attractive also from the economic and  spiritual point of view. As stated  
by the Conference of A llied Ministers of Education – the ancestor of the 
UNESCO -: «It is essential that in the new Europe Allied  Scientific 
Culture and  outlook shall replace the German»
109
. Significantly enough, 
when Ortega y Gasset realised  the IH in Madrid , the main 
preoccupations of the American observers ,after the refusal of the 
philosopher to accept the financial help  of the Rockefeller Found ation, 
focused  in particular on the prominent role of the German cultural 
trad ition in the activities of the Institute. The NY Herald  Tribune
110
 
expressed  in 1950 its concerns for this trait of the  IH, affirming that: 
«There is a constant interchange of professors and  audients with 
Heidelberg, Freiburg, Tübingen and  other universities». The article 
ended  by opening a debate over the possibility of financing this project 
for pursuing the American cultural interests asking to their readers: 
«Are we playing our part to influence Spanish cu ltural and  economic 
development?». 
Moreover, in 1948, the UNESCO published  a Solemn Appeal Against 
the Idea that Wars are Inevitable, a document that invited  all the cultural 
promoters such as teachers, scientists, artists, writers and  journalists, to 
spread  the values of peace and  democracy, in order to counter the 
«pernicious idea that war is inevitable»
111
. The organisation, supported 
by other Found ations and  institu tions, not only was a brain trust of 
scientific knowledge, but was also actively engaged  in the promotion of 
specific educative policies in the d ifferent cases with the aim of 
propagating its very ideology (Casual, 2005: 42).  
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Among the most relevant cultural institutions which were acting in 
support of the American interests there was the general-purpose Ford  
Foundation which was acting more on the global than on the local level 
(Arndt, 2005). In particular, since 1949, when The Gaither Commission 
submitted  its recommendations to the Foundation’s Board  of Trustees, 
the Found ation started  to implement its activities with the specific aim 
of promoting the development of peace, democracy, economics, 
education and  behavioural sciences. After the conference in Aspen on 
Goethe, Ortega continued  to act as a reference point w ithin the 
European culture for Robert Hutchins, who, in 1950, became associate 
d irector of the Ford  Found ation, during the same period  in which the 
Aspen Institute was founded . During the winter 1949-1950 the 
correspondence between Ortega and  Hutchins, concerning the 
theoretical premises and  the practical goals of this educative institution , 
was quite intense. Robert Maynard  Huctchins was a professor of 
philosophy at the University of Chicago. Since the ‘30s he had  been 
focusing in particular on the importance of liberal education as a means 
for the development of a peaceful and  whealty society. In particular, he 
proposed  a reform of the American educative system partially indebted  
to Ortega’s proposal as presented  in the Misión de la Universidad and  
rejected  the pragmatism of John Dewey (Hutchins, 1936; Martin, 1991). 
When theorising the necessity of a global liberal education for the post -
war scenario he adopted  a thomist outlook, joining it w ith a general 
read ing of the Ortega’s vital-reason (Hutchins, 1943). Ortega refered  to 
Robert Hutchins, who had  invited  him in Colorado, as «el gran 
innovador de la enseñanza universitaria en los Estad os Unidos» (OC, 
X:15). Indeed , he thought he had  found  a very valuable ally in his 
campaign in defence of a renewal of humanistic education. As a matter 
of fact, the collaboration with Hutchins and  his entourage in the 
University of Chicago, the Rockefeller Foundation and  the Ford  
Foundation, would  later be extremely fruitful when, some months 
later, the Aspen Institu te for Humanistic Stud ies was finally created , 
and  Ortega was ad opted  as one of its intellectual references for the 
development of its ped agogical proposal. As Walter Paepcke wrote to 
Ortega «I derived  great pleasure from read ing you r Mission of the 
University. It is excellent in every way. Oddly enough, your ideas, those 
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of Chancellor Hutchins, and  those of Dr. Sigerist, head  of the Medical 
Department at John Hopkins, are in astounding agreement»
112
. 
In fact, Hutchins invited  Ortega in Aspen where he was creating a 
new institute of humanistic culture [See Annex 11]. His purpose was 
that of offering undergraduate courses, ad ult education and  
philosophical seminars
113
. Ortega was asked  by Hutchins to give his 
advise on the structure of this new school, given his expertise proven in 
the Mission of the University and , more recently, through the great 
success of the IH. This response offered  him the possibility of briefly  
sketching the most basic strands of his ped agogical theory in relation to 
the changing international context. 
Ortega’s argument is based  on a fund amental premise: a humanistic 
education is needed  in the post-war age. His defence of Humanities in 
the American scenario is primarily motivated  by the growing relevance 
acquired  by the natural science in the high -school and  university 
education. A supremacy which mirrored  the statement of proposal of 
the very d irector of the UNESCO, Julian Huxley (1946), who sus tained  
the ideal of a sort of evolutionary humanism oriented  towards the 
scientific progress and  the technical development of the society. As 
Ortega put it: «there is in America an extremely unbalanced  state as 
regards education in favour of the naturalist ic (not humanistic), 
physical, biological and  technical education»
114
. This condition called  
for a new input to the humanistic stud ies and , at the same time, for a 
reform of humanities not only in the US but also in Europe. In fact, this 
reform had  been pointed  out by the philosopher as the main reason for 
the creation of the IH in Madrid .  
Apart from this basic premise, Ortega’s suggestions to Hutchins 
concerned  d ifferent aspects of this humanistic education, in particular: 
1) its scope, 2) its method ology and  3) its end . Concerning the last of 
these aspects, the ultimate goal of the Aspen Institu te, accord ing to 
Ortega, would  have been that of fostering the creation of a new 
                                                          
112
 Indeed , the influence of Ortega on this oversee project was extremely 
relevant as proved  by the fact that the very name of the Institute had  been 
suggested  by Ortega who perceived  that the term “University”, precedently 
used  by Hutchins, represented  an anachronistic and  vague definition that 
would  not have revealed  the great ambition of the project. See Letter by 
Paepcke to Ortega, in AOG, C-135/ 60.  
113
 Letter by Paepcke to Ortega, 5-X-1949, In AOG, C-5979. 
114
 Letter by Ortega to Paepcke, in AOG, PB-370/ 1, pp.3-4. 
 
344 
intellectual and  social elite able to influence, as Ortega put it, «all walks 
of American life»
115
.  
This goal cou ld  have been reached , accord ing to the philosopher, 
only through the ad option of a new methodology of teaching based  on 
the cohabitation of teachers and  students in a same institution which 
should  have rejected  all form of excessive comfort and  promote what 
Ortega called  “elegance”, naming it as a vital virtue. With this word  he 
ind icated  the ability to live and  act in society in an appropriate way, 
being able to fruitfu lly take part in intellectual conversations
116
. In 
Ortega’s description of the positive climate of mutual interchange of 
ideas that should  have characterised  the life in within the Aspen 
Institute, it is evidently possible to note a nostalgic memory of the 
atmosphere he had  experienced  firstly as a young student in Germany 
and  later as a professor and  influential public figure in Spain. In fact, in 
his letter Ortega exp licitly longed  for the return of the intellectual in th e 
public sphere, conceived  as a model for an entire generation of students 
and  bourgeois willing to actively participate to the social life of their 
country by taking into account the exemplary figure of their master
117
.  
In order to realise this utop ian restoration of the intellectual and , in 
particu lar, of the philosopher at the centre of the social life, it would  
have been necessary to promote a form of education primarily d ifferent 
in scope. In fact, Ortega, in this occasion, recalls the Mission of the 
University and  vind icates the importance of an education able to reach a 
meaningful synthesis of the d ifferent scientific subjects and  to transmit 
to the students relevant knowledge which cou ld  be useful to 
comprehend  the society in which they live. Ortega’s educativ e proposal 
can be summarised  in the Latin motto non multa, sed multum , accord ing 
to which an authentic comprehension of cu lture is acquired  when a 
limited  amount of information is completely interiorised  by the 
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 Ibidem, p . 13. 
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 «Elegance must penetrate, inform the ind ividual entire life, from the gesture 
and  the way of walking, through the way of using language, of keeping on a 
conversation, of speaking in public, to the most intimate side of moral and 
intellectual actions». Ibidem, p . 9.  
117
 «This happened  in Europe fifty years ago: in many places – for instance, at 
the “fashion days”, at theatres and  at the great scientific and  literary 
ceremonies – young people had  the opportunity of seeing, merely seeing such 
exemplary figure: and  that acted  upon them without realising it, with the 
character of models to be imitated». Ibidem, p . 12. 
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student. As Ortega put it, the guideline of the Institute «would  be to 
teach how to read , that is, to really absorb an important book; therefore 
applying also to read ing the principles of concentration or 
condensation and  synthesis. The idea is to attempt an education and  
culture which are pure nerve, deprived  of ad ipose, tissues and  
lymphatic exuberance»
118
.  
Evidently, education represented  to Ortega the kernel of any social 
reform, not only in Spain but also at the global scale. He was persuaded  
that no effective policies could  have been put into practice without 
counting on the comprehension of the citizens who should  have to 
realise them and , on the same time, that all political proposals should  
have been based  on an intellectual analysis of the problems at stake. 
First of all, of the role of the hu man being in a changing social context. 
Ortega continued  to maintain frequent relations with the Ford  
Foundation, in particu lar via Walter Paepcke and  Robert Hutchins, also 
during the ’50s. He continued  to give his advice concerning ed ucation 
and  to collaborate with this Insitution that, in particu lar starting from 
1953, would  have played  a lead ing role in the development of 
educative initiatives in Europe and  also in Spain. In particu lar, the 
intervention of the Ford  Foundation in this country was aimed  at  
build ing a new intellectual and  social elite – like the one that Ortega 
thought the Aspen Institute should  have built in the US – which should  
have been lead ing the country after the end  of Franco’s d ictatorship
119
. 
This would  be realised  in particular during the decade of the ‘60s, 
through the establishment in Madrid , with the financial support of the 
Foundation, of the Seminario de Humanidades, significantly d irected  by 
Julián Marías. This series of lectures and  conferences emulated  the ones 
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 As written by Santisteban Fernández (2009: 162): «El verdadero objetivo de 
los programas desarrollados por la Ford  en España fue tener acceso a un grupo 
influyente de intelectuales, empresarios, financieros y técnicos de la 
administración con los que establecer una comunidad  de intereses y que, a su 
vez, pudieran influir en la adopción de decisiones y cambios políticos en un 
tiempo en el que la desaparición del d ictador se presumía cercana. De este 
modo se podría evitar una transición contraria a los intereses geopolíticos 
norteamericanos, evitando la inestabilidad  social o evoluciones contrarias al 
atlantismo».  
 
346 
given by Ortega in the IH, largely counting on the same people who 
had  rendered  possible the development of the previous project
120
. 
 
10. 2 The cu ltural un ificat ion  of Europe  
The IH contributed  to give to Ortega y Gasset a renewed notoriety, 
in particu lar outside the Spanish boarders. Since the beginning of the 
activities of the Institute and , during the following years, Ortega would  
have repeted ly been invited  to give lectures and  conferences all over 
Europe and  the Americas. In one of this conferences, in particuar one 
on the figure of Goethe, Ortega took the occasion, as usual, for not 
d irectly speaking of what should  have in theory been the subject of his 
d iscourse, i.e. the German intellectual, but rather for instrumentally 
taking the chance of expressing his main philosophical theses on the 
most urgent top ics of his meditations. These American conferences, as 
well as those he gave in Germany, permit to trace with clarity the 
evolution of his thinking in this period . In fact, his preoccupation 
towards the end  and  methods of education, and  in particular of 
philosophy, as an instrument of personalisation and  socialisation of the 
ind ividuals in these texts is d irectly linked  to the necessity of build ing, 
with optimism a new cultu ral parad igm after the war: «El náufrago se 
convierte en nad ador. La situación negativa se convierte en positiva. 
Toda civilización ha nacido o ha renacido como un movimiento 
natatorio de salvación» (OC, X:10). In particu lar, Ortega affirms for the 
first time the necessity to restore the European  identity and  construct a 
new form of super-national coexistence between the citizens of 
d ifferent countries (Beneyto, 2005). And  to do so, in line with his 
precedent philosophical and  pedagogical writings, he underlines the 
need  of reforming the cultu re of the continent, in particular through the 
adoption of his historiological and  humanistic method .  
In all the occasions in which, during 1949, Ortega was invited  to talk 
about Goethe - he d id  so in particu lar in US, Germany and  Spain – he 
depicted  him as a symbol of the European identity and  as a source of 
inspiration for the destiny of the cultural and  political health of the  
whole European society. Significantly, he attributes this potentality to 
an eminent intellectual who, during his whole life, accord ing to Ortega, 
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 On the organisation and  activities of this seminar see Ibidem, p . 174-180. 
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had  epitomised  the most intimate struggle of the human condition with 
what he called  the “d ifficulty of being”  (OC, X:29)– both in its 
anthropological and  social d imension. Put it d ifferently, the struggle 
between being and  having to be, between an ideal and  its concrete 
realisation. By assigning this normative function to an intellectual, the 
philosopher partially reaffirms the importance of this social authority 
in ruling the society in an age of crises. However, at the same time, he 
goes a step further when underlining the necessity of transforming this 
culture into a possession of the masses so to render each citizen part of 
an intellectual community. In fact, accord ing to the philosopher, no 
social improvement could  have been made in a mass-society without 
having previously converted  the mass-man into an educated  and  
responsible human being. In this way, the philosophy and  the 
philosopher acquired  a new role and  presence within the society, 
having philosophical ideas – the vitamins of a society – to be converted  
in popular beliefs, credences and  habits. 
This compelling thesis was enounced  by Ortega in a particu larly 
significant occasion, such as during a d iscourse he gave to the students 
in 1949 at the Freie Universität in Berlin, the cap ital of the recent global 
d isaster of the trad itional concept of humanity . The city that, for many, 
represented  the end  of the Western culture, for Ortega could  have 
represented  the re-birth of a new civilisation. In this occasion he 
provocatively affirms that d emocracy was neither an absolute value 
nor an unproblematic form of government. Indeed, a democracy to be 
positive and valuable has to rest on the aware participation of citizens to public 
life. As Ortega put it, «la democracia si no es contenida por otras 
fuerzas ajenas a ella, lleva al absolutismo mayoritario» (OC, VI: 569). 
These forces which are deemed responsible for sustaining the 
democratic life can be summirised  in the intellectual aspiration for 
living a meaningfu l life. This is the mission that Ortega assigns to 
education, that is to propagate among the general public the perception 
of the importance of cultivating a humanistic education aimed  to 
enhancing the basic rational requ irements among citizens, in relation to 
their knowled ge and  political awareness. If this precondition were not 
satisfied , then it would  be impossible to think about  any sort of aware 
and  conscious public opinion . The public sphere would  on the contrary 
be characterised  by superficiality and  “recentism”. As Ortega put it: 
«no vale hablar de ideas u  opiniones donde no se ad mite una instancia 
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que las regu la, una serie d e normas a que en la d iscusión cabe apelar. 
Estas normas son los principios de la cultura» (OC, IV: 417).  
The conference at the Freie Universität offered  him the opportunity 
to apply his theories to the European scenario by the time in which the 
project of a unification of Europe was starting to be concretely 
established . In fact, months before Ortega’s conference in Berlin, 
significantly entitled  De Europa meditatio quaedam, it had  been founded  
in May 1949 the Council of Europe. The creation of a European  
community fascinated  Ortega and , at the same time, weighed  on the 
philosopher as a new intellectual responsibility that had  to be seriously 
faced . The kernel of his conference is offered  by his meditation on the 
nature of society, the d istinction between Nation and  State, based  in 
particu lar on the role that each ind ividual is deemed to play in each of 
this institu tional framework. In fact, being each nation – as each human 
being – characterised  by a contrad ictory complementarity between 
trad ition and  novelty, irrationality and  rationality
121
, it would  be 
impossible to conceive a social community without attributing to it a 
certain dose of rationality. Of what Ortega called  vital reason
122
. As 
Ortega put it, a nation is a combination of three elements: man, 
trad ition and  chance (OC, X: 106). 
Ortega’s conference on  the essence of the nation in relation to the 
problem of the creation of the European community focuses in 
particu lar on the process of build ing a nation. In fact, in a moment in 
which, as Ortega wrote, Europe was d issociated  (OC, X: 126) – both 
from the point of view of the single States and  of that of the mutual 
relation between these with their citizens – it was crucial to understand  
how this new social community could  have been efficaciously built.  
The entire argumentation of the philosopher lies on a basic premise 
that defines the society as a combination of social uses in force. These 
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 «El hombre, como persona o como colectivid ad , es siempre una ecuación 
entre su ser inercial – receptivo, trad icional, y su ser ágil – emprendedor, 
afrontador de problema» (OC, X: 102) 
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 As Villacañas (2005: 183) wrote: «En la medida en que las naciones son 
varias, acred itan su carisma mediante la emulación, la competencia y el 
esfuerzo. En todo caso, en este momento de su  formación, son realidades 
también sistemáticas y auto-referenciales. Componen trad iciones y viven desde 
sí mismas, con los ojos puestos en las demás, en una competencia vital 
continua. Vemos así que el problema de la nación es complementario del 
problema de la razón vital». 
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uses can have either a trad itional or a rational ground , but they all must 
have in common a widespread  acceptance and  forcefulness among the 
whole social community. This implies that each person would  engage 
with the society in d ifferent ways, accord ing to her scale of rational 
participation to it. In fact, as Ortega writes: «La socialid ad  se da 
siempre estratificad a» (OC, X: 110).  
In a moment in which this sociability has been pu t into question or, 
as in the case of the European Union, has to be built, he deems 
necessary the intervention of culture as a means of socialisation. The 
history of nation build ing, accord ing to Ortega, reveals the crucial role 
that the intellectual has always played  in the formation of the public 
opinion – i.e. the grounding principle of the social uses – and  the 
pernicious consequences, in terms of nationalisms, violences and  
democratic deterioration, that the replacement of the intellectual by the 
demagogue had  repeated ly caused
123
. In order to counter this 
possibility, Ortega underlines the necessity of a political elite that in 
each nation, and  at a continental level, should  be responsible for 
avoid ing this process of d eterioration. At the same time, however, he 
does not limit the scope of his meditation to the role of these elites 
within the life of the community, but he also takes into account the 
active participation of each one of its members in this “project of future 
coexistence” that a nation ultimately is, a vis proiectiva (Llano Alonso, 
2010). As a consequence, Europe, should  have been realised  as a 
confederation of national States that rejected  any form of nationalism. 
For d oing this, the depersonalisation both of the ruling classes and  the 
single citizens should  have been countered  by the valorisation of the 
culture of each nations and  the whole continent  (Sánchez Cámara, 2006: 
270). A culture that had  to be continuously revitalised  through a critical 
thinking, for restoring «el credo intelectual y moral de Europa» (OC, X: 
125).  
Ortega’s conference in Berlin represented  an epic event for the 
students of the German university. As the newspapers reported , 
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 «Lo que sí acontenteció al llegar la democracia, por tanto, en los comienzos 
del siglo XIX, es que con ella comenzaron los pueblos de Occidente a caer en el 
deletéreo poder de los demagogos – sean de izquierda o de derecha – y como la 
única táctica de estos irresponsable personajes es extremarlo todo para poder 
alcoholizar a las masas, la conciencia de Nacionalidad , que llevaba ya dos 
siglos de tranquila, pacífica vida, se convirtió en programa político» (OC, X: 
114). 
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thousands of people attended  to Ortega’s speech, the University was 
literary assaulted  by students and  common people who wanted  to 
listen to the word s of the philosopher. The Bildungshung of the Berliners 
exploded  in this mass-manifestation of enthusiasm and  interest
124
 
towards the w orks of a foreeign intellectual, compared  by the press to 
the greatest of the world : Jaspers, Huizinga, Croce and  Heidegger. The 
incred ible reception received  in Germany – more among the general 
public than the academic thinkers (Jung-Lindemann, 2006) – and  the 
international appeal of his theories provided  to Ortega the stimulus to 
continue to develop his activities abroad , also due to the far more aloof 
reaction of the Spanish academia. 
 
10.3 Export ing the IH: an  u topian  project  
More than a resource for implementig a political change in Spain , 
Ortega saw in the Ford  Foundation a very powerful ally which could  
have contributed  to the global promotion of his humanistic reform. 
Indeed , the conditions for realising this reform in Spain were really 
scarce, in particular since the end  of Franco’s international isolation and  
the restored  hegemony of the Catholic intellectuals. For these reasons, 
Ortega started  to concretly conceive the possibility of realising his IH 
abroad . The idea of exporting the IH came to Ortega’s mind  in 1951, 
during a long and  fruitfu l stay in Germany. After having shared  his 
idea with very few d istinguished  intellectuals, such as Martin 
Heidegger and  Heisenberg, in October 1951 he wrote to a student of 
Hutchins, and  Director of the University of Puerto Rico, Jaime Benitez, 
to look for financial support – in particular, he asked  for a contribution 
of 30.000 d ollars – for realising an IH in Munich starting from January 
1952. Benitez was a fervent Orteguian who had  had  the opportunity to 
meet the philosopher in his first stay in Aspen  [See Annex 10]. He 
frequently wrote on the pedagogical theory of the Spanish philosopher 
and  invited  him and  Marías in Puerto Rico several times in the period  
comprised  between 1949 and  1955. Ortega presented  the project of this 
Institute as a «obra en cierto modo única hasta ahora en el mundo y 
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 «Als es der Mange gelang, unter Demolierung enier Türfülluung in den Saal 
einzudringen brach spontaner Beifall aus». Die Neue Zeitung, 8-IX-1940. Cited  in 
Carriazo Ruiz, 2014: 59. In his long article the au thor provides a very detailed  
and  precise description of Ortega’s trip . 
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que, sin buscarlo ni pretenderlo, coincide tanto con la línea general de 
la política estad ounidense»
125
. Benitez wrote to Hutchins, who took into 
consideration the possibility of realising this cu ltural initiative. 
However, as Ortega wrote to Marías some months later, the project was 
not finally concretised  d ue to the d ifficulties of realising such an 
ambitious initiative in the very short period  of time established  by 
him
126
. 
Ortega’s asp ired , through this new institute, to gather in the 
German town some of the most d istinguished  international scholars 
with the aim of opening a public debate on what he conceived  as a 
systemic ordeal of the Western civilisation. He had  presented  his 
d iagnosis of the cultural European crisis in the course of the recent 
Rencontres internationales de Genève that had  taken place in the Swiss 
capital. The lack of historical awareness in the general public opin ion 
and  the lack of certainty at the top level of scientific knowledge were 
the two main factors that, accord ing to the philosopher, contributed  to 
the condition of insecurity – both from an ind ivid ual and  collective 
point of view – of the Western civilisation
127
. To restore it, accord ing to 
Ortega, it would  have been necessary to propose at a larger scale the 
project of IH he launched  in Madrid  three years before. In fact, desp ite 
the extremely negative d iagnosis offered  by Ortega in regard  to the 
cultural situation of Europe, in the course of the Rencontres he clearly 
defended  an optimistic ou tlook towards the possibility of recovering 
from this condition, in particu lar through a new intellectual and  
pedagogic intervention.  
In the course of the colloquium that followed  his conference he was 
supported  in his d iagnosis by the French philosopher Merleu -Ponty 
who, at the same time, rad ically d iffered  from the prognosis of the 
                                                          
125
 Letter by Ortega to Paepcke, 1-X-1950, in AOG, CD-120/ 31. 
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 «Hubo un momento que pensé que podía hacerse aquí, financiado por la 
Ford  Foundation, el Instituto de Humanidades. Heidegger quería venir a 
trabajar en él y así porción de gentes de archiprimer orden. He dado algunos 
pasos en este sentido para ver si en principio podría contarse con la anted icha 
financiación. Sin que las cosas estén claras, no parece que haya mal ambiente 
pero de todas suertes sería cosa de solución un poco d istante». Letter by Ortega 
to Marías, 23-II-1952, in AOG, CD-M/ 57. 
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 «Las cosas que parecían más estables, y que eran para el hombre como una 
terra ferma en la que sus pies podían posarse, se hacen de golpe incertas o se 
revelan como errores, utopías o piadosos deseos […] La civilización occidental 
ha muerto, con una muerte bella y honrosa» (OC, VI: 791, 792). 
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Spanish philosopher. In fact, accord ing to Ortega, for ameliorating the 
current situation it would  have been necessary to avoid  any sort of 
existential tendency and  focus with optimism on find ing a cu ltural 
solu tion to the problem of the destiny of human being in the post-war 
society: «Tod a mi conferencia no es más que una invitación a un  trabajo 
entusiasta, en razón de las enormes posibilid ades que hay» (OC, VI: 
1122). With this statement Ortega defended  the importance of 
education, and  in particu lar of humanistic education, in promoting a 
positive social and  cultural change. This was not a generic defense of 
the positive values of humanities per se since, as already pointed  out, it 
rested  on a general reform of the curricula, the methodologies and  the 
final goals of this teaching. The vague idea that the study of 
philosophy, or even and  more generally the humanities per se, would  
fashion better people and  better society was rejected  by the Spanish 
philosopher exactly for the same reasons that he proposed  a new form 
of humanistic education: because of the historical failure of the 
trad itional ed ucation that had  produced  the critical situation he was 
d iagnosing. These failures, however, would  not have proved  the 
inadequacy of education as a whole, bu t rather only in relation to a 
particu lar model. For this reason, Ortega proposed  an interd iscip linary 
approach to education which considered  each ind ivid ual as an integrum 
and  which suggested  the existence of a minimal threshold  in the 
learning process. 
The criticisms of the Spanish philosopher against the 
standard ization of humanities, conceived  as an instrument of social 
development per se, are explicitly presented  in the conferen ce he gave 
in London in 1953 concerning the future of philosophical education. He 
had  been invited  to give this conference, organised  by the Ford  
Foundation, by the Board  of the Fund for the Advancement of Education . 
In that occasion, Ortega remarked  the need  of starting all d iscussions 
on the future of humanities by taking into account the great 
“philosophical d iversity” of the XX century. This d id  not only depend  
on the contraposition of two main political fronts – i.e. communism vs 
liberalism – but rested  on the more substantial d isagreement about the 
interpretation of the human condition in the contemporary age. For this 
reason, as Ortega w rote:  
 
La d ificultad  extrema de la actual “philosophical d iversity” para elaborar 
una sólida filosofía de la educación que oriente un importante 
“advancement of the education”, no parece que pueda, de manera fértil y 
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firme, ser tratada si no se hace antes un estud io a fondo de la situación 
humana en nuestro tiempo (OC, X: 391). 
  
Thus, the anthropological turn proposed  by Ortega in regard  to the 
educative problem concerns at the same time the life of the common 
citizens and  that of the intellectual. The second  of these figures is 
stud ied  in particular in the several conferences he gave in 1949-1951 on 
Goethe. In fact, to Ortega, the German thinker epitomises the 
intellectual anxiety for living an authentic life through a constant 
personal amelioration rend ered  possible by the help of culture. Goethe 
represents the importance of build ing one’s own life, abandoning a 
«concepción ornamental de la cultura» (VI 554) and  replacing it with  
the desire of realising a fruitful life through study, after having 
accepted  that this would  imply a withdrawal into one self. By focusing 
on the anthropological d rama that, accord ing to the Spanish 
philosopher, life always is, he set the bases for a new philosophical 
education that was thought as an antidote aganist existentialism
128
. 
Goethe is used  as an example of the new mission that the European 
culture had  to accomplish to resolve its inner crisis. As Ortega wrote:  
 
Aquí tienen ustedes la gran tarea goethiana en que, a mi juicio, comienza a 
entrar Europa: la construcción de una civilización que parta expresa y 
formalmente de las negatividades humanas, de sus inexorable limitaciones 
y en ellas se apoye para existir con plenitud  (VI 564). 
 
 This social mission of culture cannot but rest on a pedagogy aimed  
to the humanisation of the very cu lture purported  in a given time, 
since: «La auténtica y completa realid ad  de una idea aparece sólo 
cuand o está funzionand o, cuand o ejecuta la acción que ella, en verdad , 
es, cuand o cumple su misión en la existencia de un hombre» (X 22).  
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 «Algunos grupos de escritores europeos, menos numerosos que rumorosos, 
pretenden hoy retrotreaer al hombre a la nada y dejarlo en ella instalado. 
Mucho habría que hablar sobres este brote de inspiración mihilista que se llama 
a sí propio “existencialismo”. No es esta ocasión oportuna para entrar en ello. 
Unicamente d iré esto: no es la manera de combatir y superar ese nihilismo (que 
algunos – no yo – califican de pesimismo), apartar u tópica e ingenuamente la 
mirada de las limitaciones y negatividades humanas. A mi juicio, hay que 
proceder inversamente» (OC, VI: 560-561). On the conflictive relation between 
Ortega and  the existantialists see in particular Vela (1961) and  Abbagnano 
(1987: 170-175). 
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As a consequence, education is thought as ind ispensable for the 
society as a whole and , at the same time, for the ind ividual citizens 
insofar as their comprehension of the social world  has to be sustained  
by the comprehension of the civilisation under which they live in order 
to give sense to their lifes
129
. For this reason it would  be necessary to 
construct a new form of humanistic education, since: 
 
Éste es uno de los fenómenos más característicos de nuestro tiempo. 
Las gentes – insisto en que me refiero al continente – no sienten 
entusiasmo o, por lo menos, satisfactoria confianza en el régimen bajo 
el cual viven, pero, al mismo tiempo, no vislumbran en el horizonte 
ningún otro sistema de instituciones que les sea una luminosa 
promesa (X 452). 
 
As it is possible to argue from these considerations, Ortega’s 
pedagogical proposal during these years was basically aimed  to set the 
grounds for the practice of a liberal democracy at the global scale that 
refused  the risk of a hyper-democracy
130
, of what has been defined  as 
the democracy of the public (Manin , 2010). The relation he established 
between ind ividuals and  society, and  his reflection on the importance 
of education in promoting a responsible form of democracy , ultimately 
do converge in his attention towards rhetor ic as a political tools. 
Indeed , the Spanish philosopher frequently underlined  – and  he d id  so 
in his Swiss conference – the importance of rhetoric as the main cultural 
feature of the Greek civilisation, conceived  as the homeland  of 
democracy. By d oing so – and  by affirming the necessity of reforming 
the ideas of rationality, calling for the creation of an historical and  vital 
reason – Ortega tried  to enlarge the notion of rationality by includ ing 
also rhetoric in it, and  giving the proper importance to a -rational or 
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 «La clave del proceso consiste entonces en la educación de la opinión pública 
[…]. La educación racio-vitalista de la minoría selecta se convierte entonces en 
Ortega en educación para la ciudadanía, una invitación a asumir la 
responsabilidad  colectiva que es capaz de superar el ind ividualismo de 
intereses y de criterios personales». Á. Peris Suay, 2009. 
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 For this reason, and  for all the previous d iscussion on Ortega’s theory of 
education in comparison to the Francoist one, it seems absolutely wrong, as 
Subirats (1990: 55) does, to affirm that Ortega’s p hilosophy «es una filosofía 
moralmente sujeta a un principio de autoridad  y de obedencia que no se aparta 
en absoluto de los modelos educacionales de la España trad icionalista».  
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irrational arguments in the political debate
131
. In fact, he was aware of 
the fact that language and  rhetoric d id  play a vital role in the p olitical 
sphere, but that they were usually bad ly controlled  both by the general 
population and  by the ru ling class. For this reason, the reform of the 
humanities should  start by the restoration of language as the basic way 
to comprehend  the past of a civilisation and  project its future.  
During the last years of his philosophical activity Ortega aband oned  
the interest towards Spain that had  always characterised  his career, 
preferring to focus on what he perceived  as the new mission of the 
authentic intellectual: the build ing of a new Europ ean society and  
culture which would  overcome the national contrapositions that had  
ended  up in the second  world  war. In any case, in sp ite of his physical 
and  somehow intellectual d istance from Spain , Ortega d id  not 
completely d isappear from the cultural scenario of his homeland . 
 
 
 
10.4 The regime’s ost racism  
There are at least three significant instances which can reveal how 
Ortega still constitu ted  a reference point w ithin the Spanish intellectual 
debate, both in positive and  negative terms. The first of these instances 
is represented  by the initiative of some university professors  of the UC 
of Madrid  who, in 1951, decided  to write a petition in  favour of 
Ortega’s candid acy to the nobel prize for literature. Among the signers 
of this document, whose stimulus came from the Real Academia 
Española, there were the dean of the Facu lty of Letters and  Philosophy, 
Sánchez Cantón, and  other professors, in particular devoted  to the 
study and  teaching of Spanish literature
132
. This initiative had  been 
possible thanks to the fact that, as the very Franco gloomy recongised , 
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 This point of view is significantly in line with the more recent theorists of 
deliberative democracy. For instance, Chambers (2009) particularly emphasises 
the importance of passions and  rhetoric in the deliberative process, on this 
point see also Garsten, 2011. On the notion of rhetoric, conceived  in Aristotelian 
terms, as a constituent part of the deliberative process and at the same time as a 
cultivable ability see Francisco Arenas Dolz, 2013. Extremely interesting on this 
point is also the recent book by Nussbaum 2011. 
132
 For a complete list of the signers see: A la academia sueca. Comité del premio 
Nobel de literatura, in AOG, PB-403/ 4-1 (See Annex 8). 
 
356 
the regime d id  not have a d irect and  effective control over the Real 
Academia, contrary to the all the others cu ltural institutions of the 
country (Rodríguez Nuñez, 2014). The proposal, however, d id  not 
encounter the support of the Spanish cultural and  political authority, 
and  the iniciative, that had  already been proposed  in 1950 (Zamora 
Bonilla, 2002: 624), finally collapsed  and  d id  not produce any result 
(Morán, 1998: 272-273). The premature failure of this attempt was 
mainly due to the opposition of the Catholic sectors of the regime 
towards the philosophy and  the very figure of Ortega, who was 
considered  as a non-aligned  intellectual. Indeed , the propaganda 
against the Madrilenian philosopher had  reached  its climax soon after 
the beginning of the IH (for the reasons epxlained  in §9.3). Ortega 
represented  a very d ivisive figure as proved  by the in tense debate that 
took place over the significance of his theories between detractors and  
supporters of the philosopher.  
The main protagonists of this debate were on the one hand  the 
jesuits Joaquín Iriarte, José Sánchez Villaseñor and  Juan Ruiz Gironella 
and , on the other hand  Ortega’s d isciple Julián Marías. The first group 
identified  in the continuous attempt made by Ortega to influence the 
Spanish culture a significant danger for the basic Catholic principles at 
the basis of the national id eology. Joaquín Iriarte undoubted ly was the 
person who spent more efforts to d isqualify this activity of Ortega, for 
instance in his book, published  in 1949, entitled  La ruta mental de Ortega. 
Crítica de su filosofía. The main aim of the book was significantly that of 
destroying the philosopher rather than critically assessing his works, 
also with the purpose of d isqualifying the international appeal he had  
been obtaining during that period . Along this same line moved  also an 
important member of CSIC and  representative of the Opus Dei, Juan 
Sáiz Barberá, who, in 1950, published  Ortega y Gasset ante la crítica. El 
idealismo en El Espectador de Ortega y Gasset. During that period , Julian 
Marías seemed to be the only defender of his master in Spain, but his 
book Ortega y tres antípodas, published  in the same year of Barberá’s 
attack, was a unique and  marginalised  attempt to rescue the 
philosopher from such strong and  ideologically mind ed  criticisms. The 
defence of Marías, who tried to conciliate Ortega’s thinking with a form of 
Catholicism, contributed to partially distort the thought of his master and, 
moreover, to determine the birth of a sort of new Orteguian scholasticism. In 
fact, accord ing to Marías, it could  be possible to demonstrate «La 
fecundidad  concreta de la filosofía ortegu iana para comprender y 
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vivificar aspectos esenciales de la antropología cristiana, incluso en lo 
que tiene de m ás estrictamente religioso» (Marías, 1950: 182). In spite of 
its partiality, this new way of approaching the works of the 
Madrilenian philosopher undoubted ly permitted  to open a d ialogue – 
even if extremely limited  and  adulterated  – over the significance of his 
philosophical proposal. 
This process of creation of a sort of scholasticism within some 
sectors of the Spanish academia, w illing to includ e Ortega in the 
national and  catholic canon, can be rendered  patent by analysing the 
situation that emerged  during the immediately following years during 
the ‘50s. In this moment a new attitude toward s Ortega started  to 
spread  among the intellectual elite of the country. The interpretation of 
his philosophy began to be not as monolithic as before, and  within the 
established  scholars two d ifferent factions emerged: those belonging to 
the Opus Dei, strongly in contrast with the philosopher, and  some other 
more or less falangist intellectuals who, being Orteguian catholic, 
started  to defend  the thesis of a possible compatibility between 
Ortega’s ideas and  religion, find ing significant traces of a presence of 
spirituality and  religiosity in his philosophy
133
. A good  instance of this 
new tendency is offered  by the celebration for the 70
th
 birthday of 
Ortega y Gasset which took place in 1953 at the University of Madrid , 
marking his formal retirement.  
The date significantly coincided  with the promulgation of the 
decree by the Minister of Education Ruiz-Giménez
134
 which opened  up 
to the scholars of the ’36 the possibility of entering into the Academic 
system, if they had  not been engaged  in the previous republican 
government and  d id  not oppose to Franco’s regime. Tiny signs of 
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 Among them, in particular, Laín and  Aranguren. On the long d iatribe started 
during the 50s and  prolonged  at least until the 70s, about the real or false 
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revitalisation within the ed ucative system which ended  up by opening 
the way to a new generation of young historians who, in the decade 
1950-1960 significantly marked  a turning point in historiography 
during the d ictatorship
135
.  
In that occasion Ortega’s son, José, Julián Marías and  Paulino 
Garagorri organised  a course on the philosopher entitled  “The state of 
the question” which took place in Madrid  between March and  May 
1953. The group of professors and  intellectuals who gave their lessons 
on these circumstances affirmed , in the prospectus of the course, their 
dependence on the thought of Ortega y Gasset for developing an 
authentic philosophical meditation:  
 
Entre esas ideas nuevas y esos métodos aún no piestos en juego, una 
porción eminente procede de nuestro maestro común Ortega, que el 
próximo mes de mayo cumplirá, Deo volente, setenta años. A pesar de esta 
cifra, nosotros lo vemos como una promesa, como un pensador “de la 
segunda mitad  del siglo XX”. Queremos utilizarlo ávida y generosamente; 
si es posible, ir más allá de él: para un filósofo,ningún homenaje mejor que 
demonstrar – andando: con él y por caminos que ha señalado y tal vez no 
recorrd io – su  fecundidad
136
. 
 
Ortega’s reaction to this initiative was largely positive, in particular 
due to the unexpected  support he received  from some members of the 
official academic and  political system . However, this series of seminars 
and  lessons was observed  with suspicion by the more intransigent and  
orthodox sectors of the regime, as in the case of the review Arbor. In 
1953 Vicente Marrero Suárez published  a note upon the celebration 
carried  ou t in Madrid  in which he continued  to purport the theses of 
Iriarte and  the Jesuit group in order to d iscred it the works of the 
philosopher
137
. His criticisms against Ortega were so harsh and  violent 
that his note not only caused  the reaction of the Orteguian d isciples 
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who officially protested  with a letter d irected  to the Minister of 
Education, bu t also of other intellectuals. Indeed , the motivation and  
tone of that letter represented  the birth of the abovementioned  
orteguian scholasticism. In fact, as Marías wrote to his master , all those 
who had  taken part to the seminars reproached  the idea that Ortega 
could  have been labelled  as anti-Catholic, a statement which was 
concevied  as «una falsed ad  intolerable», in particular considering that 
«los d iscípulos de usted  somo en abrumad ora mayoría católicos a 
fondo»
138
. In other word s, to render the philosophy of Ortega apt to be 
included  into the outmoded  Spanish cultural debate, the strategy 
adopted  by his d iscip les was rendering it more attractive for the 
cultural establishment rather than for the younger generations. Thus, 
the real teaching of the philosopher, completely neglected  during the 
previous decade, now started  to be replaced  by a propagandist outlook , 
reducing his theory to a limited  set of basic stereotypical mottos
139
. 
 
 
10.5 A  con t inu ing con troversy : Ortega aft er Ortega  
After this enormous depuration, a debate started  over the possibility 
of includ ing Ortega within the canon of the accep ted  writers and  
intellectual figures of Spain; a debate which , in 1955, when Ortega d ied , 
seemed to involve also the new Minister of education Ruiz-Giménez. 
The 20
th
 of October 1955, two days after the death of Ortega, he 
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published  in El Sol and  El Magisterio Español the necrology of the 
philosopher, calling for a «tregua respectosa». However, de facto, in that 
occasion Ruiz-Giménez made at least three very important 
hermeneutical moves which seem to have significant political 
consequences: a) he sustained  the thesis of the personal political and  
religious errors of Ortega y Gasset; b) he underlined  the dependence of 
his overall thinking on National and  Christian premises, making him a 
prophet and  therefore an unwilling defender of the National-
Catholicism of Franco
140
; c) lastly, he traced  a continuity from Ortega’s 
teachings up to the catholic scholars and  academicians appointed  
during the regime
141
.  
Thus, it is possible to notice an explicit attempt, made by the 
established  culture, to include Ortega y Gasset among the most castizos 
authors
142
 of Spain, using him as a source of political legitimacy for the 
regime. But this position , hold  by Ruiz-Giménez, was neither common 
nor popular among nationalist intellectuals. Indeed , in the immediate 
months after Ortega’s death a violent campaign against him spread  in 
Spain through newspapers and  magazines: articles and  books 
appeared , some of them patently opposed  to the philosopher
143
, others 
on the contrary less ideologically influenced , but still unable to prod uce 
a critical and  reasoned  balance of the activity of Ortega y Gasset. 
On the contrary, an authentic interest toward s the works of the 
philosopher was manifested  by some students, in particu lar by the 
organisers of the Congreso Universitario de Escritores Jovenes in 1955. An 
entire generation of young students denounced  the absence imposed  
by the regime of this very important intellectual from the official 
educative system. In the occasion of the commemoration of his death at 
the UC a student of philosophy affirmed  that Ortega had  been , for his 
generation: «una figura un tanto fantasmal. Nunca supimos donde 
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estaba, y cuand o lo sabíamos podía estar ya en otro sitio»
144
. The 
students started  to manifest their d issension against the cultural politics 
of the regime that had  impeded  a fruitful conversation with a very 
symbolic figure, who represented  a largely unknown and  for this 
reason epic past of the Spanish academia. As Abellán (1979) recalled  in 
a short article, the funeral of Ortega gave to the students the 
opportunity to denounce the need  of reforming the university system. 
For this purpose, they identified  in Ortega a viable example of a path 
that had  to be followed  in order to reverse the trend  of cultura l 
stagnation and  oppression they had  been experiencing during the last 
15 years. The word s of these students are extremely significant: 
  
Somos d iscípulos sin maestro. Entre Ortega y Gasset y nosotros hay un 
espacio vacío o mal ocupado. Notamos cad a d ía que falta algo, que nos falta 
alguien. Nadie nos d ice qué es estud iar, cómo debemos estud iar, para qué 
estud iamos. Nadie nos d ice para qué vale la Universidad . Y estamos 
seguros ya de que vale para muy poco, y de que es necesario cambiarla 
mucho. Pero nad ie nos d ice cómo, nad ie defiende que nosotros somos la 
base de la Universidad  (Abellán, 1979: 59). 
 
Interestingly, Ortega’s death also constituted  the stimulus for the 
first patent opposition to Franco’ s regime , that significantly started  
within the University. The so-called  generation ’56, was made of young 
Spanish students and  intellectuals, manifested  its d isappointment in 
February 1956, by identifying in the person of Ortega y Gasset the 
master they cou ld  not have had  and  that, accord ing to them, might 
have contributed  to oppose liberal and  democratic values to the strong 
d ictatorship imposed  by the Generalísimo
145
. On February 10
th
, 1956, the 
government proclaimed  the State of the Exception in order to violently 
subdue the revolt that from the university had  rapid ly moved  to the 
street of Madrid . The fact that such revolt began within the University 
and  by referring to Ortega y Gasset is far from anecdotal or casual. On 
the contrary, it was evid ently motivated  by the attitude that the 
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Spanish philosopher had  always adopted  in relation to the social role of 
education, and  in particular of the University. This, as proved  in the 
course of this thesis, had  always represented  a political battlefield  of 
opposite fronts, a place in which d ifferent ideologies were built and  
frequently crashed  one against the other. After these episodes within 
the University, they will be created  the Asociacion Socialista Universitaria 
in 1956, the Union Democratica de Estudiantes, in 1957, then the Nueva 
Izquierda Universitaria, and  lastly the Frente de Liberacion Popular. More 
than expressions of a democratic or liberal tendency, the birth of all 
these movements proves how the relations between University and  
politics, in the Spanish case, represented  and  would  have continued  to 
represent the very essence of this institution.  
The protests of the students were not only violently repressed , but 
also countered  by the acad emic – and  political – establishment. This is 
the case of the monographic ed ition of Revista de Filosofía, published  at 
the beginning of 1957. In spite of the wish to present a critical, 
respectful evaluation and  an authentic d iscussion of the activities and  
writings of Ortega, the uncertain knowled ge of his own writings and  
speeches, due to the silences and  prejud ices spread  during the previous 
15-20 years, caused  very poor and  partial assessments of his works.  
From the end  of the ‘50s the strong anti-Ortegu ian campaign within 
Spanish culture d id  not come to an end , despite the fact that some 
tenuous signs of changes and  d ivisions within the regime relevantly 
continued  also in the immediate years after his d eath. A notable 
contribution to this campaign was made in particular by the publishing 
of the book of the Dominican Santiago Ramírez, in 1958, entitled  La 
filosofía de Ortega y Gasset in which the main theses of the Jesuits and  the 
official national catholic regime were reinforced  and  systematised , thus 
offering a sort of official guidebook to the main criticisms against the 
philosopher. As far as the philosophical research is concerned  – bu t a 
similar point cou ld  be raised  in regard  to the study of History – during 
the ‘50s and  the ’60, the main pillars of the Spanish academia still 
remained  the d iffusion and  defence of the Aristotelian and  in par ticular 
the scholastic trad ition which, during all those years, represented  the 
official philosophical orthod oxy, also thanks to its religious 
connotations. The book of Ramírez, as Bolado Ochoa writes (2011: 161): 
«es una aproximación inquisitorial a la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset, que 
busca calificarla desde el punto de vista de la pureza de la fe, según la 
teología y filosofía aristotélico-escolástica». In the following years 
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Ortega was largely treated  accord ing to two d ifferent points of view: 
either being subjected  to devastating criticisms to his general 
philosophical account, as far as it was seen as incompatible with the 
structure of the New Spanish society and  its religious system of value, 
or being simply neglected  and  left apart from the number of those who 
could  have been considered  as notable national intellectuals.  
An exception to the first of these ways of dealing with his thought is 
offered  by the book by José Luis Aranguren, La ética de Ortega (1966), 
which tried  to counter the very thesis of Ramírez by exhibiting the 
possibility of a peacefu l coexistence between Ortega’s philosophy and  
Christian principles. A similar attempt had  been previously made also 
by the historian José Antonio Maravall who, in 1959, published  Ortega 
en nuestra situación. Another very remarkable exception to the second  of 
the ways in which the Madrilenian  philosopher was generally treated  
was that purported  by his d isciples, among them Julian Marías and  
Francisco Romero, which contributed  to form part of what has been 
defined  as the Escuela de Madrid. They tended  to present a very 
d ifferent picture of the influence and  importance of Ortega within  the 
Spanish culture: for instance, Francisco Romero published  in 1960 a 
book entitled  Ortega y Gasset y el problema de la jefatura spiritual where he 
argued  that Ortega p layed  in Spain a fund amental role in determining 
its spiritual heritage. He defined  him as a jefe espiritual, defining this 
figure as «una función social, no una tarea que pueda ser cumplida en 
la soled ad» (Romero, 1960). But this, as the very important book of 
Marías published  in the same year, con stitu ted  a very marginal attempt 
to integrate their master w ithin Spanish culture. The beginning of the 
‘60s, however, marked  a new change in the way of dealing with Ortega, 
in particu lar thanks to a new generational turn over not within 
academia, but within other channels of cultural d iffusion that the 
regime found  increasingly d ifficult to control
146
. The years between 1955 
and  1960 were then characterised  by a vast increasing of the number 
and  quality of ed itors and  by a more vital intellectual scenario
147
, by a 
strong antifranquismo which however, from 1965
148
 onward , was 
powerfully contrasted  and  repressed  by the Tribunal de Orden Público. 
During the two decades comprised  between his death and  the one of 
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Francisco Franco, Ortega still continued  to be debated  by philosophers 
and  historians. 
This variegated  panorama offered  the possibility of a relevant 
innovation both in historical and  philosophical trend s. In regard  to this 
second  aspect, the significant importance of foreign philosophies such 
as structuralism and  Marxism, opened  a new rad ical phase of liberal 
and  heterodox intellectual activity in which the works of Ortega could  
have been reintegrated  not in the name of their pureness and  
trad itionalism, bu t in the name of their appeal to mod ernity
149
. The new 
Revista de Occidente, d irected  by Paulino Garagorri from 1963 to 1975, 
became the main vehicle of the renewed liberal approach to philosophy 
and , therefore, to Ortega’s heritage. Anyway, among the liberal 
intellectual circles, Ortega was surely respected  and  seen as an 
important source, but at the same time his texts were only very 
partially known, due to their limited  circulation. This partial 
knowledge characterised  this first new red iscovery of Ortega’s legacy, 
marked  by a tendency to d ismiss his own writings, in unwilling 
accord ance with the popular Jesu its’ theses. This fact, at the same time, 
implied  a wish of overcoming his own philosophy during the first part 
of the ‘80s, even if that was still not well understood . As Rodríguez 
Huéscar critically wrote d uring those years in regard  to the recent 
trends of his fellows scholars: «Para ser de verdad  heterodoxo, lo 
primero que hace falta es ser doxo, es decir, haber d igerido y asimilado 
la doctrina de la que se d isiente»
150
. 
To briefly summarise, from 1965 up to the end of Franco’s dictatorship, 
Ortega surely did not represent one of the main reference points of Spanish 
culture, being on the contrary largely condemned by the official propaganda. 
Nevertheless, among his direct or indirect disciples he continued to be vividly 
defended through an unceasing editorial effort. This strenuous defence was 
obviously marked  by a non-critical assessment of the works of the 
master and  by a large d ismissal of his own texts. It was in particu lar 
from the middle of the ’70s that the very group of Orteguian scholars 
called  for a cambio de marcha characterised  by a critical view on the 
author in the light of the most recent international development of 
philosophical trends. But, despite the incred ible efforts of this small 
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group of independent scholars, such as those previously mentioned  or 
other such as José Luis Abellán, until the democratic transition the 
works of Ortega d id  not find  the historical conditions to became part of 
the Spanish intellectual trad ition. Only in this completely renewed 
political scenario Ortega and  the so-called  “liberal trad ition”, which in 
reality had  to be invented  by the a recycled  self-proclaimed  democratic 
elite, benefited  of a new deal in the evolution of the Spanish academia. 
  
 
366 
 
 
 
367 
 
 
 
CON CLUSIONS 
 
1. The novelty in relation to the Orteguian studies 
 
The main aim of this research has been that of studying the relations 
between the philosophy d eveloped  by José Ortega y Gasset and  the 
teaching and  public activities he realised , considering them within the 
historical, social and  political contexts in which he lived , and  
throughout the course of his whole life. In doing this, the research has 
been cond ucted  by joining a theoretical analysis of his theorisations 
with a constant historical reconstruction of the material cond itions 
which rendered  them possible and  largely contribu ted  to influence 
them.  
An instance of the mutual influence between the broader realm of 
philosophical ideas and  the concrete situations in which they arise has 
been proven to be given, in the case of Ortega’s philosophy , by the 
development of two central topics of his reflection such as the notion of 
liberalism he elaborated  in d ifferent epochs of his life, and  the mutable 
role he attributed  to the intellectual as a social actor. Indeed , the vast 
scope of the research in relation to its chronological aspect has  implied  
the need  of studying the evolution of Ortega’s thought in completely 
d ifferent contexts. This is mainly due to the frequent changes that the 
Spanish academic and  political life underwent during this long period .  
It has been proved  that, in spite of these changes, Ortega d id  never 
completely d isappear from the Spanish intellectual debate, even when 
he was significantly marginalised  or criticised  by the orthodox 
establishment of the Franco’s regime. For this reason, the centrality of 
the author in relation to the Spanish intellectual world , both during and  
after his life, has permitted  to investigate through his figure the 
evolution of the Spanish academia d uring more than fifty years, 
comprehending its inner functioning and  its changing relations with 
the political power. Indeed , without any reasonable doubt, the research 
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has proved  that it would  be impossible to comprehend  the evolution of 
the Spanish philosophy and  academic teaching during the first half of 
the twentieth century without considering the role Ortega played  in it, 
in the same way in which, however, it would  be completely impossible 
to acquire a decent understand ing of the authentic meaning of the 
philosophy of the latter w ithout considering the context in which and  
for which he forged  his ideas. This has been proven both in relation to 
the initial period  of his intellectual career and , qu ite surprisingly, 
regard ing the last period  of his life, usually conceived  as a moment of 
substantial separation of the philosopher from the Spanish cu ltural 
debate.  
The research has contributed  to define the evolution of the concept 
of the intellectual in relation to Ortega’s life at two complementary 
levels: a microscopic and  a macroscopic one. Concernin g the first, it has 
been pointed  out how the concrete theorisations of the philosopher 
were d irectly interrelated  with the mutations within the Spanish 
academia, since his youth until his death. This particu lar context 
constituted  the basis of his meditations along the whole cour se of his 
life not only consciously influencing the aims of his research, but also 
and  more profound ly, by unconsciously determining its very scope. 
The evolution of the concept of liberalism in the course of his life, from 
a social to an authoritarian one, is a clear instance of this very forceful 
relation between the evolution of his philosophical ideas and  the 
context in which they sprang.  
Moreover, to a macroscopic level of the analysis, the thesis has 
demonstrated  that the case of Ortega y Gasset possesses a parad igmatic 
value as far as the analysis of the evolution of the role of the intellectual 
in the XX century is concerned . In fact he lived  in an epoch of transition 
in relation to the social function of the philosopher which permits to 
ind ividuate at least three evolutionary phases of the relation between 
intellectual and  society not only in the case of the Spanish history bu t, 
broad ly speaking, in relation to the evolution of the European society.  
In the first part of his life, until the beginning  of the thirties, he 
enjoyed  a very influential social status as a free thinker, a condition 
which would  have soon been countered  by the birth of the organic 
intellectual which constituted  the main characteristic of the new 
cultural establishment of Franco’s regime, in analogy with the common 
trend  of the European history during the course of the upheaval of the 
 
369 
 
totalitarian movements. At the same time, in particular from the ‘30s, 
he perceived , in line with the works of Julien Bend a, the progressive 
decline of the social prestige of the intellectual, due to the scientific and  
cultural crisis to which, during the last part of his life, he tried  to 
respond  by proposing a reform of the concept and  practice of the 
humanities as a way to counter this tendency wh ich d irectly affects our 
current situation.  
Moreover, this investigation has permitted  to counter two 
historiographical myths, one concerning the posture Ortega y Gasset 
maintained  during the ‘40s, and  the other related  to the reception he 
received  from some minority groups within the Franco’s establishment. 
Concerning the first aspect, it is possible to affirm that the self-
proclaimed  silence Ortega is deemed to have observed  during his exile 
does not constitute an historic reality. In fact, even if he d id  not 
explicitly comment the political decisions of the regime in all his 
writings of the period , it is possible to find  several critical references to 
the Spanish cu ltural scenario. Moreover, he can be said  to  have 
developed  all his philosophical ideas, concerning for instance his 
meditations on the nature of history or his sociological reflection, in 
strict relation to the academic debates that were taking place in Spain 
during the same period . His philosophy d id  undergo profound  
changes, at least in the election of the top ics and  in the ways in which 
he treated  them. Thus, all his writings can be considered  performative 
acts, always very critical, in the context of the changed  university and  
political context of the Spanish academia. 
Moreover, in relation to the reception he received  in Spain, the 
thesis has contributed  to demonstrate that the so-called  liberal 
falangism, in the measure in which it was related  to Ortega y Gasset, is 
another historiographic myth. In fact, more than to a sort of liberalism – 
a word  which appeared  to have no concrete meaning during this 
period  – the interest towards the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset among 
the supposed  members of this intellectual and  political movement was 
exclusively instrumental and  aimed  to conquer the cultural hegemony 
of the regime against other groups of interest and  power. This also 
permits to counter the id ea of the existence of a proper Escuela de 
Madrid, which would  have survived  to O rtega’s death during the ‘60s 
and  the ‘70s . Indeed , the only real instance of such a school, as proved  
in the first part of the thesis, seems to can legitimately be traced  back to 
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the beginning of the thirties, to the intellectual apogee of Ortega y 
Gasset and  the formative period  of the majority of the members of that 
supposed  school. 
If something as an Orteguian school can be ind ividuated  during the 
life of the regime the only possibility of identifying it is by the reference 
to a pecu liar form of scholasticism that significantly tried  to adapt 
Ortega to the needs of the new rhetoric of the regime. Substantially 
betraying the scope and  aim of Ortega’s philosophical and  ped agogical 
account. In fact, as the analysis of the realisation of the Institute of 
Humanities in comparison to the concurrent Spanish academic scenario 
has contributed  to prove, the meditation of Ortega on the role of the 
humanities and  the intellectuals in society d id  constitute an alternative 
educative project in relation to the one purported  by the regime. A 
proposal that d id  not find  the sufficient support within the cultural 
establishment, not only among the most trad itionalist groups, but also 
within the ones w hich are usually supposed  to have been more akin to 
the philosopher.  
Moreover, the entire investigation has contributed  to prove how 
Ortega always linked  his frequent educative theorisations with their 
concrete practices, and  that these always had  a twofold  political 
d imension. In other word s, he always conceived  the practicing of the 
intellectual role as the activity of an entire group interested  in 
influencing the social life by proposing and  imposing its normative 
view over other minorities and  over the general population through an 
educative –never propagandistic – process. This implied  the need  of 
joining the academic activity with a publicist and  ed itorial one, w ith the 
aim of acquiring a relevant role within the cultural as well as within the 
public debate.  
 
 
2. A  description of the main findings 
 
In relation to the single sections which compose the research it has 
to be noted  that each of them contributes to substantially ameliorate the 
comprehension of Ortega’s professorship in relation to its historical and  
social context. In particular, the first part of the thesis has proved  that 
the philosophy purported  by Ortega during the first years of his 
university teaching was very strictly related  to the ed ucative and  social 
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reforms he was trying to realise in the Spanish society. At the same 
time, this peculiar character of his philosophical experience was due 
both to the influences he received  during his stay in Germany, as often 
pointed  out by the scholarly literature, but also, and  probably to a 
larger extent, to the social and  political climate surrounding the 
University of Madrid  during his formative years. In other words, 
Ortega can be conceived  as a member of a very large intellectual 
community, a generation that was imposing itself against the 
trad itionalism of some sectors of the Spanish culture. The thesis has 
proved  that w ithout taking into account the constitutive struggle 
between trad ition and  modernisation which took place in side the 
University of Madrid  since the beginning of the XX century , and  lasted  
until the establishment of the Franco’s regime, it would  be impossible 
to comprehend  the historical forces which grounded  the philosophical 
meditation of Ortega y Gasset.  
This modernising movement, represented  by some educative 
institutions such as the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, initially 
determined  the d irections of Ortega’s intellectual activity and , during 
the following years, it would  have largely benefitted  from the 
theoretical and  practical contribution of the philosopher . In fact, during 
his apogee as a professor and  a public figure, between the ‘20s and  the 
‘30s, Ortega fully assumed his intellectual responsibility and  this 
brought him to d irectly intervene in the political arena. He d id  so 
through a series of ed itorial projects, via his teach ing and  political 
activity. All of these were informed by the princip les he was u sed  to 
teach within the University. In fact, he d id  not consider the academia as 
a place for build ing a neutral and  objective science, at least as far as  the 
humanities were concerned . On the contrary, he conceived  it as a social 
institution which should  have been  responsible for a political and  
historical change within the Spanish culture and  society. This rad ical 
change had  to be realised  through a rational reform rendered  possible 
by the educative process, which promoted  the political participation of 
every and  each ind ivid ual for the enhance of the ind ividual freedom. 
Indeed , the analysis of his proposal for  reforming the University that he 
presented  during these years has been proven to be substantially linked  
to the political struggles he fought during the same period , constituting 
an antidote to the growing depersonalization of the mass society and  a 
way to promote a liberal cu lture.  
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The second  part of the thesis has contributed  to show the way in 
which the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset significantly changed  both its 
scope and  its aims during his French exile which followed  the 
beginning of the Spanish civil war. In fact, in order to maintain his 
political and  intellectual influence in a period  in which the autonomy of 
the intellectual was rad ically put into question, he was ind irectly forced  
by the circumstance to adap t his philosophical d iscourse to the 
language spoken within the new academic scenario. This section has 
proven that these changes d id  not rad ically modified  the perception he 
had  of the role of the intellectual as a sort of critical spectator of the 
society and  the political power, never abd icating from his intellectual 
independence. On the same time, he tried  to be a reference point within 
the Spanish intellectual debate by observing a conciliatory attitude 
towards the political regime, aiming to regain his influential role  in his 
homeland .  
His book on translation has been proved  to represent the theoretical 
framework of the new strategic language that Ortega was ad opting to 
converse with the regime: a language made of allusions and  veiled  
critiques. This analysis has contributed  to prove tha t the myth of his 
silence during the period  of his exile does not correspond  to the 
historical reality. This constituted  part of a strategy he adopted  which, 
from a pragmatic point of view, has been proven to end  up in a 
complete failure. In fact, the substantive changes underwent by the 
Spanish academia and  educative system d id  not allow him to take part 
in the new cultural scenario, and  when he received  some attention by 
the new establishment, the instrumental use done by some members of 
the right movements d id  not correspond  to the political and  educative 
ideas presented  by Ortega both before and  during his exile. He was 
overtly criticised  and  misinterpreted , due to the fact that the historical 
and  institutional forces which ruled  the Spanish academia were 
significantly changing. This has permitted  to prove that also within a 
substantially hostile cultural atmosphere, Ortega tried  to maintain his 
independence and  freedom of speech . Even if he d id  not overtly 
criticise the regime, he tried  to contribute to enhance the intellectual 
d ialogue within it. Something he perceived  as a possible stimulus for 
the political and  social change.  
This project was condemned  to its marginalisation. In fact, as it has 
been proven in particular in the third  part of the thesis, the debate over 
 
373 
 
the normative function of the new university in the first period  of 
Franco’s regime gave birth to a completely new type of intellectual who 
was rad ically incompatible with the liberal outlook proposed  by 
Ortega: the organic intellectual. The humanities, and  in particular 
history, history of philosophy and  sociology, acquired  a growing 
relevance in the construction of this new cultural parad igm. In spite of 
the struggles within the University among d ifferent political and  
ideological elites competing for the cultural hegemony, very soon the 
Spanish academia acquired  an homogeneous outlook which impeded  
any form of au thentic d issension during the first half of the ‘40s. A 
more open, if limited , debate emerged  in particular by the end  of the 
second  World  War, due to the international accusations against the 
authoritarian trait of Franco’s regime. As proven in particu lar by the 
cases of the debates over the nature of the Roman Empire , conducted  in 
Revista de Estudios Políticos, and  in relation to the one which took form 
concerning the intellectual figure of Juan Luis Vives, not only Ortega 
tried  to d ialogue with the Spanish academia, trying to propose his 
normative ideal through the theorisation of a “new liberalism”, but he 
was also somehow corresponded  by some of its members. Thus, his 
isolation was at least partially mitigated  by the instrumental use made 
by some minorities within the regime which were trying to introduce 
some elements of modernisation within it, a timid  reform  which, 
however, never aimed  to subvert the political power. Ortega took 
advantage of this scenario to reinforce his contacts and  at the same time 
was used  as a political resource by these minority groups. All these 
circumstances, soon after the end  of the war, would  have rendered  
possible his return in Spain. 
Lastly, the fourth section of the thesis has demonstrated  that the 
first return in Spain of Ortega in 1945, more than constituting a real 
problem, turned  ou t to be a resource for the regime which, in 
propagandistic terms benefitted  from his presence in a time of 
international isolation. On the contrary, given the changed  
international scenario characterised  by the exacerbation of the cold  war 
and  the beginning of the process of international recognition of the 
Franco’s regime, the second  coming of the philosopher in Madrid  and  
the creation of the Institute of Humanities in 1948 was looked  askance 
by the l establishment. In fact, the creation of the Institute d id  coincide 
with a moment in which the polit ical confrontation among the d ifferent 
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souls of the regime had  reached  his climax and  the international 
scenario seemed to lead  to an imminent institutional reform , as proven 
by the concurrent debate between Calvo Serer and  Laín Entralgo.  
Thus, Ortega was again unwillingly converted  in a pretext by the 
components of a fragmented  regime for build ing a new cultural 
hegemony. However, he refused  to limit the scope of his cultural 
initiative exclusively to the Spanish scenario. Indeed , the Institute 
represented  the most ambitious project ever realised  by Ortega in 
relation to the progressive loss of relevance of the intellectual in the 
European society. In this new international scenario and  thanks to the 
creation of new international institu tions and  found ations devoted  to 
the promotion of the humanities, Ortega ind ividuated  useful 
collaborators which could  have helped  him to give back to the 
intellectual his prestigious role in the construction of the public 
opinion. Consequently, he also tried  to export the format of the 
Institute of Humanities abroad , even if he d id  not realise his ambitious 
projects. The significant attempt to answer to the crisis of the 
intellectual and  the humanistic education determined  also the fact that, 
during the last years of his life, Ortega chose to focus his meditations 
on the problem of the European Union, the most urgent question that 
the post-war society was facing and  in relation to which the intellectual 
could  have had  the possibility of reassuming a  guid ing role. 
During the last period  of his life, the new problems he was facing 
and  the substantial stagnation and  hostility which marked  the  Spanish 
intellectual scenario obliged  him to aband on any concrete plan of 
actively contribu ting to the academic debate in his country. Indeed , a 
strong contraposition between defenders and  d etractors of the 
philosopher contributed  to the creation of two opposing scholasticisms 
within the Spanish academia. A contraposition which, until the end  of 
the ‘70s, constituted  the major legacy of Ortega’s philosophy in Spain.  
 
 
3. An analysis of the main findings 
 
The chronological aspect of this thesis, and  consequently its d ivision 
in four main blocks following the life of Ortega y Gasset, does not 
constitute the only structural criterion which can be followed  to 
reconstruct the results obtained  through this investigation. In fact, it is 
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possible, and  probably more interesting, to notice that the whole 
research has been scrupulously cond ucted  accord ing to four main 
coord inates which have constituted  the trestle of each and  all of these 
sections: a) the theory of education of Ortega y Gasset; b) his life in 
relation to the evolution of the Spanish academia; c) the relation 
between academia and  society; d ) the role of the humanistic education 
in the definition of political ideas. In analysing the main find ings of this 
research, it can be useful to look in particular at least to two d ifferent 
aspects of this complex structure. In particu lar: I) the theory of 
education developed  by Ortega y Gasset during the course of his life; 
II) His role within the Spanish academia and  the evolution of the 
Spanish academic institution d uring the first half of the XX century, in 
relation to the social, political and  historical forces. By analysing these 
complementary aspects it is possible for each of them to deduce at least 
four interesting conclusions that this research has contributed  to 
demonstrate.  
 
I. Concerning the theory of education of Ortega y Gasset this thesis 
has proved  that  
a) in contrast to the majority of the stud ies on the author , that 
relegate his pedagogical concern to a second ary place or consider it as a 
preoccupation exclusively present during his youth, Ortega developed  
a constant meditation on the role of education in society during the 
whole course of his life and  intellectu al experience. In add ition, this 
pedagogical meditation has been proved  to have unceasingly enlivened  
his overall philosophical account which  cannot be adequately 
understood  without linking his theorisations with his concrete teaching 
activities.  
b) this educative concern was principally aimed , during his youth, 
to forge a better Spanish society, both from a spiritual and  material 
point of view, and , in the following years, to contribu te to the build ing 
of a European citizenship. The humanistic education has always been 
conceived  by the Spanish philosopher as the more effective instrument 
that should  have been used  to counter the depersonalisation of the 
masses and , consequently, to ameliorate the concrete lives of the 
citizens of a community and  of the civil society consid ered  as a whole. 
c) the philosophy developed  by Ortega y Gasset, that, at least since 
the beginning of the ‘20s, can be said  to consist in a philosophical 
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anthropology, was intrinsically linked  to his political meditations and  
precisely because of his pedagogical concern. In fact, he conceived  
education as a way through which all persons could  have reached  a 
complete fulfilment of their own humanity, through a liberal process of 
emancipation and  self-improvement. In order to realise this, he always 
tried  to translate his intellectual engagement in political projects, 
always trying to realise them through the help  of colleagues and  
politicians he perceived  as members of his own generation.  
d) Ortega’s theory of ed ucation cou ld  constitute a compelling 
reference point in relation to the role of the University in our current 
democratic society. In fact, in recent decades, it has been made an 
evident and  important detour in political theory and  social sciences 
towards the study of forms of empowered  democracies. Since the 
pioneering works of Carole Pateman  [1970; 2012] on the importance of 
fostering participation for contributing to a genuine democratisation of 
our societies, these theories have acquired  an outstand ing importance. 
In this context, as James Fishkin put it: «democracy is more meaningful 
if citizens are better informed and  more attentive to the issues they are 
voting on» [Fishkin 2002: 225]. However, several deliberative 
democrats often forget what the famous pedagogue John Dewey clearly 
and  powerfully wrote almost a century ago in his famous book entitled  
Democracy and Education [Dewey, 2004, 3]: «beings who are born not 
only unaware of, but quite ind ifferent to, the aims and  habits of the 
social group have to be rendered  cognizant of them and  actively 
interested . Education, and  education alone, spans the gap». In other 
words, citizens are required  to be able to understand  the problems at 
stake, to have adequate information about the society in which they 
live in order to act accord ing to democratic and  rational principles and  
not accord ing to authoritat ive and  instinctual ones. For this reason, in 
order to understand  a fact or a theory in its complexity it is necessary to 
possess some ind ispensable means, namely a system of knowledge and  
values –at least at a minimum threshold . This threshold  should  be 
regulated  in accord ance to what José Ortega y Gasset labelled  as the 
“principle of economy”. In fact, if this precond ition were not satisfied , 
then it would  be impossible to think about any sort of aware and  
conscious public op inion. The public sphere would  on the contrary be 
characterised  by superficiality and  “recentism”. As Ortega put it: «no 
vale hablar de ideas u  opiniones donde no se ad mite una instancia que 
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las regula, una serie de normas a que en la d iscusión cabe apelar. Estas 
normas son los principios de la cultura» [OC, IV: 417]. Thus, Ortega’s 
theory of education and  the role he assigned  to the University in the 
process of build ing a mature public opinion constitutes a still open 
invitation to question the current role of the University within society. 
 
II. As far as the roles of Ortega within the academia and  of the 
academia in relation to the Spanish society are concerned , the research 
has proved  that: 
a) The University of Madrid  represented , both d uring Ortega’s 
youth and  in the following years, the social background  for his 
philosophical activity which oriented  both the scope and  aims of his 
meditations during all his life. The particu lar context in which he lived  
since the beginning of the century was crucial in determining his 
concept of the role of the intellectual in politics and  also in rendering 
possible all the political and  educative projects he developed  during his 
life. The school of Madrid , which reached  its acme at the beginning of 
the thirties, constituted  the realisation of an ideal of educative reform  
that he continued  to long with nostalgia during his exile.  
b) At the same time this project of reform  d id  never find  a total 
consensus within the cultural elite of the country. Thus, the Spanish 
academia has always been substantially d ivided  between modernizers 
and  trad itionalists since the very beginning of the XX century. As a 
consequence, the institutional change represented  by the instauration 
of the Franco’s regime implied  the vind ication of a new  predominant 
role by those very trad itionalist groups that had  been previously 
marginalised  during the short period  of hegemonic governance of the 
liberal government. In other words, Ortega not only exercised  a 
political power during his academic career an d  had  a very prestigious 
social status during his period  as a professor, bu t he also acquired  a 
very significant symbolic status in the struggle within the academia 
that marked  the social, cu ltural and  political history of Spain since the 
democratic transition in the seventies. For this reason , his relation with 
the political debate within his country d id  not end  with his exile, since 
his philosophical and  educative preoccupation was always intrinsically 
linked  with that particular background . Also during the last and  more 
troublesome period  of his life he d id  not renounce to play his  notable 
intellectual role in society, and  even if he d id  not criticise d irectly the 
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regime, the Institute of Humanities he realised  can surely be defined  as 
his non-abdication to the duty of Parrhesia of the au thentic philosopher 
and  intellectual [Foucault, 1985]. 
c) The academia can be said  to have been one of the main political 
battlefield  of the Spanish history during the whole period  stud ied  in 
this research. It was conceived  as the main pillar in the affirmation of 
the political power since it w as considered  as the main institu tional 
contributor to the formation of the national ruling class. By ad opting 
the terms of Acemoglu  and  Robinson [2012], it is possible to 
provocatively affirm that it represented  an extractive cultural 
institution insofar as more than promoting a concr ete development of 
the nation, it contribu ted  to its political rad icalisation  and  limited  
development in comparison to the rest of Europe. In fact, both the 
limited  elite which composed  the academic world  and  the generalised  
extraction of cultural resources done by the University from the rest of 
society without any attention to the state of affairs they prod uced  
among other people and  in the long-run are clearly instances of its 
parad oxical extractive character. This is also proved  by the unceasing 
climate of violence that characterised  the life of the Spanish academia 
during the whole decad e of the thirties and  that not only continued  but 
also grew during the following two decades, in a climate of political 
control and  oppression. In fact, during the period  of Franco’s 
dictatorship, the separation between a limited  and  oligarchic ruling 
class and  the vast part of the citizens grew enormously.  
d ) This also implied  that during all the d ifferent political regimes 
the intellectuals, in the Spanish case, also played  a very relevant role in 
the construction of the main ideological bases of those very regimes 
and  in their propagation through cu ltural review. For this reason, it is 
possible to provocatively affirm that all the d ifferent regimes which 
characterised  the Spanish history during the XX century had  their 
organic intellectuals. Moreover, it  is also possible to notice the existence 
of a perennial struggle between at least two hegemonic projects that 
always competed  one against the other: the liberal versus the 
trad itionalist one, the falangist versus the national.-catholic, and  so on. 
In add ition, it has been proven that the relation with the international 
context was always marked  by a substant ial subord ination of Spain to 
the rest of the continent, and  that this aspect contributed  to determine  
the provisional victories and  defeats of the opp osing fronts. Thus, the 
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whole research has contributed  to demonstrate that the very concept of 
humanistic education, at least in the Spanish case, has always been 
intrinsically linked  to the d ifferent political regimes that promoted  a 
particu lar idea of cu lture with a very clear hegemonic purpose.  
 
 
4. Final remarks  
This study of the philosophy and  teachings of Ortega y Gasset in 
their historical and  social contexts has shown that the ideas cannot be 
conceived  as independent entities w ithout any relation to the concrete 
circumstances in which they spring. Moreover, they have always to be 
considered  as a product of a precise epoch. This does not simply me an 
that the contexts contribu te to shape the texts or are ind ispensable to 
comprehend  them. 
Far more than this, the present research has proved  that the context 
– in this case the University of Madrid  and  its social and  political 
characteristics – constitutes the necessary condition which renders 
possible the very existence of a text, of a theory. This statement d oes 
not imply any sort of historical determinism. On the contrary, the 
context has been proven to be a basic structure which orients the 
development of philosophical ideas which can be elaborated  in a 
largely unpred ictable way, but always within a given range. Put it 
d ifferently, the context constitutes the language whereas the ideas the 
speeches elaborated  starting from that language.  
The present thesis has taken into account both the common 
language that characterised  the University of Madrid  – via an in-depth 
analysis of its communities of d iscourse in d ifferent times – and  of the 
ind ividual and  relevant speeches. In particular, but not exclusively, the 
ones of Ortega y Gasset. This twofold  analysis has revealed  that the 
banality of the evil, contrary to what Nancy seems to purport in the 
case of Heidegger [2016], d id  not entirely affected  the intellectual 
activity of Ortega y Gasset.  
Indeed , his lucid  focus on the role of the intellectual in society, also 
during the years of his exile and  of the regime of Francisco Franco in 
Spain, represented  the strategy he adopted  to take part in the Spanish 
cultural debate. He chose to criticise without destroying the basis of the 
new political power, w ith the purpose of orienting its normative ideal 
and  reforming it from inside, as it has been proven by analysing his 
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courses on history and  sociology at the Institute of Humanities. If this 
attitude towards the political power has to be praised  or blamed is 
something that probably d epends solely on the peculiar sensibility of 
each interpreter.  
On the contrary, what this thesis has surely revealed  is that in the 
course of his whole life Ortega never betrayed  the two main p illars of 
his philosophical and  educative outlook. Probably, more than labelling 
this general framework with the classical term “liberalism”, it could  be 
more appropriate to coin a d ifferent and  more neutral expression  by 
adapting a term used  in the field  of biology: i.e. “capabilitism”. In other 
words, Ortega never renounced  to two basic convict ions accord ing to 
which 1) the starting point and  the end  of all philosophical and  political 
project are the single ind ividuals and  2) the duty of a philosophy, and  
consequently of an intellectual, would  be that of promoting a constant 
amelioration of the potentialities and  capabilities that each one 
possesses. Pu t it d ifferently, the intellectual should  be the promoter of a 
constant qualitative progress of a society through the enhancement of 
the ind ividual fu lfilment. If these conditions were realised , the 
intellectual would  ultimately be d ispensable, since every ind ividual 
would  have converted  himself in an intellectual.  
On the one hand , in our current Western societies it is likely to be 
the case that, as Ortega pred icted , the intellectual has irredeemably lost 
both the social status and  the political power he was used  to exercise. 
However, the basic social mission he has to accomplish still appears as 
essential in order to guarantee that the freedom of a liberal dem ocracy 
would  not end  up in the anarchy of an hyper -democracy. Who and  
how should  be responsible for playing this role and  what would  be the 
role of the University still represents an open and  urgent question for  
our current society.  
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